Chapter 3 Chapter II Strategic Planning

In the early autumn of 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong prepared to fight several major battles in a row to wipe out the main force of the Kuomintang army north of the Yangtze River in the vast area centered on Xuzhou, and ordered the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army to jointly undertake this strategic task.At this time, in view of the tense national war situation, Chiang Kai-shek began to adjust the defensive deployment in order to save the crisis on the southern front.He gathered heavy troops on the crosses of Jinpu Road and Longhai Road centered on Xuzhou in an attempt to prevent our army from going south.

How to conduct this decisive battle about life and death?Both sides have launched intense and careful strategic planning. In the early morning of September 24, 1948, Huaye had broken into the inner city from the east and west, and Jinan City could be overcome by time.On the Xuzhou side, the Kuomintang Army Qiu Qingquan Corps, which was preparing to reinforce Jinan, had only assembled in the Chengwu and Caoxian areas. The Huang Botao Corps had not yet fully assembled, and the Li Mi Corps was far away in the area near Guzhen; , full of worries, dare not move forward. Under such circumstances, once the aid enemy knows that our army has completely captured Jinan, it may stop the north aid and turn to strengthen the guard to prevent the main force of our army from going south. At that time, our army's planned aid plan will fail.

Therefore, the Huaye Front Committee convened a meeting in time to focus on discussing the next step of our army's actions if the enemy stopped the North's aid.The meeting proposed two combat directions: one is to go out from the southwest of Shandong, cross the Longhai Road, join the middle field, and find and annihilate the enemy troops in the southwest of Xuzhou; During the discussion, everyone analyzed the pros and cons of these two combat directions, and believed that the former has a vast battlefield and is convenient for large corps movements. Once a battle is won, a strategic encirclement of Xuzhou can be developed, which is a fatal threat to the enemy.However, this area borders Xuzhou in the east, Bengbu in the south, and Wuhan in the west. Our army will be attacked from three sides in this area.

The latter can avoid many disadvantages of going out of the southwestern part of Shandong, improve the situation on the southern front, expose the Jinpu line, force the enemy to retreat or strengthen the defense along the river and the Jinpu railway, so as to reduce their mobile forces, and help our army resume the riverside work. Create favorable conditions for crossing the river in the future, and the transportation and supply are very convenient, so we can win the supply and support of manpower and material resources in Central China.The difficulty in this direction is that due to the high concentration of the enemy and our forces in the southern Shandong area, the consumption of manpower and material resources in the old liberated areas is serious, but these difficulties are much smaller than those in southwestern Shandong.After heated discussions, the thinking was unified, and everyone believed that the latter combat direction was the best.

Su Yu, deputy commander of Huaye, reported to the Central Military Commission on the morning of the 24th based on the opinions discussed at the meeting, and put forward specific suggestions for the next step in the event that the enemy stopped aiding the North. This suggestion put forward four scenarios: In the spring of 1948, the first part of the East China Field Army was training in Puyang, Henan, and Zhu De came to inspect it in person.This is a group photo of Commander-in-Chief Zhu De with East China Field Army Commander Chen Yi and Deputy Commander Su Yu (1) In order to better improve the battle situation in the Central Plains, isolate the Jinpu line, and force the enemy to retreat (or at least strengthen) the riverside and along the Jinpu line, so as to reduce their mobile forces, facilitate the restoration of riverside work, and create favorable conditions for crossing the river in the future, As well as to make it easier for the Huaye army to enter the south of Longhai Road to fight in the future, to obtain the convenience of transportation and supply, and to win the support of central China's manpower and material resources for the war, it is suggested to carry out the Huaihai Campaign (the "Huaihai" mentioned here refers to Huaiyin, Huai'an, etc. and Haizhou and other regions).The campaign can be divided into two stages: in the first stage, the Northern Subei Corps (a column must be strengthened) captured the Huaihe River and Huaihe River, and took advantage of the victory to recover Baoying and Gaoyou, while the main force of the entire army was located on both sides of the Suqian-Canal Station line to annihilate possible If the enemy who comes to aid does not help or is blocked, and instead passes through Pukou and the Yangtze River to aid from Yangzhou to the north, then Huaye will start the second step of the campaign before and after the end of the Lianghuai battle, capturing Haizhou and Lianyungang with three columns, and ending the battle. After the Battle of Huaihai, the whole army went into rest.

(2) Only carry out Haizhou operations, with the sole purpose of capturing Haizhou, Xinpu, Lianyungang and other places, and control the main force in Xin'an Town, the north and south of Yunhe Station, and the Yizao Line, and rest in preparation for war.This case is more convenient for the troops to rest and reorganize, but it also increases the difficulty of capturing the two Huaihe Rivers in the future (the enemy may increase their troops). (3) Go all out to the south for reinforcements and wipe out part of the enemy, but if Jinan is conquered, the enemy will be more vigilant and may retreat, and it may not be easy to seek battle.

(4) The whole army will go into rest and reorganization, which is good for the troops, but it is easy to lose the cool autumn climate suitable for combat and the mental pressure imposed on the enemy after the fall of Jinan. After Su Yu's suggestion was issued, our army liberated Jinan that night. As our army expected, the enemy in Xuzhou did not come to help. On September 25, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi (Chen Yi was then the commander of Huaye, the second secretary of the Central Plains Bureau, and the deputy commander of the Central Plains Military Region, and accompanied the Central Plains in the operation) and Li Xiannian expressed their support for Su Yu's suggestion and agreed to take advantage of the victory after Jinan was conquered. In the Huaihai Campaign, the first plan is to attack the two Huaihe Rivers and attack and aid the enemy. If we can cooperate with some of the KMT's miscellaneous troops, the effect will be even greater.At the same time, he said that Nakano adopted the policy of dispersing and annihilating the enemy, striving to wipe out part of the enemy in the Jianghan area, so as to attract the enemy in the west and cooperate with Huaye in the east. Combat laid the foundation.

On the evening of the same day, the Central Military Commission approved Huaye's proposal on holding the Huaihai Campaign, believing that "it is very necessary to hold the Huaihai Campaign."The Central Military Commission instructed Hua Ye that several operations should be prepared for this campaign: (1) The first operation should aim at annihilating Huang Botao's corps in Xin'an Town and the line of the canal; The second battle; (3) The third battle is to wipe out the enemies in the Haizhou, Lianyungang, and Guanyun areas.The Central Military Commission emphasized that carrying out these three operations is a big battle. If it is fought well, it can wipe out more than a dozen brigades of the enemy, open up the connection between Shandong and northern Jiangsu, and force the enemy to disperse part of their forces to defend the Yangtze River, which is beneficial to our army's next step. Carry out operations on the Xuzhou and Pukou lines.The Central Military Commission asked Huaye to make full preparations for this battle before October 10, and hold a cadre meeting to unify the will to fight and adjust internal relations.

On the 28th, the Central Military Commission once again instructed Hua Ye: The first and most important battle in the Huaihai Campaign was to contain Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi's corps and annihilate Huang Botao's corps.This battle must be bigger than the battle of Jinan.Therefore, there must be a considerable amount of time for the attacking corps to be rested and replenished, and to be fully prepared for the entire army's combat needs, including all logistical work, before it can start operations.The battle time includes the fight against Huang Botao's Corps, the East China Sea, and the Huaihe River. It will take one to one and a half months, and a one-month rest after the war. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare food and fodder for two to two and a half months.It is advisable to postpone the Qufu meeting for cadres above the division commander for a few days, so that the various columns and divisions of the attacking aid corps can make some arrangements before the meeting.In order to take care of the rest of the attacking corps, the dispatch time of the Huaihai Campaign seems to have to be postponed to around October 20.

Before the end of the Jinan Campaign, the Huaye Front Committee put forward a proposal to hold the Huaihai Campaign as the next step, and immediately received the support of the comrades in charge of the Nakano and the approval of the Central Military Commission. This fully shows that the strategic guidance of the Central Military Commission and the frontline commanders The thinking is the same, that is, to wipe out the vital forces of the Kuomintang army without losing the opportunity, and to speed up the process of the liberation war. The Huaihai Campaign proposed by the Huaye Front Committee was actually limited to Huaiyin, Huai'an, and Haizhou in the East China battlefield.When the Central Military Commission approved this proposal, it emphasized that the first battle of the Huaihai Campaign should first annihilate the Kuomintang Huang Botao Corps on the line from Xin'an Town to the Canal.

This instruction of the Central Military Commission determined the initial goal of the Huaihai Campaign, which was to annihilate Huang Botao's corps first.It can be seen from this that the Central Military Commission's focus at that time was to annihilate the main force of the enemy army to the north of the Yangtze River.Because, at that time, there were not too many enemies defending the Huaihe River, but Huang Botao's Corps had three armies at that time. Our army annihilated Huang Botao's Corps, which could achieve the goal of annihilating a large number of enemies. Judging from the geographical location of Huang Botao's Corps, there are also many favorable conditions for our army. Huang Botao's Corps is far away from Xuzhou, with a prominent location and a long contact line, which is conducive to our army's division and encirclement.When our army fights in Xin'an Town, we can rely on the liberated areas in southern Shandong and northern Jiangsu, and we can get logistical support at any time.If our army wiped out Huang Botao's corps in the first battle, it would be equivalent to cutting off the right arm of the enemy in Xuzhou, and the balance of forces between the enemy and us on the southern front would change rapidly.If Huang Botao's corps is surrounded and wiped out by me, the two corps of Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi in Xuzhou may be mobilized by me. Our army can continue to expand the results of the battle and seek to wipe out these two corps; Huai, threatening Nanjing, so as to mobilize the enemy of Xuzhou to the south, so that our army can annihilate the enemy during the movement; it can also attack the Jinpu Railway to the west, cooperate with the middle field, and completely isolate Xuzhou. The Central Military Commission's instructions on the first annihilation of Huang Botao's corps played a decisive role in the success of the entire Huaihai Campaign. In order to implement the spirit of the September meeting of the Central Committee and fully prepare for the Huaihai Campaign, the Huaye Front Committee required a meeting of cadres according to the requirements of the Central Military Commission to unify the will to fight and adjust internal relations. Hold an extended meeting. After quickly handling the aftermath of the Jinan Battle, the Huaye Command arrived in Qufu from Jinan on October 3. On October 5, the enlarged meeting of the Frontline Committee of the East China Field Army of the Communist Party of China was held in Qufu. The members of the front committee and the main responsible cadres of each corps, column, and division participated in the meeting. The meeting conveyed the resolution of the Central Committee's September meeting, and discussed Mao Zedong's instructions in May 1948 about "moving the army forward, increasing production by an inch, strengthening discipline, and making the revolution invincible". After careful discussion, the participants clearly realized that this instruction of Mao Zedong was the only correct policy to guide the Chinese revolution to quickly win national victory. Only when the army advances can it destroy the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang more quickly and encourage and assist the Chinese Communist Party more effectively. The struggle of the people in the Kuomintang-ruled areas against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek made it possible for the liberated areas to recuperate and develop production.Only by continuously increasing production can we improve the lives of the people in the liberated areas, support the advance of the army, and accelerate the progress of the war.Only by carrying out the struggle against anarchy and undisciplined tendencies and strengthening discipline can the whole Party and the army be unified politically, ideologically, organizationally, and in action, and unity can be strengthened to ensure the victory of the revolution. On the basis of raising awareness and unifying their thinking, the main responsible cadres of the Huaye Front Committee and the party committees of each corps and column consciously conducted self-examination, carried out criticism and self-criticism by fully promoting democracy, and summarized Since the War of Liberation, we have found out the existing problems, analyzed and studied the reasons, and clarified the direction based on the achievements and experience in implementing the relevant policies and instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, as well as the political and military tasks assigned to them. The meeting lasted 20 days.The meeting passed the "Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Huaye Front Committee on Strengthening Discipline to Overcome Discipline, Disorganization and Anarchy".The resolution expresses loyal support for the Central Committee's resolution and Mao Zedong's instructions, and is determined to work hard to implement the principles and policies of the Party Central Committee and complete the combat tasks assigned by the Central Committee.The resolution also decided to strengthen disciplinary education throughout the entire army, requiring all officers and soldiers to strengthen their study of Mao Zedong Thought and the Party's policies, and Party committees at all levels to strengthen the collective leadership system, improve the work efficiency of leading organs at all levels, and improve the quality of their work. style, the resolution also determined to strictly implement the requesting and reporting system in accordance with the regulations. During the Qufu Conference, the Huaye Command also held three operational meetings, studied and discussed the Central Military Commission's instructions on the Huaihai Campaign, studied and formulated the operational plan of the campaign and made specific deployments. After the meeting, the party committees of each column also made corresponding resolutions to strengthen discipline. The party committees at all levels below the column held party committee or cadre meetings to convey the spirit of the September meeting of the Central Committee and the expansion of the Huaye Front Committee based on the actual situation of the unit. The meeting decided to carry out preliminary study and inspection, and some units also made a resolution. The company branches also generally held meetings to organize and study the instructions of the central government and the spirit of the Qufu expansion meeting of the former Huaye Committee, and conduct summary inspections.In this way, the instructions of the Central Committee and the spirit of the Qufu Enlarged Meeting of the Huaye Front Committee were quickly transformed into a force for new victories, which laid a solid ideological foundation for strengthening internal unity, firmly establishing the overall concept, and successfully completing combat tasks. The Qufu Enlarged Meeting of Huaye Front Committee made full ideological and organizational preparations for launching the Huaihai Campaign. In order to implement the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the Huaye Command held a combat meeting in Qufu on October 9. The meeting conveyed the instructions of the Central Military Commission, analyzed the situation of the enemy and ourselves at that time, and studied the combat plan for the Huaihai Campaign. Several possible situations are fully estimated. After the liberation of Jinan, the Kuomintang Qiu Qingquan Corps gathered in Shangqiu, Zhuji and other areas. The Eighth Army of Li Mi Corps took over Xuzhou's defense, and the Ninth Army gathered in the area from Su County to Guzhen. The 25th Army of Huang Botao's Corps was in Tancheng, the 64th Army was in Guanzhuang, Gaotangou, Gaoliu and the area north of Xin'an Town in the southeast of Xin'an Town, the main force of the 63rd Army was in Wayao, and one part was guarding Zhaodun, Canal station. More than 6,000 members of the stubborn local armed forces entrenched in Linyi, the Shandong Puppet Security Brigade Wang Hong's Ninth Division, abandoned the city and fled south to Tancheng. The 181st Division of the 55th Army of the Kuomintang, which was originally stationed in Heze, has retreated to Shangqiu. Sun Yuanliang's corps has been transferred from Zhengzhou to the east and is preparing to go to Bengbu. The Liu Ruming Department of the Fourth Appeasement Zone of the Kuomintang also moved eastward from the Shangqiu area. In the area north of the Longhai Line, from Tancheng, Yixian, Zaozhuang, Lincheng, Fengxian, Yutai, Qingguji, and Liukou, the Kuomintang army has set up outposts, and the main force is completely concentrated along the Longhai Railway. According to the Central Military Commission's instructions on the first annihilation of Huang Botao's corps, and the distribution of enemy forces on the battlefield, the comrades present at the meeting discussed two operational plans: (1) First attack Xinpu, Haizhou, and Lianyungang with one unit, and mobilize Huang Botao's corps to assist the east, and wipe out the enemy in the Xinpu and Xin'an Township areas during the campaign. (2) According to the current situation of Huang Botao's corps, first divide and encircle it and annihilate it. After discussion, the meeting decided to adopt the second option. Su Yu made a report at the meeting. In his report, he first talked about the purpose and significance of this battle. He pointed out that after our army annihilated Huang Botao's corps, it would go straight to the Huaihe River, seize the Xinhai, approach the Yangtze River, and threaten Nanjing. If we can annihilate Huang Botao's corps At the same time, annihilating 1/3 of the aided enemy and regaining the vast area of ​​​​Huaihai will cause the enemy's defense line to retreat to the area along the river, so the significance of this battle is extremely great.He then analyzed five possibilities for how the situation might develop: (1) The situation has not changed much. Huang Botao's corps will be settled quickly and smoothly, and the corps of Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi may come to the east.Firstly block the attack along the canal and inflict heavy damage and consumption. After most of Huang Botao's corps has been dealt with, release the front to lure the enemy deep, and then attack the north and south to destroy them. , threatening the area along the river. (2) After Huang Botao's corps was wiped out, Qiu Qingquan's and Li Mi's corps did not dare to come to the east, but relied on the west bank of the canal to hold on. Defense along the river; at the same time, I will capture Xinhai again. (3) We can only wipe out Huang Botao's corps, and the enemy will immediately turn on the defensive and strengthen the Lianghuai and Xinhai. I cannot expand the results of the battle. (4) The enemy discovered our intention of action. Before we approached Huang Botao's corps, the enemy immediately moved Qiu Qingquan's corps to move closer to Huang Botao's corps. First we concentrated, and then we were reinforced by Lianyungang from the sea.If so, our army will need to find another fighter. (5) After our main force has gone east, the west will be empty. If we cannot resolve the battle quickly, the enemy's Liu Ruming and Sun Yuanliang corps west of Xuzhou will disturb our rear to the north and cooperate with us. Su Yu pointed out that judging from the above situations, the first possibility is less realistic, and we should try our best to fight for it; the second possibility is greater, and we should do everything possible to fight for it; If you strive for it, at least strive for the third possibility, avoid the fourth possibility, and prevent and destroy the fifth possibility. On the Operational Policy of the Huaihai Campaign On the afternoon of the 12th, Huaye reported the meeting to the Central Military Commission.That night, Huaye received an instruction from the Central Military Commission, which was "Operation Policy on the Huaihai Campaign" in the fourth volume of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong". The "Operation Policy on the Huaihai Campaign" indicates: (1) The focus of the first stage of this campaign is to concentrate our forces to wipe out Huang Botao's corps, complete a breakthrough in the middle, and occupy Xin'an Town, Canal Station... .In order to achieve this goal, two columns should be used to annihilate one enemy division, and a total of six to seven columns should be used to divide and annihilate the enemy's 25th, 63rd, and 64th divisions (all refer to the Kuomintang The reorganization division of the army has been reorganized into the army at this time, editor's note).Use 5 to 6 columns to serve as blocking and fighting aid.With one or two columns, annihilate Li Mi's brigade in Lincheng and Hanzhuang areas, and strive to occupy Linhan, threatening Xuzhou from the north, so that the two corps of Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi dare not use all their strength to assist the east.One column plus local corps, located in the southwest of Shandong, flanking the Xuzhou and Shangqiu sections to contain a part of the Qiu corps...with 1 or 2 columns active in the Suqian, Suining, and Lingbi areas to contain the Li corps.The above deployment means that more than half of the troops must be used to contain, block and wipe out part of the enemy to deal with the two corps of Qiu and Li, so as to achieve the goal of annihilating the three divisions of the Huang Corps. Otherwise, the goal of annihilating the three divisions of the Yellow Corps cannot be achieved.In the first stage, strive to end within two to three weeks after the start of the campaign. (2) In the second stage, use about 5 columns to attack and wipe out the enemies in the Haizhou, Xinpu, Lianyungang, and Guanyun areas, and occupy the cities.It is estimated that at this time, the 54th Division and the 23rd Division of Qingdao are likely to be transported by sea to the Hai, Xin, and Lian areas. There will be a total of 3 divisions in the company's original 1 division in this area, so I have to use 5 columns to attack. And using the rest of the troops (the main force) to contain the two corps of Qiu and Li is still the principle of deploying to attack aid and aid in September.This stage also takes two to three weeks. (3) In the third stage, it is conceivable to fight on the two Huaihe Rivers.At that time, the enemy will increase the strength of about 1 division (the entire eighth division is moving south from Yantai), so it is also necessary to prepare about 5 columns of troops to attack, and use the rest of the main force as reinforcements and containment.At this stage, it will take about two to three weeks. The three stages will take about one and a half months to two months. (4) You completed the Huaihai campaign in November and December.Rest in January next year. From March to July, fight with Liu and Deng together, beat the enemy to various points along the river and stick to it. In autumn, your main force will probably be able to carry out cross-river operations. (The above quotation is from the fourth volume of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", pages 1293-1294) "The Combat Policy of the Huaihai Campaign" is Mao Zedong's conception of the campaign based on the actual situation at that time. Later, although the situation changed and the scale and scope of the campaign were expanded, the combat principles Mao Zedong put forward in this policy , the principle of using troops, the combat method of "attacking aid and attacking aid", and a series of guiding ideologies such as the first annihilation of Huang Botao's corps and the completion of a breakthrough in the middle, all achieved complete success, and the development of the campaign was larger and smoother than expected, so The result is even greater. Huaye did not receive Mao Zedong's instruction until 24:00 on the 12th. At this time, Huaye's combat plan had already been sent to the Central Military Commission, so they overlapped each other. After Hua Ye received this instruction from the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong, he discussed it and reported his opinion to the Central Military Commission on the 13th. In his report, Huaye believed that this instruction from the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong had two advantages: First, our troops can be fully deployed to avoid crowding, and pose a great threat to the enemy in Xuzhou, which can increase the enemy's concerns and reduce the pressure on our army to fight and block the enemy head-on. Second, it is convenient for food supply and rear transportation. After receiving reports from Huaye on the 12th and 13th, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to Huaye on the 14th, giving specific instructions on Huaye's deployment on the 12th: (1) The disadvantage of Huaye's deployment on the 12th is that the reinforcements were placed on the front rather than on the side.In the specific deployment of Huaye, a strong column should be used to capture the canal station, annihilate the defending enemy, and control this area; use 3 columns to capture and control Erzhuang and the area south of it, and one should go directly to the railway; Lincheng and Hanzhuang, after succeeding, leave a column in Lincheng and Hanzhuang, directly press Jiawang in the northeast of Xuzhou, and move to Taierzhuang and its west area with a column.There are a total of 6 columns above, which can be composed of 3 columns, 8 columns, 10 columns, 13 columns, Bo column and from the Subei Corps (the Huaye Subei Corps has 2nd, 11th, and 12th columns under its jurisdiction. ) to serve as a column, this deployment is to make Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi's corps feel threatened, not to expel our flank troops, not to capture Taierzhuang, that is, to be unable to cross the canal to the east for reinforcements, and to make the enemies of Xuzhou feel threatened. Li Mi's Eighth Army had to be stationed. (2) Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (that is, Ji Pengfei) led one column to go south, and joined the 11th column in the south of the road. It should not be located in the east of Suqian, but in the Suining area, control the Xu and Su highways, and threaten Xuzhou from the south This made Qiu and Li Yuan feel that if they did not expel this army, they would not be able to pass through Suining and Suqian for east aid. At the same time, it also threatened the Xubang line, so that the Ninth Army of Li Mi Corps did not dare to leave this line. (3) Use the Nine Columns and Guangdong-Guangzhou Columns to go out to the southwest of Shandong and join the local troops. They are located in Feng County, west of Yutai, north of Yucheng, and south of Chengwu, threatening Xuzhou from the northwest, so that Sun Yuanliang's troops can only deal with the Nine Columns and the The Guangdong and Guangxi columns were unable to go to Xuzhou to replace the Eighth Army of Li Mi's Corps to defend the city. (4) The first, third, fourth, and ninth main forces of the middle field began to attack Zhengzhou in a few days, and after they succeeded, they sent part of them eastward to threaten Kaifeng, attracting all of Liu Ruming's corps and part of Sun Yuanliang's corps to look westward. (5) All the deployments above are intended to restrain the various ministries in Xuzhou from aiding the enemy, so that the first impression is that our army seems to intend to capture Xuzhou, but it cannot be definitively concluded that our army is not capturing Xuzhou, but annihilating Huang Botao's corps.When our army's attack on Huang Botao's corps was urgent and we decided to reinforce it, we found that it would be difficult to send reinforcements unless the threat from the north and the south was eliminated.This will give our army the necessary time to wipe out Huang Botao's corps. (6) Huaye used 6 columns including the 1st column, 4th column, 6th column, 7th column, the 11th column in the middle field, and the Luzhongnan column, plus the special column, to annihilate the 3 armies of Huang Botao's corps. This was the center of the whole campaign Target. (7) Except for the 9th Column and the Guangdong-Guangzhou Column, which should go straight out of Fengxian, Yutai, and Yucheng from Yanzhou and Jining, the rest of the ministries should all move to the deployment position of the line of Linyi, Liangqiu, Baiyan, and Zouxian in the first step , and rest for a few days, and should not be uneven; the second step is to advance from the line at the same time according to the prescribed tasks.The date for the whole army to move south from Linyi and Zouxian should be postponed to between November 5th and 10th. (8) Preparations for logistical work (food and ammunition, etc.) and political work preparations, strive to be relatively complete and thoughtful. The above-mentioned instructions of the Central Military Commission are actually supplements and specific explanations to the instructions of the 11th, which made the guiding ideology, strategic principles, operational centers and deployment of troops of the Central Military Commission on organizing the Huaihai Campaign very specific. In these instructions, the Central Military Commission clarified the strategic guiding ideology of the Huaihai Campaign, which was to restrain the main force of the Xuzhou enemy from all aspects, and to concentrate our superior forces to first annihilate the Kuomintang Huang Botao Corps, which was the central goal of the entire campaign. In order to achieve this goal, the two major field armies were stipulated to act in unison to restrain the enemy's forces from all aspects so that they could not effectively reinforce Huang Botao's corps and buy time for our main attacking troops. In terms of specific deployment, the ten major military principles were flexibly used, and the art of command was highly exerted. In order to confuse the enemy and conceal our army's campaign intentions, it first created a situation of besieging Xuzhou, giving the enemy the illusion that our army seized Xuzhou first. Especially in order to effectively block the enemy's reinforcements and ensure our army's first annihilation of Huang Botao's corps, the principle of "attacking aid and fighting aid" was used, and the reinforcements were placed on the side of the enemy's reinforcements, and from the north and south to Xuzhou. This threat made the enemy's reinforcements afraid to go to the rescue easily, and created conditions for our army to have sufficient time to wipe out Huang Botao's corps. Therefore, the formulation of this combat policy enabled our army to build the Huaihai Campaign on the basis of a very safe and reliable victory from the very beginning, and fundamentally guaranteed our army's victory in the entire Huaihai Campaign. On October 14, the Huaye Command held the second operational meeting to discuss the instructions of the Central Military Commission that day, and studied and drafted the specific operational deployment of the Huaihai Campaign. The leaders of the various columns present at the meeting believed that in accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission, while concentrating their forces to encircle and wipe out Huang Botao's corps, they deployed the main force to attack the key points outside Xuzhou from all directions, creating momentum to besiege Xuzhou, and blocking the enemy's reinforcements. It is most prudent to stay in the area between the west of the canal and Xuzhou, and use this restraint method to buy time and ensure that the main attack direction can smoothly annihilate Huang Botao's corps.After discussion, the meeting drew up a specific combat plan, the general content of which is: (1) Use 5 columns to divide and encircle and annihilate the main force of Huang Botao's corps located in Xin'an Town, Tancheng, Wayao and other areas, use 1 column to attack and control the canal station and the positions on both sides, and deploy along both sides of the canal to attack and aid the enemy. (2) Use two columns to go south from Lincheng, forcing Feng Zhi'an to revolt, and occupy Hanzhuang, control the canal and bridges, and advance to Liguoyi and Jiawang; capture Taierzhuang with two columns, and seize Wannian with one Gate, advancing south, threatening the rear of Feng's Ministry of Security. (3) Use one column as the general reserve to encircle and wipe out Huang Botao's Corps, and control the area around Pi County. (4) Use two columns to cross the canal to the west through Suqian, and cooperate with local troops to capture Suining at will, threaten Xuzhou and Bengbu, or control the area north of Suining, and cooperate with the four columns from north to south to block the enemy of Xuzhou's east aid . (5) Attack the southwestern part of Shandong with two columns and some local troops, threaten the northwest area of ​​Xuzhou, and destroy the railway line between Xuzhou and Shangqiu. (6) Use part of the local troops to attack the railway line between Xuzhou and Bengbu after the start of the campaign. (7) The whole army marched to Linyi and Zouxian on October 31 to gather at the front line, and began to attack on November 5. Deputy Commander Su Yu (third from left), Chief of Staff Chen Shiju (fifth from left), and Deputy Chief of Staff Zhang Zhen (fourth from left) are listening to a report on the situation at the Huaihai Front After Huaye reported this plan, it was approved by the Central Military Commission on the 17th: he fully agreed with the deployment on the 15th, and hoped to implement it accordingly. At this time, our army learned that the enemy of Xuzhou had the possibility of invading from the southwestern part of Shandong (that is, the Kuomintang’s plan to attack Shandong). After analysis, the Central Military Commission believed that if the enemy really committed an intrusion in the north, it would launch the Huaihai Campaign against our army. It is very convenient, so I decided not to change the plan for the Huaihai Campaign.Later, our army discovered that the enemy did not act, but only strengthened the defense of Xin'an Town and the east of Xuzhou. According to this situation, the Huaye Command held the third combat meeting on October 20.In order to strengthen the frontal support troops on the north and south sides of the canal station, and ensure the success of encircling and annihilating Huang Botao's corps, the meeting decided to make some adjustments to the original plan: (1) Increase the strength of the troops encircling and annihilating Huang Botao's corps from the original 5 columns to 8 columns. (2) Raiding and occupying canal stations and gun carriages, the number of troops preparing to block reinforcements was increased from one column to two columns. (3) Use 3 columns to cross the canal southward from Hanzhuang and Taierzhuang, go straight to the Longhai line east of Xuzhou, attract enemy reinforcements from Xuzhou, and support the frontal blocking troops to fight. (4) The two columns and local armed forces that threatened Xuzhou in the southwestern area of ​​Shandong organized a diversion attack on the enemy in Yutai, Fengxian, Dangshan, and Shangqiu areas, so that the enemy could not send reinforcements eastward to support the main battle. (5) In order to conceal the main force's intention to move, the troops from southwestern Shandong moved southward first, and launched a feint attack on the enemies of Shangqiu and Dangshan in advance, and the rest of the main force marched in parallel after the 25th. Huaye's adjustment to the original deployment was based on the fact that the Xuzhou enemy strengthened the defense of Xin'an Town and the east of Xuzhou.This adjustment increased the strength to encircle and wipe out Huang Botao's corps and to attack Xuzhou from the north, so as to put our army's operation of annihilating Huang Botao's corps on a more secure and reliable basis. After this adjustment opinion was reported on October 20, the Central Military Commission issued a reply of "full agreement" the next day. The Central Military Commission also instructed Huaye: Troops entering southwestern Shandong should advance to the line from Shangqiu to Dangshan before October 30, about 100 miles away from the enemy, and form a line, cut off pedestrians, and do not attack the Shang and Dang lines. In order to prevent the enemy from being aware of our army's feint deployment as soon as possible.It is better to launch the attack at the same time or one day earlier when the battle in the east starts, otherwise, it may not have a big effect. This instruction of the Central Military Commission is mainly to conceal the combat intention of our army.Because if my troops in the southwest of Shandong attack the enemy prematurely, the enemy will realize that our army is using the tactics of "strike the east and attack the west", thereby strengthening the defense in the east of Xuzhou, or making Huang Botao's corps in the east of Xuzhou to attack the enemy. Xuzhou is getting closer. This will increase the difficulty for our army to encircle and wipe out Huang Botao's corps.If my troops entering southwestern Shandong and my troops east of Xuzhou to encircle and wipe out Huang Botao's corps attack at the same time, it will be difficult for the enemy to judge the main direction of our army's attack. While Huaye was adjusting and deploying to actively prepare for the battle, the main force of the Central Plains was holding the Zhengzhou Campaign to contain the eastward advance of Sun Yuanliang's corps and cooperate with Huaye to fight.The Central Military Commission instructed Huaye and the troops entering southwestern Shandong to get in close contact with Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, who commanded the central field operations, so as to facilitate cooperation. On October 28th, it was very close to the launch date of the battle. The leader of Huaye once again studied the situation of the enemy and us. It is estimated that after our army launches an attack, the Kuomintang army may stick to the situation at that time in order to consume our army on the periphery and defend the enemy. The purpose of Xuzhou. Secondly, the enemy may also assemble Li Mi's corps and Huang Botao's corps to hold on to a few points and support each other. After discovering that the main force of our army is attacking the new sea section, Huang Botao's corps may hold Xin'an Town as the core, and Li Mi's corps may use canals, mills, etc. Zhuang's first-line defense is very mobile. These situations have no major impact on our army's campaign, because if the enemy sticks to the situation at that time, it will just give our army the opportunity to divide the enemy and annihilate them one by one. Therefore, Huaye decided not to make any major changes in combat deployment. That night, Hua Ye reported to the Central Military Commission the final combat deployment before the war. This combat deployment was divided into two aspects: containment, blocking aid, attacking aid and mainly attacking Huang Botao's corps. After receiving Huaye's report, the Central Military Commission approved the report on the 30th, believing that Huaye's plan and deployment on the 28th were very good, and asked Huaye to "implement accordingly." This is the process of formulating, revising, and determining the specific combat plan for the Huaihai Campaign. From October 28 until the launch of the campaign, there were no major changes in the plan. This specific combat plan had been brewing for more than half a month, and it had been revised many times. The plan has given specific instructions to Huaye many times. After the Battle of Jinan, the Liberated Areas of East China and North China joined together. Chiang Kai-shek's painstakingly designed three-legged defensive formation of Xuzhou, Zhengzhou, and Jinan collapsed. Since the key offensive strategy was shattered by the People's Liberation Army, Chiang Kai-shek, on the one hand, ordered to restore the army and division designations from September 1, 1948, cancel the reorganization army, division and brigade designations, and restore the original reorganization division commander As the commander of the army, the commander of the reorganized brigade was restored to the division commander to boost morale; on the other hand, he was forced to adopt a strategy of shrinking, consolidating the main force into five strategic groups in Shenyang, Beiping, Xuzhou, Wuhan and Xi'an.After the Liaoshen Campaign ended, the Shenyang Weilihuang Group was completely wiped out. Among the remaining four major groups, the Xuzhou Liu Zhi Group had the largest force and was a heavily armed group.Liu Zhi Group used the two railways of Jinpu and Longhai and the two major rivers of Huaihe and Canal to form the so-called "Xubeng defense system". After the Battle of Jinan, the Kuomintang Army Command initially judged that the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army would unite to launch a large-scale attack on the area south of Longhai Road.Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek hastily ordered to adjust the deployment, and decided to command the third and twelfth corps under the command of Bai Chongxi, the commander-in-chief of the "suppression general" in central China, from Queshan and Suiping to launch an attack on the Tanghe and Credit Qizhen areas, in an attempt to destroy the western Henan army. In the liberated area, the Central Plains Field Army was restrained to the west of Pinghan Road.同时，蒋介石还下令驻郑州的第十六兵团东调徐州，把郑州防务交给第十二绥靖区负责；以徐州“剿总”总司令刘峙指挥第二、第七、第十三、第十六兵团与第一、第三、第四、第九绥靖区的部队，加强以徐州为中心的陇海路东西两侧的防御，阻止华东野战军由鲁西南或鲁南地区南下。后来，当国民党军统帅部发觉华东野战军有出苏北、中原野战军有打郑州的意图时，蒋介石又打算放弃郑州、开封等地，下令刘峙进一步加强陇海路商丘至海州段、津浦路临城至蚌埠段的防御，企图以“攻势防御”，“巩固徐州而确保之”，并准备在淮海战场同人民解放军进行战略决战。 1948年10月下旬，东北辽沈决战已近尾声，国民党在东北已经惨败，国民党蒋介石也看出了徐州大战已形成一触即发之势，他们决心加强徐州防御。 10月22日，国民党统帅部在南京召开军事会议，做徐蚌会战的准备。会议提出由华中“剿总”总司令白崇禧统一指挥华中和徐州两个“剿总”所属部队，并决定黄维十二兵团出周家口，依情况策应徐州“剿总”或华中“剿总”作战。 24日，蒋介石下达《对当前作战之指导》的指令，要求徐州“剿总”取“攻势防御”，“巩固徐州而确保之”；命令黄伯韬七兵团、李弥十三兵团分别控制于阿湖、新安镇、曹八集（今八义集）附近机动，遏阻华东野战军南进，并适时策应邱清泉二兵团、孙元良十六兵团；命令邱清泉兵团机动控制于砀山附近，负责监视鲁西南华东我军之行动，并依情况与黄维兵团协力夹击东进之中原我军；命令孙元良兵团向宿县、蒙城转移，控制于蚌埠附近机动。蒋介石的指令对徐淮地区其余各部均有要求，冯治安第三绥靖区应以主力控制于运河以西地区台儿庄、枣庄一线，担任守备；刘汝明第四绥靖区应以主力守备商丘，一部掩护陇海路东段商丘至徐州段交通。徐州“剿总”应加强徐州、蚌埠、淮阴等地防御工事，务期固守，以徐州形成机动兵团之核心。 24日后，国民党徐州“剿总”按照蒋介石的指令调整了部署，这一部署是东起连云港，西至商丘，北自临城，南到蚌埠，以徐州为中心，沿津浦、陇海路摆了一个十字架。国民党军以为在这一地区兵力充足，调动灵便，又有坚固工事，可以固守徐州以屏障京（南京）沪，进而伺机进窥中原。 据郭汝瑰回忆，10月29日，国民党参谋总长顾祝同和国民党国防部长何应钦等举行会议，研究中原作战问题，与会人员都认识到中原作战是为了保障江南的战略防御，故提出了“守江必守淮”的主张，但对守淮有两种不同意见。 第一种意见主张以攻为守，即除留一至两个军坚守徐州外，所有陇海铁路上的城镇一律放弃，集中可以集中的兵力于徐州蚌埠之间津浦铁路两侧形成重点，作战略防御。无论人民解放军由平汉路、津浦路还是取道苏北南下，均集中全力，寻求与人民解放军决战，为了配合徐州的作战，华中“剿总”必须以黄维兵团进出周家口附近。 第二种意见主张退淮河两岸进行河川防御。 研究结果，认为退守淮河南岸，则而后不便于向平汉路或苏北方面机动；且人民解放军打通陇海路后，向东西方向调动兵力，非常灵便，对国民党军队更为不利，于是会议决定采纳第一种主张（《郭汝瑰回忆录》第323页）。 另据杜聿明回忆，11月3日，国民党国防部作战厅副厅长许朗轩送给他的“徐蚌会战计划”，主要内容是（杜聿明：《淮海战役始末》，《淮海战役亲历记》第8-9页）： （一）方针 蒋军为集中兵力于蚌埠附近，击破共军攻势，达成“戡乱建国”之目的，着将徐州“剿总”所属兵团及绥靖区各部队主力移至淮河南岸蚌埠东西地区（包括临淮关、怀远、风台间地区），占领阵地，以攻势防御击退对方之攻击，相机转为攻势，予以歼灭。 （二）任务及行动 1、以某兵团之一部守备徐州、贾汪，掩护主力转移。 2、各部队行动：（1）新安镇附近之第七兵团经五河、临淮关附近转进。（2）徐州附近之第十三兵团、第三绥靖区经褚兰、固镇向蚌埠转进。（3）徐州以西黄口、虞城附近之第二兵团经涡阳向怀远附近转进。（4）柳河、商丘附近之第十六兵团及第四绥靖区经蒙城向海河街、风台间地区转进。（5）总部及直属部队经津浦路向蚌埠转进。 3、各部队到达目的地后，应迅速占领阵地构筑工事。 杜聿明回忆的作战计划的内容，明显地是第二方案的内容。 杜聿明此时在东北，对国民党国防部讨论的作战方案有两个是事后才知道的，并且明确说对第一方案的内容全无印象。而郭汝瑰的回忆是采纳第一方案，送给杜聿明的却是第二方案。 可见，所谓徐蚌会战方案至11月3日送至杜聿明手中时尚未确定。 杜聿明还听人说，顾祝同11月4日到徐州，5日主持会议，是根据第一方案的原则安排的，但并未当机立断，及时实施。 11月6日，淮海战役正式打响，刘峙在徐州坐卧不安，连电向蒋介石告急。蒋介石此时才按第一方案下达正式命令。国民党蒋介石执行第一方案，正如杜聿明所说：“则自徐州到蚌埠间200多公里的铁路两侧，摆了数十万大军，既弃置徐州既设永久工事而不守（徐州那样庞大纵深的据点工事，只留一两个军，几乎等于不守），又将各兵团摆于铁路两侧毫无既设阵地的一条长形地带，形成鼠头蛇尾、到处挨打的态势，据我了解，古今中外的战史中还找不到这样一种集中会战的战略先例。”（杜聿明：《淮海战役始末》，《淮海战役亲历记》第10页） 当然，这是杜聿明的事后评价，他在当时是否认识到了这一点，我们不得而知。 蒋介石采纳第一方案，是一种观望的行动，或者说是一种被迫的行动。根据杜聿明作战计划内容的回忆，证明蒋介石并不想采纳第一方案，而是主张集中兵力于蚌埠附近与人民解放军决战。时任总统府少将参军、战地视察官的李以匡在回忆中写道：“临时决定在徐州会战是被迫的。” “济南解放后，在淮海方面，蒋介石决心放弃徐州，坚守淮河。他的着眼是徐州乃四战之地，易攻难守，后方联络线过长，兵员粮弹补充困难（据徐州第一补给区刘永焜司令说徐州粮食储备只有21天）；且蒋介石一生唯心迷信，四面楚歌垓下被围的历史故事，就是发生在徐州（古彭城）附近地区，这更使他有所避忌。蒋介石的总企图是：退守淮河确保南京外围，企图在淮河附近地区挫败解放军主力，来争取第二线战略配置的时间。”（李以匡：《淮海战役国民党军被歼概述》，《淮海战役亲历记》第62页） “放弃徐州退守淮河，原定在11月上旬转移完毕，但蒋介石在10月下旬来往北平、葫芦岛、南京间，想作多方面挣扎，一面又迟疑，怕徐州之撤影响人心。”（李以匡：《淮海战役国民党军被歼概述》，《淮海战役亲历记》第63页） 时任国民党徐州“剿总”总司令的刘峙也在回忆中写道：“陈毅、刘伯承将合攻徐州图一战获胜，直下江南，乃极明显的企图，而我方则有两个对策，撤至淮河之线取攻势防御，或增加兵力与匪于徐州附近决一生死。唯参谋本部对攻守之计迟未确定。”（转引自王道平等着《震撼世界的大决战》第129-130页） 对于徐州是守？是撤？蒋介石虽然举棋未定，但有一点是很明确的，企图拖延我军南下的时间，或者说阻止我军进攻徐州。 时任国民党第二兵团少将参谋长的李汉萍回忆说：“到11月初，原集结在济宁、兖州一带的解放军围攻徐州的动态逐渐明朗化，国民党军统帅部仓皇失措，决定作徐蚌会战准备。 “为了使徐州不受东西夹击并能彻底集中使用兵力起见，蒋介石特用极机密的亲启电，令邱清泉派1个军，伪装解放军，轻装出发，昼夜兼程前进，将鄄城以西之董口黄河堤掘开，造成鲁西泛滥，阻止解放军由鲁西方面包围徐州。”（李汉萍：《邱清泉第二兵团覆灭记》，《淮海战役亲历记》第304页） 时驻黄口的邱清泉兵团距董口相距约300公里，往返至少需1周时间，且途经的鲁西地区已经解放。邱清泉为执行蒋介石的秘密手令，与李汉萍商量后，决定派第七十军去执行任务，并且还找来第七十军军长高吉人，具体拟定了完成任务的措施。只是由于11月5日徐州军事会议后情况发生变化，才停止执行这个计划。 谁来担当徐蚌会战总指挥，如同会战计划一样，这让蒋介石也伤透了脑筋，10月22日南京军方的军事会议，提议白崇禧统一指挥国民党华中和徐州两个“剿总”所属的部队，然而，白崇禧却有意出难题。 白崇禧（1893-1966），字健生，广西临桂人，国民党二级陆军上将。1923年任广西讨逆军参谋长，1924年与李宗仁的“定桂军”合并，组成广西“定桂讨贼军”，任前敌总指挥兼参谋长，与李宗仁、黄绍竑共同消灭了广西境内其他势力，控制广西，形成新桂系集团。 1926年，新桂系归顺广州国民政府。北伐战争开始时，任国民革命军副总参谋长，协助蒋介石筹划军事。1927年初，任北伐军东路军前敌总指挥，率部占领杭州及上海附近地区；4月，支持并参与蒋介石的“四一二”反革命政变。 1928年，任国民革命军第四集团军副总司令兼新编第十三军军长、前敌总指挥，率部参加对奉系张作霖的战争，直抵滦东地区。 1929年蒋桂战争中新桂系失败后避居香港，不久与李宗仁恢复在广西的统治，后多次参加反对蒋介石的战争。 1931年宁粤妥协后，当选国民党中央执行委员。 1932年任广西绥靖公署副主任、第五路军副总指挥，与李宗仁以自治、自卫、自给的“三自”政策统治广西，抗日战争爆发后，任国民政府军事委员会副总参谋长。 1938年底，任国民政府军事委员会委员长、桂林行营主任，统一指挥长江以南5个战区，后任军训部长、军事委员会监察委员会主席，参与制造了“皖南事变”。 1946年5月，任南京政府国防部长。 蒋介石派系林立，矛盾重重，我们从白崇禧的简历中也可以看出这一点，蒋介石历来只重用嫡系，而排挤非嫡系。国民党内勉强可以与蒋介石抗衡的当数桂系李宗仁。1948年4月，伪国大举行所谓大选，蒋介石当选总统，李宗仁冲破蒋介石的重重阻挠当选副总统，在李宗仁的竞选过程中，桂系白崇禧出了大力。于是，蒋介石决心给桂系一点颜色看看，在5月便免去了白崇禧的国防部长职务，任命何应钦为国防部长，调白崇禧为国民党华中“剿总”总司令。 白崇禧对蒋介石的这一手并不感到意外，因为蒋介石对李宗仁和白崇禧历来采取“分而治之”的政策，一个在中央，另一个必在地方。李宗仁作为副总统已入朝，白崇禧肯定要调到地方，既然要到地方去，就想多争一点兵权。 于是，在蒋介石向他宣布任命时，他就向蒋介石提出了由他统一指挥中原大军的要求，白崇禧说：“军人以服从为天职，我只有接受委员长的任命。但健生认为：华中'剿总'的成立，应以保卫南京这个国府的政治中心为基本任务，而为达到此目的，必须确立'守江必先守淮'的战略方针。 “总结九江指挥所这几个月来的经验教训，中原大军必须统一指挥，不能分割使用。我建议将华中'剿总'设在蚌埠，统一指挥中原大军，在徐蚌间江淮山岳地带，运用攻势防御，坚持长期作战……”（《蒋介石与白崇禧》第171-172页） 与此同时，李宗仁也向蒋介石建议将黄淮平原划成一个一个战区，由白崇禧统一指挥，但蒋介石拒不接受李宗仁和白崇禧的建议，白崇禧在黄绍竑的劝说下才去武汉任职。 蒋介石不信任白崇禧，但当郭汝瑰遵照顾祝同的叮嘱报告蒋介石，由白崇禧统一指挥华中和徐州两个“剿总”所属部队只是暂时的事，蒋介石却坚定地回答：“不要暂时指挥，就叫他统一指挥下去好了。”（《郭汝瑰回忆录》第320页）国民党参谋部根据蒋介石的指令，于10月24日下达了由白崇禧统一指挥中原军事的命令。 10月30日，白崇禧由汉口飞到南京，参加当日下午国防部召开的中原作战会议。会上，白崇禧满口同意以第十二兵团转用于阜阳、上蔡、太和地区，还提议以第三兵团随第十二兵团进出阜阳和太和附近。 但次日，即31日上午再次开会时，白崇禧却变更主张，一是坚决不肯统一指挥徐州和华中两个“剿总”，二是只允许调动十二兵团，并且还提出第二军、十五军在形势和距离上都不便归十二兵团序列，至于自己的嫡系张淦三兵团则更不允许调动了，恐怕事出有因。 10月30日晚上，白崇禧与李宗仁交换了意见。他们估计这很可能是蒋介石设下的圈套，其目的无非是想利用他的军队抵挡人民解放军的进攻，维持蒋介石政权，这与一心想取代蒋介石的李宗仁及白崇禧的夙愿是相违的。 同时，白崇禧还看到徐州“剿总”的几个兵团，以徐州为中心，像一字形部署在陇海线上，态势极为不利，假若“徐蚌会战”失败，他就得负失败之责，蒋介石也可以名正言顺地处置他。 另外，白崇禧到南京后，还发现京沪一带政治气候有点异常，呼吁和平的声浪正在高涨，他觉得还是在汉口静观风向为好（王道平等着《震撼世界的大决战》第130页）。 白崇禧的这一招，是对蒋介石5月份拒绝白崇禧建议的回敬，使蒋介石无可奈何，当然，蒋介石和国民党军方在考虑国民党华中和徐州两个“剿总”统一指挥的同时，也想加强徐州“剿总”的指挥，国民党徐州“剿总”总司令刘峙（1892-1971）也是二级陆军上将，是蒋介石、何应钦的心腹将领，素有北伐中的“福将”、中原大战中的“常胜将军”、抗战中的“长腿将军”之称。1946年9月，刘峙由于进攻冀鲁豫解放区失败而被撤职，之后虽然不久仍被蒋介石任命为战略顾问委员会上将委员，但由于无事可作，便带着三姨太回到上海家中闲居，1948年5月，何应钦担任国防部长，于是刘峙被任命为国民党徐州“剿总”总司令。 以徐州为中心的淮海战场，位于江苏、安徽、山东、河南4省交界处，属黄淮平原，介于黄河、长江之间，北上是济南，直通平津；南下可达长江，直下南京、上海，历来是兵家必争之地。在这一辽阔地域内，地形开阔，村落稠密，铁路纵横，公路四通八达，有利于大兵团机动作战。如掌控了徐州和淮河以北的平原地区，也就控制了长江以北，直接威胁到南京和上海的安全，其战略地位异常重要。 刘峙（1892-1971）1948年6月任徐州“剿总”总司令 在如此重要的地区，蒋介石派到徐州坐镇指挥的却是庸碌无能的刘峙。国民党军内部对此议论纷纷，认为刘峙根本就不是解放军的对手，有人说：“徐州是南京的大门，应派一员虎将把守；不派一虎，也应派一狗看门，如今只派来一只猪，眼看着大门是守不住了。” 国防部第三厅厅长郭汝瑰曾把这个笑话讲给参谋总长顾祝同听，并借机询问为什么要委任刘峙为徐州“剿总”总司令，顾祝同解释说：“徐州'剿总'的人选，我们考虑过两个人，一个是刘经扶（刘峙），另一个是蒋铭三（蒋鼎文），蒋铭三夜嫖日赌，不理公事，比较起来还是刘经扶好一些。” 刘峙在徐州当了半年的总司令，济南失陷后，徐州地区的形势顿趋紧张。国防部长何应钦和参谋总长顾祝同都觉得让刘峙指挥徐州“剿总”有些不放心，于是他们提出让白崇禧来统一指挥华中和徐州“剿总”，与解放军在淮海地区进行一场大会战。郭汝瑰奉命向蒋介石请示报告前，顾祝同特意叮嘱他说：“要报告总统，白健生统一指挥是暂时的，会战结束后，华中'剿总'和徐州'剿总'仍分区负责。” 自内战爆发以来，刘峙这员“福将”屡战屡败，没给蒋介石带来一丝的福气，蒋介石对他也失去了信心，听完郭汝瑰的汇报后，蒋介石当场表态说：“不要暂时指挥，就叫白健生统一指挥好了。” 刘峙听到这一消息后，私下里发牢骚说：“白健生是寡妇