Chapter 7 Chapter 6 From rendezvous to separation
After the Huili meeting, the Central Red Army carried out its plan to establish a base in western Sichuan or northwestern Sichuan, and continued northward along the road leading to Xichang. On May 19, the column of the Central Military Commission arrived at a place called Tiekeng near Lizhou, tens of miles north of Xichang City.In this place, Zhang Wentian presided over a central meeting to discuss the marching route.In view of the fact that Xichang was firmly defended by the enemy, the meeting decided to abandon the original plan to besiege Xichang, and instead took the route of Mianning, crossed the Yi nationality area, crossed the Dadu River at Anshunchang, entered northwest Sichuan, and joined the Red Fourth Army.
After the meeting that day, the Central Military Commission column entered Lizhou.Zhang Wentian made a report to the cadres of the Ninth Red Army Corps at the Lizhou Catholic Church.In recognition of the Red Ninth Army's successful completion of the task assigned by the Military Commission of the "Mobile Detachment", it has written a glorious page in the history of the Red Army.He conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi meeting, and also conveyed the new decision on the course of action of the just-convened central meeting, calling on the whole army to realize it.
On this day, according to the decision made by the Huili meeting, the advance team of the Central Red Army was established to open the way for the whole army to go north.
After the advance team entered the Yi area of Daliang Mountain, Commander Liu Bocheng and the leader of the Guji tribe, Xiaoyedan, formed a blood alliance and became brothers.With the help of Yi compatriots, the Red Army troops safely passed through the Yi area and arrived at the Anshunchang Ferry by the Dadu River.
When Chiang Kai-shek learned that the Red Army had reached the banks of the Dadu River, he immediately ordered the Kuomintang troops to step up their defenses in the area north of the Dadu River, and called various generals to order: "The Dadu River is the place where Shi Dakai's army was destroyed in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom." .Chiang Kai-shek's delusion made the Red Army the "Second Shi Dakai".The heroic Red Army did not repeat the same mistakes.
On May 25, the advance team Red First Regiment selected 17 warriors to form a courageous team and successfully crossed the Dadu River, and the Red First Regiment crossed the river one after another.But the boat sailed very slowly.When Mao Zedong saw this scene at the ferry, he immediately held a small meeting and decided to quickly seize the Luding Bridge. On May 26, the Red Army marched upstream along the east and west banks of the Dadu River.The Red Fourth Regiment, the vanguard marching north along the west bank, ran 240 miles a day on the 28th, arrived at Luding Bridge at 6:00 am on the 29th, and quickly occupied the west bridgehead.Organized a commando team of 22 people, launched a charge at 4 pm, braved the enemy's intensive firepower, climbed on the suspended iron chains, laid planks on the iron chains, crawled and shot forward, and rushed to the opposite bank.In this way, the Red Army crossed the river from Anshunchang and Luding Bridge, and all reached the opposite bank on the 30th.
On May 31, Zhang Wentian followed the column of the Central Military Commission and crossed the river on the chain bridge to Luding County.Here, he presided over the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the situation and tasks of the Red Army after crossing the Dadu River.The meeting decided that the Red Army would go northward along the snow-capped mountains and avoid densely populated areas.According to "Zhu De Chronicle", People's Publishing House, 1986 edition, p. 141.The meeting also decided to send Chen Yun to Shanghai to restore the party's underground organization.
On the way to Ya'an, the Red Army troops learned that there were Sichuan troops guarding the high ground in Hanyuan, waiting for the Red Army condescendingly.So I decided to change direction and turn northeast to the Tianquan River.With this change, the Red Army's marching route was changed from the avenue to the mountain path, and it was the first time to climb over the snow-covered mountains all year round.
On June 2, the central column was stationed at Hualinping, an altitude of more than 4,000 meters.In the afternoon of the same day, a meeting of cadres above the squad leader of the central column was held, and Zhang Wentian made a report, talking about the victory of crossing the Dadu River and the current situation and tasks.We spent the night there that day, and it snowed heavily.
Subsequently, the Red Army went north to the Tianquan River and defeated the 6 brigades of Yang Sen's department defending the enemy. On June 7th, Tianquan was occupied, and on the 8th, Lushan was occupied.Continue to move forward and climb Jiajin Mountain, which is covered with snow all the year round, has no human habitation and no roads.
At this time, the Red Front Army was not far from the vanguard of the Red Fourth Front Army. On June 11, the 20th issue of the "Red Star" newspaper published an article "Let's Join the Fourth Front Army", saying, "We will be able to shake hands with the Fourth Front Army in the shortest possible time. The meeting of the two front armies will make our Combat strength has been strengthened", "We must strive for the rapid realization of this great task no matter what."
At noon on June 12, the Red First Army's second division and fourth regiment, the vanguard of the Red First Army, joined forces with the Red Fourth Front Army's advance regiment, the Twenty-fifth Division and the Seventy-fourth Regiment of the Ninth Army's advance regiment between Jiajinshan and Dawei.The next day, the General Headquarters of the Field Army issued a good news: Our Fourth Front Army "No. 8 Zhan Maogong, marched south to the north of Jiajin Mountain on the 12th yesterday, and joined the advance corps of our Field Army."The meeting of the two front armies marked the decision of the Zunyi Conference that the Central Red Army go north to "cross the Yangtze River and directly cooperate with the Red Fourth Front Army." The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the Red Fourth Front Army on February 16, 1935.The policy was finally realized. On June 15, the "Red Star" newspaper published an editorial "The Great Rendezvous". On the 16th, Zhu, Mao, Zhou, and Luo sent telegrams to Zhang (Guotao), Xu (Qianqian), and Chen (Changhao) to celebrate the meeting of the two main forces.The order of the telegram signature is the original.This is the case for the telegrams quoted below in this book.According to the traditional Chinese custom, when two or more people sign a letter or telegram, the drafter usually signs after. On the 18th, Luo, Mao, Zhou, Zhu and others met with Li Xiannian.Li served as the political commissar of the Thirty Red Army at that time, and led the vanguard of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army to capture Maogong.
1. After the Fourth Front Army successfully joined forces in the Maogong area, the issue of strategic policy was brought up sharply again.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek's direct line Xue Yue and other troops chased after the Red Army and occupied the area south of Jiajin Mountain.Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc. knew that the south was heavily guarded by the enemy, and it was impossible to go south.The enemy has assembled 130 regiments in the east, and it is no longer possible to cross the Minjiang River eastward and take Chengdu.To the west is the vast grassland, and it is an ethnic minority area, and the conditions are even worse.Only to the north, go north to Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu, where the population is dense and the economy is better, which is convenient for the Red Army to expand and develop.Therefore, the policy determined by the Party Central Committee is to go northward to establish base areas in northwestern Sichuan, and then occupy Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu.Zhang Guotao proposed: go west to Xikang, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, and go to the "regional development" of "economically backward and culturally backward", or go south, "take Chengdu directly, go out of the Yangtze River, and go to Wuhan."There are serious differences between the two approaches.Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc. exchanged telegrams, discussed with Zhang Guotao, and exchanged views patiently, hoping that he would change his mind.
At 2 o'clock in the morning on June 16, Zhu, Mao, Zhou, and Luo jointly called Zhang, Xu, and Chen. Zhang Guotao sent two telegrams on June 2 and June 12 to ask the central government to "fly instructions on the general policy for future actions." "The plan for the two armies' actions in the future," he replied, stating: "In the future, the general policy of our first and fourth front armies should be to occupy the three provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan, establish a Soviet regime in the three provinces, and occupy Xinjiang with an expeditionary force at an appropriate time." He also proposed to resolutely break the enemy's new large-scale offensive at present, "to develop between the Min and Jia rivers", "resolutely consolidate Maoxian, Beichuan, and Weizhou in my hands, and defeat Hu Zongnan's southward advance is the hub of this plan." .Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, etc. disagreed with Zhang Guotao's westward policy, and clearly pointed out: "The area centered on Maogong stretches for more than a thousand miles. It is deep in mountains and valleys, sparsely populated, and difficult to provide for. The situation on both sides of the Dadu River to the vicinity of Mount Emei is similar. As for The situation in Xikang is even worse. If the enemy blocks the upper reaches of the Minjiang River (the enemy is carrying out this plan), it will be extremely difficult to move north. Therefore, in the Qionglai Mountains area, only small troops can be used for activities, and the main force does not seem to be a good strategy.” Zhang Guotao completely ignored the opinions of the Central Committee. , adhere to his westward or southward policy.
At 21:00 on the evening of June 18, Luo, Zhou, Zhu, and Mao jointly sent an urgent telegram to Zhang Guotao and others to reply to Zhang Guotao's call back on the 17th.In response to his erroneous claims, he pointed out: "In the current situation, we must concentrate our firepower to break through Pingwu first, thinking that it will be the hub to move north." That is to say, make up your mind to go north. At 4 o'clock in the morning on June 20, Luo, Zhu, Mao, and Zhou jointly called Zhang Guotao again to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the three policies of moving northward, moving westward, and southwestern Sichuan. Immediately come to Maogong to discuss everything.”
At this time, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc. were all making contributions.They set off from Xinzhai in the early morning of June 17, crossed Jiajin Mountain, and camped in Dawei in the afternoon. In the early morning of the 18th, we departed from Dawei again and arrived in Maogong in the afternoon.The Red Fourth Front Army is headquartered in Zagunao Town, Lifan County (now the county seat of Li County).Zhang Guotao is in Mao County.In order to resolve differences of opinion and unify thinking, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to hold a meeting in Lianghekou to discuss the strategic policy after the reunion of the first and fourth front armies.
Zhang Wentian arrived in Lianghekou on June 23 and lived in a local Guandi Temple.In order to unify the understanding and make this meeting a success, he wrote here on June 24, "Seize Songpan, Redify Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu!" "The article was immediately published in the first issue of "Forward News" (mimeograph) published that day.On the 25th, the Political Department of the First Army reproduced it and distributed it to cadres for study.
Zhang Wentian analyzed the significance of the great victory of the rendezvous of the first and fourth front armies: "The two main forces that used to operate separately on the two fronts are now completely under the unified command of the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission", "caused the realization of our victory in Sichuan. The possibility of establishing a new Soviet base area in Shanxi-Gansu." At the same time, he pointed out that the terrain of Song (Pan), Li (Fan), Mao (Gong) and other counties where the two front armies are located is not conducive to combat, and material supplies are very difficult. And the enemy is using all its strength to "blockade" us in this area, and then gradually oppress the Xikang and Qinghai grassland areas, so "staying here for a long time" or "going west" to Qing and Kang is in line with Chiang Kai-shek's blockade policy, " It is extremely unfavorable to the Red Army", thus negating Zhang Guotao's erroneous claim.
Then, how can the "possibility" of the establishment of Soviet base areas in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu, created by the meeting of the two main forces, become a reality?Zhang Wentian believes that the strategic direction should be to "advance northward", and the key campaign task is to "capture Songpan".He pointed out: "We must now concentrate all our forces, first break through the enemy's northern line of defense, and transfer the main force of the Red Army into the vast area of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu to seek to wipe out the enemy in large numbers in mobile warfare. Therefore, seize Songpan and control the area north of Songpan At present, the elimination of Hu Zongnan's troops has become the most important key for the entire field army and the Fourth Front Army to establish the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu New Soviet Area, and it is also an urgent task for our Red Army at present."
Zhang Wentian's article also discussed the strategic significance of striving for "decisive victory" and the strategic and tactical principles of "mobile warfare" in the process of establishing the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area.He wrote: "We are still in the period of transition from guerrilla warfare without a rear to mobile warfare with a rear. The key to the transition depends entirely on victory in the decisive battle. Only by winning the decisive battle can we establish new Soviet base areas. "The three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu are a very large area. After acquiring Songpan, we may first acquire parts of southeast Gansu or northern Sichuan. Which area in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu to start establishing a base area depends on the enemy's situation at that time, and the Our victories against the enemy depend on the magnitude of our victories. In order to seek mobile warfare to destroy the enemy, the main force of the Red Army often cannot stay in areas that have begun to redden, but needs to transfer areas. But the purpose of this transfer is to seek operations. Establish a base area, and the scope of transfer is also within the scope of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu." Zhang Wentian also criticized Zhang Guotao's erroneous claims, without naming names, and criticized the "fleeist tendency" of "avoiding war".He said: "If under the current circumstances, we still take reaching a certain area as the center of our actions, in fact, we want to avoid war, give up the task of establishing new Soviet base areas, and turn into endless escape." He proposed : "We must fight resolutely against this tendency toward escapism."
Zhang Wentian's "Seize Songpan, Redify Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu!" "This article made important ideological preparations for the Lianghekou Conference to decide on the strategic policy of going north.In the history of the Red Army's Long March, this is the earliest document that systematically expounds the strategic policy of going north to establish the Sichuan-Shanxi-Gansu Base Area, and explicitly criticizes Zhang Guotao's right-leaning escapeism.
It was already the afternoon of June 25 when Zhang Guotao arrived at Lianghekou from Mao County via Wenchuan and Lifan.Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and other dozens of people walked out of their residences to welcome them, and held a meeting of the Red First and Fourth Front Armies.Mao Zedong delivered a welcome speech, and Zhang Guotao delivered a reply speech. The atmosphere was warm and joyful.
On June 26, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was held in a lamasery in Lianghekou, focusing on discussing the current strategic policy.The attendees of this meeting, listed in the minutes of the meeting (the names in brackets are added by the citation of this book): Zhu (De), Zhou (Enlai), Liu (Bocheng), Wang (Jiaxiang), Luo (Fu , Zhang Wentian), Bo (Gu, Qin Bangxian), Shaoqi, Kaifeng, Deng (Fa), Lin (Biao), Peng (Dehuai), Nie (Rongzhen), Guotao, Boqu, Fuchun.The meeting was chaired by Zhang Wentian, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee.At the meeting, Zhou Enlai made a report on the current strategic policy, expounding the reasons why it is necessary to go north to Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu to establish base areas, and proposed that in order to quickly attack the southern part of Hu Zong in Songpan, the two front armies should be under unified command.The participants all agreed with the policy of going north, and Zhang Guotao also agreed in his speech.
Zhang Wentian spoke before Zhou Enlai made his conclusion.Zhang Wentian has a democratic style of work. After he presided over the work of the Party Central Committee, he changed the previous general secretary's personal arbitrary style.When a Politburo meeting discusses a certain agenda, usually the Politburo Standing Committee member or Politburo member in charge of this work will make a "report" and a final "conclusion." Zhang Wentian, the general secretary who presides over the meeting, often Speaking before making conclusions, this kind of speech naturally has a concluding nature.This is what he said at the Lianghekou Conference.
Zhang Wentian first summed up everyone's opinions, emphatically pointing out: "Everyone agrees on the strategic policy of going north, and it should be realized in unison. This strategic policy is progressive and the only correct one." At the same time, he unequivocally denied the "Westward" policy: " Another policy can occur, prepare the grassland and guard the opening, which is retreating and not applicable." Then, he pointed out the issue of the current campaign deployment: "To realize this strategic policy, we must first attack or control Songpan. "Zhang Wentian emphasized that "the only way to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area is to rely on victory in decisive battles" and "now I should do my best to overcome difficulties."He once again criticized the tendency to retreat and flee, and flatly pointed out that "it is wrong to abandon this (going north) policy."Zhang Wentian also particularly emphasized that the two front armies "should be unified" in organization.At the same time, it is explained that the adjustment of personnel can be discussed in detail.
The plenary meeting approved the strategic policy proposed in Zhou Enlai's report and entrusted Zhang Wentian to write a decision. On June 28, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee issued the "Decision on the Strategic Policy after the First and Fourth Front Army Convergence" written by Zhang Wentian.He pointed out: "After the first and fourth front armies meet, our strategic policy is to concentrate our main force to attack north, destroy a large number of enemies in mobile warfare, and first obtain southern Gansu to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet base area." "In order to realize this strategic policy In the battle, we must first concentrate the main force to eliminate and attack Hu Zongnan’s army, seize Songpan and control the area north of Songpan, so that the main force can advance to Gannan victoriously.” And clearly pointed out: “In order to realize this strategic policy, we must resolutely oppose and avoid war The tendency to retreat and flee, and the conservative tendency to settle down, these right opportunist vacillations, are the main dangers in the present struggle to create a new soviet area."
At the same time, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission made a campaign deployment to attack Songpan.If it weren't for Zhang Guotao's delay, avoidance of war, and opposition to the right-leaning separatist activities of the central government, the goal of the Lianghekou meeting to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area could have been achieved.
At the end of June 1935, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and others led the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission to leave Lianghekou.Since then, they have climbed Mengbi Mountain and other snow-capped mountains continuously, and arrived at Shangluhua in Heishui County on July 10.Here, while patiently waiting for Zhang Guotao to implement the resolution of the Lianghekou meeting and launch the attack on Songpan, he raised food and prepared to go north to win the battle.From the commander-in-chief, down to the cooks and breeders, everyone works together.General Secretary Zhang Wentian and Xu Teli and Lin Boqu, who are in their fifties and sixties, also participated in harvesting, threshing, and frying wheat.During the break, Zhang Wentian chatted with cadres and soldiers.The Red Army on the one hand is all from Jiangxi and Fujian, and they are not used to eating pasta, nor can they cook it.Based on his own experience, he intentionally talked about the eating habits of all countries in the world, what about the Soviets, Americans, and Japanese. He said: Seventy percent of the people in the world eat noodles, but only three percent eat noodles. Ten people eat rice, and we "go north" to the place where we eat pasta, but the minority must obey the majority.Everyone laughed.
At the Lianghekou meeting, although Zhang Guotao apparently agreed to go north and agreed to fight Songpan, in fact he was still afraid of the enemy and wanted to avoid the main force of the enemy, so he moved westward to Sichuan and Kangbian.After the Lianghekou meeting, Maoluo discussed and the Standing Committee decided to appoint Zhang Guotao as the vice chairman of the Military Commission.But Zhang Guotao's desire for power was not satisfied.Within a few days, he violated the decision of the Lianghekou meeting, caused disturbances, and even threatened the central government.
On June 29, Zhang Guotao called the Central Committee, emphasizing the difficulty of attacking Songpan, and asked the first army to go to Aba, and the main force of the Fourth Front Army went west and south.
On July 1, Zhang Guotao also used the excuse that in order to quickly drive the main force to the northeast of Maoergai and wipe out the southern part of Hu Zong, he proposed that "our army should quickly solve the organizational problem of unified command", deliberately delaying the movement of the main force of the Fourth Front Army going north.Then, Zhang Guotao expressed to Li Fuchun that he was very concerned about the "unified organization issue" and put forward requests such as "enriching the general headquarters".
On July 8, Zhang Guotao convened a meeting of senior cadres of the Fourth Front Army in Zagunao, seized the publication of Kai Feng's "Lenin on the Federation" in the "Forward News" to criticize Zhang Guotao's announcement of the establishment of the "Northwest Soviet Federal Government" at the end of May, and attacked The Central Committee provoked the relationship between the First and Fourth Front Armies and carried out factional activities against the Party Central Committee and undermining the unity of the Red Army.
Under the instigation of Zhang Guotao, on July 8, the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China called the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, saying that the "Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic" established by Zhang Guotao was "correct in theory and organization." "Forward News" The article on the website is incorrect in its criticism of the federal government. On July 9, the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to the Central Committee to strengthen the General Command, with Chen Changhao serving as the General Political Committee and other positions; ". On July 10, Zhang Guotao was impatient, and proposed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that "our army should quickly solve the organizational problem of unified command." right.As for the "Songpan Battle Plan", it was delayed as much as possible and would not be implemented.
Why is Zhang Guotao so blatant and ambitious?The important reason is that he relies on his strong military strength and senior qualifications.He is a representative of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China and one of the three members of the Central Bureau, the central leading body elected by the National Congress of the Communist Party of China.At that time, the Red Fourth Front Army had more than 80,000 soldiers, and the Red Front Army had only more than 10,000 people, and it was a tired army that had gone through an expedition.Zhang Guotao looked at the revolutionary army completely with warlordism, and he wanted to command the party with a gun.
The central government criticized Zhang Guotao's mistake of delaying the northward flight, and urged him to "really be able to quickly adjust and advance quickly, and don't delay to let the enemy take the lead." command.
At the same time, in order to unite Zhang Guotao, the Central Committee still compromises and considers his request on "organizational issues" as much as possible.Zhang Wentian discussed repeatedly with Mao Zedong on the personnel arrangement of the central government.Starting from the overall situation of uniting the north, Zhang Wentian voluntarily expressed his willingness to relinquish his position as general secretary of the Party Central Committee.Mao Zedong disagreed.After discussion, Zhou Enlai gave him the position of general political commissar.Liu Ying, who was the secretary-general of the central team at the time, recalled and narrated the situation of Mauro's negotiations:
Chairman Mao said: "Zhang Guotao is a powerful faction. He has ambitions. I don't think I can give him a suitable position. It is difficult for the First and Fourth Front Armies to be united." Chairman Mao analyzed that Zhang Guotao wanted to be the chairman of the Military Commission. Commander-in-Chief Zhu is in charge, and he cannot replace him.But he is not reconciled to being only the vice-chairman, on an equal footing with Enlai and Jiaxiang.Wen Tian said to Chairman Mao: "Let him be the general secretary." Chairman Mao said: "No. He wants to seize military power. If you make him general secretary, he may not be satisfied, but let him sit. It’s troublesome to take this throne.” After thinking about it, Chairman Mao said: “Let him be the chief political commissar.” Chairman Mao meant to consider his request as much as possible, but he couldn’t let him capture all the military power.Discussing with Enlai, who is the general political commissar, Enlai didn't care about his personal status at all. He felt that this arrangement was good and agreed.
On July 18, an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was held in Luhua (now Heishui County, Sichuan Province) to discuss "organizational issues."For the attendees of this meeting, only "Zhu, Mao, Zhou, Luo, Wang, and Bo" are recorded under the item "Attendance" in the records. The speakers in the records also include: Zhang Guotao, Deng Fa, Xu Xiangqian, and Kaifeng.It is uncertain whether Chen Changhao will participate.The following description of the meeting and the content of Zhang Wentian's speech are all based on the meeting minutes.
Zhang Wentian presided over the meeting. He first put forward his opinions on personnel arrangements: "The Military Commission has a commander-in-chief, Comrade Guo Tao is the chief political commissar, and the chief person in charge of the Military Commission. There are small military commissions (members of the Military Commission Standing Committee) under the Military Commission. In the past, there were four people, but now there are more. Comrade Guotao was the main person in charge. Comrade Enlai was transferred to work in the Standing Committee of the Central Committee, but before Comrade Guotao was familiar with it, Enlai temporarily helped him. This is the division of labor of the Military Commission. About the General Political Department Director Jiaxiang is actually Bogu due to illness, and Bogu is now decided to be the director.”
During the discussion, Zhang Guotao emphasized the need to promote new cadres and proposed to add members to the Central Committee.Mao Zedong said: It is necessary to promote cadres, but it is not necessary for so many people to be concentrated in the central government, and people are also needed at the lower levels.Zhang Guotao had to give up temporarily.
Zhang Wentian finally concluded that everyone agrees, which is very good.Now the main task is to concentrate on fighting this battle well.And announced the decision: Zhang Guotao is the general political commissar of the Red Army, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao are the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the former enemy general headquarters, and Bo Gu is the director of the general political department.
On July 18, the Military Commission will notify the heads of the legions of the above decision.
In order to promote the unity of the two front armies, unify their understanding, and distinguish some major issues of right from wrong, from July 21 to 22 in Luhua, Zhang Wentian presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to focus on discussing the work of the fourth front army.At the meeting, Zhang Guotao made a report on the work of the Fourth Red Front Army.After the discussion, Zhang Wentian made a concluding speech.
Zhang Wentian first affirmed that the "general leadership of the Fourth Front Army is correct" and that the troops are "very capable of fighting." At the same time, he pointed out its shortcomings and mistakes: at the beginning of the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the leaders had a "left" tendency in assessing the situation Later, when the enemy split up and attacked together, they failed to grasp the enemy's weakness and concentrated on attacking him all the way; Tongnanba refers to the Tongjiang, Nanjiang, and Bazhong areas in northern Sichuan, where the Red Fourth Front Army established the Sichuan-Shaanxi base.They gave up after winning the battle, reflecting that they did not understand enough about the importance of the base areas; it was not good to take away all the cadres and guerrillas when they left Tongnanba; after leaving Tongnanba, they lacked a clear strategic policy and did not have a certain development direction, causing some difficulties now.Zhang Wentian also pointed out that the Fourth Front Army also had some problems in its treatment of ethnic minorities. For example, it divided the land of Tibetans in Lianghekou, which aroused opposition from the masses. Regarding the issue of the Northwest Federation, it was not clear what constituted a "federation". Establishing a "Federation" without mobilizing it first will be in vain.Zhang Wentian emphasized that creating a new Soviet area under the new environment is the current central task, and revealing the weaknesses of past work is to sum up experience.
After the Luhua meeting decided that Zhang Guotao was the general political commissar of the Red Army, he reluctantly implemented the second-step plan of the Songpan Campaign issued by the Military Commission to remedy the delayed fighter planes, and led the Fourth Front Army northward to concentrate in the Maoergai area.However, after arriving in Maoergai, Zhang Guotao carried out a series of activities against the central government and undermining unity.He held an emergency cadre meeting in the Fourth Front Army, at which he announced that the central government was implementing an opportunistic line, and demanded that a dozen cadres from the Fourth Front Army be approved as members of the Central Committee, members of the Politburo, and secretaries of the Secretariat.He accused the Zunyi Conference of being a reconciliation line, and asked Bo Gu to withdraw from the Secretariat and the Politburo, Zhou Enlai to withdraw from the Military Commission, and not to enter the army until the goal was achieved.A serious military demonstration was also held near the central garrison.At the same time, he blocked the voice of the Central Committee in the entire Fourth Front Army, and mobilized against the Central Committee and the First Front Army, resulting in an extremely bad relationship between the Fourth Front Army and the First Front Army. political task.According to a telegram from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Communist International on July 14, 1936.At this time, the enemy Hu Zongnan had already taken advantage of Zhang Guotao's delay to gather the main force of the Hu tribe and built a fortress line in the area near Songpan. The favorable opportunity for the Red Army to attack Songpan had been lost.Not only that, after the mobilization and defense of various enemy troops, a situation of besieging and destroying the Red Army was formed in the snowy mountains and grasslands west of Minshan and north of Maogong.The Red Army was in an extremely difficult situation.If Zhang Guotao's erroneous policy is not resisted and his actions of undermining unity and opposing the Central Committee are stopped, the situation of the Red Army will be even more dangerous.
Under such circumstances, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, etc. proceeded from the overall situation and the unity of the whole party and the whole army, and adopted a special and very patient policy in order to seek a common northward movement, promote Zhang Guotao's transformation and win over the Fourth Front Army.Under the guidance of this policy, in early August, Zhang Wentian held a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in Shawo, a small village about 20 miles south of Maoergai in Songpan County.
The Shawo meeting had two items on its agenda: (1) the situation and tasks after the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies; (2) organizational issues.
Before the meeting, these two agenda items were fully deliberated.Zhang Wentian discussed with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bogu, etc., and drafted a draft resolution on the situation and tasks.After the draft was drafted, it was discussed with Chen Changhao and Fu Zhong of the Fourth Front Army, and their approval was obtained.Regarding organizational issues, Zhang Guotao first brought to the Central Committee a list of comrades from the Fourth Front Army as members of the Central Committee and members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Zhang Wentian exchanged opinions with Mao Zedong, and discussed back and forth with Chen Changhao and Fu Zhong, and basically reached a consensus.After doing these preparations, at 21:00 on August 3, Zhang Wentian sent a message to Zhang Guotao: "Please arrive at Shawo at 10:00 tomorrow for the Politburo meeting, and please inform Fu Zhong, Bo Gu, Deng Fa, Kai Feng, and Fu Spring has come to the meeting."
The Shawo Conference lasted for three days from August 4th to August 6th.
At the beginning of the meeting, Zhang Wentian made a report on the first agenda item.He made a comprehensive and systematic elaboration based on the drafted document "The Central Committee's Political Situation and Tasks after the Convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies".After two days of discussion, Zhang Wentian made the conclusion at the beginning of the meeting on the third day.
Zhang Wentian summed up the two-day discussion and said: "There is no major difference of opinion on the resolution, and the comrades are all unanimous. This is the guarantee for the victory and advancement of the First and Fourth Front Armies." Zhang Wentian pointedly affirmed the correctness of the Zunyi Meeting, Emphasize the military line affirmed by the Zunyi Conference, and demand that the Party branches in the Fourth Army should discuss the "Zunyi Conference Resolution."Regarding the issue of the Northwest Federation, Zhang Wentian once again pointed out that "it is too early, and this should be pointed out in the resolution."As for the criticisms of comrades from the Fourth Front Army on the First Army, Zhang Wentian first affirmed that "it is good, and it is to help the First Army to correct its shortcomings." hampering unity".He believes that what is really important is "to actually do it now", that is, to correct shortcomings by rectifying the army.Zhang Wentian finally said: Basically, the resolution was passed, and the Standing Committee made some revisions before printing and distributing it.
On August 9, the central government issued the "Resolution of the Central Committee Concerning the Political Situation and Tasks after the Convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies" (hereinafter referred to as the "Shawo Meeting Resolution") drafted by Zhang Wentian and adopted by the Shawo Conference.
The Shawo Conference Resolution is a document of great practical and far-reaching historical significance.Aiming at the main problems that have arisen more than a month after the meeting of the two front armies, it uses the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, sums up historical experience, analyzes the current reality, and makes a profound and specific answer, forcefully but also very strategically. Resisted and criticized Zhang Guotao's erroneous strategic policy of "going west" and "going south", resisted the tendency of warlordism to command the party with guns, undermined the unity of the two front armies, and wavered right opportunism that avoided war and fled.Created an example of correctly handling intra-party conflicts under special circumstances.
The "Shawo Meeting Resolution" affirmed that the strategic policy of "attacking northward" decided at the Lianghekou meeting on June 28 was "undoubtedly correct" and that "the creation of the Soviet base areas in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu was a history that was placed ahead of the first and fourth front armies." Task".It also further mentioned the idea of "creating the base areas of the Northwest Soviet Area" in Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu and the vast Northwest region.This is actually a conclusion to the debate on the strategic policy since the first and fourth armies joined together, affirming and adhering to the central government's "going north" policy, and denying Zhang Guotao's "going west" and "going south" policy.
The "Shawo Conference Resolution" (hereinafter referred to as the "Resolution") established the necessary conditions for the creation of the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area, answered the main problems that have arisen since the two armies joined together, and criticized and resisted Zhang Guotao's various mistakes anonymously. The "Resolution" emphasized: "It is necessary to further strengthen the party's absolute leadership in the first and fourth front armies, and improve the prestige of the Party Central Committee in the Red Army." It pointed out that "without the Chinese Communist Party, there would be no Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army." His military leadership was "unquestionably completely correct". The "Resolution" made a comprehensive assessment of the two front armies, and quite strictly criticized the weakness of the front army, and proposed the task of "immediately rectifying the troops", emphasizing "the unity of the brothers in the first and fourth front armies", which is Strongly resisted Zhang Guotao's words and deeds that undermined unity. The "Resolution" also proceeded from the fact that the areas where the two front armies joined forces are currently operating in the minority areas and in the Northwest China in the future, and pointed out that "struggling for the minorities" "has decisive significance for the future of the Chinese revolution"; It is inappropriate to organize the Soviets of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Democratic Dictatorship”; regarding the controversial issue of the “Northwest Federation”, it also concluded that “it is too early to establish a government of the Northwest Federation of Soviets.”
The "Resolution" proposes 12 "current central tasks", including military construction, work on ethnic minorities, work in white areas, local work, security work, organizational work, work in Soviet areas, etc. Tasks and measures are also a summary of past struggle experience.
The "Resolution" pointed out that "the occupation of North China by Japanese imperialism resulted in the actual actions of 'North China'", but it failed to go one step further, pointing out the huge changes in the international and domestic situation and class relations brought about by this. The "Resolution" upheld the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" and the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, but still failed to recognize the mistakes in the political line since the Fourth Plenary Session, and demanded to study the resolution of the Fifth Plenary Session.Therefore, on the whole, it has not been able to start the transition from the agrarian revolution and the Soviet movement to the national revolution and the anti-Japanese national united front in time.This major change still needs to be promoted by the deepening of the national crisis caused by the intensification of Japanese aggression and the Seventh Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow.Not long before the "Shawo Conference Resolution" was formed, the CCP's international delegation wrote the "Message to All Compatriots for the Resistance against Japan and the National Salvation" (the "August 1st Declaration"). The "August 1st Declaration" was published on October 1935. moon.The reason, according to Wang Ming’s report at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on December 9, 1937: “When the August 1st Declaration was decided, it was Liu Zuofu who first rose up to oppose it... After two months of discussion, the International Secretary I published it after seeing it everywhere."Of course, the limitation caused by history that this kind of understanding lags behind the situation should not be exacting.Mao, Luo, Zhou, Bo and other leaders of the Party Central Committee gathered in Shawo are devoting all their energy to solving the most urgent strategic direction issues related to the survival and development of the Red Army. They worked hard in the Shaanxi-Gansu base areas, and the environment of the Long March also made it impossible for them to understand the changes in the domestic and foreign situations. The deficiencies and limitations of the "Shawo Conference Resolution" do not affect its positive significance and historical status in the slightest.
The second item on the Shawo meeting's agenda was organizational issues - "Absorbing cadres from the Fourth Front Army to participate in the work of the Central Committee".On behalf of the Politburo, Zhang Wentian put forward a pre-negotiated list of three full members of the Central Committee: Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao, and Zhou Chunquan, three alternate members of the Central Committee: He Wei, Li Xiannian, and Fu Zhong; Zhou Chunquan is an alternate member of the Politburo.The meeting agenda and the list proposed by Zhang Wentian are based on the records of the Shawo meeting on August 6, 1935.
对这个名单，张国焘不满意，说：在坚决提拔工农干部上还可以多提几个人嘛！
毛泽东回应他说：四方面军中有很多好的干部，现在我们提出这六位同志，是很慎重的。照党章规定，本来政治局不能决定中委，现在是在特殊情况下才这样做的。其他干部可以更多地吸收到各军事、政治领导机关工作。
张国焘又迂回曲折地从另一方面提出要求：本来我们的意见，要提这几个同志都到政治局的，这样可以提拔工农干部，他们有实际经验，又可以学习领导工作。
毛泽东既肯定“国焘同志的意见是很好的”，又一点不松口，说四方面军的好干部“将来很可以吸收到中央机关及其他部门”。
8月6日的会议主要在这个问题上争来争去。毛、洛等看透张国焘的用心，是企图形成多数来控制党中央（这当然只是张国焘的一厢情愿。事实上沙窝会议吸收为中央委员和候补中央委员的同志大多数是党的好干部而不是张国焘的人），所以在增加中央委员的人数上毛、洛口径统一，维持原议。但为了从大局出发，尽一切可能同张国焘搞好团结，在组织问题上还是作了一些让步：最后决定进政治局的两位同志都是正式委员。据1935年8月6日的沙窝会议记录。在组织问题上，还决定恢复红一方面军总部，由周恩来任红一方面军司令兼政委；中国工农红军总政治部由陈昌浩任主任，周纯全任副主任。
沙窝会议以后，为执行《夏洮战役计划》，中共中央决定，会合后的两个方面军组成左、右两路军继续北上。右路军由红一方面军的一、三军团和红四方面军的四军、三十军组成，由中共中央和毛泽东、周恩来、徐向前率领，以毛儿盖为中心集结，向班佑、巴西地区开进；左路军由红四方面军的九军、三十一军和红一方面军的五、九军团组成，由朱德、张国焘带领，以马塘、卓克基为中心集结，向阿坝地区开进，到达后即东进，到班佑同右路军靠拢，然后齐头并进，向甘南进军。
张国焘又一次玩弄两面派伎俩。他在会上赞成《沙窝会议决议》，会后继续同中央的北上计划对抗。他回到毛儿盖后即召开四方面军军以上干部会议，再次提出，西出阿坝，占领青海、甘肃边远地区的方针，而不执行中央经阿坝北进东出的计划。
针对张国焘这一破坏北进战略部署的错误主张，中共中央于8月15日致电张国焘，指出：“不论从敌情、地形、气候、粮食任何方面计算，均须即时以主力从班佑向夏河急进，左路军及一方面军全部应即日开始出动。万不宜再事迁延，致误大计。”“目前洮、夏敌备尚薄，迟则堡垒线成，攻取困难。气候日寒，非速到甘南夏河不能解决被服。”“班佑以北，粮房不缺，因此，一、四方面军主力均宜走右路，左路阿坝只出支队，掩护后方前进，五军、三十二军即速开毛［儿盖］。”“目前应专力北上，万不宜抽兵回击抚边、理番之敌”。张国焘对中央的耐心说服教育和明确指示置之不理。
为了克服张国焘的新的阻挠，中央决定再次召开政治局会议。
在召开这次政治局会议的前一天，8月19日，张闻天主持召开了中央政治局常委会。会议情况与内容均据会议记录。到会者为毛泽东、博古，王稼祥列席。周恩来因病缺席。会议讨论了对张国焘错误的方针问题，常委分工问题，宣传工作问题。
会议认为：应该加强常委会的工作，发挥常委会的作用。决定：“常委会每周至少一次，各部有临时发生事件，由各部与书记商量，［必要时］召集临时常委［会］。”会议经过充分讨论，确定中央分工如下：张闻天负总责之外兼管组织部，罗迈副之；毛泽东负责军事；博古负责宣传部；王稼祥负责红军政治部；凯丰负责少数民族委员会。这一决定，将领导权集中统一于常委会和党中央总书记手里，军事领导权则掌握在毛泽东手里，这在当时张国焘拥兵自重、向党争权，党内矛盾趋于尖锐的形势下，是十分必要的。对日后战胜张国焘的个人野心和分裂活动，具有关键性的作用。
会议决定加强对宣传工作的领导，《干部必读》和《斗争》分别成立编委会。《干部必读》由张闻天兼主编，编委成员罗迈、陈昌浩；《斗争》由博古主编，张闻天、王稼祥为编委。
8月20日，中央政治局会议在毛儿盖召开，集中讨论红军行动方针。会议内容据会议记录。会议由张闻天主持，毛泽东作关于夏洮战役后行动问题的报告。与会者一致同意毛泽东提出的以岷州、洮河为中心向东发展，以便取得甘、陕广大地区的行动计划，并指出，目前左路军应迅速向右路军靠拢。毛泽东作结论，他说，我们应该坚决向东打，以岷州、洮河为中心，向东发展，不应因为有一些困难而转移向西。最后，张闻天说：“由泽东同志起草一决议，补充上次政治局决议。”会后，发出了《中央政治局关于目前战略方针的补充决定》，对1935年6月28日两河口会议《目前战略方针的决定》作了补充。
张国焘没有出席毛儿盖会议。张闻天等通过各种方式将会议决定电告张国焘，明确要求左路军“迅速出墨洼、班佑，出洮河左岸，然后并肩东进”。但张国焘仍然按兵不动，不执行从两河口会议、沙窝会议到毛儿盖会议再三商讨确定的北上东出方针。这样一直拖延到8月30日，张国焘才命令左路军集结后向班佑前进。但是才走一天，8月31日，张国焘又犹豫动摇，却步不前。
毛儿盖会议后，张闻天带领中央机关随毛泽东、周恩来、徐向前率领的右路军行动。8月下旬，从毛儿盖出发，进入纵横几百里，渺无人烟、气候变幻莫测的茫茫草地。走了五天，终于在月底通过草地，到达四川、甘肃交界之班佑、巴西地区。
8月29日至31日，右路军在徐向前指挥下，以红三十军为主，在包座地区歼灭胡宗南部第四十九师，打开了向甘南进军的大门。从这里到西固、岷州只有五六天的路程。如果左路军能迅速向东靠拢，红军集中向东北开进，将能迅速打开新的局面。但张国焘却仍然迟延不前。
这时，中央机关到达包座西北的潘州城。张闻天在这里写了一篇论北上、南下的文章，准备在《干部必读》上发表。写罢，他照例拿到编委会上讨论。参加讨论的有陈昌浩、凯丰、杨尚昆。文章词句并不尖锐，但观点很鲜明：北上是正确路线，南下是退却逃跑。文章还没有念完，陈昌浩就火冒三丈，强烈反对。张闻天坚持自己的观点，但从团结出发，还是对陈昌浩让步，这篇文章没有发表。
不管张国焘及一时追随张国焘的同志怎样反对北上方针，毛泽东、张闻天等还是宽容忍让，耐心等待。到达班佑、巴西地区以后，右路军部队就停止前进，进行休整、整顿，等候左路军到来。9月2日，张闻天主持召开了中央政治局会议，讨论整顿红一方面军的工作方针。由毛泽东作报告。张闻天发言要求政治局的同志需要亲自深入连队。会后，张闻天起草了关于红一方面军整理训练工作的中央指示信。
张国焘对中央的劝告、命令一概置若罔闻。9月2日，他复电中央，借口左路军自阿坝出发在行军途中遇“噶曲河水涨，上下三十里均无徒涉点”为由，停止向右路军靠拢。9月3日，张国焘更变本加厉，不仅决定左路军退回阿坝，而且不顾朱德反对，竟以红军总司令部的名义，发电要中共中央和右路军南下。9月5日，张国焘以朱（德）、张（国焘）的名义正式发出退兵命令：“左路军先头兵团决定转移阿坝补粮改道灭敌”。
毛、洛、周等当然不同意张国焘的错误主张和行动，但是他们还是期望能够争取张国焘北上。毛、洛、周就怎样答复张国焘要求中共中央和右路军“南下”、红军下一步究竟应该怎样行动这些问题，同徐向前、陈昌浩等多次讨论。毛、洛、周仍然力图通过和缓的商讨劝说张国焘放弃南下主张而取北上方针，他们的表态既不失原则而又留有余地，甚至表示南下如果真有利的话不是不可以交换意见。同时，让徐向前、陈昌浩向张国焘把问题讲透，便于张国焘转圜。
9月8日上午，徐、陈联名给张国焘发了一份电报，从中可以清楚地看出毛、洛、周争取张国焘改弦易辙的良苦用心。徐、陈的电报说：
中政局正考虑是否南进，毛、张皆言，只有南进便有利可以交换意见；周意北进便有出路；我们意以不分散主力为原则，左路速来北进为上策，右路南去南进为下策，万一左路若无法北进，只有实行下策。
徐、陈要张国焘“即明电中央局商议，我们决执行。”
但是，张国焘一意孤行，竟致电前敌总指挥部，要求“一、三军暂停向罗达前进，右路军即准备南下，立即设法解决南下的具体问题。”陈昌浩、徐向前商议后，即向中央报告。张闻天即于9月8日晚召集毛泽东、周恩来、博古、王稼祥、陈昌浩、徐向前等在周恩来的住处开了一个非正式的会议，细致冷静地分析南下、北上的利弊。会议经过充分讨论，决定由七人联名致电劝告张国焘执行北上方针。
9月8日晚22时，由周恩来、张闻天、博古、徐向前、陈昌浩、毛泽东、王稼祥七人联名的电报发出，力促张国焘北进。电报文辞十分恳切，开头说：“目前红军行动是处在最严重关头，需要我们慎重而又迅速的考虑与决定这个问题。”电报将“弟等仔细考虑结果”一一条列陈述，指出“右路军如果向南行动，则前途将极端不利”，因而，“务望兄等深思熟虑，立下决心”，“改道北进”。并告以行动计划：“拟于右路军中抽出一部，先行出动，与二十五、六军配合行动，吸引敌人追随他们，以利我左路军进入甘肃，开展新局。”电报最后说：“以上所陈，纯从大局前途及利害关系上着想，万望兄等当机立断，则革命之福。”真是一片至诚，溢于言表。
对于8日徐、陈传递毛、张、周、博、王意见电报和七人联名电报的透彻分析，热忱期待，张国焘全然不顾，一概不听。9月9日，张国焘复电徐、陈并转周、张、博、毛、王，依然以种种困难为借口，反对北进，鼓吹其“乘势南下”的主张。
更为严重的是，张国焘于9月9日发密电给陈昌浩，背着中央令陈率右路军“南下，彻底开展党内斗争”。
译电员送交这封密电的时候，恰好陈昌浩在会上作报告，讲得兴高采烈。他没想到这是张国焘给他的一封密电，示意坐在旁边的前敌总指挥部参谋长叶剑英先阅。叶剑英一看电文，立即敏锐地洞察张国焘企图分裂红军和危害中央的阴谋，遂机警地离开会场，赶到巴西党中央驻地报告。对叶剑英这一功绩，中共十二届四中全会给叶剑英的致敬信写道：“长征途中，您同张国焘企图危害中央和中央红军的阴谋进行了英勇机智的斗争，为党立了大功。”他第一个遇到了毛泽东。毛随即用铅笔将密电抄录在香烟壳纸上。叶带着密电仍旧返回会场。
毛泽东感到情况紧急，立刻找张闻天和博古商量对策。他们三人一致认为事态十分严重，等待张国焘率部北上已经绝无可能，继续滞留下去将会招致不堪设想的后果。张闻天和毛泽东、博古三人很快赶到三军团驻地阿西，与在那里治疗的周恩来、王稼祥举行中央常委紧急会议，果断地决定党中央同四方面军暂时分离，即率右路军中的红一、三军团和军委纵队先行北上，速出甘南，并通知已经率红一军团北上进至俄界的林彪、聂荣臻，行动方针有变化，要他们在原地待命。
会后，立即分头秘密布置脱离险区的行动。张闻天亲自向李维汉布置了任务，叫他负责把党中央机关、政府机关、总政治部等单位在次日凌晨带到巴西，会同党中央一道北上。张闻天叮嘱他，上述决定要绝对保密。李维汉接受指示后，立即分别通知了凯丰、林伯渠、杨尚昆，叫他们明天凌晨就走。对下只说到黑水打粮，叫各单位负责人准备好。
9月10日凌晨两三点钟，毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来等中央领导人一起率领三军团、红军大学离开危险地区。军委纵队各单位也以“上山打粮”为名，随党中央一道北上。
出发时，毛泽东率部在前，彭德怀率部在后掩护。张闻天也策马前后照应，亲自向干部讲明当时危险处境，还与彭德怀一起布置三军团部队在山上警戒。
9月10日当天，张闻天和毛泽东、周恩来、博古等到达阿西，立即以中央政治局名义致电陈昌浩等下达指令，指出：张国焘电令你们南下，显系违背中央累次之决定及电文。中央为不失时机地实现自己的战略决定，已令一方面军主力向罗达、拉界前进。四军、三十军归你们指挥，应于日内尾一、三军后前进。并郑重声明：“本指令因张总政治委员不能实行政治委员之责任，违背中央战略方针，中央为贯彻自己之决定，特直接指令前敌指挥员（党员）及其政委并责成实现之。”并通知他们，“右路军统归军委副主席周恩来指挥。”同时，张闻天等以中央名义致电张国焘，申明：“阅致徐、陈调右路军南下电令，中央认为完全不适宜的。”指出：“目前方针只有向北，才是出路”，“中央认为，北上方针绝对不应改变，右路军应立即北上。”
与此同时，9月10日在阿西，发布了毛泽东写的《共产党中央为执行北上方针告同志书》，指出：“自从我们翻过了雪山，通过了草地之后，我们一到包座，即打胜了仗，消灭了白匪军49D49D，即在包座被红军歼灭的胡宗南的第49师。D，英文Division的缩写。目前的形势是完全有利于我们，我们应该根据党中央正确的战略方针，继续北进，大量消灭蒋介石、胡宗南的部队，创造川陕甘新苏区。”《告同志书》指明了南下方针的危害，对其断然予以否定：“南下是草地、雪山、老林，南下人口稀少，粮食缺乏，南下是少数民族的地区，红军只有减员，没有补充，敌人在那里的堡垒线已经完成，我们无法突破。南下不能到四川去，南下只能到西藏、西康，南下只能是挨冻挨饿，白白的牺牲生命，对革命没有一点利益。对于红军，南下是没有出路的。南下是绝路。”《告同志书》号召：“应该坚决拥护中央的战略方针，迅速北上，创造川陕甘新苏区去。”
作为党中央总书记，张闻天在危急关头临危不乱，镇定自若，同毛泽东、周恩来、博古、王稼祥、彭德怀、叶剑英、杨尚昆等中央和红军的领导同志团结一致，密切配合，使党和红军又一次脱离了生死攸关的险境。
9月12日，张闻天在俄界（今甘肃省迭部县高吉村）主持召开中央政治局紧急扩大会议，讨论张国焘的分裂错误和红军今后的行动方针。
毛泽东在会上作报告，回顾了一、四方面军会合后，同张国焘就战略方针进行争论的过程。毛泽东指出：我们现在背靠一个可靠的地区是对的，但不应靠前面没有出路、后面没有战略退路、没有粮食、没有群众的地方。“所以，我们应到甘肃才对，张国焘抵抗中央决议是不对的。”他明确指出：现在我们不应依靠共同北上，而应该单独北上。
毛泽东作报告以后，彭德怀作了改变军队编制等问题的报告。
在与会者充分开展讨论后张闻天作总结性发言，对毛泽东的报告作了补充和发挥。
关于同张国焘斗争的性质，张闻天明确指出：“这是两条路线的斗争。一条是中央的路线，一条是右倾的军阀主义——张国焘主义。”张闻天分析了张国焘的军阀主义路线形成的过程，并着重指出其性质：“从退出通南巴起，已经形成了反对中央的路线。对敌人是惧怕的。在红军建设上，不要党的领导。红军变成个人统治的军队。对干部的培养，是要拥护他个人。无论从哪一方面，都充分表现了军阀主义倾向，这是很明显的。”
对于张国焘错误发展的前途，张闻天同意毛泽东所作的“反对中央，叛变革命”的估计，并且具体指出：“其前途必然是组织第二党。”不幸而被言中，后来张国焘果然另立中央，最终叛变而去。张闻天简要回顾了争取张国焘的过程：“过去中央站在布尔什维克的路线上，如同一方面军一样看待他，后来知道他的错误，才用许多办法来争取他。用了许多