Chapter 17 4. Peng Dehuai's return to Beijing and Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin

After the start of the fourth battle, the various ministries under the command of Han Xianchu on the western front, relying on field fortifications, launched a tenacious resistance under the condition of weak troops and insufficient food and ammunition, and always maintained the basic position on the south bank of the Han River, effectively covering the east. The advance and assembly of the main attack group. After the various ministries commanded by Deng Hua on the Eastern Front were assembled, fighter opportunities appeared. On the evening of February 11, the 8th Division of the South Korean Army was divided and surrounded in the northwest area of ​​Hengcheng. With the cooperation of the People's Army under the command of Jin Xiong, they fought until the morning of the 13th, and all three regiments of the 8th Division of the South Korean Army were encircled. Annihilated, and wiped out 1 battalion and 4 artillery battalions of the US 2nd Division, and wiped out more than 12,000 enemies.This battle was another great victory for the Volunteers after winning three consecutive battles without rest and replenishment.

In order to expand the results of the battle and defeat the enemy's attack, the Volunteer Army transferred its forces and attacked and wiped out the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division of the United States, which was located in the small town of Toppingli, west of Hengcheng, with 6 regiments. The army went out of Wonju and Pingchang to the east to block the enemy's western aid and expand the results of the battle.In the battle to attack and annihilate Topingli, due to the small force advantage (approximately 10,000 volunteers, about 6,000 members of the 23rd U.S. Regiment), the attack firepower was too weak (only 3 howitzer companies), and there were many troops (6 regiments divided Belonging to 3 armies), due to difficulties in coordination and other reasons, after two nights of attacks, although the US 23rd Regiment and other units were severely damaged, and they once invaded the town, they were not completely wiped out.Later, U.S. reinforcements arrived, and more than 20 tanks rushed into Topingli to join the 23rd U.S. Regiment, which made it even more difficult for the volunteers to attack.

At this time, Li Qiwei knew that the Volunteer Army’s follow-up corps had not arrived, and the attack had no stamina. He used the combat rules of the Volunteer Army’s “Saturday Offensive” and adopted “magnetic tactics”.So he deployed defense in depth and prepared to go on the offensive.Even if the volunteers conquered Topingli, Li Qiwei would not retreat. In view of this battlefield situation, Peng Dehuai decisively decided to withdraw the attack on Topingli in order to avoid fighting with Li Qiwei and gain the initiative. On February 17, he switched to mobile defense across the board.At this time, the second combat unit of the Volunteer Army has begun to enter the DPRK, and is preparing to take over the front-line operations around mid-April.In order to cover the second troop entering North Korea to participate in the war, Peng Dehuai decided that the first-line troops traded space for time, and deployed three lines of defense starting from the east-west line of Seoul and Hengcheng in the south, and extending to the 38th line in the north. Each line of defense was 20-30 kilometers deep. , adopting the deployment principle of "strength before the front and heavy after the firepower", and insist on defense for 20-25 days.Strive to organize a defense for about two months south of the 38th parallel, cover the second combat force to complete the assembly in the 38th parallel area, and launch the fifth campaign.

In order to realize the above determination, on the same day, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army issued instructions to the Party Committees of the various armies, stating: As a result of our army's efforts in North Korea, we won four battles and brought about fundamental changes in the situation in North Korea.In other words, the situation is very unfavorable to the enemy.But as far as the current specific situation in the Korean battlefield is concerned, it will take a difficult journey to achieve the final victory. ... It is difficult to solve the North Korean issue at once by relying on my existing troops in North Korea.In order to shorten the duration of the Korean War and completely liberate North Korea, our Central Military Commission has decided to send the 19th and 22nd Corps and the Southwest Three Corps to take turns to fight in North Korea. Armed with technical arms, these measures undoubtedly guarantee the victory of the Korean Just War.But it will take two months for the second unit to catch up in batches, and the enemy cannot give us such a long time.

Therefore, Zhisi ordered the deployment on February 17, mainly to buy time so that our follow-up corps can arrive as scheduled. ... In short, it is urgent for us to gain two months.Time is victory. I hope that cadres and party members at all levels will understand this and lead the troops to resolutely complete this arduous task. In view of the sentiment of underestimating the enemy and quick victory in the army and within the democratic camp after the third battle, as far as the situation of the troops is concerned, the third battle was fought reluctantly, and the fourth battle was even more reluctant.After the start of the fourth campaign, Peng Dehuai believed that with the current equipment level of the Volunteers, to win the war would not only be arduous, but also long-term.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission also realized the difficulty and long-term nature of the war, so they decided to implement the policy of taking turns fighting in North Korea.After the fourth battle, the troops also had an understanding of this issue, and the idea of ​​quick victory no longer existed. However, within the democratic camp, although wars were believed to be difficult, they still had different understandings of long-term issues.In order to be more conducive to war guidance, Peng Dehuai believes that it is necessary to have a unified understanding of this issue.In addition, in early February, Kim Il Sung asked him to go to Beijing to discuss war issues after the battle ended.In this way, when the Volunteer Army and the People's Army transferred to the full-line defense movement, Peng Dehuai decided to return to Beijing, and on February 16 he telegraphed Mao Zedong, intending to take advantage of this gap in the battle to return to the Central Committee on a moonlit night to report on various matters.Prime Minister Kim will come here tomorrow night to discuss relevant issues.Jin asked me to go to Beijing with me before, and I think it is still necessary.If agreed, we intend to depart from here on the evening of the 19th and arrive in Anton on the 21st.Consent was obtained.

Due to Kim Il Sung's busy schedule, he was unable to reach Junzili, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, on the evening of the 17th. On the night of the 18th, Peng Dehuai went to Pyongyang to hold talks with Kim Il Sung. On the afternoon of the 19th, he returned to Zhisi and called Deng Hua, Han Xianchu, Jin Xiong, the commander of the 9th Corps, Song Shilun, the commander of the 19th Corps, Yang Dezhi, and political commissar Li Zhimin. : I plan to leave for the Central Committee at dusk on the 20th, and return to the headquarters in 10 to 15 days. The headquarters of the Volunteer Army will move to the front line within a day, under the command of Deng Hua.When Hong Xuezhi and Jie Fang led the headquarters to Jinhua, Deng Hua returned from the front line to Jinhua to preside over the work of the volunteer army.After arranging work, Peng Dehuai left for Beijing on the 20th.

On the afternoon of the 21st, Peng Dehuai arrived in Beijing and went directly to Yuquan Mountain to meet Mao Zedong.Reported to Mao Zedong the situation of both the enemy and us on the battlefield and the difficulties of the volunteer army in combat, as well as the air force's entry into North Korea and the construction of airports, the repair of North Korean railways, rear supply issues, strategic guidelines, and so on. From the 22nd to the 28th, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Yang Lisan jointly studied the preparations for the military and arms to participate in the war and the strengthening of logistical support in Zhongnanhai; together with Nie Rongzhen, he discussed with Shakhanov, the Soviet military chief adviser in China, about the Soviet air force dispatching cover Transportation issues in the north of Pyongyang; participated in the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission chaired by Zhou Enlai, attended by the three headquarters of the Military Commission, various military services and relevant departments of the Government Affairs Council, and studied how to support the Volunteers more effectively from the rear and overcome the difficulties in the front; together with Nie Rongzhen Listen to the reports of the leaders of the relevant services and arms, and study the issues of the services and arms participating in the war.

During this period, Peng Dehuai and Zhou En came to Yuquan Mountain twice to discuss war-related issues with Mao Zedong, including the issue of war policy, the issue of domestic troops taking turns to go abroad to fight, the dispatch time and planning of the air force, artillery, tanks and other military units, and asked the Soviet Air Force for cover Rear transport issues, etc. Regarding the policy of war, Mao Zedong made it clear that he still adhered to the policy of "preparing for a long-term war and striving for a short-term as much as possible." In a few years, we should consume hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and make them retreat in the face of difficulties. We should make preparations for at least two years. In 1951, the national army was preparing to replenish 600,000 people. The country focused on national defense construction, and economic construction was also carried out around national defense construction.At the same time, take turns to fight, improve the weapons and equipment of the Volunteers, improve the supply and transportation, strengthen the logistics organization, and strive to prepare the air force and armored forces to participate in the battle. This is to strive for the shortest possible time.Peng Dehuai suggested that Stalin should be notified of the issues identified during his return to Beijing this time so that he could understand the difficulties faced by the Volunteers in fighting on the battlefield.Mao Zedong agreed and entrusted Zhou Enlai to draft a telegram to Stalin.This telegram specifically pointed out the difficulty of the Volunteer Army's combat and that the war will be long-term. It was revised and supplemented on the basis of the telegram sent by Mao Zedong's Wholesale Military Commission to the Volunteer Army and major military regions on February 9 on the issue of taking turns in combat. After Mao Zedong's approval, it was issued on March 3 On January 1, it was sent to Stalin in the name of Mao Zedong.The full text of the telegram is as follows:

Stalin replied on March 3, agreeing with Mao Zedong’s analysis of the war situation in the telegram and the policy of the Volunteer Army to fight in North Korea, and agreed to send two Soviet air divisions to fight in North Korea to cover the rear of the Chinese and North Korean troops; 6,000 cars, to be delivered in the second half of the year. Peng Dehuai left Beijing on March 1. After arriving in Shenyang, he discussed the rear support issue with Gao Gang. On the 9th, he returned to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army. On the 11th, he called Chai Junwu and transferred to Kim Il Sung, and notified Kim Il Sung of the results of his return to Beijing to discuss war issues with Mao Zedong. I should actively increase the combat power in North Korea, and especially step up the construction of airports so that the air force can participate in the war.In addition to the deployment of three combat troops, another 50,000 veterans were drawn into the court so that they could be replenished with the battle.The combat policy is mainly to destroy the enemy, and there is no need to worry about the temporary gains and losses of the city.The Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea has been fully launched in China, and mobilization to join the army has exceeded all places.Mao Zedong said that the Central Committees of the two parties in China and the DPRK generally have the same understanding of the war situation, and Comrade Kim Il Sung is very busy, so there is no need to go to Beijing for the time being.

After Peng Dehuai left Beijing, on March 3, Zhou Enlai telegraphed Peng Dehuai to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang in Shenyang to discuss various issues that needed to be implemented from the rear on March 3. Issued; 2. The 19th Corps has all arrived in the Sun'an, Chengchuan, and Suncheon areas of North Korea. Peng Dehuai will designate the advancing area and start time.The 3rd Corps decided to enter the DPRK along the route of the 19th Corps on March 11; 3. Whether the new veterans of the 9th Corps can come to the army from March 15th to 20th to supplement the new veterans of the 4 armies of the original 13th Corps When to arrive at the army, Gao Gang will check and report to Peng; 4. After consultation with Kim Il Sung, two jet airports will be built near Pyongyang, and 4 ordinary airports will be built south of Pyongyang. And the three airports in Dadonggou are used as bombing airports, and the troops, anti-aircraft artillery cover, technical force, and various support equipment and materials for the construction of two jet airports are being mobilized. The steel plates used for the runway are only one pair in North Korea. The Soviet Union is in the process of borrowing or purchasing; 5. The air force dispatch plan. In April, 4 regiments are planned to be dispatched, including 2 regiments of destroyers, 1 regiment each of bombers and shock aircraft. 3 regiments of aircraft, 2 regiments of bombers, and 1 regiment of impact aircraft. After consultation with the North Korean side, the Joint Command of the Chinese and North Korean Air Forces plans to use Liu Zhen as the commander, and Wang Lian (North Korean side) and Chang Qiankun as deputy commanders; The armored force dispatch plan plans to deploy 2 regiments in late March, and dispatch 2 regiments in mid-April, and send out 1 regiment of unarmed personnel, ready to start the captured tanks, and form the Volunteer Armored Forces Command on the basis of the Northeast Armored Forces Command; 7. Artillery dispatch plan. According to the original plan, the anti-aircraft artillery battalions attached to the divisions and the Railway Corps and the anti-aircraft machine gun companies attached to the regiments will be dispatched in full. In addition to the anti-aircraft artillery divisions covering the construction of the airport, one more will be dispatched in late March. Anti-aircraft artillery division, and sent 1 anti-aircraft artillery division and 3 rocket artillery regiments, and sent 1 to 2 howitzer regiments in late April.In addition, there are transportation plans, hospital plans, combat budgets, and troop replenishment plans.

On March 15, Zhou Enlai called Chai Junwu to transfer to Kim Il Sung, and informed Kim Il Sung of the relevant issues Peng Dehuai returned to Beijing to discuss, Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin on March 1, and Stalin's reply. The urgent repair of sufficient airports in North Korea has become the central issue for the Air Force to participate in the war as soon as possible.” It is hoped that the North Korean side will implement the agreed force required for the construction of the airport. Regarding this return to Beijing, Peng Dehuai also recorded it in his "Self-Report" written during the period when he was wrongly censored. Reported the situation of the Korean War to the Chairman and requested a strategic guideline, explaining that the Korean War cannot be won quickly, and the Fifty Army on the south bank of the Han River must be withdrawn to the North Bank before February 15. This time the Chairman gave a clear instruction for the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, That is, 'If you can win quickly, you can win quickly; if you can't win quickly, you can win slowly'. This has a flexible and clear policy." Indeed, as Peng Dehuai said in his self-report, he got a "flexible and clear policy" when he returned to Beijing this time.Because he is the commander in chief of the battlefield, he knows the battlefield situation best.Prior to this, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission had specific inquiries about the combat deployment and command of the Volunteers.This time, Peng Dehuai was given a policy, that is, "prepare for a long-term war and strive for a short-term as much as possible." However, whether it is long-term or short-term, the right to maneuver was given to Peng Dehuai, who decided according to the actual situation of the battlefield. If you can't win quickly, you can win slowly."In addition, they agreed with Stalin on the long-term understanding of the war and reported it to Kim Il Sung, which will be more conducive to the guidance and deployment of operations. When Peng Dehuai returned to the battlefield, the enemy was still attacking fiercely.The Volunteer Army and the People's Army followed the original mobile defense plan. After holding on to the first line of defense for 22 days, they began to switch to the second line of defense on March 10 and continued to defend. On March 14, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army voluntarily abandoned Seoul. At the end of March and early April, it was transferred to the defense of the 38th parallel area.Some of the second combat units of the Volunteer Army have arrived at the combat assembly area, and some are marching towards the assembly area.Under such circumstances, on April 6, Peng Dehuai presided over a meeting of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army with the participation of the leaders of the various corps of the second combat force to study and deploy the fifth campaign.At the meeting, Peng Dehuai conveyed the central government's policy of "preparing for a long-term war and striving for a short-term as much as possible", and notified domestic preparations and deployments.The meeting decided based on the analysis and judgment of the enemy's situation: if the enemy's progress is fast, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army plan to launch a counterattack around April 20; if the enemy's progress is slow, they plan to launch a counterattack in early May. Basically, the second combat unit of the Volunteer Army will be the main force, with 11 armies of the Volunteer Army and 3 regiments of the People's Army participating in this counterattack.He also emphasized the importance of logistical preparations for the fifth battle, pointing out that "if the battle is won this time, half of the contribution of all commanders and fighters will be counted, and half of the logistics will be counted." On April 10, Peng Dehuai telegraphed the planned deployment of the fifth campaign to Mao Zedong. On the 13th, Mao Zedong replied: "I fully agree with your planned deployment, and hope to resolutely implement it according to the situation." According to the policy of "preparing for a long-term war and striving for a short-term as much as possible", the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army regards this counterattack as a decisive battle whether the war is long-term or short-term. On April 17, the Volunteer Army pointed out in the "Fifth Campaign Political Work Instructions": "The fifth campaign is about to begin. The task of the campaign is to wipe out a large number of enemy divisions. Specifically, each army is required to wipe out one or two regiments of the enemy. , The purpose of the battle is to gain the initiative and strive to shorten the time of the war." On the 19th, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua further pointed out in the "Fifth Campaign Political Mobilization Order": "This battle is of great significance because it is our The key to whether the army takes the initiative is the key to shortening or prolonging the Korean War. If we can wipe out a large number of the enemy's vital forces in this war, it will not only make the enemy lose the initiative on the Korean battlefield, but also deepen the enemy's The internal contradictions and chaos will enable people all over the world to achieve strong cooperation in their struggle for peace and democracy, and may shorten the criminal war of aggression against Korea by the U.S. imperialists. increase. We must strive to shorten the war time." By April 21, the first combat unit of the Volunteer Army stopped the "United Nations Army" in the north and south areas of the 38th parallel. The second combat unit of the Volunteer Army basically completed the campaign, and the fourth campaign came to an end.In the fourth battle, which lasted 87 days, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army wiped out more than 78,000 enemies, which bought time and created conditions for the preparation of the fifth battle. On the evening of April 22, the 20th, 26th, and 27th armies of the 9th Corps of the Second Volunteer Army and the 39th and 40th armies under the command of the corps, the 63rd, 64th, and 65th armies of the 19th Corps The 12th, 15th, and 60th armies of the 3rd Corps and the 3 legions of the People's Army launched the fifth campaign.There are two stages in this battle.The first phase ended on the 29th, and the tactics of two-wing breakthroughs and centripetal circuitous encirclement were implemented, and the enemy forces west of the central part of the 38th parallel were beaten back from the north and south areas of the 38th parallel to the east-west line and south of Seoul, and 23,000 enemies were wiped out. The rest, although the 64th Army, which was responsible for the detour mission of the campaign, was blocked after the breakthrough, failed to realize the encirclement of the campaign, and failed to annihilate the US division troops in an organized manner, they still had the initiative and favorable situation in the battle.The second phase began on May 16 and ended on May 21, mainly fighting the South Korean Army on the Eastern Front.Peng Dehuai used the tactic of crossing the sky and attacking the west, using three corps of the 19th Corps and one corps of the People's Army to feint on the north bank of the East and West Han River in Seoul, creating the illusion of attacking Seoul and attracting the main force of the US military; The 9th Corps commanded the 20th and 27th Corps and the 12th Corps of the 3rd Corps. With the cooperation of the two Corps of the People's Army, the tactics of multiple breakthroughs and multi-layer detours and encirclement were basically realized. It was planned to wipe out 2 to 3 divisions of the enemy, wiped out most of the 3 divisions of the South Korean Army and defeated another division, wiped out more than 23,000 enemies again, and won the battle. At this time, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army had fought two battles in a month. The troops urgently needed to replenish and rest, and it was difficult to transport supplies. In addition, the rainy season was approaching, and the rivers, lakes and swamps were behind. Once flash floods broke out and traffic was interrupted, it would be even more difficult to transport supplies.Peng Dehuai and Park Yiyu then ordered the end of the fifth battle on the 21st, and the main force was transferred to rest.At that time, Li Qiwei had already made a counterattack deployment across the board, but on the battlefield, except for the "United Nations Army" in the Seoul area that had begun to counterattack, the "United Nations Army" on the entire central and eastern fronts was still retreating.Therefore, when the Volunteer Army and the People's Army ended the campaign and were deployed for rest, they underestimated Li Qiwei's counterattack. The deployment was more or less affected by the experience of fighting the Kuomintang army in China, leaving only a few troops to fight on the front line. The main force of the cover is retreated and rested, rather than a deployment of alternate cover and transfer, and the troops responsible for the first-line blocking cover have not yet fully deployed. The "United Nations Army" uses its mechanized and motorized superior equipment to use tanks, artillery and motorized The infantry formed a "task force" and took the opportunity to penetrate deeply into the Volunteer Army and the People's Army. In addition, the supply of food and ammunition for the Volunteer Army and the People's Army was basically exhausted, resulting in passivity and confusion in the retreat and transfer of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army. Inappropriate command and other reasons, and suffered serious losses.The main force of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army was also forced to shift from rest and reorganization to blocking.As of June 10, more than 36,000 enemies were wiped out again, and the "United Nations Army" was stopped in the north and south areas of the 38th parallel, and the front line was basically stable.So far, more than 82,000 enemies have been wiped out in the fifth battle, and the opposing sides have formed a stalemate on the battlefield. After the fifth battle, the Volunteer Army, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission have more fully realized the great disparity between the enemy and our own weapons and equipment, and the difficulties caused to the Volunteer Army in combat. It has also further seen that wars cannot be short-term, but long-term. of.