Chapter 26 I have the same belief -2

On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev, in response to American liberal policy toward underdeveloped countries—a two-pronged program of economic aid and, if necessary, military intervention—raised the great challenge of communism throughout the 1960s : A "just" war of "unlimited support for nations struggling for liberation".Six weeks later, his Congolese ally Patrice Lumumba was murdered in Katanga province.The furious Russian then called the murder "the crowning achievement of Hammarskjöld's criminal activities" and again demanded his immediate dismissal as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Khrushchev also expressed some other dissatisfaction among the right-wing forces in Russia.Laos, which was about to fall into their arms, is now turning to the road of neutrality.Hardliners in the Red Army demanded a resumption of nuclear testing suspended by the Soviet Union in the fall of 1958; test.These cold war symptoms continue to irritate people every day, keeping the diplomatic climate cold without causing a world crisis.But for them, there is one crucial question that overrides everything else.Khrushchev sometimes called it “a bone stuck in the throat,” sometimes “a cancer that needs to be cut out,” or a “Sarajevo” that could lead to another world war; the problem was the division of Berlin.

For 15 years, the Russians have viewed the West's presence in the former German capital as a thorn in their side. In 1948 Stalin attempted to drive out the Allied forces, but was thwarted by a massive airlift.When the first Sputnik boosted the Soviet Union's status, Khrushchev seized the opportunity to demand that Berlin be demilitarized as a "free city."He gave the allies a six-month deadline, which was later extended because Eisenhower made the extension a condition of inviting Khrushchev to visit the United States.Ike had made several concessions.He agreed that the situation in Berlin was "abnormal" and offered to negotiate the size of the Western garrison there and the limits of West Germany's use of the city as a base for propaganda and intelligence activities.

Now Khrushchev used this problem to attack Kennedy again.He made a big fuss in his speeches on the War of Liberation, publicly intimidating Kennedy.He said that if the "imperialists" refused to "face up to the actual situation," the Soviet Union would "take firm measures" and "sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic."Thus, Kennedy now faced the same demon that Eisenhower had exorcised.Khrushchev explicitly declared that such an agreement would include assurances that any "violation" of East Germany's borders would be considered an "aggressive act" against all members of the Warsaw Pact - effectively requiring the West or abandoning Berlin , or prepare for war.Did he really want this? Charles de Gaulle doubted it.He persuaded the president to stand firm ("you must be able to bear this stick").He said that if Kennedy stood firm and planned a new airlift, the chairman of the Council of Ministers would back off.Averell Harriman, preoccupied only with the Congress of Vienna, agreed, but suggested another tactic.He predicted that Khrushchev would show his fierce face and threaten the young president wantonly.The best way to deal with it is to ignore his words, but be gentle.Moreover, Kennedy never overestimated his opponents.Harriman said that Khrushchev himself must have been very nervous.The chairman's only other trip to the West has failed, and American Kremlinologists agree that Khrushchev has always been concerned about his humble origins.Tensions were inevitable at the Vienna Conference.He must be rude, because that's all he can do.Harriman suggested that in such a situation, the president must not be moved, but laughed.

Kennedy received this suggestion from Harriman in Paris on the eve of Feio.The trip to Paris was a first for the young first lady. Eleven years ago, she was a student at the University of Paris, and now she arrives here with two truckloads of luggage, bejeweled, and an entourage (including Europe's top hairdresser).De Gaulle looked at her almost intently.French newspapers exclaimed how "touching," "glamorous," and "beautiful" she was! Walking into a press conference, the president said: "I think I should introduce myself. I am accompanying Jacqueline . The man Kennedy came to Paris."

Vienna was different.Mrs. Kennedy joked with Khrushchev, saying, for example, "Oh, Mr. President, please don't bother me with statistics." But the gloom was too heavy for even her to laugh it off.As soon as Khrushchev's Russian-made black Seagull car passed through the barbed wire and entered the huge stone and brushed concrete building of the US embassy in Austria, the whole atmosphere became as bad as the weather at that time.Kennedy told aides that his opponent was a man who was "beyond funny" and "very sinister."During the two days of talks, his ferocity became apparent.After a final confrontation, James Reston requested a visit from the President.That day, as soon as Kennedy entered the room where Reston was waiting, he plopped down on the sofa, pulled his hat down, and let out a long sigh.Reston felt as though he were in a semi-concussion.He asked the president: "It's hard to deal with." Kennedy replied: "I have never encountered such a difficult thing in my life."

Later, Reston wrote: He (the president) walked into a gloomy room at the U.S. embassy looking depressed and angry.When talking to Khrushchev, he remained calm as usual, trying to reason with the other party, asking him to make it clear what the Soviet Union was going to do and what it was not going to do, but Khrushchev was intimidating him and taking the issue of Berlin. War threatened him... What Kennedy said in that room convinced me of the fact that: Khrushchev had already studied the Bay of Pigs incident.Khrushchev would have understood if Kennedy had not touched Castro, or had simply gotten rid of him.But Kennedy's reckless attack on Cuba without the guts to go to the end made Khrushchev feel that he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be bullied and blackmailed.

Kennedy told Reston: Khrushchev was very rough and barbaric, and at times it seemed like he was going to charge Kennedy.There was only one issue on which he was reasonable, and that was Laos, which he regarded as insignificant.When discussing any other subject, he always assumed a vicious, cynical demeanor.He insisted that Hammarskjöld must be replaced and replaced by a troika.Any disarmament agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union also needs to be supervised by tripartite commissioners representing the three major political camps in the world.To no avail, Kennedy told him that such an arrangement would necessarily be invalidated by the use of the veto by one party (“Even the Russian troika has only one driver!”).Khrushchev issued an ultimatum on the Berlin issue, saying: This bone must be removed from the throat of the Soviet Union. Regardless of whether an agreement can be reached with the United States, he must sign a peace treaty with East Germany before the end of this year.If the United States wants to fight a war on this issue, there is nothing he can do about it.The only way to deal with a madman trying to start a war is to put him in tights.

At Kennedy's request, they held a final secret meeting.The president tried to dissuade Khrushchev from taking such a rash step.Khrushchev flatly refused, saying: "I want peace, but if you want war, that's your business." His determination to sign the peace treaty was unalterable, and he would sign the treaty in December.When they parted, Kennedy said: "This winter is bound to be very cold." In "Khrushchev's Memoirs," the chairman commented: "... I am very happy from the bottom of my heart that we met in Vienna. Although We didn't come to any concrete agreement, and I could see that he was interested in finding a peaceful solution to the world's problems... He was a reasonable man, and I think he knew that starting a new war over Berlin was pointless Makes sense."

Kennedy told Reston: "I have two problems to solve: one is to figure out why he did what he did, and in such a hostile way; and the other is to figure out what we can do about it. I think that the first This problem is easy to explain. He did it because of the Bay of Pigs incident. I think he thinks that a person who is so young and inexperienced, who openly brings himself into trouble, can be frightened; If he thinks I'm inexperienced and I have no courage, then unless we can change his attitude If we don’t think, we can’t talk to him about the result. So we have to act.” Whether Khrushchev's words count or not, people will wait and see, and he himself knows this.Upon his return to Moscow, he ordered the publication of two memorandums he had given to the President concerning the nuclear tests and the Berlin question.Sharp-eyed people at the State Department saw right away that he was no longer talking about deadlines with Berlin, but that no longer mattered much.The whole world knew about Russia's ultimatum.Since then, Khrushchev has raised the Soviet military budget by 3.144 billion rubles and delivered a series of chauvinistic speeches.

Kennedy also followed Khrushchev to escalate step by step. On June 25, he made a televised speech to the American people, "If war breaks out, it must start from Moscow, not from Berlin... Only the Soviet government would use the Berlin border as an excuse to start a war He asked Congress to approve his allocation of 3.247 billion yuan to the Pentagon, call up the reserve force, triple the recruitment rate, increase the maximum limit of combat troops, and repair and use the aircraft and ships in storage.Dean Acheson asked him to declare an emergency, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson agreed.But Kennedy advocated keeping the door open for negotiations.He dare not engage in atomic blackmail rashly, because the other party may force you to showdown.His main concern, he told a New York Post editor, was that the chairman was “out to bully me” and that if that was the case, “everything would be over.” Leaders on both sides are under mounting pressure.Lest the Germans in Berlin fear being abandoned, Kennedy sent his vice president to visit Berlin along with General Clay, the airlift hero of the past.Khrushchev warned the world that the Soviet Union was now capable of producing nuclear bombs with an explosive force equivalent to 100 million tons of high explosives, and that it already possessed rockets capable of delivering such nuclear bombs.It seems that in order to prove this point, he sent a Soviet cosmonaut into orbit.Tensions grew in the United States, and Kennedy urged the Americans to build anti-aircraft shelters.Meanwhile, Berlin is in chaos. In July, 30,444 refugees flowed into the west of Berlin. In the first ten days of August, another 16,500 crossed the line.On the 12th alone, as many as 4,000 people crossed the border, most of them doctors, technicians and skilled workers. necessary people. Half an hour after midnight on August 13th, sirens blared wildly on the dark and deserted streets, and the stubby T-34 and T-54 tanks led the trucks full of German troops straight to the 25 miles between East and West Berlin ( About 40 km) long border line.East Berlin police officers in steel helmets headed to the main thoroughfare in trucks to stand guard.Soldiers unloaded wooden horses, barbed wire, concrete piles, stones, picks, and shovels from the carts.By sunrise four hours later, the foundation of a wall had been formed.Four days later, the wall was fully erected, and the Germans who were still in East Berlin were imprisoned ever since. This incident caught Western countries off guard.Kennedy was not in Washington at the time, and it took four days for the State Department to lodge a formal protest to Moscow.Then, on September 1, Khrushchev tightened the screws a little more.U.S. seismographs have recorded indisputable evidence that the Russians have resumed nuclear testing.Kennedy and Macmillan called on the Soviet president to stop testing, pointing to the extent and toxicity of the new fallout.Khrushchev ignored their appeals, and reconnaissance equipment recorded a second test, followed by a third.In the month that followed, the Soviet Union exploded a total of 30 larger devices, almost all in the atmosphere.By the end of this series of experiments, Russia had released more radioactive poisons into the air than the United States, Britain, and France combined.He also announced at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that a 50,000-megaton nuclear bomb would soon be detonated—equal to 2,500 times the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in the past, and equal to that used in all wars in history. five times all high explosives.At the second meeting, he told the delegates that the explosion had "proved to be a little larger than the 50 million tons that the scientists had originally estimated," but that they would certainly not be punished for the "error" in their calculations.This caused a roar of laughter from the delegates. Kennedy decided that if this was Khrushchev's only answer to Western proposals to ban atmospheric testing, he too would have to authorize the United States to resume testing, although he would only approve underground testing that would not produce fallout.Given the behavior of the Soviet government, he said, "we must now take those steps that even prudent people would feel necessary to take."It was September 8, and the crisis reached its apogee.The Berlin Wall had been built, a brick and concrete fence that pierced the center of Berlin.Since August 22, all but one passageway has been closed to Allied troops.The only place where it was possible was for the East Berlin police to check the papers of Allied soldiers.Approaches are prohibited within 100 meters of the border. Notes were also sent to Paris, Bonn, and Washington formally demanding that West German leaders be banned from flying into Berlin.But the attitude of the West is very tough on this point.Khrushchev's insistence on September 8 that the West German flight into Berlin should be supervised was flatly rejected by the West.Ten days later, when Kennedy was about to leave Hyannis Port for Washington, he was handed an unfortunate note that Dag Hammarskjöld had died in a Congolese plane crash, the cause of which was never understood.Not since Victory Day against Japan has war been so imminent. Two weeks later, Khrushchev began to withdraw from the brink of war.He told the Belgian diplomat Paul-Henri Spaak, who was visiting Moscow, "I realize that, contrary to my wishes, the Western countries are unwilling to sign a peace treaty... I do not want to put you in an intolerable situation; I know very well I know you can't be trampled on." That said, the bone stuck in the throat is not so intolerable.He went on to tell the Belgian guest: "You know, Berlin is not a big problem for me. Two million people are nothing among a billion people in the Communist Party!" And now there is less urgency.He had given Kennedy an ultimatum (“until the end of this year”), but now he just said: “I am not bound by any deadline.” Certain concessions allowed him to save face.He also made some gestures to defuse tensions, including touting Kennedy's maturity and wisdom.But he saw that these gestures did not get any response, so he decided to call it a day. On October 17, he once again declared at the Communist Party Congress: "It seems that Western countries understand the current situation and are willing to seek a solution to the German issue and the Berlin dispute." He finally said: "If this is the case, we will It also no longer insists that the peace treaty must be signed by December 31, 1961." In this way, a confrontation finally ended.It seemed to be a victory for the United States, but the real price paid was not revealed until later.Because of Moscow's attitude, the Berlin problem, and the resumption of nuclear testing, Schlesinger later wrote, "the president undoubtedly felt that an American retreat from Asia would upset the world balance of power." He must further convince his opponents of his fearlessness and fortitude.He told James Reston that the only place where the Communists were engaged in a hot war against the West was Indochina, so "one of our problems now is convincing us that we have power, and Vietnam seems like the best place to do that ". For Lyndon Johnson, these days were very unhappy.The previous year he was the powerful majority leader in the U.S. Senate. Now, as vice president, he has a false position in the government and is troubled by everything.On all fronts Johnson felt his own insignificance more and more clearly.He has room for only one car in the White House parking lot and only one telephone extension to the White House (Attorney General Robert Kennedy has three).His wife has never boarded the president's plane, and he himself has, but not by invitation.On three occasions, Kennedy's aides found Johnson alone in the cabin of the plane, looking around.They always got in because the President was about to use the plane and Johnson always had to be asked to leave.The situation inevitably made him a little embarrassed, but he kept on going, as if this symbol of actual power had completely fascinated him. Kennedy's men saw Johnson's men as outsiders.The entire Vice President's staff, with the exception of Walter Jenkins, was unknown to the prominent presidential advisers.Some of them do not have a pass to the White House and have only entered the White House as tourists.This obscurity was no exception even for Johnson's Secret Service agents.Officially they are equals to the President's Guard, but in practice they are excluded from the White House Guard—no use of their cars, offices, or social engagements.Most of them don't really care about it because they know it's not a snub to them personally.They are ostracized by those in power simply because the person they are responsible for defending is unimportant—for lack of a better word. Kennedy was unclear about the situation.Like most presidents, he also holds a respectful attitude towards this figure second only to him.Because of deep-seated historical conventions, and perhaps also because of human nature, the relationship between the people elected to the number one and number two positions in the United States has never been very harmonious.Some vice presidents who had been close to their executive heads in the early days were saddened that friendship had been replaced by cold courtesy.They forget that for a president, having a vice president by his side is a daily reminder that he could die at any moment.And it doesn't stop there.Although some people took death with equanimity, they didn't have a man waiting to follow him in his place.Those who expected the president to brief the vice president in detail probably didn't consider the implications.To understand this, we must understand the meaning of the presidency, the meaning of the legacy that awaits the number two.The patriarch of a family may write his will without flinching, but if he is told that when he dies, the man next door will become the father of his children and the husband of his wife, he will immediately become Faceless. In addition to this constitutional trouble, there is another layer of trouble.In actual political life, in order to "balance" the presidential election list, the presidential and vice presidential candidates must come from two different regions of the country, and each has appeal to different voters, and their personalities and so on may also be opposites .This is like saying that the husband must also choose someone who looks different, dresses differently, talks differently, and has different values ​​from him to wait to replace him.Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman had little in common with each other.The same is true of Eisenhower and Nixon, Kennedy and Johnson.In Kennedy's view, Johnson was an incredible, if not ridiculous, geek.His self-aggrandizement is naked and unabashed.During his trips abroad, he called his Washington office every day to ask how American newspapers reflected his activities.On a perpetual campaign—an American doctor working in Pakistan exclaimed: “My God! He shook hands with a leper!”—he decided to cast a camel driver in Karachi as a Goodwill envoys make the whole country of Pakistan happy.He said to the flattered Bashir Ahmad: "We have come to see you and your camels, and our president wants to see your camels too, and he has plans to improve your life. "In fact, the president has no such plan at all, and this move seems sure to backfire.But the result was not. Ahmad's trip to the United States was very successful, and Kennedy was also satisfied. He said: "If it were me, I would end up letting the camel shit on the lawn of the White House." Knowing how unhappy the vice president was, the president did everything possible to show Johnson respect, giving him many trips abroad, some of which turned out to be major events.Unexpectedly, there are two things that seem inconspicuous at first, but in retrospect, they are extremely important.One is the trip to Berlin.The Vice President was in a bad mood before going to Berlin, but he gave a good speech there, just in time for the arrival of the first American reinforcements to Berlin.His German hosts saw his visit as a turning point in the future of the besieged city, and he returned emotionally. The other was a trip to Saigon in May of that year.It turned out to be of greater significance, though it was not apparent at the time.It was a trip to South Asia, where everyone expected the Vice President to go to cheer up non-communist regimes.This time he did not want to show that the United States is determined to fight with the local people as he did last time when he went to Berlin. At that time, the United States had not assumed that responsibility in Southeast Asia.Nevertheless, he made a very strong pledge to Saigon.He admired Ngo Dinh Diem very much, and publicly called him "Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia".When the vice president and his party left Vietnam, Stan Carnot of the Saturday Evening Post asked him if he really thought that way, to which the vice president replied, "Fuck you, man, we don't have anyone else in there." This Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia is a black, fat, smoking bachelor, the most notable feature of which is that he seems to have endless words.Anyone who walks out of his huge yellow brushed concrete Independence Palace must first listen to his non-stop monologues that sometimes last six, seven, or even 12 hours.But his other shortcomings are not many.At 60, he is still determined and dedicated.Diem is a typical example of a strongman in power.His title is President, but he doesn't have much respect for democracy.He was a thoroughly Oriental tyrant, or at least a high-ranking bureaucrat who firmly believed that the duty of the people was to obey him.He sent his political enemies to concentration camps, and under his rule there was no freedom of the press or real reform.Important government candidates are all selected from military officers, and the main consideration is loyalty rather than ability.Although Ngo Dinh Diem himself was incorruptible, his court was filled with ambitious and corrupt officials.He was stern and stubborn, and seemed to think that, because he was a Catholic, Catholics should be privileged.His monopoly was astonishingly powerful—a company commander could not move his men without his approval; passports had to be signed by him until his downfall.His autocratic rule is harsher than January.He consulted with only a few trusted aides and family members, notably his domineering brother Ngo Tin Ngu and Ngo Tin Ngu's beautiful but vicious wife, known to American correspondents abroad as "the Dragon Lady."Mrs. Wu Tingru once explained the philosophy of the Wu family's rule: "If we open the windows, the sun can come in, but many bad things will fly in too!" Although very few people went in, not many came out.This is especially true when it comes to intelligence.One of the two great mysteries about the Vietnam War is why it discredited many Western experts. The lack of sufficient factual basis is the main reason.It is rare in history that so many famous people make such absurd mistakes on such a major issue.Until October 1972, when Henry Kissinger was disgraced by prematurely announcing a solution to the Vietnam War, many soldiers and politicians also misjudged the nature of the Vietnam War and its possible future . On April 6, 1954, a state in New England referred to as Massachusetts. —The Translator The Senator to distract his colleagues by quoting to them some early remarks on the Vietnam War, such as "The military situation is looking more and more in our favour" (Acheson, 1952), "We believe that the situation in Indochina is improving" (Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, 1953), that a French victory is "not only probable, but probable" (Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, 1954), and that " The French are winning" (Admiral Radford, 1954).As a result, France failed.In seven years, the French lost 19,000 people and the United States lost 45,882 people between 1961 and 1972.The French casualty figure is usually stated at 92,000, but that figure includes the Foreign Legion, Africans, and Vietnamese who fought under French command.France, unlike the United States, did not send conscripts to Vietnam. .This seemed to justify the suspicions of the New England senator, none other than John F. Kennedy himself.But Kennedy later fell into it too.His policy on Vietnam was still in the end still in the style of the 1960 Senate committee report. Lewis Carroll see page 669 of this book. - Translator-style estimates formulated.That report predicted: "Based on the assurances of the head of the military aid mission to Vietnam... the U.S. military... will be able to withdraw from Vietnam in batches in the foreseeable future." Will be based on winning within 18 months. Another great mystery about the Vietnam War is why so many Americans of different views, including four presidents (two Republicans and two Democrats), felt it was their duty to save the government of Saigon, the country, no matter what. Said, far away in Asia, five thousand miles away from us, in the remote Indochina peninsula, on a pristine land full of rice fields and dense jungles, however, for more than ten years, successive governments in Washington have insisted on going their own way, even disregarding the domestic Tranquility, trying to keep some doubtful figures in power in Vietnam.The American effort in Vietnam was doomed from the start.Kennedy should understand this.At first, he was one of the few people who saw the trouble Vietnam was bound to cause.He visited Vietnam in 1951 (when he was a congressman). After returning home, he said through the "Meet the Press" program: "Without the support of the local people, there is no hope of winning in any Southeast Asian country." Later, he too was influenced by Cold War rhetoric.Cold War figures believe that the United States has "lost" China and must not "lose" Indochina now. The United States began to assume obligations to Saigon in 1954, and in 1957 it reiterated the previous agreement.After the signing of the Geneva Agreement, Eisenhower guaranteed in a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem that the United States would "help the Vietnamese government develop and maintain a strong and survivable country, capable of resisting subversion and aggression through military means."Ike made this promise with the condition that "the Vietnamese side should also take necessary reform measures" to cooperate with him.His purpose in offering this pledge was "to dissuade anyone from imposing a foreign ideology upon your free peoples." During the years when Lyndon Johnson was in the White House, whenever he talked about the Vietnam issue, he often said, "Ike made a promise, and I had to keep it." But he didn't keep it.It was not a formal treaty after all, and the Senate was never involved in it.It doesn't even have the legitimacy of an executive order.But both Johnson and Kennedy believed compliance was imperative.Theodore Sorensen wrote that withdrawing U.S. support would cast "world doubts on the reliability of U.S. guarantees."Arthur Schlesinger went further and wrote: Whether or not we had a significant stake in Vietnam prior to 1954, Eisenhower's letter had created one.Whether we should draw a line where we draw it or not, the line once drawn binds us more and more every year.Whether or not the domino theory was valid in 1954, it was well-founded seven years later, when neighboring governments had pinned their security on the ability of the United States to keep its guarantees to Saigon.Kennedy...had no choice but to work in the general situation he had inherited. Bai Xiude wrote in the book "1968 Presidential Election Documentary" that "our cause in Vietnam" is "the cause of the United States for half a century, and this cause has been known to the whole world. A world order, albeit fragile, that was achieved at the cost of the lives of 400,000 Americans in four wars this century." President Johnson argued that a "hasty withdrawal" was "amount to Announce to the world that we do not intend to abide by the treaties we have signed nor stand by our friends." Time explained to those who disagreed: ...south vietnam must be held at all costs...if the united states cannot or will not hold south vietnam from communist attack then asian nations will no longer feel confident that the united states is safe; the fall of all southeast asia is only a matter of time . The consequences of such a retreat are said to be unimaginable.In support of sending U.S. troops to Vietnam, Robert McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff bluntly stated that otherwise they would only see a general deterioration in the region.General Lyman Lanitzel, speaking on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, predicted that if the Viet Cong prevailed, "we will lose all of Asia, down to Singapore." General Maxwell Taylor, however, believed in defeating the guerrilla enemy (North Vietnam, he said, "wouldn't stand up to conventional bombing.") He told President Kennedy that sending in an "American military task force" was "essential." All these claims make no sense.If the Kennedy administration did not feel obliged to withdraw the Cuban brigade from the doomed beaches, then it had no obligation to Ngo Dinh Diem.Moreover, since Ngo Dinh Diem has publicly denied the obligation to take "necessary reform measures", Eisenhower's letter has also lost its validity.Diem also refused to implement all-Vietnam elections in 1956.Even if America's relations with him were bound by a treaty, it would be absurd to think that he would demand to act in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and there is no treaty at all! The real pressure to keep Washington from leaving Saigon comes from domestic politics.At this time McCarthy was dead, but no matter whether it was the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, everyone was in panic, fearing that Wu Ting Diem might become Chiang Kai-shek's second.What is especially paradoxical is that they repeated the mistakes of the Americans who had advised Chiang Kai-shek; although the core problem in South Vietnam was also political, they gave military aid.One of the reasons they make this mistake is because of the attitude of the powerful people in Congress.They trust the Joint Chiefs of Staff very much, but they don't trust the political officials of the State Department's Asian Division.Another reason is the difference in personality between the two cabinet members who advised the White House on Vietnam in the early 1960s: McNamara was decisive and powerful, while Rusk was timid and ambiguous. As a result, the voice from the Pentagon was of course more popular. Pay attention to. In the later period of Eisenhower's administration, the situation in Vietnam was quite stable. 800 US military advisors and US$300 million in military aid each year are enough to maintain the status quo.Then, in December 1960, a month before Kennedy's inauguration, Diem's ​​enemies announced the formation of the National Liberation Front.Their opponents in the Independence Palace called it "Viet Cong".Ngo Dinh Diem, at first indifferent to this front, had easily foiled a coup attempt the previous fall when Vice President Johnson asked him if he needed any American soldiers, and he said no;他却仍然承认需要一些帮助。于是肯尼迪总统批准了400名特种部队(绿色贝雷帽)去担任训练工作。美国向越南派出部队从此开始了。 1961年5月初，新任美国大使弗雷德里克·瑙尔汀到达西贡。他的前任由于企图同吴庭艳讲道理，结果实际上成了不受欢迎的人。瑙尔汀决心不蹈前任的覆辙。这时，越共的破坏活动已经非常明显，连那位做官当老爷的总统也不得不承认这一事实。乡村的情况日益恶化。游击队自由来去，到处暗杀村长。美国情报方面的一份报告估计，“最严重的时期”看来“即将来临”，并警告说，西贡政权“实际上依赖寡头统治”，“容忍贪污腐败”，已使很多人“对吴庭艳在这一时期的领导能力表示怀疑”。 在华盛顿，人们敦促白宫对越南各地各种不同官僚体制的违法行为进行干预。副国务卿帮办亚历克西斯·约翰逊要求肯尼迪把“打败越共”作为“真正的和最终的”目标。参谋长联席会议向总统保证，只消4万名美国部队就可以“消除越共的威胁”，再加上12.8万人就足以抵挡住北越和中国共产党可能进行的干涉。麦克纳马拉的副国防部长罗斯韦尔·吉尔帕特里克建议同吴庭艳谈判，探讨订立“防御安全同盟”的可能性；当时还在五角大楼的威廉·邦迪也敦促美国“尽早毫不留情地”对战争进行干预。邦迪估计获胜的机会为70%。 肯尼迪下令作进一步研究，同意扩大在西贡的685人的美国军事顾问团，同时批准了再为吴庭艳装备2万名越南部队并承担其费用的计划(这样总数便达15万人)。像艾克一样，他也希望援助应以南越国内的改革和动员一切人力物力反对越共为前提，但是他却并没有强调这一点。当时他正在为柏林问题和禁试问题伤脑筋。施莱辛格怀疑他从来也没有“充分注意过”越南问题。冷战派观察家继续对越南问题感到不解，白修德在1961年8月写道：“形势几乎是一周比一周更坏。”他发现，“游击队现在差不多完全控制了南方三角洲——以致在大白天，如果没有军队护送，我就找不到一个美国人愿意让我坐他的车子驶出西贡。”他报道说：“政治上的崩溃已达到惊人程度。”又写道：“……令我大惑不解的是，在共产党那边，他们似乎总能找到一些愿为他们的事业出生入死的人。”革命精神常常使那些没有为这种精神所感染的人困惑不解。 6月间，游击队占领了一个省会，处决了省长。吴庭艳部队到处后撤。他无可奈何地召见了瑙尔汀，要求签订双边防御条约。华盛顿立即表示支持。整个夏季，援助一直是以林登·约翰逊对东南亚的理解为依据的。副总统表示了一种典型的自由派立场，他从东南亚回国后写道，越南的真正敌人是“饥饿、无知、贫困和疾病”。他认为，美国“必须——不管我们采取何种战略——始终以那些敌人为我们进攻的目标，并充分发挥我们在科学和技术上的能力”。 总统为此派出一个高级调查团前往西贡，其中包括两位最受他信任的顾问，马克斯韦尔·泰勒将军和沃尔特·罗斯托。于是，一位将军和一位好战的文官(罗斯托自始至终是最不妥协的鹰派)便成了这个关键时刻总统在越南的耳目。值得注意的是，调查团里没有高级外交人士参加。索伦森后来曾写道，这反映了“国务院无力同五角大楼竞争”。其结果是更进一步牺牲政治上的考虑，而突出强调军事目标。 泰勒-罗斯托报告形成了越南战争的一大转折。为了挽救吴庭艳的命运，报告要求肯尼迪派出一大批美国顾问。更重要的是，立即派去八千名美国步兵，需要时再增加。作为调查团主要成员的泰勒希望总统以越南问题为主题发表一次重要的电视讲话。他要求对南越进行干预的某些论点是非常奇怪的。例如，在极力主张派遣远征军时，竟拿越南同朝鲜相比，认为在朝鲜“美国部队并没有花费很大的气力就适应了那里的生活和工作环境”。实际上，朝鲜和越南根本不同：朝鲜战争是正规战，敌人的队伍越过分界线进攻，美国兵在比较熟悉的地形上同他们进行固定战线的战斗。越南战争则是在茂密的热带丛林中进行的非正规战。最重要的一点区别是，南朝鲜的当地居民希望美国人待在那儿，越南却不是这样；越南村民倾向于把美国白人部队看成是来接替法国人的，而把越共看成英雄。 政府中低于内阁一级的若干成员，其中包括切斯特·鲍尔斯、乔治·鲍尔和艾夫里尔·哈里曼，对这一建议很感吃惊。但是，提出疑问的惟一高级人士还只有肯尼迪本人。他拒绝在电视广播中和人民见面，因为那会把越南问题搞得和柏林问题一样。他还尖锐地指出，同参谋长联席会议不一样，泰勒和罗斯托对美国进行干预的效果是乐观的，因为他们认为只要能防止北越人向南越渗透就行，至于如何才能做到，他们根本没有提出办法。最使肯尼迪感到惊愕的是关于派遣部队的建议。索伦森写道：“所有他的越南问题的主要顾问都赞同这一建议，说它是考验我们的信用的'试金石'，是我们的决心的象征。但是总统实际上否决了这一建议，而只有他的这一票才作数。”肯尼迪告诉一位助手说：“他们想派去美国部队。他们说，为了恢复信心和维持士气，这是必要的。但这会同柏林的情形完全一样：部队开入，高奏乐曲，群众欢呼，可是四天之后，谁都把它忘了。然后，又会有人告诉我们，必须派出更多部队。这就好像喝酒，酒劲一过，你又得再喝。” 虽然如此，他也难免为大家的意见所左右。他否决了派遣美国部队的建议，但在另一些问题上却有所让步，从1961年12月起就开始加强美国在越南的力量了。和七年前艾森豪威尔的做法一样，总统在同吴庭艳公开交换的信件中肯定了这一安排。这也不完全是单方面的，吴庭艳也同意进行改革，并且承认必须加强军队的指挥和提高士气。但是没有规定美国援助的限额，以及这一援助到何时为止，只是笼统地说直到平定了越共和逐出北越人的时候为止。泰勒并不认为这里面包含着什么巨大的危险。他从菲律宾拍电报给总统说：“通过南越卷入一场亚洲大战的危险是存在的，但并不十分严重。”相反，乔治·鲍尔却对此事十分不安。他说，吴庭艳在迫使我国政府派出步兵以前是不会罢休的。这正是吴庭艳的真正目的，这样他就可以让美国人去为他打仗，而由自己来巩固政权。鲍尔预言，如果答应派兵，其规模就会不断扩大。他告诉总统说，不出五年之内，就会有30万美国部队在越南。肯尼迪笑着说：“乔治，你真是疯了。” 美国后来所以加速陷入越南(这证明了鲍尔和后来一些人的意见是正确的)，其中一个因素乃是美国在西贡的决策人的性格。从1962年初直到肯尼迪执政一千天的末尾，这里的两个关键性人物是瑙尔汀大使和2月到达越南的美国军事援助顾问团新任团长保罗·哈金斯将军。选用这两个人本身就是一个悲剧。瑙尔汀出身于弗吉尼亚望族，一向因循守旧，对亚洲毫无所知。他的任命是由国务院中强硬的反共派推荐的。不论出现任何危机，他都支持吴庭艳，而当肯尼迪真正需要他时，他却会一去多日，到爱琴海上优哉游哉地度假去了。哈金斯比他还要糟糕，他是波士顿一个世家的浪子，中学也没有念完就退了学。他在军队中的晋升，只因他精于马术，是个勇敢的马球队员，乔治·巴顿需要轻松一下时陪同他骑马的伙伴。他在第二次大战中是巴顿的副参谋长，他那时的绰号是“枪通条”，是因为他贯彻巴顿的命令雷厉风行而得来的。但是和巴顿一样，他自己有时却不那么遵守命令。这一点，在他接到指示要他向总统如实报告越南战争进展情况时，表现得尤其明显。肯尼迪明白指出他需要知道一切情况，不管消息好坏。但哈金斯却不喜欢把坏消息往上报，他认为这对他不利，他的一切做法让人感到仿佛他的使命就是万事只求表面上不错就行了。他一到西贡，就对美国记者说，他是乐观主义者，也喜欢看到他周围的人都是乐观派；还说，今后给华盛顿的每日情况估计汇报可以叫做“进展报告”。他要使人完全相信，在他的领导下，反对越共的战斗将会不断进展。 瑙尔汀和哈金斯都同意，一切问题都取决于吴庭艳，没有他什么事也办不了。同时，既然对他的政权进行批评只会激怒他，那就不要批评。用《纽约时报》霍默·比加特的话来说，这就变成了“与吴庭艳共存亡”的政策。吴庭艳很快就认识到，他完全可以为所欲为地来利用这两个美国人。 哈金斯到后对越共发动的第一次进攻称为“日出行动”，这倒很恰当。哈金斯告诉记者说，他计划建立一系列设防的“战略村”，由民防队防守；同他一起搞这个计划的就是越南总统的弟弟吴庭儒。紧接着华盛顿得到的报告是，战略村已获得惊人成功，农村人口的1/3以上都居住在战略村里。战局看来已开始扭转。从西贡来的报告全是好消息。怀疑哈金斯所作估计的人可以拿瑙尔汀的估计来加以核实，因为后者也是同样觉得一切如意。 实际上，战略村的试验完全失败了。除了那些居于高位的人之外，什么也没有变。他们现在是通过发布新闻在进行战争。从战地来的报告都由哈金斯重新改写，悲观和不受欢迎的消息全部删除，代之以彻底的虚构。反对这样做的校级军官——他们中的确有人表示过强烈反对，最令人难忘的是约翰·保罗·范恩中校——就调去担任不受欢迎的职务，在他们的档案上写下可能从此断送他们的军人前程的评语。另一位职位仅次于哈金斯的将军巡视了前线，发现整个形势全然不同于美国军事援助顾问团团长亲拟的电报所作的描述，于是就写了一份报告给哈金斯，列举战争实情。哈金斯竟在报告的边上批道：“谎话”，“谎话”，“又是谎话”，然后往档案柜里一塞了事。实际撒谎的是他自己，而能够揭穿他的谎言的只有美国报纸派驻越南的记者发回国的消息。哈金斯为了替自己辩解，便说那些记者危言耸听，甚至干脆骂他们为卖国分子。他偶尔也承认受挫，那是因为他别有企图，他要借此多搞些兵、枪炮、直升机。他警告说，如果不给他补充，就是文官想拆军队的台，任何人只要还记得当年中国的往事，准知道会产生什么结果。 要是越共发动春节攻势或其他攻势，这个单人新闻社可能在一开始就暴露了。但当时的情况却是游击队的活动恰好有所下降。这正是那些操纵新闻的人求之不得的机会。他们宣称，“日出行动”已经为战场带来了晴朗的天空。他们兴高采烈，而华盛顿也为他们的这种扬扬得意的情绪所感染。马克斯韦尔·泰勒说，他已感觉到在越南将出现粉碎越共的“一次伟大的全国性运动”。麦克纳马拉说：“一切统计数字都表明，我们正在赢得战争。”肯尼迪总统是又惊又喜，当下就批准了把西贡的司令部从2000人扩大为1.6万人，把美国军事援助顾问团升格为美国驻越军事援助司令部。