Chapter 6 2. Kim Il Sung requested special assistance from Stalin and Mao Zedong

Chinese leaders have been paying close attention to the development of the situation in the Korean War, hoping that the Korean People's Army can achieve complete victory.Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the People’s Army was developing smoothly in early July, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai analyzed that the U.S. military might land in Incheon, and the Korean People’s Army should build solid defensive positions in the Incheon and Seoul areas and pay attention to defense.At that time, although China and North Korea had established diplomatic relations, they had not yet sent ambassadors to each other. China and North Korea had no direct communication links. Ambassador Luo Shen asked him to convey the analysis and suggestions of Chinese leaders to North Korea through the Soviet government.

After the stalemate in the Korean War, in August and September, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly pointed out the possibility of the U.S. Army landing in Incheon through the Soviet government and directly to North Korean representatives.When Mao Zedong met with North Korean representatives, he analyzed that: the development of the Korean War situation, there may be two situations, one is that the People’s Army wipes out the U.S. troops and drives them into the sea; the other is that the war lasts.If it is the latter case, the U.S. military will strengthen the defense of the Busan area, contain the main force of the People's Army there, and land in other places at the same time.The places where the US troops land may be the Incheon-Seoul and Jinnampo-Pyongyang areas.Mao Zedong reminded the North Korean comrades to pay attention to the second possibility.

From the first ten days of August to the beginning of September, North Korea judged that the U.S. troops on the front line in Busan were insufficient, and that it would be impossible to launch a counteroffensive without increasing its troops, and it would be difficult to land in other areas. On August 15, Kim Il Sung, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, issued an order, "The entire Korean People's Army and Navy must finally sweep away the troops of the American interventionist and the remnants of Syngman Rhee's puppet army, and make August the month for the complete liberation of North Korea." ". After mid-August, the People's Army is struggling to achieve this goal. Its strength on the front line has become insufficient, and it is indeed unable to take care of the rear.

After the U.S. Army landed in Incheon, the situation on the Korean battlefield reversed. On September 18, Kim Il Sung met with Ni Zhiliang, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, and talked about the three-day battle situation since the U.S. Army landed in Incheon. It is estimated that the U.S. Army’s Incheon landing force has one division, and the People’s Army has only two newly formed regiments, with no combat experience and weak combat effectiveness. , The reinforcements did not arrive in time, and the landing U.S. troops were approaching Seoul. The People's Army was preparing for a long-term battle, and had already mobilized 10 to 15 recruit divisions.Ni Zhiliang reported the situation to Chinese leaders.Out of concern for the combat situation in North Korea, Zhou Enlai, from the standpoint of a friend and comrade, made suggestions to Kim Il Sung on the issue of the People's Army's combat guidance.After approval by Mao Zedong, this proposal was sent to the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang, on September 20 to inform Kim Il Sung.The suggested content is as follows:

We think your thinking about long-term combat is correct.The bravery of North Korean soldiers and civilians is admirable.It is estimated that the enemy may still increase in Incheon, and its purpose is to extend the occupation eastward, cut off North Korea's south-north communication, and advance towards the 38th parallel.The People's Army must strive to keep the north of the 38th parallel, and it is possible to carry out a protracted war.Therefore, please consider how to preserve the main force so as to annihilate the enemy one by one while adhering to the general policy of self-reliance and long-term struggle.At present, the main force is exposed to the enemy's front, and they will be at a stalemate, which will consume a lot of energy. If the enemy occupies Seoul, the People's Army's rear will be in danger of being cut off.Therefore, it seems appropriate for the main force of the People's Army to gather and maneuver, to find the enemy's weaknesses, and to divide and annihilate the enemy.In combat, we must concentrate our forces. In each battle, we must use a small number of troops and firepower to divide and restrain the majority of enemies, and use the absolute superiority of the majority of troops (three to five times) and firepower (more than twice) to encircle and wipe out the few enemies divided by us. (e.g. a regiment).In combat, it is most taboo to divide troops equally, and it is taboo to only defeat or stop the enemy but not wipe out the enemy's vital forces.As long as the enemy's vital forces can be wiped out, even if only one regiment or battalion is wiped out at a time, the accumulation of small amounts will gradually weaken the enemy, which is conducive to long-term operations.If the U.S. military is equipped with strong firepower and it is difficult to break into the puppet army for a while, it is advisable to consider targeting the Syngman Rhee puppet army first, concentrate the main force, annihilate one or two regiments at a time, and annihilate one or two divisions every month. Annihilate the puppet army, cut off the minions of the U.S. military, isolate the U.S. emperor, and then annihilate them one by one.Under the principle of protracted warfare, it is necessary to take full account of the difficulties.All mobilization and use of manpower, material and financial resources must be made with long-term plans everywhere to prevent subordinates from feeling desperate.The enemy demands a quick decision and is afraid of protracted ones, but the People's Army believes that a quick decision is impossible, and the only way to win is a protracted war.The above statements are made from the standpoint of friends and comrades for your reference.

After receiving Zhou Enlai's suggestion, Kim Il Sung was very grateful and hoped to continue to make suggestions in the future. However, after the U.S. Army landed in Incheon, the main force of the People's Army on the front line in Busan suffered from the enemy and was forced to implement a strategic retreat in late September.At this time, relying solely on the strength of the People's Army, not only was it impossible to drive the U.S. aggressors out of North Korea, but it was also difficult to organize an effective defense to keep the U.S. forces south of the 38th parallel. On the 28th, the US military occupied Seoul and advanced across the board to the 38th parallel.

Under such circumstances, on the same day that the U.S. military occupied Seoul, Kim Il Sung presided over an emergency meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea to analyze the war situation.The Politburo agreed that the military situation was grim. After the fall of Seoul, the People’s Army was no longer able to prevent the U.S. military from crossing the 38th parallel, nor was it able to carry out effective resistance north of the 38th parallel. The U.S. military would quickly occupy the entire North Korea, and North Korea would become the colonies and military bases.To avoid this situation, direct military assistance from the Soviet Union and China must be requested.The Politburo meeting unanimously approved a letter of appeal to Stalin to be sent to Stalin on the 29th in the names of Kim Il-sung and Park Hyun-young.The letter reviewed the changes in the situation since the outbreak of the Korean War, analyzed the plight of the People’s Army after the U.S. Army landed in Incheon and the dangerous situation that the U.S. military was about to cross the 38th Parallel, and asked Stalin to give "special assistance." North of the line, direct military assistance from the Soviet Union is needed." "If for some reason this cannot be done, then please help us to establish international volunteer forces in China and other people's democracies and give military assistance to our struggle .”

On the 29th, Kim Il-sung and Park Hyun-yong met with the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, Stekov, informed him of the meeting of the Politburo of the Labor Party, and asked Stalin for his opinion on sending a letter of appeal to Stalin. .Stekov said that he had no opinion, and argued that the content of the letter was a matter for the Politburo of the Labor Party.Afterwards, Park Hyun-yong handed over the appeal letter to Stekov. On the 30th, Stekov sent it to Moscow. On the night of October 1st, Kim Il-sung and Park Hyun-yong met with Ni Zhiliang, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, and Chai Chengwen, the political counselor, and directly asked China to send troops for assistance. Taking the request letter written by Kim Il Sung and Park Xianyong to Mao Zedong on October 1, he went to Beijing. On October 3, Park Il-woo presented the request letter to Mao Zedong in person.The content of this appeal letter is roughly the same as the appeal letter to Stalin.The full text of Kim Il-sung and Park Hyun-yong's letter of appeal to Mao Zedong is as follows: