Chapter 19 Whistleblower Roy

At the end of May, the Comintern's instructions on armed struggle were transmitted to China.In particular, the telegram known as the "May Instructions" in history is completely Stalinist in tone: the dependence on unreliable generals must be eradicated.Mobilize about 20,000 Communist Party members, plus about 50,000 revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan and Hubei, form several new armies, use military school students as commanders, and organize (it is not too late) a reliable army.Otherwise there is no guarantee against failure.This work is difficult, but there is no other way.Organize a revolutionary court-martial headed by a prestigious, non-Communist Kuomintang member.Punish military officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek or instigate soldiers to harm the people, workers and peasants.It can't just be advice.Now is the time to act.

Luo Yi received this telegram and notified the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to hold an emergency meeting for consultation.Luo Yi, Borodin, and Wikisky also attended the meeting. Chen Duxiu read the telegram, but remained silent for a while.Because the contents of the telegram happened to be denied by him a few days ago.Cai Hesen was the most active advocate of armed insurrection; Zhou Enlai and Wu Yuzhang also repeatedly proposed the establishment of an independent armed force for the Communist Party; Mao Zedong’s first words were land revolution, which was denied by Chen Duxiu. slap?He tentatively said: "My opinion is not to tell the contents of this telegram, so as not to cause ideological confusion."

Cai Hesen naturally disagreed: "If you don't take out the telegram, isn't it withholding international instructions? Comrades in Hunan and other places really need the support of telegrams." Borodin and Vikingsky agreed: "Moscow is too ignorant of the situation in Wuhan. Can Wang Jingwei organize a revolutionary military court to punish Chiang Kai-shek?" Luo Yi placed even greater hopes on Wang Jingwei: "Let's discuss it with Wang Jingwei and see if he agrees or not. If he agrees, it can be implemented." The members of the Communist Party of China are disgusted with Luo Yi's empty talk, but his so-called "deepening the revolution, consolidating the Wuhan line and the agrarian revolution" slogan has the "five big" resolutions as amulets, and no one can deny him.Another international "master" Borodin advocated "extensive alliances, development to the northwest, and correction of the excesses of the workers' and peasants' movement", which was not appreciated by the members of the Communist Party of China.Although it is difficult for Borodin to justify himself in theory, his ability to grasp reality is many times stronger than that of Roy, so he can often propose solutions to specific problems.In this way, Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai, who were very bookish, could get close.So they mostly adopted Lao Bao's specific suggestions on the grounds that Luo Yi did not understand the real situation in China.Most Politburo members avoided the Roche-Bao debate.

There was a popular saying at the time: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is wandering in the cross streets.It seems true. Chen Duxiu was busy calling International.It was the same old trick of agreeing in principle and denying in detail: "Your instruction is correct and important. We fully agree." He wrote, then changed his pen, "The Chinese Communist Party wants to establish a democratic dictatorship, but in a short period of time Impossible. It is especially difficult to expel Wang Jingwei through reorganization. When we cannot achieve these tasks, we must maintain good relations with the Kuomintang and the National Revolutionary Army generals. We must attract their leftist leaders and reach a common political platform, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to build up our own military power if we split with them."

When the picture of the young Mao Zedong gesticulating and talking about the peasant movement in Hunan appeared in front of him, he couldn't help but use the topic: the peasant movement was developing particularly rapidly in Hunan.Ninety percent of the National Revolutionary Army was Hunanese, and the entire army was hostile to the excesses of the peasant movement.Xia Douyin's rebellion and the Changsha Incident were manifestations of this general willfulness.Under such circumstances, not only the Kuomintang, but also the Communist Party must adopt a policy of concessions.Excessive behavior must be corrected and land confiscations must be curbed.The combined attack on the local tyrants, evil gentry and bandits (although supported by the small and common landlords) should be checked so that we can concentrate our forces against the reactionaries.Otherwise, there will immediately be a conflict with the majority of the reactionary army, a split with the Kuomintang, and we will become an opposition party.The general mood in the Kuomintang was to fight against Chiang Kai-shek and suppress the Communist Party at the same time.In the immediate future, it will probably be objectively impossible to remain in the Kuomintang.

Chen Duxiu's last sentence was right. On May 29, Tang Shengzhi publicly released a telegram to change his attitude.He expressed anti-communism, pointing out in the telegram that "the party affairs in Hunan Province are all manipulated by cross-party thugs and bad elements of our own party."He changed his usual attitude of tolerating the CCP’s activities in Hunan. On the surface, he was under the pressure of his subordinates’ demands and the fact that the “Ma-Day Incident” was a fait accompli. In fact, it seemed to be the general trend. The true meaning hidden in his heart was ready to surface. .He still hoped to use Wang Jingwei to oppose Chiang. His anti-communist attitude showed that it was doubtful whether he had obtained Wang's consent in advance; but it was an obvious fact that Wang adopted an attitude of turning right from then on.

The change of the whole situation in Wuhan is also marked by this.Tang Shengzhi was no longer a supporter of Borodin, but a master under Wang Jingwei's "under attack".As the mass movement developed, Feng Yuxiang, whom the leftists of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang had pinned their hopes on, became increasingly rightward.For a period of time, he did have many anti-Chiang remarks, but he did not bear any major political responsibility for the leftist forces.He liked to talk about the revolution favorably and sympathized with the peasants, but his attitude was that he neither supported nor interfered.But now he's starting to turn right.He instituted strict inspections of Communist newspapers in Shaanxi and decided to punish the editor of an article calling for revolutionary action by the peasants.It is stipulated that farmers who have "deviant actions" should be punished, up to shooting.Today, Feng Yuxiang, addressing the commanders, asserted that "the peasants' struggle against the gentry is harmful to the cause of the revolution." When an economic strike started at a small arms factory in Xi'an, the strike leaders were arrested.

In June 1927, several prominent Communists were arrested.A month earlier, he had announced to military political workers that anyone who convened a secret meeting would be punished, and he also asked the political workers to sign and agree to the propaganda slogan he formulated.All these are used to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. In the areas controlled by Feng Yuxiang, the party organization has always been kept secret.For several months, Feng Yuxiang stayed in his own territory and did not give active assistance to the National Revolutionary Army.When he decided to fight jointly with the Wuhan regime, he did not fight a few major battles.The biggest battle was the Battle of Luoyang.But the enemy troops who participated in the battle were only a few thousand people.

In April, the Red Spear Society in Luoyang held a major uprising against the generals of the Henan Army. The uprising swept through four or five counties and caused fierce fighting that lasted for three weeks, which made Feng's operations less difficult.Hundreds of villages were destroyed, people were looted, fruit trees were cut down, and even pots and jars were smashed.After Feng took Luoyang, although the leaders of the Wuhan government sent telegrams urging him to take action several times, he was still in no hurry to move forward, and he did not conquer Zhengzhou and Kaifeng until May 30 and 31.

Feng Yuxiang did not make any statement on Chiang Kai-shek's coup and the political attitude he adopted for a long time.When Feng was still in Xi'an, representatives from Wuhan and Chiang Kai-shek came to Feng to lobby.Chiang Kai-shek suggested to Feng not to send troops to fight Fengjun until Fengjun defeated the National Revolutionary Army; then, the two of them joined forces with Yan Xishan to oppose the victors.The persuasion worked.Feng Yuxiang's generals were frightened by the revolutionary events and economic difficulties in the Wuhan area, and they were especially afraid of being alone against the mighty Feng army.The anti-Chiang slogans on the wall disappeared overnight. Two days later, a pamphlet criticizing Chiang was withdrawn, and finally an order was issued to the entire army to ban anti-Chiang propaganda.From mid-May 1927, Xu Qian, the former leftist leader of the Wuhan Kuomintang, became Feng Yuxiang's "second me", and he tried his best to persuade Feng to join Chiang.At the Zhengzhou meeting with the "leftists", Feng pretended to be deaf and dumb, and at the military conference he proposed to form a government in the Northwest and Henan.Since then, the Xi'an Political Branch of the KMT in Feng's area has been recruited by some rightists, while a Communist Party member, the head of the agency, has been removed from his post.Feng Yuxiang claimed that the Kuomintang Henan Provincial Party Headquarters, which had a communist majority, carried out a wrong policy that caused chaos in the rear.In order to reorganize the provincial party headquarters, the political committee formed a new party headquarters headed by Xu Qian, and the new party headquarters were all rightists.

In mid-June, Feng Yuxiang and Chiang Kai-shek jointly signed a telegram opposing the Communists and demanding Borodin's departure at the Xuzhou meeting. In this way, Feng fell into the reactionary camp completely.The changes in Feng Yuxiang, an influential figure in China at that time, are very typical and thought-provoking.Many other KMT leaders have traveled a similar path from making the most revolutionary-sounding statements to quietly betraying revolutionary interests. The leftist regime in Wuhan is extremely fragile; Wang Jingwei, as the leader of the leftists, has been vacillating all the time.He opposed Chiang Kai-shek's military dictatorship and wanted to replace it himself. He was afraid of the CCP's revolutionary edge, but he wanted to take advantage of it for the time being.He also remembered the alliance with Russia and the Communist Party in Sun Yat-sen's legacy, but after returning from the European tour, he seemed to feel that the Soviet Union's international power was too weak to win by relying on it.He may have never forgotten that Borodin and the CCP did not resolutely support him in the "March 20th" Incident.The words that he often hangs around "has been caught in the pincers of the left and right" seem to be a reflection of this state of mind. Since Wang Jingwei arrived in Wuhan on April 10, his attitude gradually turned to the right is very obvious. In the beginning, he did hold high the banner of "party power" and resolutely opposed Chiang Kai-shek's changes. The resolution to expel Chiang Kai-shek from the party on April 17 was passed at the meeting where he was chairman.After Chen Duxiu arrived in Wuhan (about April 20), he actively promoted the holding of the joint meeting of the KMT and the Communist Party, hoping to stabilize the anti-Chiang front.However, within a few days, his remarks at the joint meeting of the two parties began to change.This is probably because after he learned about the internal situation in Wuhan, he felt that the future of anti-Chiang was not optimistic, so he had to leave a way out.Therefore, his argument was no longer about "conquering Chiang from the east", but "correcting the excesses of the workers' and peasants' movement". In this way, the meeting was also of the nature of a talk meeting, where Wang Jingwei often described some facts about the excessiveness of the workers' and peasants' movement, and then the talkative Chen Duxiu sang to it, and made some understated replies.In this way, the CCP and Wang Jingwei's "leftists" are fragile.At this delicate and unpredictable juncture, Luo Yi made an incomprehensible move that instantly tipped the political balance. When Luo Yi met with Wang Jingwei, he intentionally or unintentionally mentioned Moscow's "May Instructions."Wang Jingwei was taken aback for a moment, and asked if he could take it out for a look?In the past few days, Luo Yi has been suffering from the refusal of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to implement his ideas. He complained to Wang Jingwei, and Wang Jingwei perfunctory him.But Wang has a sincere appearance and impassioned revolutionary words. Luo Yi is likely to be confused by this false appearance, or he himself hopes to create a miracle on Wang to prove that his views are higher than those of Borodin and others. people.In any case, he gave Wang Jingwei a copy of this extremely important international call.Wang Jingwei looked at the telegram and tried to hide his surprise. Uncharacteristically, his face was very ugly. He said: The content of this telegram violated the "Sun (Zhongshan) Yue (Fei) Declaration" of the year, because the Sun Yue Declaration clearly pointed out that the communist organization and even the Soviet system, None of the facts can be quoted in China; but this telegram is to make China move towards communism. Roy denies it.Wang Jingwei showed the copy to the people around him again, as if he was annotating the copy: "Look carefully, this is enough to prove that it is not that the Kuomintang did not join forces with Russia and the Communist Party, but that the Communist International violated its promise to destroy the Kuomintang. Conspiracy!" The Kuomintang dignitaries around Wang Jingwei also talked about "electricity" and turned pale: "This means war between the two parties!" Zhou Enlai, who had just arrived in Wuhan from Shanghai, soon learned from within the Kuomintang that Luo Yi had leaked international instructions and reported it to the Central Committee.The members of the Politburo were stunned: Bookishness can't be for this sake!Other Central Committee members such as Mao Zedong even said later: "Who contributed to the split with the Kuomintang? In the end it was Luo Yi himself." Deng Yingchao also said later: "Luo Yi is very undisciplined!" Borodin was so angry that he almost snapped the pipe stem.He and Weijingski asked Luo Yi: "Why did you do this?" Luo Yi's understanding is short, and he shrank his body when he spoke for the first time, and his eloquent tongue was not smooth: "I, my original intention is to ease the relationship with Wang" Angry Borodin telegraphed Roy's leak to the international community.The transcript obtained by Wang Jingwei was soon passed on to Tang Shengzhi and his subordinates. Tang Shengzhi's reaction was a bit smug: "How is it? We are still ahead of the Communist Party." So the subordinates had flattering words: Ah, Tang always has the foresight and predicts things like a god. On June 4, Zhu Peide, governor of Jiangxi Province and commander of the Third Army, sent Fang Zhimin and other 164 Communist Party members out of the country as gifts; On the 13th, Wang Jingwei returned from a meeting with Feng Yuxiang in Zhengzhou and announced that all the main forces of Tang Shengzhi's troops had returned to Wuhan from Henan; On the 20th, the above-mentioned incident occurred in which Feng Yuxiang publicly turned to the right after talks with Chiang Kai-shek and demanded that the Communists be expelled from the Kuomintang.