Chapter 5 Chapter 4 What the Americans Touched on the Elephant

Air operations were the decisive factor in winning the war against Iraq...Effective use of high technology weapons was a key reason both air and ground forces excelled in the war and kept coalition casualties to a minimum. —— L. Aspin The Gulf War is the biggest prey captured by the US military in war hunting in recent decades.As soon as the war ended, the U.S. military, members of Congress, and various civil organizations began to conduct detailed dissections of this prey from different angles.From every report they submit and every subsequent adjustment of the US military, it can be seen that this dissection is extremely fruitful, and these results are invaluable to armies and soldiers all over the world Yes, we must not take it lightly.As for the Americans who feel too good about themselves, due to their national nature, especially the long-standing sectarianism among the military and arms, their research inevitably contains theoretical blind spots and misunderstandings, so that the concept of a grand war is Examination has become a blind man's idea of ​​what is right and what is right, and it is a subject that needs to be soberly screened by us, and should not be used as an excuse to deny its value.But what exactly did the Americans imitate from this behemoth?Let's see.

The hand outstretched under the military fence The fence between the U.S. Army and Navy that had been erected since the Civil War, not only failed to be dismantled after the birth of the U.S. Air Force, but instead became a fence between the three armed forces. It has become a headache for the president and the Pentagon. historical malaise.Even the "Reorganization Act", which was effective in the Gulf War, aimed at this invisible obstacle, rather than a cure for the root cause, it is more like an expedient measure for the symptoms.Once the battle dust settles, all armies return home.Still shutting the door and talking to themselves, doing their own thing.However, the generals who lead the three armed forces of the United States are not stubborn and mediocre people. When the unexpected progress and ending of the Gulf War shocked the whole world, it also deeply shocked the decision makers of these "Desert Storm" ; the disintegration of the Soviet Union that followed, the sense of loss of opponents and the sense of mission to re-establish a new world order headed by the United States made these generals clearly aware of the urgency of reforming this army. There is still no intention of giving up the service prejudice.Judging from the combat regulations of various services and arms promulgated successively in the 1990s, the reform of the US military has already started in an all-round way, and its starting point is without exception based on a large number of fresh experiences and lessons brought about by the Gulf War.Just like "there are a thousand Hamlets in the eyes of a thousand people", what is displayed in the eyes of the US armed forces is the three Gulf Wars.For this war, which is both the last battle of the old era and the opening battle of the new era, the army, sea and air forces insisted on finding evidence that is most beneficial to their own military branch. It is impossible to touch an elephant like the Gulf War.

General Sullivan may have touched a limp elephant leg.In the opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army during the Gulf War and the Chief of Staff of the Army who took office only a few months after the war, although the performance of the US Army in "Desert Storm" was not lackluster, it was definitely not outstanding.Especially compared with the Air Force, which was in the limelight during the 38 days of indiscriminate bombing, the four days of ground warfare, which was like wind and clouds, failed to bring his military branch the long-awaited glory.Knowing every joint of the army, he knows better than anyone the crux of this ancient army in this epoch-making war.Although the U.S. Army when he took over was holding the power of "Desert Storm" in full swing, and because of the decline of the Soviet Army, it became clear that it had become a powerful military that no one could compete with, but he still expressed his vision to the world with great foresight. type of worry.His biggest fear is that after the cold war's strings are suddenly relaxed, the military structure that has shown signs of aging and politicians eager to share the peace dividend will prevent his army from crossing the threshold of the 21st century. In the new millennium At the beginning, it still ensured its leading position in the armies of various countries.The only way to bring it back to life is to give it a radical overhaul.To this end, he put forward the idea of ​​building a brand-new "21st Century Army", and advocated redesigning the US Army in all aspects of "from foxhole to factory" [1].In order to minimize the influence of bureaucracy pervading in layers of institutions, he formed the "Louisiana Exercise Task Force" directly under his leadership with only 1,100 people at first, and used the experience and lessons gained in the Gulf War to shape this team. The special unit, which is often called the "digital force", has used its success to "pull out the weight" to bring the Army to the brink of information warfare, stepping ahead of other military services.As a result, this army has also taken a road that is bold and innovative, but also has an unpredictable future.During the whole process, what he never explicitly said was that there was a military selfishness in carrying out such tempting reforms, that is, to cut a bigger slice for the Army from the shrinking military spending cake for the first time in decades. A larger share of the other services.

[1] "Army in the 21st Century" is Sullivan's favorite work.From the beginning of his tenure to his departure, he has always maintained an undiminished enthusiasm for this matter.Although many people in the U.S. military and other countries' militaries equate the "21st Century Army" with the "digital army," Sullivan does not see it that way.He believes that instead of viewing the "Army of the 21st Century" as a "final solution", it is better to regard it as "a state of mind and direction", and the US Army should continue to carry out "integrated" reforms. "The integration of the military in the 21st century includes: combat theory, organizational structure, training, commander training, materials, equipment and soldiers, and infrastructure." (U.S. Military Review, May-June, 1995) According to the general view of the U.S. Army at present, "the 21st Century Force is the field experiment, theoretical research and equipment procurement plan of the Army's existing forces in the information age, which will enable ground combat forces to Prepare to execute missions between now and 2010." (Colonel Robert Killible, Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Armed Forces, October 1996)

Sullivan's successor, General Rymer, also knew this well. He continued to deepen reforms on the basis of the blueprint drawn by his predecessor[2].Everyone knows that the establishment of a digital army is very expensive, and this is where Sullivan and Reimer are astute: spending more money is just to get more money.From "21st Century Army" to "Post-2010 Army" and then to "Army of the Day After Tomorrow", two steps and three steps, using quite convincing development goals as bait, using Capitol Hill's support and more military spending Attracted to the construction of the army.As for those politicians who know nothing about military issues, when faced with the conclusions and practices drawn by the generals from a victory that may not necessarily lead to new victories, most of them are afraid of making a fool of themselves. The newly dressed emperor made irresponsible remarks.In fact, no matter how much hype there is about the "digital army", it is still far from the time to give a conclusion on the correctness of this idea.Among other things, according to the standard practice of the U.S. Army, the procurement cycle for a new weapon and equipment is as long as ten years from the request of the military, the development of the industrial department, and the acceptance by the military. The two irreconcilable rhythms of "law" and the "60-day theorem" of network technology make it difficult for the "digital army" to be technically finalized and organized into an army, thus making it a whiplash of constantly changing new technologies. The gyroscope, in the exhausted rotation, is neither at a loss nor does anything [3].For this alone, it is difficult to truly become the only guidepost for the future development of the Army, which is a rather forward-thinking and bold idea to tie the fate of a military branch to the popularization of certain technologies.What's more, who dares to assert now that in future wars, this is not an electronic Maginot line of defense that is extremely expensive but extremely fragile due to its overreliance on a single technology[4]?

[2] General Dennis "J. Rymer said," Army Vision 2010 is also the key to connecting the theories of "21st Century Force" and "Army of Tomorrow". "21st Century Force" is the plan that the Army is implementing... "The Army of the Day After Tomorrow" is the long-term plan that the Army is brewing...the three cooperate with each other to determine a set of continuous and orderly changes to ensure that the Army can follow along development in an orderly manner. "(See Army Vision 2010 report, 1997) [3] Behind the phenomenon that the speed of technological updates is much faster than that of weapons and equipment, there is a deeper contradiction hidden: "The pioneers tend to fall behind" (this can be confirmed from the development of the telecommunications industry and the replacement of computers).This may be one of the contradictions that are difficult to coordinate between the professional army established according to the large-scale industrial model and information technology.It is precisely because of this that Americans are morbidly sensitive to the proliferation of various military high-tech and even civilian-use new technologies.

[4] Many people in the U.S. military have questioned this point.Colonel Allen Kampen believes that "hasty adoption of a poorly understood and untested new method of warfare is risky" and "may well turn a salutary military revolution into a gamble on national security ". (July 1995 issue of Beauty Magazine) For the Air Force, the dismissal of the quick-talking General Dugan and the fact that the Air Force units that fought throughout Operation Desert Storm were commanded by a general did not prevent it from being a big winner in the Gulf War.[ 5]. The army-building policy of "global reach, global power" has withstood the test of war for the first time. As a force that can independently carry out strategic and campaign strike missions on any battlefield, its status has never been as prominent as it is now[6].This made the smug General McPeak and his successor determined to go further.They thought that one victory would be enough for them to play the leading role in the ranking of the three armies in the future. The air force, which was made out of a rib from the army 50 years ago, is no longer Wuxia Amon, because they touched the elephant in the Gulf Wings sprouting from his body.Even though Air Force Chief of Staff Fogelman and Army Chief of Staff Reimer agreed that through the Gulf War, "both services have developed a deep understanding of 21st century military operations," but "when both sides try to learn from the Gulf War The relationship between the Army and the Air Force became strained as the lessons learned were crystallized and exploited"[7].The reason is simple. Neither the air force with longer wings nor the army with Lao Tzu's number one in the world wants to hand over the command and control of operations to the other.This kind of dispute between the military services that seems to be reasonable from their respective standpoints, but beyond that, it will be found that there is a hundred harms but no benefits, making every military leaders' meeting to study joint combat operations a routine without solving the problem. , It also prevented the fresh experience gained from the Gulf War from being fully and effectively shared among the military branches.This point will be clear in a day only by looking at the operational outlines and regulations successively promulgated by the Air Force and Army after the war.

[5] The Joint Air Forces Command commanded by Air Admiral Charles Horner, although also under Schwarzkopf's command, had the limelight in the Gulf War after all. [6] "Global Reach, Global Power" was published as a white paper in June 1990 as a strategic vision of the US Air Force after the Cold War.Six months later, the Gulf War verified the basic principles of this conception. [7] See the December 1996 issue of the US "Army" magazine, the article "Joint Land and Air Operations". It should be pointed out that, of course, the Air Force did more than compete with other services for power after the war.As a response to the main body of "Desert Storm" - the successful experience of the air strike campaign, they adapted all combat flight wings into a mixed wing according to the proven effective model; The seven-plus-four approach has completely reorganized the entire Air Force command structure; now they are experimenting with forming an Air Force Expeditionary Force that can reach any theater of the world within 48 hours and remain operational throughout crises and conflicts.The Air Force, which has always shown great enthusiasm for electronic warfare and even information warfare, took the lead in establishing the Air Force Information Warfare Center before Sullivan established a digital force.The introduction of these measures is obviously directly related to the harvest of the Gulf War.It is a pity that such a beneficial attempt did not go beyond the boundaries of the military services. As a result, the long-talked-about "inter-service joint combat operations" is still a slogan in the end.However, all this does not prevent the generals of the U.S. Air Force from imitating their colleagues in the Army, and regard positive changes within the service and active competition outside the service as two wheels to promote the interests of the service.It is impossible for a lifeless military without any fresh plans to draw a penny from the pockets of congressmen who are in charge of military appropriations.In this regard, the Air Force has its own small nine-nine [8].In the increasingly fierce budget battle among the services, the aerospace weapon system is a powerful trump card in the hands of the Air Force.Although President Reagan's "Star Wars" plan smacked of bluff at the beginning, and did not really develop combat capabilities until the presidential scepter was handed down for two terms, Americans are enthusiastic about building a space strike force But it never cools down [9].With this enthusiasm, several Air Force chiefs of staff have won as much military spending as possible for their own services.As for whether the U.S. aerospace force is as General Estes, the commander of the Space Command, said, "the performance of the space force in the Gulf War has proved that it has the potential for independent use", I am afraid only God knows.

[8] In 1997, the U.S. Air Force put forward a new development strategy "Global Participation--21st Century U.S. Air Force Vision". "Our strategic vision can be summed up in one sentence: The U.S. Air Force will be the world's pre-eminent air and space power . Participation--A Vision for the U.S. Air Force in the 21st Century") [9] Although President Clinton announced the cancellation of the "Star Wars" program, in fact the US military has not slowed down the pace of space militarization. "Global Engagement--21st Century U.S. Air Force Vision" specifically pointed out that "the first step in this revolutionary change is to turn the U.S. Air Force into an aviation and aerospace force, and then transform it into an aerospace and aviation force." The change in sequence obviously reflects the adjustment of the center of gravity.As for the Space Command, it emphasizes the role of the Space Force (for details, see (U.S. Space Force and Joint Space Theory). In April 1998, the United States Space Command issued the long-term plan "2020 Vision", proposing 4 military aerospace This operational concept is control space, global engagement, comprehensive force integration, and global cooperation. By 2020, control space must achieve the following five goals: ensure access to space; monitor space; protect the space system of the United States and its allies; prevent the enemy from using the United States and allied space systems; to prevent the enemy from using space systems. (See "Modern Military", Issue 10, 1998, P10-11)

If the Gulf War is really regarded as an elephant, it can be said that the front fins of the US Navy barely brushed the fur of this elephant, and the theory of touching an elephant is out of the question.Perhaps precisely because of this, the proud sailors who slid off the cold bench of "Desert Storm" began the most painful strategic thinking change in the history of the US Navy while they were still on their way back.This pain tortured those soldiers with gills for a year and a half.Then, a white paper called "From Sea to Land" proposed by several lieutenant colonels and colonels was placed on the desk of the Secretary of the Navy.This article obviously departed from the teachings of Mahan, the spiritual godfather of the U.S. Navy. It changed the old chapter and no longer regards decisive battles in the ocean to seize sea dominance as the eternal sacred mission of the navy. For the first time, it listed supporting coastal and land operations as its top priority. Task.This is equivalent to turning a thresher shark swimming in the deep sea into an alligator rolling in the mud.What is even more surprising is that such a deviant heresy was jointly signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of the Marine Corps, and became the most important naval document since Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power on History" .The bold strategic mutation gave this army, which was looking for a way of regeneration against the background of great changes in the world structure, an important turning point.While the goals the Navy has set for itself are less radical than those of the Army and less ambitious than those of the Air Force, its transformation is clearly more fundamental and holistic.The navy, which is no less inferior to the land and the air force in turning the beads of the military's abacus, of course also hopes to kill two birds with one stone in terms of reforming itself and fighting for military spending.But for a military branch that failed to play an important role in a major war, if it wants to keep its established share in the new round of post-war interest cutting and is also ambitiously trying to get a bigger piece of cake, it must come up with the ultimate A beautiful proposal for the most radical reformation.Therefore, two years after proposing "From Sea to Land", the Navy published a new white paper "Frontier...From Sea to Land" [10], which put more positive "presence at the front", "deployment at the front", "deployment at the front" New hormones such as "forward operations" were injected into the naval strategy; two years later, Admiral Budar, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed the "Navy Concept 2020"; Admiral Johnson Xiao Guicao followed suit and continued to promote the reforms started by his predecessors.He listed "peacetime participation, deterrence and prevention of conflicts, combat and victory" as the three major missions of the US Navy in the 21st century.Invariably, he, like every one of his predecessors, put forward any proposal with the Navy as the axis.This time his reason was that in the frequent overseas combat missions undertaken by the U.S. military, the Army needs to deploy with the help of multiple transportation capabilities, while the Air Force relies too much on bases in other countries. Only the Navy has the freedom to patrol in any sea area and use various means to deploy The ability to put into battle, the conclusion is, of course, that the Navy should be the core of the joint combat force.The admiral knew very well in his heart that as long as his argument was recognized by the commander-in-chief and the Ministry of National Defense, the next logical thing would be to get the priority of top budget allocation for his military branch.According to the 1998 fiscal year defense budget of the United States, in the past ten years, on the graph of US military expenditures that have been showing a trend of reduction, the Navy and the Marine Corps are the two services with the least reductions in military expenditures.The admirals finally got their wish[11].

[10] "The Navy and Marine Corps White Paper (From Sea to Land) issued in 1992 marked a shift in the strategic center and focus... Emphasizing the forward deployment of naval forces, this is exactly the "Front... from Sea to Land" It is fundamentally different than that shown in From Sea to Land." (Admiral J. M. Borda, Marine Corps Magazine, March 1995) The admiral also bluntly demanded The Navy's "budgetary priorities." [11] See the 1998 Fiscal Year National Defense Report of the US Department of Defense. What the above analysis outlines is the general trend of the US armed forces after the Gulf War and the current situation where the gap between the services and arms still exists.You may be moved by the efforts made by American soldiers to sum up the war, and you may be infected by every method American soldiers take to defend the interests of the military, but at the same time, you will also have a deep feeling. It is a pity that so many outstanding soldiers and outstanding minds are actually blocked within the fences of the military branches, restraining each other and canceling each other out, so that each military branch that looks very powerful finally forms a team that is still dominated by several The U.S. military who blew the horn with an indeterminate tone disrupted the overall pace. Luxury and Zero Casualties Using a large number of expensive weapons, regardless of cost to achieve goals and reduce casualties, this kind of war that only the rich can afford is the US military's forte. "Desert Storm" once again revealed the extravagance of Americans in combat, which has reached the point of addiction.An aircraft costing an average of 25 million U.S. dollars was dispatched to conduct 110,000 indiscriminate bombings in 42 days, and each Tomahawk missile costing 1.3 million U.S. dollars was used to destroy the Baathist Party headquarters, and precision guidance worth tens of thousands of U.S. dollars was obtained. The bombs are aimed at the foxholes...even if the generals of the United States knew from the beginning that this war feast costing 61 billion US dollars does not need to be "paid" by themselves. , It still makes them feel too extravagant.An American-made bomber is like a flying gold mountain, more expensive than many of its targets, and it is doubtful whether it is worth dropping tons of dollars on a likely insignificant target.In addition, for as long as 161 days, as many as 520,000 personnel and materials weighing more than 8 million tons were transported to the front lines from the continental United States and Europe around the clock, including the Thousands of sun hats that have been scrapped at the bottom of the warehouse for decades and containers of rotten American fruits on the Riyadh wharf.Major General Pagonis, the commander in charge of logistics support, called such a large-scale chaos and extravagant support operation "perhaps unheard of in history" sea and air transportation.According to the image of the US Department of Defense, this is equivalent to moving all the living facilities of Jefferson City, the capital of Mississippi, to Saudi Arabia.Among the soldiers in the world, I am afraid that only the Americans will think that this is a luxury necessary to win a war [12]. [12] See "The Gulf War - The Final Report of the US Department of Defense to Congress" and "Appendix 6". That's what's weird about it.The Pentagon, which has been completely remodeled by McNamara with business spirit, has always only fought luxurious wars regardless of cost [13].Even the House Armed Services Committee, a body that routinely sparred with four-star generals over money, said nothing about the horrific cost of the war.In their respective survey reports on the Gulf War, they almost identically gave high praise to the key role of high-tech weapons. Secretary of Defense Cheney said that "we are ahead of a whole generation in weapon technology", Congressman A Spiing responded that "high-tech weapons have performed better than our most optimistic estimates."If you can't hear the overtones of these self-praises, and just think that they are proud of the US military's successful realization of the war goal of defeating Iraq with the help of high-tech weapons, then you will think that these are just two typical technological triumphalists. If you speak wild words, you have not yet understood the full meaning of American-style warfare.You know, this is a nation that has never been willing to fight for victory at all costs in life, but will always strive for victory at all material costs.The emergence of high-tech weapons can just meet this extravagant wish of the Americans.In the Gulf War, only 148 of the 500,000 US troops were killed and 458 were injured, almost achieving the goal they have long dreamed of: "zero casualties".Since the Vietnam War, both the military and American society have become almost pathologically sensitive to casualties in military operations.Reducing casualties and achieving combat objectives have become two weights on the balance of the US military.The American soldiers who were supposed to go to the battlefield as soldiers have now become the most expensive collateral in the war, as precious as a porcelain vase that is afraid of being broken.All opponents who have confronted the US military have probably mastered a trick: If you can't beat this army.Then you go and kill its soldiers[14].This point can be unmistakably confirmed by the report of the U.S. Congress emphasizing that "reducing casualties is the highest goal of planning". The simple and compassionate slogan "Pursue Zero Casualties" turned out to be the main driving force behind the creation of American-style luxury wars.If so, the unrestrained use of stealth aircraft, precision munitions, new tanks and helicopters, plus beyond-visual-range attacks and carpet bombing, all of these, regardless of weapons or methods, will all take on a paradoxical double duty at the same time. Goal: To win without casualties. [13] McNamara, who changed from the president of Ford Motor Company to Secretary of Defense, introduced the accounting system of private companies and the concept of "cost-effectiveness" into the US military.The army has learned how to purchase weapons with less money, but they have other standards in how to fight wars. "What the Department of Defense needs to achieve: the security of our homeland with minimal risk, minimal expenditure, and, in the event of war, minimal casualties." (McNamara, "Reviewing the Tragedy and Lessons of the Vietnam War", P27-29) [14] Colonel Charles Dunlap, Jr. stated, "Casualties are an effective means of weakening American power...therefore, the enemy may simply inflict our casualties regardless of personal losses or tactical victories." ("Standing Analyzing the Joint Vision 2010 from the Enemy's Standpoint", Joint Force Quarterly, Fall/Winter 1997-1998) A war framed by such a premise can only be a sledgehammer. Its high-tech, high-input, high-consumption, and high-return characteristics make it far less demanding on military strategy and combat art than on the technical performance of weapons. .So much so that in this successful war, which was almost as large as a battle, there was not a single outstanding battle to be noted.Compared with its advanced technology, the U.S. military is obviously lagging behind in tactics, and it is not good at capturing the opportunities provided by new technologies for new tactics.In addition to the effective use of advanced technology weapons, we can't see how far the military thinking of the Americans in this war differs from other countries, at least not more than the gap in weapons and equipment between them.Perhaps because of this, this war failed to become a masterpiece of military art, but to a large extent became a luxury exposition of high-tech weapons represented by the United States, and thus began to spread American-style wars around the world. The luxury of war.While the large amounts of dollars smashed Iraq, they also stunned soldiers all over the world.As the world's number one arms dealer, the Americans are naturally overjoyed by this.Faced with this typical war with advanced technology, monotonous tactics, and huge costs, just like facing Hollywood blockbusters with simple plots, complicated stunts, and similar models, people have been confused for a long time after the war, thinking that modern warfare is just Such a style of play, and feel ashamed that you can't afford such an expensive war.This is why after the Gulf War, military forums around the world were full of yearning for high-tech weapons and calling for high-tech wars. When the poet Jeffers talked about the American nation that produced the genius Edison, he wrote: "We... are good at machinery and obsessed with luxury goods." Americans are born with a strong preference for the two and a kind of The tendency to pursue the ultimate and perfect in technology, and even turn machinery, including weapons, into luxury goods.General Patton, who likes to wear ivory handle pistols, is a typical example.This tendency makes them persistently obsessed with technology and weapons, and always wants to find the way to win the war at the level of technology and weapons; this tendency also makes them worry that their leading position in the field of weapons will be shaken at any time. They continue to make more newer and more complex weapons to dispel this worry.Under the guidance of this mentality, when the increasingly complex weapon system conflicts with the simple principles required by actual combat, they often stand on the side of the weapon.They would rather regard war as a marathon race against their opponents in terms of military technology, rather than see it more as a contest of morale and bravery, wisdom and strategy.They believe that as long as the contemporary Edisons are not asleep, the door of victory will always be open to Americans.So confident are they that they forget a simple fact: War is not so much a race along fixed tracks of technology and weapons as it is a ball game of ever-changing directions and multiple uncertainties.Wearing an Adidas jersey and Nikes doesn't guarantee you'll always be a winner. But the Americans don't seem to want to pay attention to this. Old Sam, who tasted the sweetness of high-tech victory in the Gulf War, is obviously determined to maintain his leading position in high-tech at all costs.Although the financial constraints made them face an unsustainable embarrassment, it did not change their almost paranoid enthusiasm for new technologies and new weapons.It seems that the list of extravagant weapons that has been continuously listed by the US military and continuously recognized by the US Congress will definitely become longer and longer[15], and the list of casualties of US soldiers in future wars may not be fixed wishfully in the "zero" position. [15] According to the U.S. National Defense Report for Fiscal Year 1997, there are 20 advanced concept technology projects approved by Congress, "1. Rapid power projection system; 4. Medium-altitude long-distance unmanned aerial vehicle; 5. Accurate signal target acquisition system; 6. Cruise missile defense; 7. Simulated battlefield; 8. Joint anti-ground (water) mine; ;10. Advanced technology for advanced joint planning; 11. Battlefield understanding and data transmission; 12. Anti-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 13. Air base (port) defense against biological weapons; 14. Advanced navigation systems; 15. Combat Identification; 16. Joint logistics; 17. Combat vehicle survivability; 18. Medium transport helicopter with low life cycle cost; 19. Semi-automatic image processing; 20. Small air-launched false targets." Group Expeditionary Force Integrated Unit "What kind of division does the U.S. Army need in the 21st century?" This was a question that perplexed the U.S. Army in the last decade of the 20th century[16].In the Gulf War, the army's unsatisfactory performance was in stark contrast to the impact of high-tech weapons on the combat rhythm.The U.S. Army, which has always been more conservative than the Navy and Air Force, finally realized the need to reform the establishment system.Interestingly, this time it was not the upper echelons of the Army who played the role of resistance, but the new division commanders who had just climbed from division commanders to higher positions and succeeded them.It was a group of colonels and lieutenant colonels who were commended by the chief of staff of the army who opened fire on them.The long-standing dispute between "Division faction" and "Brigade faction" has resumed, and the two sides hold their own opinions and are at a stalemate.Most of the "division factions" with two or three general stars on their shoulders believe that the current division organization has just passed the test of war and can be changed slightly but without major changes.The "brigade faction" who wear the eagle emblem and the maple leaf logo hold the opposite view.It is believed that the army division failed the war test and had to undergo major surgery.Therefore, the three plans of "elite division", "module division" and "brigade base division" were handed over to General Sullivan at the same time.The Army chief, despite his sympathy for Plan 2, which embodies "a new way of thinking about future operations," failed to convince most generals to accept it.As a result, after he left office, as a compromise between conservatism and reform, the U.S. Army established a new experimental division with 15,800 people based on the Fourth Mechanized Infantry Division in January 1996[17] . The "teacher school" idea clearly prevailed. The "Brigade faction" refused to stop there. They insisted that "the division organization is too large and cumbersome to meet the needs of the battlefield in the 21st century." A new type of army based on a new combat brigade of 5-6,000 personnel.In order to ease the antipathy of the generals, they showed their humane side and retained as many general officers in the new plan as in the old army[18].At the time when the "division" and "brigade" factions were arguing, Lieutenant Colonel McGregor, director of the U.S. Army Combat Command Laboratory, made a new statement. In his book "Breaking the Phalanx", he advocated that at the same time The division and brigade system was abolished and replaced with 12 combat groups of about 5,000 people.Its novelty is that it has jumped out of the stereotype of large and small organizations, large and small numbers, and can adopt the method of building blocks to implement task-based organization according to wartime needs.The shock caused by his views in the army was somewhat unexpected, so that Admiral Rymer asked all army generals to read this book [19].Perhaps the current chief of staff of the army has a unique eye, and he believes that although the lieutenant colonel's idea may not be a panacea for solving problems, it is a panacea for shedding the cocoons of the veterans wrapped in general uniforms. [16] "What kind of division does the U.S. Army need in the 21st century?" Sean Naylor wrote an article in "Army Times" on October 16, 1995, commenting on this matter in detail. [17] According to the U.S. "Army Times", "After five years of analysis, research, and discussions within the military, the Army authorities have finally formulated a new organization for the armored division and the machine infantry division. The new heavy division organization is named 21 The Century Division is organized....It is composed of divisional detachment, 1 armored brigade, 2 machine infantry brigades, divisional artillery unit (brigade level), 1 aviation brigade and 1 support command in charge of logistics. The division has 15,719 people (including 417 reservists). "The establishment staff explained, "The new establishment formulated this time is not a revolutionary establishment...In fact, it can only be regarded as a relatively conservative establishment." . (See Jim Teswin, Army Times, June 22, 1998) [18] See John R. Brinkerhoff, "A New Brigade-Based Army," Parameters, Winter 1997. [19] For a detailed view of the book "Breaking the Phalanx", see Sean D. Naylor's article on June 9, 1997 in the US Army Times. Originally, the concept of "group" was not new to the U.S. Army. The reform of the "five-group atomic division"[20] in the 1950s and 1960s was generally regarded as an unsuccessful attempt, and was even accused of causing indirect causes of poor performance.而在麦格雷戈看来，一个早产儿未必就不能长大成人。如果说"群"诞生在三十年前是生不逢时，那么今天对它来说则可谓恭逢其盛。现代化的武器装备已足以使任何一支较小规模的部队，在火力、机动力方面部不逊于以往规模比之大得多的军队，特别是C4I的出现，使优势互补的军兵种联合作战成了新的战斗力生长点，如果这种时候还抱着十八般武器齐备的师体制或旅体制不放，那才真叫不合时宜。但军事技术的发展即或是高新技术的出现，也只是一种契机，并不会自动带来先进的军事思想和体制编制。一俊遮百丑，军事技术和武器装备方面的领先地位，遮蔽了这样一个事实：美军在编制体制上如同在军事思想上一样，明显比其所拥有的先进军事技术要滞后。从这个意义上看，用"群"打破由师、旅构成的方阵，这是海湾战后美陆军在体制编制上最有创意的构想，代表了美军体制编制改革的新思潮。与陆军不同，空军和海军没有根深蒂固的"方阵"传统，他们的调整步伐相对要显得轻灵些。特别是空军，它巧借沙漠风暴的势头，把师级编制一风吹，全部取消；顺势又将所有的作战飞行联队改为合成联队，率先完成了第一轮体制编制的改革。在把"全球到达，全球力量"确定为新的空军战略目标后，它又继续煽动改革的翅膀，开始试验由约翰·江珀空军中将提出的建立"空军远征部队"的方案。根据这位将军的设想，所谓空军远征部队，是由一支1175人和34架旨在夺取空中优势、实施空中打击、压制敌空防力量及空中加油等飞机组成的、能在命令下达后48小时内到达战区、并在冲突全过程保持空中作战能力的精悍部队。在这方面，美空军的行动可谓是超音速，目前已组建了三支"空军远征部队"并完成了实兵部署。当第四、第五支这样的部队开始组建时，它的前三支"空军远征部队"已经在"南方瞭望"、"沙漠惊雷"等军事行动中崭露峥嵘[21]。 [20]为适应核战争的需要，设法使部队在核战场上既能进行战斗，又能得以生存，1957年美国陆军进行原子师或五群制师改编。全师11000－14600人，分为机动性较强的5个战斗群，并都配有战术核武器，但该种师在非核战场上攻击能力就相对比较低。 [21]美国空军远征部队构想，详见威廉·卢尼空军准将在《空中力量》杂志1996年冬季号上的文章。 对海军而言，既然已经有了《前沿……由海向陆》的新战略，组建由海军舰队和陆战队混编的远征部队便是顺理成章的事。与举步维艰的陆军、狂飘突进的空军不同，海军更乐意通过一次又一次的演习和实战来打磨"海军远征部队"的构想。从1992年5月大西洋总部的"海洋冒险"、欧洲总部的"双重突击"、太平洋总部的"无声杀手"、陆战队的"海龙"演习，到建立伊拉克南部禁飞区的"警惕南方"、威慑伊拉克的"警惕勇士"，以及在索马里的"恢复希望"、波黑的"精干卫兵"、海地的"维持民主"，每一次行动，海军都在孜孜以求地试验着自己的新编组[22]。他们给这支出一个航母战斗群、一个两栖戒备大队和海军陆战特设部队组成的"海军远征军"规定的任务是，迅速控制海洋并在沿海地区作战。最令海军感到意外和惊喜的是，这支远征部队所需的两栖登陆装备，竟然出乎意料地获得了国会批准的预算资金[23]。美国政治家们对海军近乎某种情结式的偏爱，使海军特别是海军陆战队走出了海湾战争时遭受冷遇的阴影，并在建立新的海军体制编制后，对占据美军中第一军种的地位充满自信。 [22]正像海军作战部长凯尔索和陆战队司令芒迪所说的，在军费不断削减，海外基地越来越少的情况下，"美国需要一支规模较小，但能快速部署，易于合理编配和训练有素的联合作战部队"（1993年5月，《海军学会会刊》）。关于"海军远征部队"见《海军陆战队》杂志，1995年3月号。 [23]见1995年11月号《海上力量》，L·埃德加·普赖纳《从超越地平线到超越滩头》："出乎预料的预算资金--美国国会最近同意在1996财年拨款建造第7艘多用途两栖攻击舰，此事令海军不胜惊喜。由于预算限制，美海军本打算到2001年才为该舰提出拨款申请……海军原决定把建造第一艘LPD－17两栖船坞运输舰的拨款请求推迟至1998财年，而不是1996年。但出乎预料的是，国会投票同意今年为该舰拨款9.74亿美元。" 海湾战后开始的体制编制改革，不仅调整了美军内部结构，而且也推进了武器的研制和战法的变化，甚至对美国国家战略也造成了深远的影响。小型、灵活、迅捷，既可用于军事打击，又能执行非战争军事任务的"远征军"，成了各军兵种竞相采用的新编制模式，也成了美国政府手中方便又有效的工具。我们发现，由于有了这几支得心应手的"杀手锏"，甚至促成了一种令人担忧的危险倾向：美国政府在处理国际事物时，已经变得越来越喜欢动武，出手也越来越快，并且是睚眦必报。这种军队与政府、军事与政治的互动，正在使美军从体制编制进而到战略思想都开始经历一次深刻的但也很难说不是灾难性的变化。目前，美国国防部试图着手把地面、空中和海上的远征军组成一体化的"联合特遣部队"，就是这一变化的最新步骤[24]。只是这种充分一体化后的部队，在灵便迅捷地完成美国政府赋予的全球使命时，是否会以同样的特点把美军乃至美国拖进某个令其伤透脑筋的泥沼，现在还难以逆料。 [24]1993年美国《防务全面审查报告》提出，"下列部队组件足以应付一场大规模地区冲突：4－5个陆军师；4－5个陆战队远征旅；10个空军战斗机联队；100架空军重型轰炸机；4－5个海军航母作战大队；特种作战部队……此外，我们还提出了一个海外存在部队的新概念，即自适应特编联合部队。它根据战区司令的要求，由特定的空军部队、地面部队、特种作战部队和海军部队编成。" 从联合战役到全维作战--距彻悟一步之遥 我们说美国军事理论滞后，仅仅是相对其先进的军事技术而言。比之其它国家的军人，美国人充满技术色彩的军事思想，在假定未来战争就是高技术战争这一尺度下，当然处于无人可及的领先地位。也许率先提出"新军事革命"的苏联奥尔加科夫学派，是唯一出现过的一次例外。 经过海湾战争的铁砧锻打，"军事革命"呼之欲出。不独在美军，甚至在全世界的军人那里，这四个字都成了东施效颦的时髦口号。因为对他人技术的向往和对某种口号的追随，并不是什么费力的事情。费力的只有美国人。要想在一场业已开始并将马上全面到来的军事革命中，确保自己的领先地位，首先要解决的，是消除美军在军事思想与军事技术之间存在的落差。其实，战尘甫定，美军还没有完成从波斯湾的撤军，就已经开始了自上而下的"思想换血"，意在对军事技术革命启动后未能同步跟进的军事思想革命进行补课。尽管归根结蒂也未能完全摆脱对技术的口味式偏好，美国人还是在此番非同寻常的"突围"中，获得了某些不光是对美军，亦对全世界的军人同样有益的成果：先是"联合战役"概念的成型，然后是"全维作战"思想的出炉。 "联合战役"的提法，最早出自1991年11月美军参联会颁布的第1号联合出版物《美国武装力量的联合作战》条令。这一明显洋溢着海湾战争气息的新鲜概念，大大突破了流行已久的"协同作战"、"合同作战"的局限，甚至也超越了一度被美国人视为法宝的"空地一体战"理论，该条令把"联合战役"的四要素--统一指挥、军种平等、全面联合与全纵深同时作战凸显出来，首次明确了战区联合司令部司令的指挥控制权；规定任一军种都可能根据不同情况担任作战主角；把"空地一体战"扩展为陆、海、空、天一体战；强调在整个作战空间里进行全纵深同时攻击作战。在美军参联会的强力推进下，各军种相继着手制定与联合条令相匹配的军种条令，以示公开对这一代表未来战争走向的新战法的认同。尽管私下里他们仍念念不忘突出本军种的核心作用，尤其希望实行一种界限清晰的联合--即明确各自领域和权利，由条令、法律和军种荣誉感区分彼此的联合。参联会主席沙利卡什维利看来这一次不打算对各军种参谋长表示妥协，他通过颁布被称为"引导美军共同行动的样板"的《2010年联合部队构想》[25]，决心扮演它一回现代摩西，在满天令人狐疑的暮色中，带领美军拆除军种间藩篱。迈上为真正实现一体化联合作战艰辛跋涉的旅途。 [25]1996年美军参联会推出《2010年联合部队构想》，作为美军未来作战理论，详见《联合部队季刊》1996年夏季号。在《联合部队季刊》1996年冬季号上，海军作战部长约翰逊和空军参谋长福格尔曼均表示支持《2010年联合部队构想》。陆军参谋长赖默也随即推出了《2010年陆军构想》，以响应《2010年联合部队构想》。 即使是在美国这样一个很容易传播相接受新鲜事物的国家，事情也远不像沙利卡什维利以为得那么简单，随着他的退役，美军中对"联合构想"的批评渐渐多了起来，怀疑论重新抬头。海军陆战队认为，"不要将联合奉若神明，而去压制有关未来军队编成的讨论"，"联合的一致性将导致军种独特性的丧失"，而这是与"强调竞争、多元化"的美国精神相违背的。空军则委婉地表达了"2010年联合构想必须在实践中发展，并鼓励军种间相互学习"、"在这个变革的时代，实验的时代，我们的思想要灵活，不能僵化"的意见[26]，海军、陆军在这方面的看法也相去不远，大有将沙利卡什维利的心血毁于一旦之势。可见，并不是只有发生在东方的改革才会出现人存政举、人亡政息的境况。我们作为旁观者，当然会对为了狭隘的集团利益牺牲一种可贵的思想扼腕而叹。因为"联合战役"、"联合构想"的实质根本就不在于对军种利益的肯定或剥夺，而是意图使各军种能在统一的战场空间内实现联合作战，最大限度地降低各军种自行其是的负面效应。显然这是在尚未找到真正一体化军队的办法之前，人们能够想出的上乘战法。只是这一可贵思想的局限性在于：它的起点和终点都落在了武力战的层面，而没能将"联合"的视野，扩及到人类可能产生对抗行为的所有领域。这种思想上的缺陷在二十世纪行将结束、广义战争的端倪已然露头的时刻，显得如此醒目，以至于如果没有美国陆军在1993年版《作战纲要》中提出"全维作战"的概念，我们简直就会对美国军事思想界的"贫血"感到惊讶。 [26]详见美《海军学会会刊》，1998年1月号，霍夫曼中校题为《改革不会一帆风顺》的文章。 这份被第13次修改后的纲领性文件，极富远见地洞察到了美军在今后若干年间可能面临的种种挑战，首次提出了"非战争军事行动"的崭新概念。正是由于有了这一概念，才使人们认识到进行全方位战争的可能性，也就便美国陆军得以为自己的作战理论找到了一个非常大气的新名字--"全维作战"。what is interesting.主持修订美国陆军1993年版《作战纲要》并表现出强烈创新精神的，正是在海湾指挥第七军时被人们指责为作战保守的弗兰克斯将军。如果不是后来发生的事情改变了美国人的思维走向，这位战后初任的陆军训练和条令司令部司令差点就让美国军事思想史产生一次历史性突破。虽然在此版《作战纲要》中，弗兰克斯将军和他的条令编写组的军官们，没能理清"在整个战区实施太空作战支援下的统一的空中、地面、海上和特种作战"与"在战争和非战争行动的各种可能行动中运用所掌握的一切手段，以最小的代价去果断地完成受领的任何任务"这两句话之间的巨大差异，更没能发现在作为军事行动的战争之外，还存在着远为广阔的非军事战争行动的可能性，但它起码指出了"全维作战"应具有"全纵深、全高度、全正面、全时间、全频谱、多手段"的特点，而这正是战争史上从未有过的作战方式最具革命性的特征[27]。 [27]（1997世界军事年鉴》对"全维作战"有详尽介绍。（P291－294） 很可惜，美国人，准确地说是美国陆军，过早地中止了这次革命。在一片反对声中，曾在弗兰克斯将军麾下任团长、后担任陆军训练与条令司令部联合兵种司令的雷尔德，对其老上司的创意诘难最甚。此时的霍尔德中将己不是战场上那个冲劲十足的霍尔德上校，这一回他扮演的是陆军中保守传统的代言人。他的看法是，"那种认为非战争军事行动有一套自己的原则的想法，在作战部队中并不受欢迎，很多指挥官都反对把非战争行动与本义上的军事行动区分开来"。在霍尔德的身后，"陆军中已形成这样一种共识，即把非战争行动区分出来单独对待是一种错误的做法"。他们认为，如果把"非战争军事行动"写入基本条令，将会冲淡军队的尚武特征，还可能导致军队行动的混乱。事情走到这一步，弗兰克斯将军的革命归于流产就不可避免了。在后一任陆军训练与条令司令部司令哈佐格将军授意下，霍尔德将军和98年版《作战纲要》的修订小组，以"一组单一的原则涵盖陆军所有类型的军事行动"为基调，终于对新纲要做出了重大修正。他们的做法是不再区分非战争行动与一般军事行动，只是将作战行动划分为：进攻、防御、稳定、支援四种类型，把原本已归到非战争行动里的救援、维和等任务，重又装回作战行动的老套，以使其能纳入统一的作战原则之下，而对"全维作战"的概念则干脆放弃[28]。表面上看，这是一次正本清源、删繁就简的举动。而实际上，这是一次美国版的买椟还珠。因为修订后的新纲要，在消除尚未成熟的"非战争军事行动"概念所带来的理论混乱的同时，也顺手遗弃了他们不经意间采摘的颇有价值的思想果实。看来在跳进一步退两步的舞蹈时，所有的民族都无师自通。 [28]据美《陆军时报》1997年8月18日肖恩·内勒的文章《新版〈作战纲要〉草案的变化》。 不过，指出美国陆军的短视，并不等于说"全维作战"理论已无可指摘。刚好相反，这一理论从其概念的外延和内涵两方面都存有显而易见的缺陷。诚然，"全维作战"已比此前任何军事理论对作战领域与方式的认识都宽泛了许多，但就其本质来看，依旧没有脱逸出"军事"的范畴，比如我们在前面提出的"非军事战争行动"这一比军事性战争行动含义更广泛、起码可以与其并驾齐驱的作战领域和方式，就被排除在了美国军人的视野之外--可恰恰正是这一大片领域才是未来军人们和政治家发挥想象力和创造力的空间--因而也就不能算是真正意义上的"全维"。更何况"全维"一词在美国陆军那里，还没理清究竟是指几何学上的空间维度，还是与战争相关的各种要素，亦或是二者兼指。就是说，它还处在语焉不详、混沌不清的状态。而如果理不清全维是指什么，各维间的关系又是什么，当然便无法充分展开这一原本极富潜力的概念。事实上，没有人能在360度立体空间加时间再加其它非物理要素的全维度上展开一场战争，任何具体的战争总会有所侧重，总是在有限的维度中展开，又总是在有限的维度中结束。唯一不同的，是在可以预见的将来，军事行动将不再是战争的全部，而只是全维中的一维，甚至加上弗兰克斯将军提出的"非战争军事行动"也还其不上是全维。只有再加上除军事行动以外的一切"非军事战争行动"，才可能实现完整意义上的全维作战。需要指出的是，这一思想在海湾战争结束后的所有美军军事理论研究中，都不曾出现过[29]。尽管"非战争军事行动"、"全维作战"这些充满创见的概念，已经相当逼近从军事技术革命开始的军事思想革命，可以说，它已经来到了崎岖山路的最后一块悬岩之下，距离大彻大悟的峰巅还有一步之遥。但就在这里，美国人停了下来，一向在军事技术和军事思想两方面都领先于世界各国的美国兔子，开始在这里发出沉重的喘息。无论海湾战后沙利文或弗兰克斯们在多少篇军事论文中发出"兔子跑吧"的呼唤，也不可能把所有的乌龟都甩在它的后面。 [29]大概只有安图利奥·埃切维里亚的文章"一场军事理论上的革命：战争各维的互动性"，指出了战争中的"各维"不应是几何学及空间理论中所指的长、宽、高等，而是指与战争密切相关的政治、社会、技术、作战、后勤等因素。但可惜他还是围绕军事轴心来观察战争，并没有对战争的外延形成突破。 现在，或许该是伦奈·亨利中校[30]这些对别国的军事革命能力提出质疑的美国人扪心自问的时候了： [30]1996年4月，在美国陆军军事学院召开的战略研讨会上，陆军中校伦奈·亨利作了题为《21世纪的中国：战略伙伴……或对手》的报告，结论是："中国至少在下个世纪头25年里不可能进行一场军事革命。"（见军事科学院外国军事研究部《外军资料》，1997年第6期） 为什么没有发生革命？