Chapter 4 Chapter 3 Deviating from the Classics

The special nature of the Gulf War... Did it cause a "military revolution"?It's always a matter of perspective. —Anthony H. Cordesman Abraham R. Wagner Compared with any war in military history, the Gulf War can be called a major war. More than 300 warships, 4,000 aircraft, 12,000 tanks, and 12,000 armored vehicles from 6 aircraft carrier groups, and nearly 2 million troops from more than 30 countries participated in the war. In the 42-day war, 38 days were air strikes, and the ground battle lasted only 100 hours. The multinational forces led by the United States wiped out 42 Iraqi divisions. The Iraqi army suffered 30,000 casualties, 80,000 prisoners, and 3,847 tanks. , 1,450 armored vehicles, and 2,917 artillery pieces were destroyed, and only 184 U.S. troops were killed, while the cost was as high as 61 billion U.S. dollars [1].

[1] See "The Gulf War - The Final Report of the US Department of Defense to Congress", "Defense in the New Era: Lessons from the Gulf War" and other research reports. Perhaps the victory was achieved too easily, and few of the ecstatic Uncle Sam have been able to accurately assess the significance of this war.Some hot-headed people began to endlessly fabricate the myth of the invincibility of the United States, while others with a calm mind-mostly generals and military critics who failed to participate in "Desert Storm" had complicated and Subtle psychology believes that "Desert Storm" is not a typical war[2], which means that a war conducted under such ideal conditions is not enough for training.This kind of statement sounds somewhat like a fox can't taste grapes.Indeed, from a traditional perspective, "Desert Storm" is not a classic war in the typical sense, but for a war that is being fought when the largest military revolution in human history is coming, it cannot be used traditional or even outdated standard to measure.When a new war requires a new classic, the coalition forces headed by the US military created it in the Gulf at the right time. Only those who follow the old ways cannot see its classic significance for future wars.Because the classics of future warfare can only be born by departing from the traditional mold.We have no intention of helping Americans create myths, but when "Desert Storm" unfolded and ended under the eyes of everyone, the world was surprised by the number of countries participating in the war, its large scale, short period of time, small casualties, and brilliant results. , who can say that a classic war that heralds the advent of war in the era of technological integration and globalization-even though it is only a classic created by American technology and American style of play-is not opening its first chapter to the mysterious and treacherous history of war. a gate?

[2] The first chapter of the research report "Military Experience and Lessons from the Gulf War" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies of the United States, "A Unique War" believes that "the particularity of the Gulf War actually greatly restricts us from learning lessons from experience. capabilities. . . . In fact, it is highly questionable how many important long-term lessons can be drawn from the Gulf War." ("Gulf War" (Part 2), Military Science Publishing Du, 1992 internal issue, P155) After the Gulf War, the Chinese soldiers who were strongly shaken accepted the views of the Western military circle at first, and many people have begun to rethink the experience and lessons of the Gulf War. ("Modern Military", November 1998, No. 262)

When we try to talk about technological integration-war in the era of globalization through the wars that have already taken place, only "Desert Storm" can provide a ready-made example.Right now, in every sense, it is both unique and classic, and therefore an apple worthy of our careful dissection. "Dew" Alliance In Saddam's view, the annexation of Kuwait was more like a domestic matter in the big Arab family than the detention of American hostages by the Iranian revolution, let alone a greeting in advance.But he ignores the difference between the two -- Iran's hostage-taking is of course sweeping the face of the Americans, but what Iraq is strangling is the neck of the entire West.Of course, the lifeblood is more important than face. The United States has to be serious, and other countries that feel the threat of Iraq have to be serious.The alliance between most Arab countries and the United States is more concerned with eradicating Saddam Hussein, an Islamic anomaly, so as not to harm their own interests after he rises up, but it is hard to say that it is really justice for Kuwait[3] .The common concern for interests enabled the Americans to quickly weave a network of alliances to capture Iraq.Western powers have long been familiar with modern international political techniques, and the anti-Iraq alliance has been gathered under the banner of the United Nations.The halo of justice successfully dispelled the religious complex of the Arabs, and made Saddam Hussein's plan to play modern Saladin and launch a "jihad" against Christians in vain.Many countries have volunteered to be a responsible node in this web of alliances.Although Japan and Germany were reluctant, they opened their pockets readily after all. More importantly than paying money, they dispatched their own military personnel without losing the opportunity, thus quietly taking a step towards becoming a symbol of global power again. sexual step.Egypt persuaded Libya and Jordan to stand on the sidelines in the war and no longer support Iraq, making Saddam completely alone.Even Gorbachev, in order to win the support of the Americans for his weak position in the country, finally acquiesced in the military strikes by the multinational forces on his former allies.Even if it is as powerful as the United States, it still has to rely on the support of its allies. This support is mainly reflected in the legitimacy of the operation and logistical assistance, not in the number of additional troops.The reason why President Bush's policies are widely supported by the American public is largely due to the fact that he established an international alliance, which convinced the public that this time, it is not just the Americans who pay for the war and are ready to shed blood.As for the transportation of the 7th Army from Germany to Saudi Arabia, 465 trains, 312 barges and 119 fleets from 4 NATO countries were used; at the same time, Japan also provided microelectronic components urgently needed by the US military equipment, which further proves that growing dependence on allies.In the new era, "going it alone" is neither a smart nor a realistic choice [4].As such, alliances become a common need.From Security Council Resolution 660, which requires Iraq to withdraw its troops, to Resolution 678, which authorizes member states to take all means, the impromptu coalition has gained the broadest recognition in the international community. 110 countries participated in the embargo against Iraq, and more than 30 countries participated in the use of force, including many Arab countries!Obviously, each country has fully assessed its own interests before this operation.

[3] The anti-Saddam coalition in the Arab world is centered around Saudi Arabia-Egypt-Syria.According to General Khaled, who served as the commander of the coalition forces in "Desert Storm", Iraq posed a huge threat to us, "We have no choice but to ask for help from friendly forces, especially from the United States." (See "Desert Warrior", Military Yiwen Publishing House, P227) Americans also attach great importance to alliances. For details, see Part 9 "Formation, Coordination, and Operations of Alliances" in the Appendix of the Final Report of the US Department of Defense to Congress.

[4] The US Center for Strategic and International Studies research report "Military Experience and Lessons from the Gulf War", Chapter 2 "U.S. Military Dependence" pointed out, "This war proves beyond doubt that the U.S. military is Rely on friends and allies politically and logistically. The United States cannot conduct any major contingency operations without significant help from other countries. Except for small operations, the option of going it alone is simply not feasible, and all diplomacy and Defense policy decisions must be made on the basis of this understanding." (ibid.)

The full involvement of the United Nations could not make the dewy, cobweb-like coalition formed in a short period of time strong enough to withstand the brunt of a war.For politicians, an alliance may be nothing more than a high-level meeting after careful weighing of interests, a signing, or even a verbal commitment through a hotline call.As for an army engaged in a coalition war, no detail should be overlooked.In order to prevent American soldiers from violating the Islamic commandments, the U.S. military, in addition to stipulating that they must strictly abide by the customs of the country where they are stationed, also rented the cruise ship "Princess Cunard" to park at sea to provide American soldiers with Western-style entertainment; "The missile attack retaliated and disrupted the Iraqi camp. The United States tried its best to provide air protection for Israel and carefully guarded this alliance network.

More profoundly, the emergence of the "Dew" alliance ended an era, that is, the era of fixed alliances that began with the conclusion of the German-Austrian military alliance in 1879.After the Cold War, the period when ideology was the basis of alliances has disappeared, and the practice of forming alliances based on interests has risen to the fore.Under the banner of political realism, where national interests are above all else, any alliance will only focus on interests more nakedly, and sometimes even the flag of morality is too lazy to raise.There is no doubt that the phenomenon of alliances will continue to exist, but more of them are loose and short-term interest aggregates.In other words, there is no longer any alliance with no interests but only morality.There are different interests and goals in different periods, and whether to form an alliance will be determined accordingly.More and more realistic, more and more free from any moral fetters, this is the characteristic of modern alliances.All forces are connected by the web of interests, which may be extremely short-lived, but very effective.Since then, the interests of modern countries, transnational organizations, and even regional powers have become increasingly erratic, just like the rock star Cui Jian sang: "It's not that I don't understand, the world is changing fast."The ever-changing combination of forces in today's world is also forming a coincidence with the ever-changing technology synthesis-globalization era, which is by no means accidental.Thus, the "Dew Water" alliance formed for the Gulf War officially lifted the curtain of a new era of alliances.

The "Reorganization Act" at the right time Americans who are all over the sky often have introspective behaviors. This seemingly contradictory character surprises those who are looking forward to seeing the arrogant Yankees suffer, and at the same time, it also benefits Americans time and time again. A lot.Indeed, Americans can almost always find the key to the next one from the lessons learned in each military operation. Disagreements and conflicts of interests between the military and arms have existed for a long time, and it is the same in all countries.The competition among the various services and arms of the U.S. military to safeguard their own interests and strive for honor is well known and unparalleled.In this regard, what is impressive is that in the war against Japan 60 years ago, in order to highlight the role of the military, MacArthur and Nimitz each formulated a set of Pacific strategies.In this regard, even the wily President Roosevelt was difficult to balance; it can also be proved that the American planes that bombed Vietnam 30 years ago were under the command of four independent headquarters at the same time. It is really unbelievable.Until 15 years ago, the command system was divided and independent and the authority was unclear. The disastrous consequences for the US military stationed in Beirut were the direct result of the death of about 200 marines.And Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, the deputy commander of the Joint Task Force for the "Grenada" operation, even after he was promoted to the commander of the coalition forces of "Desert Storm" in the future, he still did what he wanted to do with the US military in Grenada. The exposed problems are still fresh in my memory.The question is, who should be under whose command in joint operations?

Ironically, this problem that has plagued the U.S. military for decades was not solved by a seasoned general or a knowledgeable expert, but by two senators named Goldwater and Nichols. solved. In 1986, Congress passed the "Ministry of National Defense Reorganization Act" [5] proposed by them, which solved the problem of unified command of various services in joint operations in one fell swoop by means of legislation. [5] In the study report on the Gulf War made by L. Aspin and W. Dickinson on behalf of the House of Representatives, they gave a very high evaluation to the "Gorney National Defense Reorganization Act", ""Gorney National Defense Reorganization Act" To ensure that the three armed forces of the United States work together to fight the same war."The report also quotes Defense Secretary Dick Cheney as saying that the law is "the most far-reaching piece of legislation affecting the Department of Defense since the birth of the National Security Act."Military generals also spoke highly of this. Admiral Owens, who was the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the "Gorney-Neighborhood Defense Reorganization Act" "one of the three major revolutions in the U.S. military field." In all conflicts, a joint force will be used to fight, and it also makes it clear that the chief of staff of the services is no longer the combat commander. The combat commander is the five theater commanders in chief." ("Journal of National Defense University", No. 11, 1998, P46－47; "Modern Military", No. 12, 1998, P24)

The next question left was the need for a war.Not sooner or later, just at this time, Saddam Hussein stupidly launched the war to invade Kuwait, which was a godsend opportunity for the Americans who were eager to test whether the "Reorganization Act" was effective.In this sense, rather than saying that the "Reorganization Act" was at the right time, it is better to say that the arrival of the Gulf War was at the right time. Fortunately, Powell and Schwarzkopf became the earliest beneficiaries of the "Reorganization Act", and at the same time became the two most powerful generals in the history of American warfare.As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell has clearly obtained the status of chief military adviser to the president for the first time, which allows him to directly obey the president and the Secretary of Defense, and can issue orders to the three armed forces accordingly, without having to serve as the staff of the military and arms The coordinator who is endlessly wrangling among the commanders; as the commander of the battlefield, Schwarzkopf is even more clear-eyed and in power.He can choose to listen to the nagging chatter from the Pentagon, and do what he wants to do. He looks like a general who will not accept the orders of the emperor abroad, and gathers millions of troops in the Gulf and even satellites in space. The frogmen under the sea and every ro-ro cargo ship must obey his orders.This allows him not to hesitate to exercise the supra-service powers given to the Joint Headquarters Commander under the Defense Reorganization Act when necessary, such as when the Marine Corps' frontline commander strongly demanded an amphibious landing off the coast of Kuwait. , decisively exercised the veto, and continued to concentrate on the "left hook" operation that he had already planned. A decree that has just been promulgated for less than five years can be so thoroughly implemented in the ensuing war, which cannot but be attributed to the contract spirit of people in the legal society of the United States.The new command model derived from this has become the most successful proper use of military command power since the division of services.Its intuitive effect is to reduce the level of command, truly realize the entrusted command, and make the tree-like command system deeply rooted in the past evolve into a network structure. The by-product of this evolution is to allow more combat units to immediately Share battlefield information. If we examine the "Reorganization Act" in a broader context of the times, it is not difficult to find that this reorganization of the US military is not an occasional coincidence, but a timely response to the new era's proposals for the old military command relationship. The natural requirement is to recombine the originally dispersed power of the military and arms, and on this basis, generate a super power that is concentrated for a temporary goal and overrides the power of all the arms and arms, so that it can be used in any battle. Competent and happy in the race of war. The birth of the "Reorganization Act" in the United States and its effects in the US military are thought-provoking. Any country that hopes to win a war in the 21st century will inevitably face this choice, or "reorganize", or fail, there is no other way. Going Further Than "Air-Land Battle" "Air-ground combat" was originally a strategy that the U.S. military came up with to deal with the Warsaw Pact tank groups that would flood in at any time on the European plains, but it was just that there was no chance to try its edge.The Gulf War provided a stage for these American soldiers who were full of desire to create and kill, but the actual battle situation was quite different from what people had imagined in advance. "Desert Storm" was basically a battle with "empty" and "ground" that lasted for dozens of days. The "Desert Saber" that was finally shown at the last moment, including that beautiful "left hook", It only took 100 hours of waving before it ended in a bitter mood.The ground battle did not become the finale as the Army expected, but it was more like a concerto that ended in a hurry after playing only one movement[6]. "The air battlefield will become the decisive battlefield", Du Het's prediction seems to have been proved belatedly.But what happened over the Gulf was far beyond the imagination of this Air Force victory theorist.Whether in Kuwait or Iraq, all air battles are not simply knightly duels to seize air supremacy, but an air battle that integrates all combat operations such as reconnaissance, early warning, bombing, fighting, communication, electronic attack, and command and control. It also includes the occupation and scramble for outer space and electronic space. [6] Admiral Merrill McPeak, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force during the Gulf War, said that this was a "war that used a lot of air power, a successful battle won by the U.S. and multinational air forces", The First War in which Air Power Defeated Ground Forces" (Air Force Magazine, May 1991).His predecessor, Michael J. Dugan, said in a speech before the battle that "the only way to avoid a bloody ground battle is to use the Air Force".Although Duggan was dismissed for speaking beyond his authority, he was not mistaken. So far, the Americans who put forward the concept of "Air-Land Battle" have gone farther than Dohey. Even so, they will have to wait a few years before they understand that once the theory of integrated combat is put into practice, Its scope is much wider than their initial expectations, and even so wide that land, sea, air, sky, and electricity are all-encompassing.Although it will take some time to digest the fruits of the Gulf War, it is destined to become the origin of the theory of "total dimensional warfare" proposed by the elites of the US Army when they suddenly become enlightened. What's interesting is that you can think that Americans' understanding is a bit behind, but this does not affect their early acquisition of the key to "full-dimensional combat": this is the famous "air mission order" [7].This 300-page "Air Mission Order" was formulated jointly by land, sea, and air, and enabled the coalition commander Schwarzkopf who was born in the army to order the entire coalition air force. It is the soul of the air campaign. According to the general attack plan, the most suitable targets are selected for all aircraft on a daily basis.Thousands of coalition aircraft take off from the Arabian Peninsula, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey every day. According to the "air mission instructions" processed by computers, they launch cross-service and cross-border air strikes.Although this command procedure is considered too "aircraft-oriented" by the Navy-for this reason, they even made a small calculation and quietly left some aircraft for use in the moment when the Navy did not come to the limelight- But it managed to organize the largest and most complex aerial campaign in the history of warfare. [7] Whether it is the report of the U.S. Department of Defense or the report of House of Representatives L. Aspin, they all spoke highly of the "Air Mission Order" and believed that "the Air Mission Order directed a well-planned and integrated air battle situation." Not only that, the "Air Mission Order" also provides a paradigm for organizing and commanding all combat operations from now on.A piece of "instruction" is an excellent plan for the combination of combat forces among the military services, and the complexity and success of the transnational combination is its brilliance.This alone has greatly surpassed the vision of the designers of the "air-ground integrated combat" theory.That is to say, the GI has inadvertently led God of War into an open field that she has never set foot in before. Who is the king of land battles? Yamamoto Fifty-Six was undoubtedly the most innovative military "specialist" of his time. Using an aircraft carrier to attack Pearl Harbor and win a big victory is his magical stroke in the history of naval warfare.What is incomprehensible is that the same Yamamoto failed to understand the epoch-making significance of his own unique tactics.After commanding the United Fleet to severely damage the U.S. Navy, he still held the belief that only battleships were the main force in the decisive battle at sea, and threw the key to the door of victory that he had already held into the vast waves of the Pacific Ocean.If the first person to make a mistake can still be regretted, the second person who makes the same mistake is simply stupid, especially the person who makes the kind of mistake that has already been made but has never been imagined.Unfortunately, the history of warfare is not uncommon for such examples of thinking lagging behind action.Like Yamamoto Fifty-Six back then, although the U.S. Army used helicopters to defeat the Iraqi armored mechanized units-it is said that in the entire ground battle, except for the Republican Guard "Medi", which was surrounded by the U.S. 7th Army south of Basra The "armored division has fought a trapped beast, and almost never had a decent tank battle.However, when the smoke in the bay cleared, the Americans who had clearly created a new era of land warfare with helicopters also returned to the level of thinking before the war inexplicably. While weapons, including tanks, have increased research and development costs, the appropriation for helicopters has been reduced.Hold on to the handicap, and still insist on using tanks as the decisive weapon in future land warfare [8]. [8] According to the prediction of Russian and Western military experts, "Today, the survival time of a tank as a single target on the battlefield may not exceed 2-3 minutes. The survival time of a battalion-company tank on open ground is 30 minutes." -50 minutes." Although experts made such estimates, most countries still use tanks as their main weapons (Russian "Soldier" magazine, No. 2, 1996).Ralph Peter said in his article "The Future of Armored Warfare" that "flying tanks have been desired for a long time, but considering the rationality of using fuel and the physical and psychological factors of combat, what is still needed in the future It is a ground system. Given that the attack helicopter incorporates all the features we had envisioned for the flying tank, we believe that the attack helicopter is a complement to, not a replacement for, the armored vehicle." (Parameters, Fall 1997) In fact, as early as the Vietnam War, helicopters had already made their debut in the hands of the Americans, followed by the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan and the British in the Malvinas Islands, which made helicopters shine.Only because its opponents are mainly guerrillas and unarmored infantry, the helicopter's challenge to the tank throne was delayed by a full two decades.The Gulf War finally gave the helicopter a chance to flex its muscles.This time, not counting the helicopter units of the coalition forces, the U.S. military alone has deployed 1,600 helicopters of various types in the Gulf. Such a large group of helicopters is enough to form an entire helicopter army. Uncreatively, just as the French distributed tanks to infantry during World War II, they also used helicopters as an accessory force for armored mechanized troops and other troops.Fortunately, the helicopter, which was destined to become famous in this battle, did not conceal its kingly appearance. Helicopters (only the "Apache" is not well-loved) are being unfairly snubbed at a time when the Americans are hoisting the Patriot, F-117, Tomahawk, etc. into the sky via CNN However, apart from the "Final Report to Congress" written by the U.S. Department of Defense after the war, few people still remember that it was not other new favorite weapons but helicopters that made the first contribution to "Desert Storm".Twenty minutes before the start of the month-long continuous bombing, after flying close to the ground for several hours, the MH-53J and AH-64 helicopters used "Hellfire" missiles to destroy the Iraqi early warning radar first, opening up a safe passage for the bombers. Demonstrated the helicopter's unparalleled penetration capabilities.As the most flexible battlefield flying platform, it also undertakes a large number of tasks such as transporting supplies, medical evacuation, search and rescue, battlefield reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures. The main force is also the helicopter.In this war, what really impressed people and demonstrated the profound potential of helicopters was "Operation Cobra": the 101st Division used more than 300 helicopters to perform the farthest "leapfrog" in the history of war, deep inside Iraq. The "Cobra" forward operating base was established more than 100 kilometers away.Then they relied on the base to cut off the only way for the Iraqi army to retreat along the Euphrates Valley, and intercepted the Iraqi troops fleeing along the Hamar Causeway.It must have been the most significant tactical operation of the land campaign of the war.It announced that helicopters can stand on their own and carry out large-scale independent operations from now on.When hordes of Iraqi soldiers ran out of the fortifications destroyed by helicopters and knelt down to beg for surrender, and were rounded up by helicopter pilots like bison on the western plains, the view that "the final solution to the battle can only be solved by infantry" , has been fundamentally shaken by these American "flying cowboys".Originally, the original intention of the helicopter "Moth Jump" operation was to provide support for the main attacking armored force, but the unexpected success of the helicopter force made the plan far behind the progress of the battle.For this reason, Schwarzkopf had to order the 7th Army to launch an attack 15 hours in advance, although under the command of General Franks, the U.S. 7th Army advanced far faster in the desert than it was famous for launching a tank blitzkrieg. Guderian, but did not win the reputation of "blitz" like that predecessor, but was reprimanded as "moving forward slowly step by step like an old lady".After the war, General Franks refuted criticism from the coalition headquarters in Riyadh on the grounds that the Iraqi army still had combat effectiveness [9].But in fact, neither the critics nor the rebuttals have grasped the essence of the problem.General Franks's criticism of the mobility of his tanks was based on the helicopter as a frame of reference.To this day, there is no case to prove which kind of tank can keep up with the combat rhythm of helicopters. [9] "Into the Storm--Command Research" is a book written by the retired General Franks. In the book, he said that the speed of the 7th Army crossing the desert was not wrong, and the criticism from Riyadh was unreasonable . (See US (Army Times, August 18, 1997) In fact, it is not only mobility, as the former "king of land warfare", tanks have been challenged by helicopters in all aspects. Compared with tanks that need to constantly overcome the friction coefficient of the ground, the combat space of helicopters is as high as a tree. , is completely unaffected by any ground obstacles, and its good mobility is enough to offset its lack of thick armor.It is also a weapon platform in motion, and its firepower is no less than that of tanks. This is the biggest crisis that tanks have encountered since they entered the war stage with the nickname "water tank".What makes tanks even more embarrassing is the energy it takes to organize a large-scale tank assault (just how to transport a certain number of tanks to the assembly area remotely is a headache), and the risks taken (in When tanks are assembled, they are extremely vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes by the enemy), and they have no advantage at all in front of helicopters that are good at scattered deployment and concentrated assaults, can fight regular warfare when gathered, and can fight guerrilla warfare when dispersed.In fact, tanks and helicopters are a pair of natural enemies. The former is far from the opponent of the latter. Not to mention the "tank killer" such as the AH-64 helicopter, even the old AH-1 "Cobra" helicopter also destroyed the tanks in the Gulf War. Hundreds of tanks, but no casualties.Faced with the powerful attack power of helicopters, who would still insist that "the best weapon against tanks is a tank"[10]? [10] See "Appendix to the Final Report of the US Department of Defense to Congress", P522. It can now be said that the helicopter is the real terminator of the tank.This rising star above the waves of the bay is crowning his throne with a terrific victory in Desert Storm, and there's no doubt that it's only a matter of time before it drives the tanks off the field.It may not be long before "winning land battles from the air" will no longer be a sensational slogan, and more and more army commanders will form a consensus on this point.New concepts such as "flying army" and "flying land warfare" with helicopters as the main combat weapon will become standard military terms and appear in every military dictionary. The other hand behind the victory Regardless of the fact that Bush, as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, must have known the time of the attack in advance, from CNN's television report, the whole world, like the US president, saw the thrilling scene of the start of the war at the same time.In the age of information sharing, a president has no more privileges than a civilian.This is what makes modern warfare different from any previous warfare. Real-time or near-real-time reports make war a new program that ordinary people can directly examine from the media. Therefore, the media has become a direct part of war. More than just providing information from the battlefield. Unlike a live broadcast of a World Cup football match, what people see is limited by the subjective perspective of TV reporters (the 1,300 journalists sent to the front line all know the "News Report on the Gulf War" just issued by the US Department of Defense. "Regulations on the Amendment of the "Regulations", which can be reported and which cannot be reported, everyone has their own discretion), and they have to go through the confidentiality review of the joint press office in Dhahran and Riyadh.Perhaps the U.S. military and the media have learned the lesson of the deep discord between the two sides during the Vietnam War. This time, the news organizations and the military got along very well. There is a figure that may illustrate the problem. More than 1,300 pieces of news were issued during the entire war. Of the manuscripts, only five were sent to Washington for review, four of which were approved within a few hours, and the remaining one was withdrawn by the news organization itself.With the concerted efforts of journalists, the field commanders successfully affected the world's audio-visual, allowing people to see everything the military wanted people to see, and all the things they didn't want people to know, so no one could See.The American press unanimously gave up the neutral stance advertised to them, and joined the anti-Iraq camp with enthusiasm, cooperating with the military circles like a pair of excellent double reed actors, interpreting the same war script very tacitly and with great effort, so that The power of the media and the power of the coalition formed a joint force to attack Iraq [11].Not long after Iraq invaded Kuwait, a large number of reports of U.S. troops entering Saudi Arabia appeared in various news reports, which made the Iraqi army deterred from the border of Kosha and quietly created momentum for the "tripping horse rope" operation; before the "Desert Storm" war One day, the news that the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet passed the Suez Canal was blatantly publicized by the Western media, which played a role in confusing Saddam, making him think that the U.S. military had not yet completed its combat deployment when the catastrophe was imminent.Similarly, any so-called high-tech weapon that came in handy in the Gulf War would not be as powerful as people think if it is not rendered by the media.At as many as 98 press conferences held throughout the war, people saw pictures of how precision-guided bombs drilled into buildings and exploded along ventilation holes and many impressive pictures of "Patriots" destroying "Scuds" The lens, all this gave the whole world, including Iraqis, a strong visual shock, and the myth about the strange power of American-made weapons was established. The belief that "Iraq must be defeated and the United States must win" was born from this.Clearly, the news has done Americans a great favor.It can be said that the U.S. military and the Western media have joined forces intentionally or unintentionally to create a deadlock that hangs Saddam's Iraq on the gallows.In the "Operation Outline" revised after the war, the Americans deliberately mentioned that "the power of media reports can have a dramatic impact on the strategic direction and the scope of military operations." In it, the news war in the Gulf War is used as an example.It seems that in all wars from now on, in addition to the basic means of military strikes, the power of the media will increasingly become the other hand in the war, playing an equal role in promoting the war process as military strikes. [11] See Section 19, "News Reports," in the Appendix to the U.S. Department of Defense's Final Report to Congress. Different from battlefield propaganda that is too subjective and easily rejected by opponents and neutrals, the media has an immeasurable impact quietly because of its skillful cloak of objective reporting.In the Gulf, just as the coalition led by the US military deprived Iraq of its right to speak militarily, the powerful Western media deprived Iraq of its right to speak politically, to defend itself, and even to be sympathized and supported. Compared with the weak voice of the heinous "Great Satan", Saddam's image as an invader and war madman is rendered more convincingly.It was the combination of one-sided media power and one-sided military power that made Iraq suffer double blows on the battlefield and morally, which doomed Saddam Hussein's failure. However, the role of the media has always been a double-edged sword.This means that while it is pointing at the enemy, it will have another equally sharp edge pointing at itself.According to information disclosed after the war, the reason why the ground war ended abruptly after 100 hours was actually the same rash decision made by President Bush after being influenced by a rash view of the war process published by the field press officer on TV , "dramatically shortened the time from strategic decision-making to the end of operations" [12].结果使余日无多的萨达姆逃过了必死的一劫，也就为日后掌政的克林顿留下一串最终没能炸响的"沙漠惊雷"。传媒对战争的影响越来越普遍、越来越直接，以至于连一个超级大国的总统做出类似停战这样的重大决策，都在很大程度上源自于对一次电视新闻的反应。媒体在当今社会生活中分量之重，由此可见一斑。可以毫不夸张地说，无冕之王已经成了打赢任何一场战争的重要力量。在"沙漠风暴"横扫海湾之后，将不会再有仅仅依靠军事力量而没有媒体力量介入就能取胜的战争。 [12]美国陆军FM100－6号野战条令《信息作战》中，详细披露了这一带有戏剧性的事件（见《信息作战》，P68－69）。电视新闻对"死亡高速公路"的报道，也对战争的过早结束产生了影响。（《联合部队季刊》1997－1998秋／冬号） 有许多个剖面的苹果 作为结束旧时代、开启新时代的第一场最具技术综合特点的战争，"沙漠风暴"是一次能给予各国军人以全方位启迪的经典之战。任何乐于对军事问题进行探究的人，不论把目光投向这场战争的哪个角落，总能从中得到教益或者是教训。基于此，我们把这场在经验和教训方面都具有多义性的战争，称之为有许多个剖面的苹果。而这只苹果的剖面远不止前面已经谈到过的那些，只要你有一把锋利的思维之刀，便随时都会有一个意想不到的剖面出现在你的眼前： 在布什总统对美国和全世界为科威特所负有的道义责任慷慨陈词时，没有一位自负的经济学家预见到美国会为这场战争的军费开支提出典型的A－A制"责任分担"计划，从而开创了分担国际战争费用的新模式--一起打仗，共同付帐。即使你不是商人，也不得不佩服这种华尔街式的精明[13]； [13]《美国国防部致国会的最后报告附录》第16部分，专门谈到"责任分担"的问题。与一般认为的不同，美国人在让盟国分担战争费用时，主要不是出自经济因素，而是基于政治考虑。莱斯特·瑟罗的《21世纪的角逐》谈到，610亿美元的战费"与美国每年6万亿国民生产总值相比，这笔军费开支实在微不足道。之所以要那些没有输送战斗人员参战的国家给予财政资助，完全是为了让美国公众信服此战不是美国一家的事，而是联合行动"。 心理战并不是新颖的战法，"沙漠风暴"心理战的新颖之处在于它的创造性。把一颗威力巨大的炸弹投下后，再让飞机撤下传单，警告那些在几公里外被这次爆炸震得心惊肉跳的伊军士兵：下一颗炸弹就会轮到你了！仅此一招，就足以使成建制师的伊拉克军队土崩瓦解。一位伊军师长在战俘营里承认，心理战对伊军士气的打击，仅次于联军的轰炸[14]； [14]杰克·萨姆少校在《特种作战》杂志上撰文，介绍美军第4心理战大队在海湾战争中实施心理战的情况。（见《特种作战》杂志1992年10月号）在美军《东欧中亚军事杂志》1991年12月号中，也有专文介绍海湾战争中的心理战。 战争开始时，A－10被美国人自己都认为是一种已经落后的对地攻击机。在与"阿帕奇"直升机进行了被称为"致命的联合"之后，这种飞机以大面积淘汰伊军坦克而使自己免遭淘汰的命运，直至成为海湾上空众多耀眼的明星之一。一种并不先进的武器与其它武器搭配，竟产生如此神奇的效果，这对武器的设计和使用当会有一言难尽的启示； 对于开战前不久才匆忙接任美国空军参谋长的麦克皮克将军来说，他在"这只苹果"上留下的齿痕，是在战争中实现了他打破战略空军和战术空军界限，建立空军混合联队的梦想，并在战后以"减7加4"的办法对美空军指挥体制进行了有空军以来最富创见的改革，即在取消了战略、战术、空运、后勤、系统、通信、保密等7个空军司令部之后，又组建了作战、机动、装备、情报等4个空军司令部[15]。很难想象，如果没有海湾战争，麦克皮克将军的同僚们会接受如此大胆的变革[16]。而我们这些海湾战争的局外人，就更无法从中得到某种启示和借鉴。 [15]空军参谋长麦克皮克主张用多机种组成的"混合联队"，替代由单一机种组成的联队。他说，"如果我们今天在沙特阿拉伯再干点事的话，就不再是用由72架F－16装备起来的联队了，而是由一些攻击机、防空战斗机、防空区外飞行的干扰机、野鼬鼠、加油机等等组成的联队。……这些战术也许在世界的某个地区发生武装冲突时会用得着的。"（美《空军》杂志1991年2月） [16]美国空军部长堂纳德·B·赖斯认为，"海湾战争非常透彻地阐述了这样一条（经验）：空中力量作为一个统一的整体计划和实施作战行动时，可以做出最大的贡献。"战术空军司令部司令迈克尔·洛将军指出，"用诸如战略和战术等术语来限定飞机的类型和任务，正在阻碍为发展空中力量而做出的努力，到了如此地步，我们必须进行组织结构的改革。"（见美国空军条令AFM1--1《美国空军航空航天基本理论》P329，注释8）分管计划与作战的副参谋长吉尼·V·亚当斯承认，从海湾战争中汲取的教训是"修改而不是检查我们的作战条令"。美国空军分管后勤与工程的副参谋长亨利·维切利奥中将，也赞成通过改革减少保障方面的薄弱环节。见《简氏防务周刊》1991年3月9日。 Etc., etc. 假如照此穷举下去，我们会看到这只苹果更多的剖面，而且并不都是随处可圈可点。老实说，它的缺陷和可疑之处几乎和它的长处一样多，但这无论如何不会使我们对它产生丝毫的轻视。尽管这场内涵丰富的战争，还不能被看做是现代战争的百科全书，起码没有为我们提供关于未来战争的全部现成答案。但它毕竟是大量高新技术武器出现后，头一回最集中使用并由此引发了一场军事革命的实验场，凭借这一点，已足以为它赢得战争史上的经典地位，并为我们思维的根芽，提供一张全新的温床。