Chapter 13 Chapter 3 Secret Qian Shang

If we objectively evaluate China's economic development over the past 30 years, we can draw a conclusion: the reason why China's economy has achieved relatively good results in the past 30 years is not because of more government intervention, but because of less government intervention and more common people. Freedom, entrepreneurial spirit. The tightening of bank credit caused by the government's increase in the deposit reserve ratio, and the double pressure of the private lending interest chain generated by the interweaving of legal and illegal finance have caused SMEs to struggle with financing issues.

As a result, the hidden world finally showed its feet. On July 21, 2011, the Wenzhou Private Lending Market Report released by the Wenzhou Central Sub-branch of the People's Bank of China showed that the interest rate of private lending was at a staged high, with an annual comprehensive interest rate of 24.4%.According to the statistics of 300 samples of specific monitoring households in random checks, 89% of private households and 59.67% of enterprises in Wenzhou participate in private lending, and the scale of private lending in Wenzhou is as high as 110 billion yuan.For the first time, real estate investment was surpassed by private lending.

In fact, Wenzhou's private lending market has far exceeded the scale of 110 billion.After the failure of coal speculation and real estate speculation, private credit has become the hottest investment method for Wenzhou people. Where there is huge profit, there must be warriors.Overseas Wenzhou capital distributed all over the world has also returned to Wenzhou in recent years. "The money was earned by the first generation of Wenzhou businessmen who 'went out'. Now that they hear that private lending in their hometown is very profitable, and people can invest even if they don't come back, they entrust their relatives and friends in China to lend money."

Even at the height of the heat, people needed connections to put their money into underground banks. This crazy state of the whole people, this game of money that never sleeps, attracts more people, such as banks, guarantee companies, pawnshops, consignors, investment companies, leasing companies, private enterprises, state-owned enterprises, listed companies, civil servants and others. The general public threw themselves into it desperately. A few years ago, a friend of Mr. Ni in Wenzhou told him a clear way to "make money easily": use the real estate under his name as collateral, apply for a loan from the bank, and then hand over the funds to a guarantee company to lend out at high interest rates. The principal and interest will be returned together at the end of the year.

This approach has become very common in Wenzhou.The interest on bank loans is about 6% to 7%, while that of the guarantee company is 12% to 15%. That is to say, if the mortgage of 2 million yuan of real estate is put in the guarantee company, the annual interest can be more than 300,000 yuan, minus the bank's interest. Loan interest, and more than half of the interest belongs to himself. Later, the interest rate of private lending soared, and Mr. Ni planned to invest another sum, but he did not realize that "the storm is coming". Beginning in 2011, when money became tighter and tighter, private lending interest rates were abnormally high, but there were also reports of running away and jumping off buildings.At this time, Mr. Ni went to the boss of the guarantee company to get back the funds, but the boss made it clear that he couldn’t get it back for the time being, and then comforted him: the panic will pass soon!

This is just the story of an ordinary Wenzhou person.In fact, among Wenzhou's huge team of private lenders, civil servants have become a powerful branch.In some cities in Zhejiang Province, banks have certain related policies, and every civil servant can get a loan of 500,000 yuan from the bank.This provides great convenience for civil servants to participate in private credit. On September 20, 2011, the Wenzhou version of the "Wu Ying case" came to light.Shi Xiaojie, from Yongjia, Wenzhou, and her husband Liu Xiaosong, borrowed the name of the well-known local enterprise Shunji Group to raise funds for several guarantee companies of their family, amounting to as much as 1.3 billion yuan.

During the investigation of this case, it was found that a considerable number of borrowers were local civil servants in Yongjia, some even said that more than 80% of them were civil servants, and there were also cadres above the bureau level.In this way, the case becomes more compelling and worth watching. In private credit in Wenzhou, the participation of civil servants is very common. At the beginning of 2011, Wenzhou Longwan Public Security Bureau detected a case of illegally absorbing public deposits. The creditors involved were all from Wenzhou judiciary, and the amount involved by a single borrower ranged from several million.

"I will help you with affairs, and you will lend usury for me", which has become one of the unspoken rules of private credit in Wenzhou. Mr. Wang, who is very active in Wenzhou’s private lending industry, used to be in charge of the credit business of Wenzhou Industrial and Commercial Bank. He revealed: “If you know people, the bank is relatively easy to talk to. Now that the income is so good, many people are racking their brains to get cash from bank loans. , used for lending, using houses or other real estate as collateral, and there are also clever schemes to find various loan reasons.” The report of the People’s Bank of Wenzhou pointed out: “The source of funds for private lending in Wenzhou, of which the indirect inflow of bank credit funds accounts for 10%. Its scale exceeds 10 billion yuan."

Of course, there are also civil servants, government officials, and bank employees who directly use their identities as "brokers." In August 2011, the news that "a female bank employee absconded with a huge sum of more than 70 million yuan..." spread in Wenzhou.Later, when the matter was made public, it was discovered that the account manager from the Yueqing Liushi Branch of China CITIC Bank did not embezzle huge sums of money from the bank, but was deeply involved in private credit and absconded in fear of crime. Afterwards, the Wenzhou Banking Regulatory Department carried out severe investigations and crackdowns on such incidents. Bank employees who used their positions to act as "brokers" were all fired and assumed corresponding responsibilities.From August to November, four bank employees were found acting as "brokers" and participated in private lending with a total amount of about 200 million yuan.

There are generally two forms of private lending in Wenzhou, one is through a "middleman" and the other is through a guarantee company.A guarantee company is a form of loan in which the company lends money and then gives the annual interest to the investor. "Middleman" can be subdivided into two types.One is a "middleman" who lends money by relying on personal relationships. "Middlemen" are generally women who are more active in the circle of friends, have extensive interpersonal relationships, and have been proved to be more "reliable" in their long-term "practice experience", and have the ability to gather spare money from relatives and friends, and then earn money through loans. Get stable income.The amount of capital contributed by each investor will not be too large, but after being gathered into a tower through the hands of "middlemen", the total amount of funds is not less than that of professional guarantee companies.According to the reporter’s understanding, there are such large and small “middlemen” active everywhere in Wenzhou. On the premise of guaranteeing the investor’s income, the interest they get will leave a part as an intermediary fee. The level of the intermediary fee depends on the amount of funds and the direction of investment. There are slight differences depending on the time of loan.

The second type of "middleman" is generally a bank employee, a government official, or the boss of a large enterprise.They take advantage of their higher credit standing and better access to bank loans than ordinary small and medium-sized enterprises, and then lend the money they get from the bank to others at a higher interest rate, earning a spread from it.The amount of each loan issued by these people is often relatively large, because to ensure that the borrower can repay the money on time, they often have to go through strict inspections beforehand on their repayment ability, creditworthiness, and risk of investment projects. In the so-called "private lending", not all funds come from individuals, and the "official bank" obtained by guarantee companies through various means has also become an important part of private lending. In 2011, a leaked CBRC senior executive’s speech was circulated on the Internet, revealing that the phenomenon of “official banks” participating in private credit is very serious, and it is said that 3 trillion yuan in bank loans has been involved.The text of the speech said: "Due to the strong demand for credit, they have switched to the usury business, and a large part of the funds for lending come from banks, which are loans from banks to large enterprises. (These loans) are low-cost in coastal areas such as Zhejiang. , (Enterprises get it) and then lend usury to earn huge interest and spreads, which actually become a platform for the usury market to obtain financing from banks. Some state-owned guarantee companies and financial companies also use state-owned bank funds to secretly lend usury.” State-owned enterprises did not miss this "speculative feast".Some state-owned enterprises use land as collateral, obtain huge loans at low interest rates from banks with one hand, and lend money at high interest rates through guarantee companies with the other hand. With the development of Wenzhou's financial crisis, layers of inside stories have been uncovered.In this "money adventure game" in which all people participate, listed companies have not been immune to it. Shrinking credit environment, bleak industrial operating environment, and rising private interest rates are the background and motivation for listed companies to start entrusting a large number of loans.According to incomplete statistics, as of October 15, there have been 139 announcements on "entrusted loans" in the two cities, involving 79 listed companies, with a cumulative loan amount exceeding 20 billion yuan.Most entrusted loans of listed companies occur between affiliated companies, and listed companies turn into capital hubs, providing low-interest loans to holding subsidiaries.Most of the external entrusted loans of listed companies flow to real estate and related industries subject to policy control, with an annual interest rate as low as 12% and as high as 24.5%. Listed companies "lending" loans are of course aimed at seeking higher performance, but the emergence of entrusted loan extension announcements this year has made the outside world realize that the risk of private lending capital chain breaks has begun to pass to listed companies. Wenzhou's "jumping" incident is far from over. In the early morning of September 23, 2011, the downstairs of the Wenzhou Talent Building was stained with blood, and a woman jumped to her death from the 26th floor. Her name is "A Hui", and she is a "borrower" in Wenzhou's rampant private lending industry.The direct cause of her jump was the disappearance of another woman, Chen Fanrong. Chen Fanrong's public identity is the person in charge of Bangben Printing Co., Ltd., but she is actually a loan shark. People in Wenzhou call such people "Lao Gao".Chen Fanrong and "A Hui" lived together in the Wenzhou Talent Building, and they were related to each other. Therefore, A Hui mortgaged several houses under her name and raised a total of 20 million yuan to Chen Fanrong to issue usury loans. Windfall profits.Unexpectedly, Chen Fanrong suddenly disappeared without a trace. In despair, A Hui committed suicide by jumping from Chen Fanrong's house. There are dozens of other people with the same identity as Ah Hui. They all knew Chen Fanrong, and they either actively or passively became the "offline" of Chen Fanrong, the "old senior".After Ah Hui jumped off the building and "Lao Gao" disappeared, these "borrowers" received loan confirmation letters from the Aowseng Branch of Wenzhou Lucheng Rural Credit Cooperative Bank one after another.In other words, the loan of 300,000 yuan per person has disappeared with Chen Fanrong, and more "Ahuis" will be repaying the debt next. A "borrower" Xiao Zhang told reporters that at the beginning of September 2011, he heard that Chen Fanrong was an old customer of the Lucheng Rural Cooperative Bank's Aidengqiao branch, and that some bank preferential services could be given to his own people, so he agreed to transfer the utility bill Transferred to Wenzhou Lucheng Rural Cooperative Bank's Aitengqiao branch, Chen Fanrong can pay the water and electricity bills every month and give 1,500 yuan in cash every month. After Chen Fanrong showed a business card with a position as a salesperson of the Aidengqiao Sub-office, Xiao Zhang went to Chen Fanrong of the Aidengqiao Sub-office to go through the formalities and press his fingerprint. On September 24th, Saturday, a staff member of the head office of Lucheng Rural Cooperative Bank called Xiao Zhang and wanted to go to Xiao Zhang’s home for loan reconciliation and asked him to sign a loan confirmation letter to confirm that there was a small revolving loan under his name. Loan in the amount of 300,000 yuan. "I don't even have a loan card, and I should be the one to withdraw the money, but I didn't participate in anything, and the 300,000 yuan loan was taken away." Xiao Zhang said. Obviously, Chen Fanrong's behavior is not only a problem of usury, but also economic crimes such as fraudulent loans, and the large number of people and the high amount of money are obviously not something that Chen Fanrong can handle alone.With the intervention of relevant departments, it was discovered that government officials and bank employees were involved behind Chen Fanrong. It is said that Chen's ex-boyfriend had a friendship with Li Jun, director of the Lucheng Rural Cooperative Bank's Aitengqiao branch, so through this relationship, many "borrowers" got their loans from this bank.After Chen failed, Li Jun was also immediately investigated. As "Old Gao", to whom did Chen Fanrong give the huge sum of money, which caused the capital chain to break and "run away"?It is reported that some of Chen's funds were raised for Dong Yuchi, the deputy mayor of Shacheng Town, Longwan District. At the end of July, Dong Yuchi was absent from work for no reason, and it was finally discovered that all Dong's family members had disappeared, including his parents, wife and children. One ring after another, with a large number of participants, the most attractive part of private lending is that the promised return is many times higher than bank interest. The interlocking loan relationship seems to be calm, but as long as one link is broken, the entire interest chain will inevitably collapse.Such a loan relationship has an organizational model of pyramid schemes.The real beneficiary of this kind of inverted pyramid structure MLM lending is at the top of the tower, and the upline earns profit by continuously developing the downline and charging entry fees.When the downline can no longer develop or the development shrinks, the extension of the interest chain will stop, and the funds will flow to the top of the pyramid, and those downlines with a large team will become victims of the entire chain. These downlines are ordinary individuals or families. They hand over the money to the middleman, and the middleman then transfers it to the guarantee company, which issues the loan. They are the highest level. The tightening of monetary policy under macro-control indicates that private lending is booming. In 2011, Wenzhou's private lending rates soared, which has drawn a real equation with "usury". Relevant data show that in July, August, and September 2011, Wenzhou’s private credit annual interest rates were 24.14%, 24.81%, and 24.43%, respectively, about four times the bank loan interest rate; The highest even reaches 5 points, that is, the annual interest rate is 60%, while the annual interest rate of private lending in some places has exceeded 100%. While the business owners in Wenzhou were running away and jumping off the building, the indispensable entities in Wenzhou's private credit - guarantee companies, pawn companies, investment companies, and guarantee companies - also fell into trouble, triggering a new round of "running away, Jumping Tide".Under a guarantee company, hundreds of ordinary lenders are involved. The escape of the guarantee company caused panic among the people on a large scale. "A Hui" who jumped off the building on September 23 was so desperate after her online disappeared that she paid her debts with death.More tragedies are still happening. In the early morning of November 8, "broker" Tong Xiaolu was found dead in his residence by jumping off a building.It is understood that Tong Xiaolu raised tens of millions of yuan from banks, friends, neighbors, etc. at the beginning of 2011, and then loaned out at a higher monthly interest rate. Because his family ran away and relatives and friends came to press for debts, Tong Xiaolu committed suicide by jumping off the building at home . On November 13, Lin Jianping and Ji Zhongfen, the legal representatives of Wenzhou Kai Guarantee Company and Trade Import and Export Company, both committed suicide by injecting heroin at home.According to preliminary investigations, they borrowed more than 10 million yuan from the private sector at a high interest rate of 3 to 6 cents per month, and they ended up dying because they could not get the bank to renew the loan and were unable to pay the huge private loan and interest. There are only dozens of formal microfinance companies in Wenzhou, but there are more than 1,000 so-called guarantee companies, investment companies, and consignment companies. They are the "main force" in this round of "running away".By the end of 2010, Wenzhou had 1,879 financing intermediaries, including 186 guarantee companies and 1,088 investment (consulting) companies. Wenzhou Jinqiao Credit Guarantee Co., Ltd. and Wenzhou Jinhong Credit Guarantee Co., Ltd. are respectively the vice president and director unit of Wenzhou Guarantee Association. In May 2011, Jinqiao Guarantee and Jinhong Guarantee obtained the financing guarantee business license issued by the government department.At that time, when the Wenzhou Municipal Economic and Trade Commission issued the first batch of financing guarantee business licenses, it emphasized in the announcement: "Financing guarantee institutions shall not engage in activities such as taking deposits, issuing loans, entrusting loans, entrusting investment, etc., and shall not engage in any form of Illegal fundraising.” However, under the cover of such a legalized identity, Jinqiao and Jinhong’s illegal fundraising behavior became more and more bold. The person in charge of Jinqiao Guarantee is Xu Mi and her husband Yao Ming, while the boss of Jinhong Guarantee is Xu Mi's mother Qian Yuezhen.Qian Yuezhen is well-known in Wenzhou's investment circle. In November 2005, she visited Spain with state leaders, and she participated in the investment in Nordic China Town.Xu Mi's daughter inherited her mother's business, and her development is also very smooth. What made the lender suspicious was that Jin Hong guaranteed to move the office.Jinhong Guarantee originally rented half a floor of the luxurious Wenzhou Guoxin Building for office use. On September 13, many borrowers saw a relocation notice on the gate: "The office has moved to the first floor of Dongfang Building across the road. .” Compared with the base of financial institutions - Guoxin Building, Dongfang Building is completely different.Jinhong Guarantee moved to such an old and messy office building, and the borrowers began to feel that something was wrong, and came to Jinhong Guarantee to collect debts. Sure enough, on September 22, 10 days later, the borrower guaranteed by Jin Hong could no longer get through to Qian Yuezhen.After that, Xu Mi and his wife, who were guaranteed by Jinqiao, also disappeared. News began to spread on the Internet that Xu Mi and his wife had already arrived in Brazil with 500 million yuan, and Qian Yuezhen might have gone to Finland or Brazil. According to the statistics of the borrowers of Jinqiao: "Jinqiao guaranteed a total of more than 200 million yuan in cash from them, and the monthly interest was between 1.5% and 2%." Jinhong guaranteed more.But no one knows to whom Jin Qiao and Jin Hong guaranteed the money.According to Guo Bingchao, secretary-general of the Wenzhou Guarantee Association, Wenzhou Guarantee Company currently has a balance of more than 10 billion yuan in bank guarantees. If small and micro enterprises want to obtain loans from banks, there are very limited channels, such as mortgage loans, joint loans and joint guarantees, guaranteed loans, or loans for small enterprises that are specially matched with large enterprises.However, most small and micro enterprises cannot use these channels. According to a survey by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, 90% of small businesses below the designated size have no loan relationship with financial institutions, and 95% of micro enterprises have no loan relationship with financial institutions.In Wenzhou, there are 360,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, many of which may be less than 10% able to obtain loans from financial institutions.These enterprises shut out by financial institutions can only rely on private finance to survive and grow. Many years ago, private finance was the strong backing and source of strength for the development of the Wenzhou model. However, the break of the private credit capital chain in 2011 directly ignited the fuse of the collapse of private enterprises in Wenzhou. The good wine of the past, the poison of the present, why is it here? Looking back at some of the country's policies and guidelines in recent years, we can get a glimpse of the hidden details and context. In 2011, the National Bureau of Statistics Zhejiang Survey Team and the Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Statistics surveyed 1,525 enterprises in the province. The survey results showed that the business climate index in Zhejiang Province in the third quarter was 133, down 6.8 points year-on-year and 2.6 points month-on-month, still in the "relative prosperity” range.The Entrepreneur Confidence Index dropped slightly to 123.7, down 10.5 points and 4.1 points from the same period last year and the second quarter of this year respectively. Since the fourth quarter of last year, it has shown a trend of falling quarter by quarter. Compared with the first half of 2011, the inherent "difficulties" such as high costs, financing difficulties, fewer orders, and employment difficulties have not been resolved, and the loss of confidence in the industry and economic situation has become a "new problem" for some business owners.In addition, the "transformation" road before the business owners has actually changed due to the transformation of enterprises into other investment industries such as microfinance companies, and the "hollowing out" of the industry has a tendency to expand. From a macro point of view, the decline in entrepreneur confidence can easily lead to the abandonment of physical operations and the emergence of a virtual economy.Such a trend will seriously hit the sustained vitality of the national economy and affect the stability of a country's economy.The economic crisis in the United States and Europe is actually the manifestation of the consequences of the overexpansion of the virtual economy and the relative shrinkage of the real economy. From a micro perspective, such an economic state will cause entrepreneurs to have a "cash is king" mentality, which will further affect their withdrawal of capital from the real economy and transfer to the virtual economy.Wang Hexia is a typical case. The accumulation of "Jubang" shoe industry over the years has left Wang Hexia with a lot of spare cash in his hands. As mentioned earlier, the concept of "capital can only appreciate in sports" has also penetrated into the concept of this boss.Going back to my previous point of view: "The tightness of monetary policy and the growth of private lending are in a trade-off relationship. If the policy is tight, lending will go crazy. If it is properly relaxed, private lending will not be so crazy." As the country Due to the shift in monetary policy, more and more small and medium-sized enterprises began to have financial problems, and the demand for loans was high.Wenzhou businessmen who saw the right time began to devote themselves to the field of private credit frantically.All of a sudden, credit companies on the streets of Wenzhou popped up like mushrooms, and naturally Wang Hexia would not give up such a good opportunity. In fact, as early as mid-2009, Wang Hexia, who had a keen sense of smell, had already started a guarantee company with two friends.At that time, Wang Hexia contributed 20 million yuan, and the two friends each contributed 10 million yuan. However, this capital was obviously not enough to maintain the operation of a guarantee company, so two friends of Wang and Xia borrowed 50 million yuan from local loan sharks at a rate of one cent. In the initial stage of operation, Wang Hexia's guarantee company went smoothly.Since the Wenzhou area has a relatively popular guarantor system, private financing is relatively smooth, and the capital turnover cycle of Wenzhou enterprises is relatively short. Therefore, when the guarantee company was first established, lending and lending were very smooth, and there were no problems. Wang Hexia also Big bucks. But the good times didn’t last long. In 2010, a large number of small private enterprises began to close down. These enterprises brought a lot of bad debts to Wang Hexia’s guarantee company. However, Wang Hexia and her friends survived on the money they earned from setting up factories. Looking forward to earning the money back when the economic situation improves. However, the "good day" that Wang Hexia and her friends were looking forward to did not come. Instead, large-scale "deaths" of large customers followed the collapse of small customers, which completely made Wang Hexia and her friends desperate. In Wang Hexia's guarantee company, a considerable part of the principal comes from usury.When the company is operating normally, Wang Hexia makes a profit by using her loan interest rate higher than that of usury, and the loaned money can be recovered on time, so Wang Hexia doesn't have to worry about usury. However, the current economic situation has changed suddenly, and repaying the previous usury and interest has become an almost impossible task.As more and more customers of the guarantee company went bankrupt, more and more usury loans Wang and Xia could not repay.The loan of 50 million yuan with a profit of 1 share in the past has turned into a burden of several hundred million yuan. "Borrowing usury and lending usury" used to be Wang Hexia's business experience. According to this business theory, as long as the loan is repaid on time, the problems in the previous links are not a problem, but when the problem happens in this link, Wang Hexia's There was a problem with the business.Like other business owners, "running away" has become an inevitable choice for Wang Hexia. In addition to financing difficulties, there are also institutional disadvantages at the micro level. When the global financial crisis struck in 2008, the central government proposed a "4 trillion investment" plan.Stimulated by such a powerful stimulant, China's economy has maintained a high speed and has a great momentum to outshine others. In 2009, when the "4 trillion investment" plan started, enterprises ushered in a "spring of development".At that time, banks, large and small, took the initiative to find companies to lend. Around 2008, Wenzhou enterprises ushered in a concentrated period of expanding production and diversifying transformation. What is particularly prominent is that the new energy photovoltaic industry, which required a large investment in the early stage, developed rapidly, which eventually led to overcapacity.Many Wenzhou enterprises engaged in traditional manufacturing industries have turned photovoltaics into the best sustenance for enterprise transformation, such as Xintai Group, the largest glasses manufacturer in Wenzhou. Of course, real estate investment is also an investment area that most Wenzhou manufacturing enterprises are unwilling to let go. In 2010, half of Wenzhou's top 100 enterprises were involved in real estate, which was vividly called by the media as the "localized survival" of Wenzhou's manufacturing industry. With large loans from banks, enterprises in Wenzhou are busy expanding production, buying land, building factories, purchasing equipment, recruiting talents, or switching to real estate or photovoltaic industries.Of course, the first 3 years, no matter which industry it is, belong to the investment period. In 2011, just when the return was in sight, the national policy changed drastically and money tightened.Banks that were originally courteous and proactive in lending money began to turn into tough "collectors". At this time, private credit once again acted as a "salvation angel" for Wenzhou enterprises.However, this so-called "angel" has extremely greedy desires.The tighter the bank's financial policy is, the more astonishing the private credit interest rate will be.In order to maintain the normal operation of the expanded enterprises, Wenzhou SMEs have no choice but to bear the "squeeze" of private loans.A business owner said: "The patient is already lying on the operating table. Suddenly the scalpel is taken away and the shadowless lamp is turned off. What should the patient do? At this time, a doctor who asks for a red envelope can save you. No money? I can only give, and I have to thank him.” Folk Credit is the chief surgeon who asked for red envelopes. At the same time as bank reminders, Wenzhou private credit provided repayment amounts for small and medium-sized enterprises, which to a certain extent heated up the private financial market.When small and medium-sized enterprises need to find a bank to borrow again, the plan of "deposit for fixed loan" is introduced again, and all the "deposit" will undoubtedly come from private lending. Earlier this year, a business owner in Wenzhou went to a local bank to seek a loan with his collateral documents.The person from the bank told him that the deposit reserve has been raised several times, coupled with the slowdown in the growth of bank deposits, according to the bank's principle of "depositing loans", the bank now has "no money to loan". "Now you have only two choices: Either the interest rate rises by 100%, and you still can't get a loan; or you go to get deposits, and we will give you a loan. The interest rate can be lower, 6% per month." In desperation, the business owner approached Fang Peilin and asked him to draw up a certain amount of deposits within the specified time. The condition was: 4% monthly interest.This means that the business owner has to pay an additional commission of 40,000 yuan per month for the 10 million yuan deposit.Even so, the bank loan interest and extra commission with a monthly interest rate of about 1 cent are still more cost-effective for the company. After all, he can get a loan from the bank, and it is much lower than a usury loan with a monthly interest rate of more than 5 cents. Therefore, the business owner will pay the commission to Fang Peilin in advance according to the deposit term and amount. Due to the large amount of funds needed, Fang Peilin found another banker who went to raise money from depositors, and asked him to raise a certain amount of funds within a specified time. The condition he gave was: 3% monthly interest... Under prior agreement, Xiajia took the ID cards of each depositor and went to the bank designated by the business owner to open an account... According to the pre-agreed distribution of benefits, the depositors, Xiajia, and Fang Peilin all received rewards... "At present, there are at least 50 billion deposits in Wenzhou for profit." Fang Peilin said that since last year, under the situation of credit crunch, this large-scale private financial market derived from the bank's "deposit-based loan" principle has grown since the founding of New China. It appeared in Wenzhou for the first time since its establishment.He said that the bank deposits passing through his hands every month have reached as high as 4.5 billion yuan. At the same time, in the process of large-scale lending in 2009, for small and medium-sized enterprises that lack asset collateral, the local government of Zhejiang Province and banks jointly proposed the plan of "joint loan and joint guarantee" and "holding together for warmth", that is, "when a company borrows from a bank, , at least three companies provide guarantees, and if the business is run by a husband and wife, the husband and wife must guarantee each other, so there may be nine guarantees for one loan, and each guarantor may be a shareholder of multiple companies.” Many companies work together to help one company, but in turn, an accident in one company will also affect several or even dozens of companies. This is the effect of "all prosperity, one loss". In the late 1990s, Zhao Ming raised a total of 1.5 million yuan to start a manufacturing enterprise through Wenzhou's typical folk credit - loans from relatives and friends.At that time, the monthly interest rate of private credit was 2%. Although it was much higher than the bank interest rate in the same period, Zhao Ming was still very grateful for this: because with the start of this fund, the factory quickly entered the right track and paid off the original loan after two years. of borrowing. In the "joint loan and joint guarantee" activity in 2008, Zhao Ming provided a bank loan guarantee for a local enterprise. In 2009, the company guaranteed by Zhao Ming went bankrupt, so Zhao Ming assumed a debt of more than 3 million yuan due to the guarantee responsibility.As a last resort, Zhao Ming had to turn around and ask for help from private credit to resolve the crisis. Under the repeated influence and indirect coercion of the bank's financial policies, the arrogance of private credit grew irresistibly until it developed to the point where private credit was equal to usury. In the middle of 2011, the rupture of the private credit capital chain was also inseparable from the "fueling the flames" of the financial environment. Since 2011, affected by the European industrial subsidy policy and the US trade barriers, the domestic photovoltaic market has been on a "roller coaster" and has fallen into a trough. The sales volume of enterprises has decreased, and product prices have also plummeted.The real estate market has also stepped down from the altar of "huge profits" under the macro-control. At this time, domestic money tightened again.For loans that have expired, only "bridge loans" can be made through guarantee companies and private credit, that is, the bank promises to repay the loan first and then renew the loan.However, what Wenzhou SMEs did not expect was that banks began to violate their original promises, suppressed loans, and even refused to renew loans. As a result, a large number of "bridge loans" with high interest rates from the private sector were unable to repay, and the private credit capital chain was broken. layer collapsed. It is said that among Wenzhou enterprises with broken capital chains, in addition to investing in real estate, at least 80% of them have set foot in the new energy photovoltaic industry.The two industries with high hopes turned out to be the two forces pushing Wenzhou's private enterprises to the cliff. From the point of view of internal factors, the main reasons for accelerating self-destruction are Wenzhou enterprises’ abandonment of the basics and chasing after the waste, and their dislike of industry and speculation. However, from the point of view of external factors, the unreasonable domestic financial system and the improvisation of relevant fiscal and monetary policies are all to blame. In this regard, Ye Tan, a well-known financial commentator, wrote an article specifically: "The prevalence of loan sharks shows that the capital chain has been cut off. Physical investment made during the period of rapid growth has been unable to obtain financial support. The tight and loose macro-control makes enterprises at a loss. Embarking on the dead end of usury. The prevalence of usury also shows that social funds are unwilling to enter the field of real investment under the background of inflation, and turn to "playing with money" to earn huge profits; the prevalence of usury also shows that the current management system has extremely The relevant parties only pay attention to the capital adequacy ratio of formal financial institutions, and are indifferent to and turn a blind eye to the private finance that is right in front of them." In Wenzhou, all organizations involved in illegal fund-raising and illegal finance, such as guarantee companies, investment companies, and pawnshops, are collectively referred to as "underground banks."In Wenzhou's huge private lending, money houses are divided into two categories: gray and black. In Wenzhou, the gray bank is the main body, but the emergence of the gray bank has various complicated objective factors.The black bank appeared purely because of huge profits, like a malignant tumor, causing endless harm. Black underground banks are purely for the pursuit of high interest returns. Such banks usually charge very high interest rates to lenders. The minimum amount often starts at 200% of the monthly interest rate, and the maximum amount can reach 600% if there is information available. The purpose of the borrower is simpler - speculation, mainly involving investment in stocks, gambling and drug trafficking. In this case, the risk borne by the lender and the bank is the greatest. However, such banks often have underworld backgrounds, which are naturally prone to serious crimes.But it is not the mainstream of underground banks in Wenzhou, and its loan volume will not exceed 5% of the total underground loans in Wenzhou. The gray underground bank is the opposite of the black underground bank. It mainly provides short-term financial support to meet the daily life and normal business activities in Wenzhou area, and earns the interest rate difference. The interest rate given by the bank to the lender is generally 10% higher than that of the bank. Borrowers are generally local small and medium-sized enterprise owners, mostly for the purpose of starting a business plan or expanding the scale of the enterprise. In April 2011, Wenzhou, Zhejiang cracked a huge online gambling case, known as the 10.1 billion case. Three years ago, Zhu, a native of Wenzhou, discovered an overseas gambling website. After contacting him, he obtained a general agency account.After that, Zhu hired people, and through the development of offline, increased agents and gambling members.Gambling members accept bets online through their accounts.For more than a year, by the end of 2009, Zhu had opened 1,047 gambling member accounts, with a total betting amount of 10.1 billion yuan.In the end, Zhu and his gang members were convicted of opening a casino. Online gambling has long been popular among Wenzhou people. In 2010, Mr. Lin, a small boss in Wenzhou, became obsessed with a gambling game called "Café de Coral".By purchasing virtual game coins and betting online, people in Wenzhou are looking forward to "winning or losing hundreds of thousands in a minute, or hundreds of millions in a day". For the first time, Boss Lin won 4,000 yuan at a cost of 2,000 yuan.The appetite is getting bigger and bigger. At the time, Boss Lin won more than 100,000 yuan.Boss Lin became obsessed with getting huge sums of money so easily.Unable to extricate himself, he began to lose again and again, and he did not hesitate to spend all his savings in order to recover.In the end he lost everything and could never look back. When Wenzhou's private credit crisis broke out, various gambling cases also emerged frequently. In June 2011, Shanghai Baoshan destroyed a casino run by Wenzhou natives. More than 60 people involved in gambling were all from Wenzhou, and the gambling amount was nearly 100 million yuan. On September 29, 2011, the Hainan police cracked a gambling case involving 105 people, all of whom were from Wenzhou, and the gambling amount reached more than 20 million yuan. “这个赌场是温州人开的，能给我们报销机票、吃住开支。有的赢家请客，还打电话叫温州的夜店送10多个小姐飞过去，供赌友消遣。” 以做实业起家的温州企业家们，近几年来把豪赌当成了一种身份和实力的象征。 2009年9月，一起特大浙江流窜赌博团伙被青岛警方破获，多位温州籍富豪混杂其中，而温州某集团总裁林某则一下输掉2000万元，并欠下7000万元的高利贷。 2011年9月，温州龙湾区破获两个特大赌博团伙，涉案人员近800人，其中一位温州富婆出手豪气，输掉了1100多万元。 赌博“娘子军”在温州屡见不鲜。曾经一度，“温州太太赌博团”与“温州太太炒房团”、“温州太太理财团”齐名。在2011年海南的百人赌博案中，就有30多名女性。 更为夸张的是，2009年4月，在温州瓯江三垟湿地，有大大小小的无人荒岛，这为赌徒们提供了得天独厚的赌场。一次，警方在荒岛上抓获了24名赌徒，其中有19名“娘子军”，“最年长的一位老太太已经72岁，而年龄最小的女孩只有23岁。” 温州龙湾区是赌博现场最为猖獗的地区，同时也是老板跑路最集中的地区。江南皮革厂的黄鹤就是其中的一位。而在这其中，到底有多少老板是倒于“赌桌”之下，则难以统计。 龙湾区下属的龙华村是温州远近闻名的赌博村，多年来，村里抓获赌博团伙数十个，因赌引发的恶性暴力事件、悲剧事件也时有发生。 在这种聚赌风潮中，设赌人或称赌场主，是最为关键的人物。温州籍赌场主邹松华曾在上海宝山租下宾馆房间，开设赌场，一天设四场，每场牟利30万～50万元。 有人专门在澳门包赌场，向温州人推广所谓的“免费游澳门”旅游项目；而韩国济州岛、美国拉斯维加斯等地的赌场也闻讯前往温州邀客。 2011年6月，温州龙湾捣毁了一个以村为单位的窝点。据当地警方人员介绍，赌场竟然是由该村村长和村委员联合开设，村民参赌。而在该赌场中发放高利贷的也大有人在，每笔数额在10万～20万元不等，利息从7%～15%皆有。 专为地下赌场发放高利贷的“黑色钱庄”已经发展到企业化的管理模式，“赌博团伙一般设'总经理'负责赌场经营，承担重要角色的团伙成员担任'股东'，参与赌场管理并按股分红。在'董事会'的授权下，甚至设立了'猎头'，专门寻找、引诱赌博人员，发放高利贷。” 由地下赌场诱发的高利贷纠纷日益增多。 2011年4月“跑路”的江南皮革厂老板黄鹤，是温州最知名的赌徒。其身后背负债务到底是3个亿还是10个亿，只是数字问题。但是“受国际赌博集团引诱，参与大额赌博，欠下巨额赌资后外逃，造成公司经营整体瘫痪”，这一事实已无可辩驳。 黄鹤嗜赌成性在温州企业界是公开的秘密。年轻时，曾因赌欠下巨额债务，是由其叔叔代为偿还。2010年年底，有消息称，黄鹤在澳门豪赌，输掉了一个多亿。而2011年4月，在前往香港参加国际皮革展时，黄鹤又再度前往澳门赌钱，直至最后消失。而他的这些赌资全部来自民间高利贷，其中牵涉到的担保公司达10多家。 另外，温州飞驼鞋业、东艺鞋业等企业的老板也曾多次被传“因赌逃跑”，“因赌公司破产”。在国家相关部门和领导研究方案解决“温州金融危机”问题时，据说有一位部级领导公开表示：“那些企业主因赌博输了钱导致要跳楼的，就让他们跳吧。” 仅有资本的投机，而无实业的活水，温州人的投机心达到巅峰。在赌场上，温州人一掷千金，走火入魔。在企业发展上，这些老板也暴露出十足的赌性：盲目扩张，转型过猛，涉嫌高利贷，肆无忌惮，最终玩火自焚，无可挽回。 从不缺钱的温州人，面对实业的衰落，房产、矿产投资无门时，走向了民间信贷之路。而当民间信贷依然不被各界认可时，疯狂参与赌博反映的正是曾经兢兢业业的温州人的迷失与空虚。