Chapter 5 Chapter Four Encircle and wipe out the Huangwei Corps and encircle the Du Yuming Group
After our army wiped out the enemy Huang Botao's corps, what should we do next?How to wipe out the heavy enemy forces in the Huaihai area one by one?This issue was studied by the Central Military Commission, the General Front Committee, and the Huaye Command as early as the first phase of the campaign.
After full weighing and comprehensive consideration of the opinions of the leaders of the General Front Committee, Mao Zedong finally decided to wipe out the Huangwei Corps first.
Before the launch of the Huaihai Campaign, the Kuomintang stationed four mobile corps in the Xuzhou area, namely the Qiu Qingquan Corps, Huang Botao Corps, Li Mi Corps, and Sun Yuanliang Corps, and three appeasement area troops, namely the Feng Zhian Department, Li Yannian Department, and Liu Ruming Department.A total of 18 armies, more than 600,000 people.
After the battle was launched, the Kuomintang army transferred the Huangwei Corps from Henan to Xuzhou to join the battle in the Huaihai area; corps).In this way, the total force of the Kuomintang involved in the Huaihai Campaign reached more than 800,000.
After the first stage of combat, our army completely wiped out Huang Botao's corps, forced Feng Zhi'an's department to revolt, and dealt a considerable blow to the 3 corps of Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang and Liu Ruming's department, and wiped out the enemy's troops on the Huaihai battlefield. Basically equal.
After the launch of the campaign, the Central Military Commission established the General Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign in time to command the two major field armies of Huaye and Zhongye and local troops to engage in an unprecedented strategic decisive battle with the enemy.
After the first stage of combat, the task of breaking through in the middle was completed, the scale of the campaign was expanded, and the enemy's heavy troops were divided into several unconnected pieces, so that the enemy army in Xuzhou was completely isolated. The whole situation was extremely beneficial to our army.
The second stage of the Huaihai Campaign: From November 23 to December 15, 1948, the Central Plains Field Army, with the cooperation of the main force of the East China Field Army, assembled and wiped out the 12th Corps of the Kuomintang Army.The East China Field Army surrounded the three corps fleeing south from Xuzhou in Qinglongji and Chenguanzhuang in the northeast of Yongcheng, and wiped out the sixth corps.During this period, the enemy's Sixth and Eighth Corps were repelled by our army several times from the north of Bengbu.
As of the 22nd when Huang Botao's corps was wiped out, the Qiu Qingquan corps and Li Mi corps, which had reinforced Huang Botao's corps in the east of Xuzhou, were blocked by our army on the north-south line of Daxu's family. The Li Yannian Corps and Liu Ruming Corps in the south of Xuzhou and the north of Bengbu were blocked by our army in Renqiao, Huazhuangji and other areas north of Guzhen; in the southwest of Xuzhou, the Huangwei Corps who came from afar to reinforce Xuzhou marched hundreds of miles , Entering the Zhaoji area on the south bank of the Weihe River between Mengcheng and Suxian County, they were blocked and restrained by the Zhongye troops and could not advance.
On the Huaye side, after the Huaye troops wiped out Huang Botao's corps, the Four Columns monitored the enemy in the east of Xuzhou in the Caobaji area west of Nianzhuang; Zhancheng, Youxia and other areas; the 1st, 11th, 12th, and Shandong Central South Columns are still located in the southeast of Xuzhou; the 3rd Column, the Liangguang Column and the troops of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region are located in the Taoshan District on the east and west sides of the Jinpu Railway in the south of Xuzhou. Sun Yuanliang's corps was monitored in areas such as , Gushanji and other areas; troops from the Sixth Column, Thirteenth Column, and the Jianghuai Military Region went south to Dahujia, Zhangdazhuang, and Jiangjiamiao, and wiped out Lingbi County and liberated Lingbi County. Advance to the north of Xisipo to stop Li Yannian's corps who committed northern crimes from Guzhen.The Seventh Column is located in the south of Suxian County, which is the battle reserve. At this time, apart from the Li Yannian and Liu Ruming corps, which are located on the Renqiao and Xisipo lines to block the enemy, the main force has been deployed between the Guohe River and the Huihe River. The vast area to the east, west and north of Pingji.The four verticals and the nine verticals are located on the north bank of the Weihe River to block the Huangwei Corps from the front, while the one vertical, three verticals, and six verticals spread out in a fan shape on the east and west sides of the Huangwei Corps.
On November 23, the Central Military Commission analyzed the situation of the enemy and ourselves on the Huaihai battlefield, emphasizing that: in the first stage of the battle, our army has achieved great victories, but the enemy still has about 50 divisions, and there is still considerable defense. tenacious combat effectiveness.For us, the most beneficial thing is to annihilate the enemies in front of us one by one according to the current situation, and we should strive for this.If we can wipe out a large number of enemies to the south in the second stage, we can fully realize the campaign plan.The General Front Committee conveyed the instructions of the Central Military Commission to the entire army in a timely manner, so that all commanders and fighters could more firmly establish the idea of engaging in a decisive battle with the enemy and annihilating the main force of the enemy to the north of the Yangtze River. A more violent attack began the second phase of the Huaihai Campaign.
The Huangwei Twelfth Corps was determined by the Communist Army as the second combat target of the Huaihai Campaign. It has undergone a process of evolution, which can also be said to be the result of the evolution of the battlefield.
Huang Wei (1904-1989), a native of Guixi County, Jiangxi Province, stayed at Whampoa Military Academy after graduating from the first phase to serve as the lieutenant captain of the third enlistment corps. He accompanied Chiang Kai-shek in the first and second Eastern Expeditions, and accompanied the Northern Expedition.
In 1928, he was promoted to head of the regiment. In 1929, he studied in the first phase of the special class of the Kuomintang Army University. After graduation, he was promoted to brigade commander. After 1931, he took part in Chiang Kai-shek's campaign to "encircle and suppress" the Jinggangshan revolutionary base, and was promoted to division commander during the war.
In 1937, he was sent to Germany for further studies, and returned home early due to the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. In 1938, he was promoted to the commander of the Eighteenth Army and received by Chiang Kai-shek. In 1939, he was transferred to be the commander of the 54th Army, under the command of Guan Linzheng, commander-in-chief of the Ninth Army.The Fifty-Fourth Army is the basic unit of Chen Cheng's military group. Due to the grievances between Chen Cheng and Guan Linzheng, Guan Linzheng deliberately made things difficult for Huang Wei, and Huang Wei was forced to ask for resignation.Chiang Kai-shek transferred Huang Wei as Lieutenant General Gao Shen of the Military Commission. At the turn of the autumn and winter of 1944, Chiang Kai-shek reorganized the "Supervisory and Training Department of the Military Commission" that had retreated from Guilin to Chongqing into the "Department of the Editorial and Training Director of the Intellectual Youth Joining the Army and Youth Army", and Huang Wei was appointed as the deputy director.Later, the southeast branch of the youth army training director department was established, with Huang Wei as the director. Huang Wei presided over the youth army training and formulated a complete set of training and teaching plans.
After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, that is, in June 1946, Huang was appointed as the commander of the 31st Army. In the spring of 1947, he was transferred to the Ministry of National Defense of the Kuomintang Nanjing Government as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Defense Headquarters.In the autumn of the same year, he served as the principal of the new military academy in Wuhan. In August 1948, Chiang Kai-shek organized the Mobile Corps and appointed Huang Wei as the commander of the Twelfth Corps.The predecessor of the Twelfth Corps was the Eighteenth Army, which originally governed the Reorganized Eleventh Division, the Reorganized Third Division, and the Reorganized Tenth Division. The commander was Hu Lian.The reorganized eleventh division is Hu Lian's backbone force and one of the "five main forces" of the Kuomintang.After the reorganization division was upgraded to an army, the eleventh division was renamed the eighteenth army, the third division was renamed the tenth army, the tenth division was renamed the fourteenth army, and then transferred to the eighty-fifth army, and attached to the fourth rapid column.In this way, the Twelfth Corps has a total of 4 armies and 1 fast column, with a total strength of 120,000.
When the corps was formed, most people thought that Hu Lian would be the commander, and the Kuomintang military authorities also proposed Hu Lian as the commander. However, Bai Chongxi, the commander-in-chief of the "suppression general" in Central China, repeatedly attacked Hu Lian, and Chiang Kai-shek had to consider another candidate.Chen Cheng recommended Huang Wei as commander. Although Bai Chongxi and He Yingqin opposed it, Chief of Staff Gu Zhutong actively supported it.As a result, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Huang Wei as the commander and Hu Lian as the deputy commander.Hu Lian was not reconciled to being a deputy. In October, he asked for leave to leave the army and went to Wuhan on the grounds of his father's serious illness and dental treatment. Even Yang Botao, the commander of the 18th Army, was hospitalized. It can be seen that at the beginning of the formation of the 12th Corps, internal It is full of contradictions.
Before the Battle of Huaihai started, Liu Bocheng led the Nakano Division to disguise as the main force, intending to mobilize the tiger into the mountains and lead the "ox" in western Henan. The Huangwei Corps was mobilized by the Nakano in Biyang, Dianhe, and Nanyang in the middle and late October of 1948. After finding nothing, they returned to the vicinity of Zhumadian, Henan Province at the end of the month, and did not gather in the area until early November.
After the Battle of Huaihai started, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Huangwei Corps to rush to the Xuzhou battlefield. On November 8, the Huangwei Corps was ordered to dispatch from Zhumadian, and proceeded to Xuzhou via Zhengyang, Xincai, Fuyang, Mengcheng, and Suxian according to the designated route.However, there are no railways or highways in this area, and the rivers are criss-crossing, and they have to cross the tributaries of the Huaihe River, such as the Nanru River, Honghe River, Yinghe River, Xifei River, Guohe River, and Huihe River.Such a huge corps, with many tanks, trucks, howitzers and other heavy weapons, marched on the dirt roads with potholes, and had to build bridges to cross rivers. The degree of difficulty can be imagined.However, Chiang Kai-shek also strictly ordered that "no excuses shall be used to delay the action." Under Chiang Kai-shek's strict supervision, by the 18th, his vanguard troops arrived in Mengcheng.
Mao Zedong and the leaders of our army were very alert to the Huangwei Corps rushing to help the Xuzhou battlefield. On November 1, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Liu Bocheng, requesting that Huang Wei's corps be diverted eastward, and pointed out: "Except for the sixth column that must immediately tail Huang Wei to move eastward, if the tenth column is near Nanyang, it is also appropriate to cooperate with the second vertical tail Huang Wei to move eastward."11 On March 2, Liu Bocheng sent a telegram to contain the deployment of Huang Wei's corps: "1. Take six columns and command 4 regiments of southern Shaanxi troops, and one column of 20 brigades, attached to 1 regiment in western Henan, passing through the middle area between Xiping and Zhumadian 2. Use two verticals from the garden, pass through Xuanhuadian, and arrive at Xixian County in Yuri, and attack them from the side. 3. Use relevant armed forces from Henan, Anhui and Su to destroy the enemy's advancing roads and bridges, and attack them separately. Enemy on the move."
On the same day, Mao Zedong replied to Liu Bocheng and others, suggesting that the actions of the Six Columns were worthy of consideration: "It seems better to open Taihe and Fuyang from the inner countryside, and Huang Wei arrives there first, and it is appropriate to block Huang Wei from the front or side. After the mall, cross the Huai River to Taihe and Fuyang, and work together with the Six Columns to hold back Huang Wei."
According to Mao Zedong's telegram, Liu Bocheng immediately deployed six verticals and two verticals to contain and hinder the Huangwei Corps, and emphasized: "This time to cooperate with the master of Xuzhou to fight is not only related to the change of the Central Plains war situation, but also to promote the development of the national strategic situation. Therefore, it is also important to strive to defeat the Kuomintang as soon as possible. Therefore, it is necessary to mobilize all commanders and fighters to obey the interests of the whole, regardless of any fatigue, difficulties, consumption and sacrifice, and take all effective methods to intercept and block the Huangwei Corps advancing eastward and delay its movement. Time to assist the main battle to achieve victory.
The Central Plains Field Army completely surrounded the Huangwei Corps. This is the situation where the soldiers blocked the enemy in the skirmisher bunker
For this reason, the second column should arrive at Xixian County before the evening of the 6th; the sixth column should arrive at Shahedian on the night of the 6th, and strive to be the first to arrive between Shangcai and Runan on the 8th. Attention should also be paid to blocking and attacking at the right time, and using the direction of various rivers to block the enemy. "
On November 13, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and others made a clear request: "Deng and Li of the Central Plains Bureau must immediately inform the Second and Sixth Zongs of the above situation, regardless of day and night, regardless of fatigue, and advance at the same time. They must rush to Tai and Fuhuang on the 14th, no later than the 15th. In front of Wei, prevent Huang Wei from advancing towards Bo, Vortex, and Yong from the front, and there will be no delay." Mao Zedong ordered Deng Zihui, the third secretary of the Central Plains Bureau, deputy political commissar of the Central Plains Military Region, and Li Xiannian, deputy commander of the Central Plains Military Region and the Central Plains Field Army, to telegraph the Second Column and Six Even when he could reach the east of Taihe and chase after the Huangwei Corps, he also ordered Song Renqiong, secretary of the Yuwansu Central Bureau, to "immediately mobilize all available armed forces to quickly destroy Huangwei in the middle areas of Taihe, Fu, Bo, Wo, and Yong." The bridges and roads on the Weitong Road will delay the actions of the Yellow Corps."
Mao Zedong and the Huaihai frontline commanders of our army conducted many telegram consultations on the second combat objective of the Huaihai Campaign in the process of encircling and annihilating Huang Botao's corps and chasing Huang Wei's corps.
It was Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping who first proposed the second step of the Huaihai Campaign against the Huangwei Corps.At that time, Mao Zedong proposed two combat plans for the Subeng area for Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping to choose from.After consideration, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping sent a telegram to Mao Zedong on November 5: "After our consideration, it is more advantageous to attack Liu Ruming first. Because Liu's troops are weak, we can quickly wipe them out, or force him to revolt, and may mobilize the Qiu Corps for reinforcements. If When Liu's enemy is wiped out, our army can use all its strength to deal with Qiu and facilitate the second step to deal with Huang Wei and Sun Yuanliang."
Su Yu was the second who proposed the second step of the Huaihai Campaign to annihilate the Huangwei Corps. At noon on November 7, Su Yu sent a telegram to Mao Zedong, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping regarding the next step after the annihilation of Huang Botao's corps, and proposed: "If the Central Plains Army's operation to annihilate Liu Ruming's troops has been completed, it is recommended to use the main force to go straight out of the Xubeng section of Jinpu Road. , cut off the Xu enemy's retreat, so that the Li and Qiu corps could not retreat southward. After our Yundong troops eliminated Huang (Baitao) corps, we immediately joined Yunxi with one part to annihilate Li's corps, and the main force cooperated with the Central Plains Army to attack the Xubeng section. Isolate Xuzhou. Afterwards, either continue to annihilate the Huangwei Corps (possibly retreat), or wipe out the Sun Yuanliang Corps in Bengbu (possibly shrink Bengbu), or seize Xuzhou, depending on the actual situation.”
Mao Zedong was the third one who suggested that the second battle of the Huaihai Campaign was to annihilate Huang Wei’s Corps. When Mao Zedong analyzed the situation on the Huaihai battlefield in a telegram sent to Su Yu and others at 20 o’clock on November 7, he proposed that the first battle to annihilate Huang Botao’s Corps included fighting for aid and blocking Aid, a total of 21 to 22 divisions were wiped out. "If this task can be achieved, the whole situation will change. You and Chen Deng may push towards the Xu-Beng line. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek may withdraw the troops in Xuzhou and its vicinity to the south of Bengbu. If the enemy does not withdraw, we will Then we can fight the second battle, annihilate Huang Wei and Sun Yuanliang, and completely isolate the enemies of Xuzhou."
The assumptions above are merely plans and must be determined in light of the changing reality of the battlefield.Since Huang Botao's corps failed to be wiped out as scheduled, various plans were put forward to lure and annihilate the Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi corps on the northern line; encircle and wipe out the Huangwei corps on the southern line;But until November 15, the problem of the second step of the Huaihai Campaign had not been resolved.
After repeated consultations with Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu and others through telegrams for several days, Mao Zedong finally made up his mind until the afternoon of the 24th.That afternoon, Mao Zedong replied to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping: "(1) Fully agree to attack Huang Wei first; (2) Wang Su, Chen Zhang, follow Liu, Chen and Deng's deployment, and send necessary troops to fight Huang Wei; (3) The situation is urgent Timing, everything will be handled by Liu Chendeng on the fly, don't ask for instructions." In this way, the combat goal of the second phase of the Huaihai Campaign was to annihilate the Huangwei Corps.
On November 23, according to the delay of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's corps, Huang Wei's corps had crossed the Weihe River and fought with the Central Plains Field Army. There is a considerable distance, the lone army is prominent, etc., and the Central Military Commission has proposed a combat plan to annihilate the Huangwei Corps first.After being approved by the Central Military Commission, the General Front Committee immediately carried out the combat deployment to encircle and wipe out the Huangwei Corps:
(1) Use the 4th and 9th Columns of the Central Plains Field Army, and the Independent Brigade of the Henan, Anhui and Soviet Military Regions, located in the Nanpingji area, to maintain contact with the Huangwei Corps, and lure them to the north of the Weihe River, using the Weihe River to isolate the enemy ; with the first, second, third, sixth, and eleventh columns of the Central Plains Field Army covertly assembled on the Caopingji, Wugouji, Suntuanji, and Hugouji lines south of the Huihe River, waiting for the Huangwei Corps to enter After the combat area is scheduled, the east and west wings will carry out centripetal assaults, and cooperate with the frontal columns to encircle and divide the enemy troops and annihilate each one; the seventh column of the East China Field Army and part of the artillery column will be under the command of the Central Plains Field Army to participate in the battle to wipe out the Huangwei Corps.
(2) Use the 2nd, 6th, 10th, 11th, and 13th columns of the East China Field Army in Suxian County and Xisipo area to block the northern reinforcements of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's corps, and strive to wipe out part of them to protect the Central Plains Field Army's side Back safety; the East China Field Army's first, third, fourth, eighth, ninth, twelfth, Shandong Zhongnan, Guangdong and Guangxi columns, and the independent first and third brigades of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region are located in Jiagou to the south of Xuzhou. Between Liji and across both sides of Jinpu Road, multiple positions were built to block enemy reinforcements from Xuzhou.
According to the combat deployment of the General Front Committee, the participating troops of the East China and Central Plains Field Army quickly marched to the designated combat areas.
Nanpingji is located on the Meng (City) Su (County) Highway on the south bank of the Huihe River. It is a market town with about 200 households. It is about 300 meters long from north to south and 200 meters wide from east to west.The road leads from the east side of the town to the Weihe River, and there is a solid stone bridge on the river, which can pass tanks and heavy artillery.
To the south of Nanpingji is an open and flat field with no danger to defend, and the terrain is conducive to the enemy with modern equipment.If our army follows the old habit and sticks to the village, then the enemy's artillery superiority will razed our army's position to the ground.In view of the topographical characteristics of Nanpingji, some people advocated setting up formations north of the Huihe River to block the enemy.However, Chen Geng, the commander and political commissar of the Fourth Corps, insisted on deploying troops in Henan.
Chen Geng believes that the Huangwei Corps has artillery and aircraft support, and can hit our army from a long distance.However, our army's artillery is few and small, and it cannot hit the enemy across the river, and the formation of an army in Hebei can only be beaten.Therefore, Chen Geng adopted the tactics of fighting against the water.
The 11th Brigade, the 31st Regiment, and the 32nd Regiment defended Nanpingji and the line from Xiaochenjia to Sanguanmiao on the east and west sides; The 22nd Brigade is the reserve team; the Nine Columns and the Henan, Anhui and Su Independent Brigades are deployed on the left wing from Dongpingji to Shenji.
Standing up against the enemy's expectations can kill a large number of enemy forces.At the same time, fighting against the tide also embodies Deng Xiaoping's spirit of serving the overall situation of the campaign without sacrificing part of it. The 11th Brigade fought against the wall, which forced the commanders and fighters to go all out in Nanping to withstand the attack of the Huangwei Corps.
Chen Geng asked the 11th Brigade to advance the blocking position to the field hundreds of meters south of Nanpingji, and form a group of fortifications with squads and platoons on the front, so as to reduce the damage of enemy artillery fire to our army and strengthen our army's various forces. The independent combat capability of combat units.When the enemy's infantry rushed to the front of our army's position, they suddenly opened fire and dealt a major blow to the enemy.
After accepting Chen Geng's task, Liu Feng, brigade commander of the 11th brigade, Hu Ronggui, political commissar and other brigade leaders led the commanders of each regiment to carefully survey the terrain and study defensive blocking measures.Before the 11th Brigade arrived at Nanpingji, the brother troops had built a line of blocking positions along the east, south, and west sides of the town, but the villages near Nanpingji basically had no fortifications.
After investigation, the commander of the 11th Brigade believed that it was impossible to complete the task of blocking the Huangwei Corps in Nanpingji for three days only by relying on this line of blocking fortifications. Zhuang, the cemetery in the south and the small highland in the southwest were expanded to form a deep blocking position.When studying the position configuration, there was a dispute over whether to occupy Yangzhuang, which is about 700 meters away from Nanping in front of the southwest small highland.
One theory holds that Yangzhuang is too forward, vulnerable to enemy pincers, and difficult to defend, and the expansion of the Nanpingji position is too large, and the strength of a regiment is not enough.Another view is the opposite. It believes that not building a position in Yangzhuang is tantamount to giving Yangzhuang to the enemy. Relying on Yangzhuang, the enemy can easily seize the small high ground with the support of strong firepower, and then attack the south with a condescending posture. Pingji, in this way, it will be difficult for our army to hold on to Nanpingji for 3 days.And if our army builds a position in Yangzhuang, it can force the enemy to deploy on the front line of Fanzhuang in front of Yangzhuang, so that it will attack Yangzhuang through an open area of more than 500 meters.In this way, the enemy army was placed in an extremely unfavorable terrain to fight, and they could not enter Yangzhuang without paying a high price.Even if the enemy's vanguard troops enter Zhuangzi, their follow-up troops will still operate on extremely unfavorable terrain, and the enemy troops that enter Yangzhuang first will be easily counterattacked by our army.In this way, Yangzhuang became the Yangzhuang that the enemy and our armies competed for. Around the competition for Yangzhuang, conditions were created for the 3-day defense in Nanpingji.
Liu Feng, commander of the Eleventh Brigade, and Hu Ronggui, political commissar, adopted the latter idea. "They focused on increasing the depth of defense, expanding the defensive area, increasing the vitality and resilience of the positions, and utilizing our strengths in close contact with the enemy. They determined the composition of the blocking positions, not only to occupy Yangzhuang, but also to take Yangzhuang as the main force. Arrange troops in the blocking position, set up positions."
In view of the fact that there are dense villages to the west of the town, few villages and a lot of open land to the east, and the enemy is likely to attack from the west, with Yangzhuang as the main attack area, the deployment of the 11th Brigade is as follows: Take charge of blocking tasks in the main direction of Nanpingji; the 32nd regiment strengthens Nanpingji with the first battalion, the third battalion and regiment command post set up a blocking position on the north bank of the Huihe River, and the second battalion serves as a reserve team; the brigade special battalion is deployed in the northwest of Nanpingji area, to prevent the enemy from attacking from the right side; the Lushan Artillery Brigade was deployed on the west side of the north bank of the Huihe River, and mainly supported the 31st regiment's battle.
In this way, Nanpingji formed a large defense system with the brigade command post as the core.For the battalion and company positions, the head of the brigade also requires a ring-shaped support point pattern that can not only fight independently but also provide mutual mobile support.
Judging from the deployment of the 11th Brigade's combat forces and the formation of positions, it fully demonstrates the initiative of our army commanders and the creativity of implementing the intentions of superiors.After the deployment of the 11th Brigade, Chen Geng visited the 11th Brigade for inspection. In addition to fully affirming the deployment of the 11th Brigade, he also gave some important instructions: "First, the fortifications should be low but not high, and if they are high, they will be bombarded; The first is that the position must not only be deep, but also have a reserve position, and many small positions for attacking Tibet from east to west; third, in terms of military strength, one squad can be used to fight against each other, instead of two squads. It’s big; the fourth is to improve communication facilities and keep the phone unblocked.”
Before the launch of the Huaihai Campaign, the Huangwei Corps had been operating mobile operations in the western part of Henan under the command of the "Suppression General" in Central China of the Kuomintang.After the Huaihai Campaign began, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly ordered him to rush to the Huaihai battlefield with light clothes.
Therefore, the Huangwei Corps began to march eastward from the Queshan and Zhumadian areas on November 8, passing through Zhengyang, Xincai, Fuyang and other areas. The pursuit, side attack, and interception of the vertical, sixth vertical, and local troops were slow. They did not reach the front line of Mengcheng and Guohe on the 18th, and were immediately blocked by our Nakano Yizong.
On the 21st, the Eighty-Fifth Army who followed up arrived, and the whole corps had crossed the Guohe and Beifei Rivers at this time, and was advancing towards the front line of the Weihe River.
At that time, Huang Wei saw that our army was firmly blocking him, and he was afraid that it would be difficult to cross. He had planned to use the Guohe River as a cover. Then attack Su County.However, because our army was besieging Huang Botao's corps in the east of Xuzhou, Chiang Kai-shek did not agree with Huang Wei's corps to change the direction of attack, and still ordered it to attack in the direction of Su County.
Therefore, the Huangwei Corps began to attack and advance from the vicinity of Mengcheng to Suxian County from the 21st. Withdrew to the Weihe River and Nanpingji line.
On the 23rd, the Huangwei Corps took the Eighteenth Army as the center, the Tenth Army on the left, the Fourteenth Army on the right, and the Eighty-fifth Army behind them. attack.From 9 am to dusk, the Eighteenth Army, under the cover of more than 20 tanks, stormed for a day. Although our army suffered heavy casualties, it did not abandon a position.The Huangwei Corps was eager to move forward and took offensive actions, which provided an excellent opportunity for our army to encircle and wipe out the enemy.At this time, the General Front Committee had already made a plan to wipe out the enemy, and the Central Military Commission also approved the General Front Committee's suggestion to wipe out the Huangwei Corps first.
Our attacking troops approached the enemy's defending village step by step and launched an attack on the enemy
Just as the Huangwei Corps was attacking our Nanpingji and Weihe front-line positions, the General Front Committee had already arranged a pocket position on the north bank of the Huihe River, waiting for the Huangwei Corps to throw itself into this pocket in order to encircle and wipe it out.
It is the four verticals in the middle of the field that our army guards Nanpingji. On the night of the 23rd, the Four Columns were ordered to evacuate from Nanpingji, moved to the north of the Huihe River, and deployed a group of troops in Zhukou, Wujiahu, Banbudian, Dongpingji and other areas with the Nine Columns and the Henan-Wansu Independent Brigade. Pockets.
On the morning of the 24th, the 18th Army, the 10th Army, and the 14th Army of the Huangwei Corps each crossed the Weihe River, and respectively set up the Zhongye Nine Columns on the east-west line in Dongping, as well as Zhukou, Wujiahu, and Banbudian. Four-column attack in other areas.After a day of fierce fighting, the enemy failed to break through our army's position, but has gradually entered our army's preset pocket position.
Huang Wei originally planned to forcibly cross the Weihe River and advance to Su County in a surprise attack.At this time, not only did he feel that our army's heroic and tenacious resistance made it difficult for him to cross our defense line and reach Su County smoothly, but he also found that he had entered the pocket position set up by our army, and the situation was extremely unfavorable to him. He found that the entire Corps was already in the narrow area between the Guohe River, Beifei River and Huihe River. The Beifei River and Guohe River behind him had become obstacles and threats to his actions. The entire Corps had marched for more than 500 miles. Cutting off, if this continues, the entire corps will inevitably fall into a predicament, unable to advance or retreat.
Therefore, Huang Wei decided to change his original plan in order to get rid of the encirclement of our army.After convening several army commanders to discuss, he decided to move towards Guzhen on the Jinpu Railway in order to join the two corps of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming, and then attack in the direction of Su County.Huang Wei immediately ordered the first part of the 18th Army, which had entered our pocket position, to shrink to the south bank of the Hui River, and then cover each other one by one and move towards Guzhen.
On the afternoon of November 24, Huang Wei ordered the Eighteenth Army to turn around and retreat to the south bank of the Hui River.When Nakano took advantage of the chaotic retreat of the enemy, he began to attack across the board at dusk, encircling the enemy vigorously, forming a complete encirclement of the enemy.The 4th, 9th, and 11th Columns of the Central Field were compressed from east, north to west, and south on the Dongpingji and Shaoweizi lines, the 6th Column and the 12th Southern Shaanxi Brigade were compressed from south to north, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Columns were compressed from west to east civil. The 8 columns formed a huge encirclement circle, together with the seventh, third and thirteenth columns of Huaye in coordinated operations, encircled the 120,000 troops of the Huangwei Corps in the encirclement centered on Shuangduiji, 20 miles from east to west, and 15 miles from north to south. The Huangwei Corps got into the net of heaven and earth completely, and it could be said that it was impossible to escape.
When Wang Jinshan, the commander of the Sixth Column of the Central Plains, reported to the General Front Committee on the phone that the final opening of the huge bag-shaped offensive had been closed, Deng Xiaoping's political commissar lit a cigarette for himself, smiled rarely, and fought The good news was sung everywhere, inside and out.
Commander Chen Yi took off the military jug hanging on the wall, filled a glass of brandy for Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, and himself.Commander Liu didn't bother to pick up his wine glass, pointed to the double piles on the map, and said excitedly: "Huang Wei's 120,000 soldiers and horses are surrounded on a lot 20 miles long and 15 miles wide. On average, there are more than 400 enemy officers and soldiers in every 500 meters long and wide area, and any shot will hurt the enemy!" He said humorously with a strong local accent: "It's really sleepy for 15 hunchbacks-seven arches and eight warps crowded together!"
"The Huangwei Corps is an elite division under the command of Bai Chongxi. It is said to attack like a tiger, defend like a mountain, be as quiet as a virgin, and move like a rabbit." Deng Xiaoping stood up and walked back and forth in the war room. See how he is guarding these two sharp grain piles, how he attacks like a tiger and moves like a rabbit?"
"The elimination of the Huangwei Corps is a crucial battle on the Huaihai battlefield!" Chen Yi picked up his wine, took a sip of brandy, and turned his head to order the staff: "I want a call from Chief of Staff Zhang Zhen!" After connecting, Chen Yi held the earphone Said: "You must closely monitor the Du Yuming Group, and cooperate with the central field operations to ensure that the southern front is completely wiped out!"
Chen Yi put down the phone, lit a cigarette, and Deng Xiaoping had an overview of the Huaihai battlefield in front of a one-hundred-thousandth battle map. , look at the Wei River Basin on the map.
The famous military strategist Liu Bocheng is famous for his "bold, careful, resourceful and resourceful".He often said: To be a commander, you must be "bold and careful", so that you can be an excellent commander with both wisdom and courage.People describe his command sometimes as a big horse with a golden knife, galloping vertically and horizontally, like a sea standing on a cloud, like lightning and thunder;He commanded the troops to surround the Huangwei Corps like a storm, and at this moment, he was looking for the enemy's flaws in the upper reaches of the Wei River like a light wind and a drizzle.He said to the combat staff officer beside him: "Order the troops to drive the enemy away from the north bank of the Weihe River, and keep the enemy away from the water source!"
On November 26, Huang Wei organized forces to break through for a day but failed.In the evening, he summoned the senior generals to find a way together.At the meeting, Huang Wei patted Liao Yunzhou, commander of the 110th Division of the 85th Army, on the shoulder and said, "Brother, what do you think?" Huang Wei didn't know what Liao Yunzhou was thinking at the time.
Liao said: "I agree with the plan to use four divisions to break through tomorrow, and my division volunteered to take the lead." Huang Wei was very happy to hear that, and praised repeatedly: "My brother has a way!" He took out a bottle of wine and said to Liao: "Old classmate, this bottle of brandy has been hidden for a long time, and I have never been willing to drink it. Now I offer you a special toast and wish you victory." Wei, you miscalculated!"
In the early morning of the next day, Liao Yunzhou led the 110th Division. Under the "cover" of 8 planes, they formed a 4-way column. According to the location designated by the PLA, they came to the position of the Central Plains Field Army and held a glorious front-line uprising.
At this time, Huang Wei, who was kept in the dark, saw that the 110th Division had drilled out of his "pocket", and immediately ordered the 11th Division, the 118th Division of the 18th Army, and the 18th Division of the Tenth Army to fight against tanks, artillery, Follow up under the cover of the plane.
However, things were completely beyond Huang Wei's expectations. Just after the uprising of the 110th Division was over, all kinds of cannons and machine guns of the People's Liberation Army opened fire on the enemy.The densely marching enemies immediately became a mess and panicked.It took a long time for Huang Wei to wake up, and immediately ordered the three divisions to rush towards the Xiaolizhuang position of the Southeast People's Liberation Army.
The Central Plains field troops standing here bravely repelled the enemy's more than ten breakthrough counterattacks, killed and wounded more than 1,000 enemies, and completely shattered the attempt of the Huangwei Corps to break through.
The battlefield uprising of the 110th Division disrupted the breakout plan of the Huangwei Corps and played a major role in the victory of the second stage of the Huaihai Campaign.In this regard, Major General Liao Yunzhou of the 110th Division later recalled the general process of the uprising on the battlefield of the division:
The predecessor of the 110th Division was the Second Division of Feng Yuxiang's Northwest Army. It was one of the basic main forces of the Chahar Anti-Japanese Allied Army. In January 1938, it was merged into the 110th Division with the troops of the Northern Henan Division of the Kuomintang and the Cavalry Brigade of the Northeast Army.
During the Anti-Japanese War, this team participated in the battles of Taierzhuang, Ruiwu Road, Northern Hubei, Southern Henan, and the Central Plains. A large number of progressive and dissident military officers were replaced by their cronies, and they continued to supervise and attack the progressive forces, but many progressive forces have survived.
In 1942, Wu Shaozhou, the former commander of the 110th Division, was transferred to be the commander of the 85th Army, and I took over as the commander of the 110th Division.
On November 25, 1948, our Central Plains Field Army surrounded the Huangwei Corps in the Shuangduiji area. The enemy had organized several breakouts, but they were all repelled by our army. The 110th Division revolted during the breakout. This is the beginning of the uprising. ○General Liao Yunzhou, commander of the division
In the spring of 1946, the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Shanxi, Hebei, Luyu) sent Li Juncheng, Xu Ren, Liu Yang, Liu Hao, etc. to the 110th Division to strengthen the party's underground activities in the division.In order to facilitate the work, we arranged these comrades at the adjutant of the division, extensively contacted the officers and soldiers, and actively planned the preparations for the uprising.We also used our relationship with the upper echelons of the Kuomintang to "recommend" Li Da and Wang Changfan, the deputy division commanders who hindered our work, to Hu Zongnan and Wang Zhonglian and let them be "promoted".
We took advantage of contradictions to carry out work, and won over Liu Xiehou, the head of the regiment who had conflicts with the former division commander Wu Shaozhou, and Wang Yuetao, the director of the division's political training department, who had more progressive thinking, and united a group of officers through them.In addition, we also set up special radio stations and information transfer stations in Zhengzhou, Kaifeng and other places in the name of the division's left-behind offices, and strengthened the information liaison work.
In the summer of 1947, we established the CPC Underground Division Party Committee.Due to the continuous strengthening of leadership, our work has been carried out more smoothly.
In July 1948, we held an enlarged meeting of the CCP’s underground party committee at the Xuangong Hotel in Hankou. At the meeting, Li Juncheng conveyed the instructions of Chief Liu and Deng: make all preparations for battle.At that time, the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered a critical moment of strategic decisive battle with the Kuomintang reactionaries, and won brilliant victories in various battlefields across the country.
In early November, we learned that the Eighty-Fifth Army was going to join the Twelfth Corps to reinforce Xuzhou. Comrades said that the time for our action had come.
On November 6 and 7, we held an emergency meeting of underground members of the Communist Party of China. We felt that considering all aspects, this "reinforcement" in Xuzhou was the "most favorable opportunity" for us to play the "maximum role". to the revolutionary family.
On November 24, the 85th Army arrived near Zhaoji from Mengcheng.At that time, the People's Liberation Army had automatically abandoned Nanpingji.黄维错误地认为解放军已被击败，让第十八军全部进入浍河北岸，第十四军在南坪集东南地区集结，第十军在孙疃集附近与解放军交战，把他自己的司令部安到了南坪集，命令各军积极侦察当前敌情，还准备继续向宿县攻击前进。
可他哪里知道，他的部队已自动进入了解放军设置的袋形阵地了。当时，我们发现赵集西北方面有大批的解放军在向南移动，蒙城已被解放军占领，黄维兵团的后方补给线已被切断，整个战局的态势对黄维很不利，如果他发现了解放军的企图，可能改变进攻宿县的决心，后来果然如此。
当天深夜，吴绍周从兵团开会回来后，我见到他神态焦急，面带难色，并听他低声对黄子华说：“情况很糟糕，敌人有纵深配备，正在向我军两侧迂回。我军将被包围，必须向固镇转移、靠拢，只怕委座（指蒋介石）不答应呀！我们是进退两难，真是难啊！现在，黄维还是下了转移的决心。”
接着，他在地图上比画着：“第八十五军的主力放在南坪集附近，占领阵地，向西北方面警戒，掩护第十八军和第十军的转移；待两军通过后，我军就经罗集向固镇以西地区集结；第十四军沿浍河南岸占领阵地，向北警戒，阻敌南犯，掩护兵团转移，第十军迅速脱离敌人，沿浍河南岸，依靠第八十五军掩护，向固镇以西前进。第十八军脱离敌人后，经双堆集向固镇西北湖沟集前进，兵团司令部在第十八军后跟进。”
吴还通知我，第一一○师暂归黄维直接指挥，明日向湖沟集方向威力搜索敌情。
听了吴绍周的话，我心里既高兴又着急，高兴的是解放军已经把黄维包围了，黄维就要完了。着急的是解放军自动放弃南坪集以诱敌深入的企图被黄维察觉了，并打算向南转移。如果解放军不能迅速出击合围，就有让黄维逃脱的危险。
此举关系着整个战局成败的关键，我们必须立即把这一重要情报向刘邓首长报告，否则就要贻误战机。
当时我心里很着急，可又不便马上离开，就用话搪塞吴绍周，我说：“为什么把我师归黄维直接指挥？这样分割使用诸多不便。为什么要第八十五军掩护第十八军、第十军转移？他们各自掩护直接转移不是更好吗？第八十五军由赵集直接开往固镇西北地区与友军取得联系不是更好吗？”
我的话在吴听来可能很在理，其实我不过是用了个缓兵之计，挑拨吴与黄的关系，拖延一下时间罢了。
吴好长时间没做声，看来我的话他是听进去了。停了一会儿他说：“你们师的任务是搜索敌情，兵力可大可小。你把第三二八团留给我做预备队好吗？”
我毫不迟疑地说：“完全可以，我带两个团就够了”。
当时，第三二八团团长姜继鑫是吴绍周的亲戚，思想顽固，该团其他军官也大都与共产党对立。我们地下党委多次研究过，将来起义，就怕这个团找麻烦，现在吴绍周要把它调走，正合了我们的心愿。
回到师部后，我马上召集李俊成、廖宜民、张士瑞进行研究，立即派张士瑞把黄维兵团的转移计划送出，并向刘邓首长请示我们今后的任务，又发电报给在汉口留守处的徐仁，让他迅速在留守处安排相应的措施。
张士瑞走后，我们的心一直悬在半空，担心情报是否能准时送到。25日拂晓，我们正在集合部队准备向湖沟集方向进发，吴绍周派参谋找我，说作战处长郑家璵乘吉普车送命令给我，在师部附近被解放军连人带车捉了去。让我们暂停前进，原地待命，原来郑家璵要送来的就是黄维兵团转移计划的部署，这时我的心才落了地。我低声对李俊成说：“郑家璵的情报要比张士瑞的快些，解放军得到情报的时间更提前了，我们可以放心了。”李会心地一笑。
午时，吴绍周到南坪集附近占领阵地，掩护其他部队转移。入夜，黄维的队伍还没全部拉开，解放军就开始了全面出击，把黄维部队打得焦头烂额，黄维的转移部署全乱套了。这一天，他的部队没有一支到达预定的目的地，我们也跟着跑了不少冤枉路。黄维让我师一会儿向东南搜索，一会儿向东北掩护，而吴绍周又让我们去南坪集增援他。报话机不间断地呼叫，行动的目标不时转变，向导说你们这个部队到底往哪里去？官兵也七嘴八舌埋怨说，我们从来没有这样混乱过。
黄维这个人很自信。在他的第一次转移的部署被解放军打乱后，并没有泄气，加上他的部队的军事素质和武器装备普遍不错，号称蒋介石的五大主力之一，所以他并没有把解放军放在眼里。
当时，我的师部和黄维兵团的司令部同住在双堆集附近的一个村子里。
26日午后5时许，我刚从前方回来，他就派人把我找了去。他看了看我，很镇静地说：“刚才空军侦察报告说，今天午后3时敌人对我兵团的包围圈已经形成，他们正在构筑工事。你有什么主张？”
我反问了他一句：“司令官有何决策尽管下命令，我师保证完成任务。”我料到黄维已经有了新的打算，他果然说：“我想乘敌立足未稳，打它个措手不及。决定挑选4个主力师，齐头并进，迅猛突围。”
我马上意识到，黄维这一招的确厉害，同时也觉得这是我们可以利用的好机会，于是对他说：“好！司令官的决策真英明。我们师请求打头阵，愿当开路先锋！我们既然能攻占敌人堡垒式工事和河川阵地，现在突破他们临时构筑的掩体，当然不在话下了，我请求立即回去准备行动。”
黄维见我这样支持他的意见，对我又是夸奖又是鼓励。在回去的路上我反复地琢磨着：黄维的部队尽管近来有些消耗，但装备仍然完好。且军官们受法西斯熏染较深，士气未退，战斗力仍然很强。现在解放军的确是立足未稳，黄维4个师并力突围还真有让他跑出去的危险，我又记起了刘邓首长要我们在最有利的时机发挥最大的作用的指示，觉得现在是火候了！必须立即举行战场起义，打乱黄维的突围部署。
我马上到了刘协侯的团指挥所，把黄维新的突围计划和我破坏这一计划的设想跟李俊成、廖宜民、刘协侯、杨振海等谈了，之后作出决定，派杨振海去见解放军前线最高指挥员，把黄维准备在27日上午采取的突围行动和我师决定趁此机会举行起义的计划一并上报。
为了避免误会，请求解放军前沿部队在突围处的左翼闪开一个口子，让开一条路，等我师过去后再把口子封上。
杨振海走了以后，我们又进一步进行了研究，考虑到4个师齐头并进，让我师居中，两翼都是敌人，于我师很不利，于是又决定想尽办法“调整”一下黄维的部署。
我又去见了黄维，向他建议：“4个师齐头并进不如用3个师好。把第十八军的主力师留在兵团做预备队，可随时策应第一线作战，控制预备队以备不时之需，这是一个常规了。让我师先行动，如果进展得手，其他师可迅速跟进，扩大战果。”
黄维见我敢于挑重担，又替他着想，照顾兵团的机动权，很是高兴。对我进行了一番赞扬，连声说：“好同学，你要什么我就给你什么，坦克、榴弹炮随你要。”他还让在一边的兵团副参谋长韦镇福通知空军，调飞机配合我们行动。
我心里暗笑，说：“我已派了几个便衣深入敌后，进行侦察，如果发现有空隙的结合部，我们就利用夜间提前行动。”
黄维又把我赞扬了一番，非常轻松地说：“有机会就前进，要当机立断。”他对我的言行没有一点怀疑，我心里踏实了许多，向韦镇福要了两份地图拿回了师部，很正经地与副师长杨柳营、参谋长洪炉青一起研究了突围计划。他们对我也没有任何怀疑，我于是决定，师直队在黄昏前做好准备，午夜开始行动。
26日那个晚上，大家心情都很激动，急切地盼望着杨振海回来。第二天凌晨3时，他终于回来了。
他一进屋就对我们高兴地说：“这次任务完成得非常顺利，真凑巧，值班参谋是我的熟人武英，一见面他就喊：'老伙计，原来是你呀！'说着就领我去见了解放军南线总指挥王近山司令员、杜义德政委和作战处贺光华处长。
他们听说我们决定在这个时候举行起义，都非常高兴，表示要给我们大力协助。”还说，他们对我们把黄维以4个师一起突围的计划及时送到，表示非常感谢，认为这是一件大事，并马上向刘邓首长作了汇报。
王司令员还为我们规定了行军路线，准备沿途为我们放上高粱秆作为路标，让我们官兵左臂一律扎白布条或毛巾，规定在两军接触时，打3发枪榴弹作为联络信号，让我们从解放军第十七师和第六纵队的阵地通过，到达罗集附近的大吴庄、西张庄。时间要提前，最好在天明以前全部通过，杨振海还拿出一张王近山司令员亲自为我们画的行军路线图。
我们都争相看着，激动得心都快要跳出来了。是啊，我们盼了多少年，等了多少日，终于盼到了这一天。大家都说，这哪只是一张行军路线图，这是我们回到大家庭的通行证，是胜利的保证书！我们将沿着这条路线走向光明。我接过了那张图，感到它是那样的沉重，很小心地把它珍藏了起来，一直保存到现在。
与上级联系上了，起义的准备工作也基本上就绪了，可离规定6点钟出发的时间还有两个小时，这两小时对我们来说比两年还难熬。为了预防万一，我决定把这段时间也充分利用上，又一次跑到黄维那里，再给他送去了一颗定心丸。
他见到了我，首先询问了我派出去的人侦察的情况，了解了我师准备的情况。我说：“我正要向你报告。我们发现敌军阵地结合部有空隙可钻，在拂晓前行动最为有利，特来请示。”
黄维大概觉得自己的决策很英明，也觉得他选准了突围的先锋，哈哈大笑起来，顺手拿出了一瓶酒，对我说：“老同学，这瓶白兰地藏之久矣，一直没舍得喝，现在我特敬你一杯，预祝你取得胜利。”又转身对韦镇福说：“来，我们是同期同班同学，也要敬一杯。”
我暗暗高兴，心里说，智者千虑，必有一失，黄维你算失算了。看看出发的时间快要到了，不便久留，我回敬了他们一杯酒后，向他们敬了个正规的军礼，就告辞了。黄维一直把我送到门口，紧紧地握了握我的手，才回去。
我回到师里不久，解放军南线最高司令部派武英穿着便服来到师部，为我们做向导。他建议我们用4路行军纵队，以正常速度前进。他同杨振海和刘协侯带第三二九团为前卫，第三三○团为后卫，后边放个加强连收容落伍的官兵，师部及直属队（炮兵营、运输营、特务连、化学炮连、通讯连、工兵连）为本队，时间一到马上出发。
在这之前，尽管我们在全师官兵中做了不少工作，也曾派两位团长刘协侯和金汉章分别跟洪炉青参谋长、杨柳营副师长透露过我们将要起义的消息，他们都比较正直，在当时的特殊处境下，同意了我们的决定，但我们对他们还是有所提防的；下边的大部分军官也都认为这是个好办法，但我们一直没有在他们中间公布我们的计划。临行前，我们觉得有必要公布了。于是，就让刘协侯把一些比较可靠的营连长召集到一起，四周布置了警戒，就站在露天地里对他们进行了起义动员。
觉得当时的把握性已经很大，我就开门见山地说：“现在，我们已被解放军全部包围，蚌埠的李延年、孙元良的救兵打不过来，徐州被围，黄伯韬被消灭，蒙城、宿县被占，我们是援兵没有，退路已无，弹粮即尽，解放军却在不断增援，这样下去我们只能坐以待毙。蒋介石对人民犯下了滔天罪行，我们为什么还要为他卖命呢？共产党、解放军的所作所为大家都很清楚。很多人都要求我利用朋友的关系（当时还不能公开我们的身份）给解放军写封信，为我们提供方便，使我们脱离战场。现在，我们已派杨振海与解放军联系上了，见到了他们南线司令员，解放军对我们将采取的行动非常欢迎，你们赞不赞成这样做？”
大家异口同声地说：“我们赞成！！我向大家提出了下列要求：（一）用行军纵队按解放军规定的路线走，解放军保证不向我们开枪，也不允许任何人向解放军开枪，同时还公布了与解放军的联络信号和我们官兵左臂上的标志。（二）任何人不准掉队，走不动的就用车拉。（三）要严守秘密。（四）不愿意走的现在可以提出来（其实这不过是给每个人的心上加上一个砝码，估计他们就是不愿走，谁也不敢提出来）。大家都说：“愿意跟师长走！ ! ”我环视了一下周围，见到他们的表情都十分严肃，十分诚恳，心里很是激动。
这时，东方已经破晓，笼罩在周围村庄、田野、道路上的浓雾渐渐散开，出发的时间到了。
27日早晨6点钟，第一一○师准时开出了双堆集附近的周庄、赵庄，在通向解放军阵地的道路上向前进发。
由于我们的动员和保密工作作得较好，在从双堆集到达大吴庄、西张庄的30华里的行军中，尽管营部都有报话机，却没有出现泄密的情况，也没有开小差和落伍的。
黄维对我们十分放心，不时地询问我们行进的情况。可是，两小时后（我们的部队已全部通过了解放军阵地，解放军为我们放开的口子又重新封了起来）。
报话机中传出他的呼唤却有些异样：“长江、长江，你们到了哪里？”我赶紧回答：“武昌、武昌，我们到了赵庄，沿途畅行无阻。”
他又说：“跟你师走的第十八军那个师，遭到了密集火力的袭击，伤亡很大。”他的话音把我的耳朵震得嗡嗡直响，按常规军事用语中是不允许出现这类字眼的，可见黄维已经顾不得了。
上午9点多钟，4架国民党飞机飞到我们头上来回盘旋，估计黄维对我们是产生了疑心，考虑我们还没有完全脱离危险地带，还要继续迷惑敌人，各连都按照预先规定的联络信号，把布板架好，告诉他们一切“正常”。这几架飞机发现了信号后，一颗炸弹也没扔，俯冲下来几次就飞走了。我们的部队继续沿着解放军为我们修好的道路、布置的高粱秆标志向前进发。
下午1点半钟，我到达了指定的地点大吴庄，黄维和吴绍周还在报话机里询问我们情况，我下令把全师的报话机统统关掉，一律上缴，师部的电台也停止使用，中断了与黄维、吴绍周的联系。
不久，在解放军六纵队司令部我见到了王近山司令员和杜义德政委，他们请我吃了饭。还在大吴庄与袁血卒、卢耀武接上了头，几双手握在一起久久没有放开，是啊，这回可真是到家了。我们又接到通知去领粮，可粮在哪儿呢？光见房前屋后树林草丛有一堆堆用草盖的小布袋，掀开一看，大米、白面、猪肉、食盐，白菜、粉条等等，真是应有尽有，士兵们高兴得跳了起来，都说这些天在国民党部队里饿得要死，到这里，解放军、老百姓把我们当做一家人，这步棋我们算走对了。黄昏后，大批国民党飞机飞了过来，在我们宿营地附近扔下了大量炸弹，可是他们知道得太晚了。
晚上8点钟，解放军第二纵队政委王维纲又亲自到我们的驻地看望大家，代表刘邓首长在连以上军官会议上讲了话，他说：“你们的师长廖运周是中国共产党员，他率领你们举行了光荣的战场起义，参加了中国人民解放军，我代表中野首长向你们全体官兵表示热烈欢迎。”他还介绍了人民解放战争的大好形势，鼓励大家在人民的队伍中为革命事业作出更大的贡献，听了王政委的话，大家无不十分激动。
那天晚上，我们就在原地宿营，官兵们睡得很香很香。第二天，炮兵们全部参加了进攻黄维兵团的战斗，不少人还在这次战斗中荣立了战功。
由于我们举行了这次起义，党中央、毛主席和全国人民给了我们很高的荣誉。12月24日，毛主席、朱总司令给我们发来了贺电，赞扬了全师官兵的义举，鼓励我们逐渐把这支队伍锻炼成真正的人民军队。在这之前，刘伯承司令员还专门抽出时间给派到我师工作的鲁子敬、赵有守等30多名干部讲了话，对我们寄予了莫大的希望。另外，中共中央中原局、中原军区、豫皖苏军区政治部、豫皖苏区行政公署以及邓子恢、李达、吴芝圃等单位和个人，也纷纷给我们来电来函，对全师官兵进行了慰问。解放区的人民群众，还载歌载舞来到我师驻地慰问大家，使官兵们受到了极大的鼓舞和教育，真正感到了大家庭的温暖。
淮海战役胜利后，第一一○师被编为中国人民解放军第四兵团第十四军第四十二师，我仍任该师师长，李俊成任副政委，廖宜民任参谋主任，刘协侯任一二六团团长，还有很多人在这个师中担任了重要职务。整编后，我们遵照上级的指示，利用过去的关系，