Chapter 93 Chapter 92

Japan's dying gasp (from Almin von Long's "World Massacre") According to the English translator, the book "World Massacre" has just been published in Germany, and the "Compilation of Records of the United States Naval Academy" has translated the following chapter that has caused controversy.As I was a battleship squadron commander at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the publication asked me to write a rebuttal.It is attached at the end of this chapter. Our offensive in the Ardennes at the end of 1944, the so-called Battle of the Bulge, was fought in parallel with the Battle of Leyte Gulf.In each of these battles, a country already facing defeat is putting all its eggs in one basket.Hitler hoped to frighten the Western Allies into a rapprochement that would give him a respite from the Russians; he even entertained the wild illusion that Britain and the United States would turn to aid him in the fight.The Japanese, on the other hand, hoped that the Americans would start to tire of wars across the ocean and finally be willing to negotiate peace.

The Ardennes offensive, which the author will discuss in the next chapter of this book, caused Roosevelt and Churren to worry for weeks.These two old warmongers thought Germany was doomed, but we split their lines in France and for a time made great progress, unfortunately, because Hitler had too much ambition With a big battle plan, our tactical constraints, coupled with the strong air forces of the Western allies, we may have been doomed to fail from the beginning. However, the Japanese almost won a big victory that turned things around.It was the folly of Admiral Halsey of the United States that created the chance for victory.It was the greater stupidity of the Japanese fleet commander Kurita who ruined this opportunity.The offensive and defensive battle in Leyte Gulf is the largest example of delaying a military aircraft that we can study.Military personnel of all countries should take this as a warning.

Politics and War War is politics that achieves its ends by force.It is difficult for any military action to exceed its political purpose; if the political purpose is false, then the sound of artillery will be in vain, and the blood will be shed in vain.These few simple and plain words of Clausewitz can explain the reason for the seemingly absurd failure of Wright Bay. At the end of 1944, the political situation in the Pacific region was as follows: On the one hand, Japan was a country with great ambitions.In order to seek hegemony in its own region, although it has been ruthlessly defeated by the U.S. imperialists, its leaders still insist on fighting.Unconditional surrender was unimaginable to these bushido visionaries.Yet Franklin.Roosevelt had made such demands in order to appeal to the psychology of his own people, who had never seen a bomb dropped on their soil, and who were fighting a Hollywood war.

Now that such a political stalemate had formed in the Pacific region—because, militarily speaking, the Japanese should have sued for peace once Tojo fell—a military shock was needed to break the deadlock.Whenever the war is protracted, there will be some peace parties: this is open in a democratic country, but hidden in the ruler in a dictatorship.Each shock strengthens the peace faction of the country hit.At that time, the Japanese planned to retreat temporarily, waiting for the Americans to hit the inner defense circle of the empire, and then give them a devastating counterattack.Once at the end of the extended supply line, close to the Japanese naval and air bases, the Yankees will be at a temporary disadvantage, and may be hit by a fiasco at that time, and they will accept reasonable peace talks.

The real intention of the Americans to launch an invasion war against the Philippines was to satisfy the vanity of General MacArthur and at the same time to calm the troubles on the domestic front.But the invasion unnecessarily forced Japan's strongest land force in the Philippine archipelago into combat.The terrible unrestricted submarine warfare of the United States has already put these troops in trouble, and they can just sit there waiting to die.But Douglas.MacArthur was going back to the Philippines, and Roosevelt was going to perform such a farce of regaining lost territory on the eve of the election.

Ostensibly, the occupation of Great Wright, in the middle of the archipelago, was intended to establish several supply depots and a large air base for the attack on Luzon.However, the mountains on Wright Island overlap, and the only important flat valley is full of large paddy fields.The advisers under MacArthur opposed the selection of Wright Island to achieve the above goals.The marshal was too anxious to achieve his grand triumph to pay any heed to their opinions.After the occupation of Wright Island, it never became an important operating base.The biggest naval battle in the world is fought just to win a trivial and useless spoil.

In executing Nimitz's operational plan for the Central Pacific offensive, both Generals King and Spruance had better strategies for ending the war.Both suggested bypassing the Philippine Islands.Jin advocated the capture of Formosa.Spruance - who was not as prudent as the legend said - proposed a bold plan to land on Okinawa.A landing like this is actually in the inland sea of ​​Japan, which is likely to form a shock, and finally overthrow the wartime cabinet and achieve peace.At that time, it was more than half a year before the atomic bomb became a reality.Perhaps the barbaric bombing of Hiroshima was simply unnecessary.However, nine months later, when the Americans really went to attack Okinawa, the Japanese made up their minds to fight to the death. At that time, only the massacre of atomic bombs could wake them up from their love for war.

All in all, Marshal MacArthur was arrogantly self-righteous with Franklin.Roosevelt played politics insidiously, which gave the Japanese an opening.Seizing this opportunity, they were supposed to win.The Americans had missed their planes, lost their advances, and yet they managed to get away with a modest "victory" in the end, thanks to an incredible mistake by a Japanese general. In my combat analysis, I described Japan's "No. 1" combat plan in detail, and attached several daily combat charts illustrating the four major battles.The following brief account only touches on a few particularly controversial points in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Using the Surigao Strait to attack MacArthur's landing forces in two directions is flawless.Using Ozawa's vulnerable aircraft carriers as a decoy fleet, this strategy is also very clever.Unless Halsey's Third Fleet could be lured away from the battlefield, the pincer attack would be difficult to succeed.The main controversy centered on Halsey and Kurita's decision strategy. After the battle of Halsey, while the nations were busy burying their dead, the American Commander William misdirected in the above battle.f.Halsey, to cover his fault, had hastened a book and serialized it in a pulp magazine.At the beginning of this book, there are a few words written by a staff officer who is said to have co-authored the book with him: In 1946, when the five-star Navy Admiral Halsey attended a reception, a woman squeezed into the crowd. The crowd around him grabbed his hand and shouted: "At this moment, I feel like I have touched the hand of God!"

The first sentence in "The Tale of General Halsey" illustrates the character of this character.He is a George of the sea.Patton, was a showy and fanatical belligerent; but, in his military exploits, we find nothing to match those of Patton: the march on Sicily, the relief of Pakistan by a hasty march on the "bulge." Stoney's crisis may sweep the German territory with a smashing force. Those who criticized Halsey's command of the Battle of Wright Gulf focused on the following questions: 1. Even if Ozawa's aircraft carriers were used to lure the enemy, was Halsey's decision to pursue them correct?

2. Why did Halsey leave the San Bernardino Straits undefended? 3. Sprague's small aircraft carrier suddenly encountered the enemy off the coast of Samar Island. Who should be responsible for this incident? General Halsey justified the above points in an urgent telegram sent to Nimitz that evening after the war was over, when he and his staff were so worried about the terrible mess they had created that they had not yet Come up with an excuse to pass the buck.But by the time Halsey wrote that book, his defense had clearly sounded plausible. One, he was right to go after those aircraft carriers.Those aircraft carriers posed a major threat to the war in the Pacific.If he didn't attack them, they would "shuttle bomb" his fleet, and the planes would fly from the deck of the carrier to the Philippine airport and back again.As for Ozawa's lure, Halsey thought it was a lie he had told during his trial. "The Japanese lied throughout the war—. . . Why should we believe their every word once the war is over?" 2. It would be a bad idea to leave the fleet in the San Bernardino Strait, because the Japanese would also "shuttle bomb" the Third Fleet there.It is also a bad policy to leave the battle fleet to defend the strait."Shuttle bombing" of a dispersed fleet would be even more powerful.He sailed north with all his ships so that he could "keep his fleet intact and in the initiative." 3. Kincaid was to be blamed for the raid off Samar Island.Kincaid had been informed that Halsey was not going to take care of the Channel.It was Kincaid's responsibility to protect MacArthur's landing force and his own small aircraft carrier.Kincaid had been negligent in not sending his planes north to search and not spot Kurita's fleet approaching in time. These irrefutable justifications may fool readers of those magazines, but they cannot fool military historians in general. Speaking of "shuttle bombing", Halsey himself tried his best to advocate an early invasion of Wright Island, and finally obtained the consent of the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces. At that time, his reason was that he encountered the air force taking off from the Philippine base and found that its resistance was very weak .He had destroyed most of Japan's remaining air force during the Battle of Formosa.He witnessed with his own eyes that the existing Japanese pilots were inexperienced and their combat effectiveness was pitifully small.When he personally directed the bombing of the Luzon airfield, he suffered almost no losses.The generals under him also believed that the troops deployed on the Xiaoyang aircraft carrier could not be strong.Li, who is proficient in strategy, once warned him tirelessly that it was a decoy fleet.Fabricating the story of the so-called "shuttle bombing" is just trying to piece together some facts, and use it to embellish Halsey's stupid actions taken by the Japanese army to lure the enemy. Halsey explained why he took the whole fleet up north and left the Channel alone, saying that it was to "keep his fleet intact", which is also an exaggeration.He doesn't need to lead sixty-four warships to fight seven warships, let alone command ten aircraft carriers to fight four aircraft carriers.It can also be known based on common sense that a fleet should be left to defend the strait.All the senior commanders at the time thought he had done so.It's just that his telegrams were drafted sloppily and unclearly, so they never noticed his negligence. To blame Kincaid for the attack off Samar would be too lowly for Halsey.It had been Halsey's duty to defend the San Bernardino Strait, and besides, he was the higher ranking admiral who was there.If he really wanted Kincaid to take on this responsibility, he should have made it clear in his telegram, preferably by going to Nimitz first, and there was plenty of time for him to do so. Halsey at Wright Gulf basically made the same mistake Napoleon made at Waterloo.He met two enemy armies, dealt a heavy but not decisive blow to one, and then, bent on striking at the second, he could only believe that the first had been routed, and he had no doubts about the Proofs to the contrary are deaf and indifferent.Kurita first retreated and then attacked at the Sibuyan Sea, just as Blücher first retreated and then attacked at Ligny. (The reader may be pleased to read my book "Waterloo: A Modern Analysis", published in Hamburg in 1937.) The reason why Halsey couldn't forget the aircraft carrier fleet was because he wanted to compete with Spruance for a day.He had been disappointed since that occasion when he fell ill and was unable to participate in the Battle of Midway.He fanatically wanted to fight a big victory against the aircraft carrier.Once a battle occurs, he will personally participate and direct it.Since he was on a battleship at that time, he wanted to deploy his forces to let the battleship sink the damaged enemy ships and win a brilliant victory, so he led the large battleship to the north. Roosevelt hesitated to choose MacArthur's and Nimitz's two different strategies for defeating Japan - one would use the navy to attack across the Central Pacific; of a disaster.Halsey was Nimitz's staff.Kincaid was ordered by Nimitz to become MacArthur's subordinate.The invasion of Wright Island was a victory for MacArthur's strategy.Halsey, on the other hand, only wanted to chase after the aircraft carrier, thinking that this was implementing Nimitz's strategy.Having swallowed the Japanese bait, he forgot his mission at Wright Gulf; we assume, of course, that he understood his mission. Halsey never admitted that he had misconducted his command in Wright Gulf, only that he did not do properly to return to the division to rescue Kincaid.According to him, the blunder was only due to anger and a misunderstanding.At ten o'clock in the morning Nimitz asked, "Where is Task Force Thirty-fourth?" Row.But the next sentence, "The whole world was amazed," seemed to insult him, much to his annoyance.After a long period of time, he realized that it was a mixed code added by the decoding officer. Those few words were clumsy, and if they were true, if Halsey was really annoyed, then what he had done was worse.Morrison, an excellent historian of the U.S. Navy, finally leniently wrote, and he did not mention these words of defense in the volume describing the Battle of Leyte Gulf.Besides, Halsey thus regretted the only reasonable thing he had done at the Battle of Wright Gulf, while at the same time blaming some unknown little man in charge of the coding machine for what was admittedly his fault— In his own words - "Daredevil". Halsey was a member of the U.S. Navy that even the Navy would dare not deny.After the battle of Leyte Gulf, there were rumors among the inner circle that he would be asked to retire.However, he still stayed in office later, causing the fleet to encounter two typhoons, and the losses suffered by ships and personnel were no less than a major defeat.He was promoted to five-star admiral; he stood next to Nimitz on the deck of the USS Missouri when the Japanese signed the instrument of surrender.Spruance was in Manila at the time.Spruance never got a fifth star.Hitler was very unfair to our staff, but Congress and the Navy also bear some responsibility for how things like this are handled. Kurita Kurita played a noble and pathetic character in Wright Bay before he became so stupid.He set out on a mission to sacrifice his life for his country.His fleet bravely endured attack and destruction from submarines and aircraft.His reward was the discovery that the exit to the San Bernardino Strait was undefended.He should go forward, break into Leyte Bay, and wipe out MacArthur's landing force in one fell swoop.But he didn't, which was a tragedy for Japan and, as I shall show, a tragedy for Germany. Kurita behaved abnormally on the morning of October 25. It was because he was tense and fatigued, reaching the limit of human endurance, and at the same time, there was a communication error with the Japanese ship.The communications of the American ships, though equipped with a great deal of sophisticated equipment, were poor; but of the Japanese work in this respect we can only say that it is pathetic.Like us in the Ardennes, Kurita lacked air support and air reconnaissance.He fought blindly under unimaginable circumstances. He made three big mistakes, the third of which was the one that decided the outcome of the battle at Wright Bay.The last hopes of both great powers were shattered by the loss of one man's mind. The first mistake was to order an "all-out attack" as soon as Sprague's escort aircraft carrier was spotted.He should form a battle formation first, and then attack at full speed, annihilating Sprague's fleet in one fell swoop.Then he could sail into the bay with almost no need to break formation. The "all-out attack," that Asian agitation mistake, sent his ships out like a pack of dogs, each chasing its own rabbit.So Sprague escaped in the ensuing chaos. The second mistake was to suddenly order his disorganized ships to cease fighting just when they could catch up with Sprague.Due to poor communications equipment, Kurita was unaware of the fighting in the haze and rain far to the south.He thought he had fought a good battle, for his excited men reported that they had attacked Halsey's large aircraft carriers, routed them to Leyte Gulf, and sunk several of them.So he decided to head for the bay. A problem that has baffled military writers is Kurita's third fatal mistake: he has fought all the way to the entrance of Leyte Gulf, where he will be free from any hindrance, but instead of sailing into the bay, he turns around and walks away up. Later, under interrogation by the Americans, Kurita explained that at noon on October 25, he was in the bay and could do nothing more.The landing position has been "solidified", the question is what else can he do.He had heard that a large fleet of aircraft carriers had been spotted about a hundred nautical miles to the north (this was a rumor), so he decided to head that way and attack that fleet, perhaps to cooperate with Ozawa.He could have escaped while heading north, but he never admitted that he had that intention at the time. Li Yin did not receive a report that Ozawa was attacked by Halsey three hundred nautical miles from Wright Gulf.If Kurita had received such a telegram, he would have sailed into the bay and completed his mission.Unbeknownst to Kurita, Halsey had been tricked into baiting the enemy, which solved the mystery of Wright Gulf. This utter failure of communication reminds one again of the Waterloo anecdote, but does not excuse Kurita's ignorance.Like Halsey, he had forgotten what he was there for.Halsey was bewildered by the zeal for glorious victories, Kurita was bewildered by inaccurate news and the many plain-coded telegrams from the enemy in his fatigue.Instead of reassuring Kurita, Kincaid's plea for help seemed to only make him more anxious about the arrival of a powerful reinforcement. However, none of these reasons can be used as a basis for defence.Kurita's task was not to determine whether MacArthur's landing position had been "secured."He had gone there to sail into the bay, to destroy the landing force, and to die with them, if necessary, like a wasp who dies when he stings.This is all the tasks stipulated in the "No. 1" combat plan.Kurita has jumped at the opportunity to complete this task.He missed his chance and got cold feet.At that time, as long as Ozawa sent Kurita a short telegram of no more than ten words in full-text - Luzon was in fierce battle with enemy ships-the battle and the entire battle situation would be changed. Because it was less than two weeks before the election of the president of the United States.More people are disillusioned with the old hypocrite in the White House and his staff who pretend to be famous.At the same time, there are rumors among the people that he is actually a person who will die sooner or later.His advantage over his Republican candidate is far from reliable.If Roosevelt had lost the election and his less experienced and less prestigious Republican opponent, Dewey, had become president, things might have been different thereafter.American hatred of the Bolsheviks may explode openly, in time to save Europe from the Soviet specter before the paralyzing influence of Communism corrupts our culture and politics as it is now. Undoubtedly, a defeat in Leyte Gulf would have caused the Americans to rethink their strategy, including the reference to "unconditional surrender."With a rallied Japan behind them, the Russians might hold off on advancing on the Eastern Front.Although Germany and Japan can no longer talk about winning, as long as the conditions for peace negotiations are not as harsh as before, the two countries can recover from the war more quickly and become a reliable force to contend with China and Russian communism. What is the actual situation?Thanks to luck in Leyte Gulf.The dying Roosevelt managed to realize his dream, smashing all competitions that American capitalism encountered in a short period of time.In this way he will finally sell out our Western Christian culture to the Marxists.But that didn't seem to have caught his attention, nor worried him. "Battleships line up in battle formation" An article refuting US Navy Vice Admiral (retired) Victor.By Henry I am not going to discuss Feng.General Long's ingenious geopolitics, for which I will make only one or two general criticisms, and then talk about the campaign. Long slanders Roosevelt, the greatest president of our country since Lincoln, and his words are not worth refuting, because those who say those words only know that they are devoted to Adolf.Hitler's crimes were revealed until the day the monster was shot dead. What he calls the "shock" in the final phase of the war is interesting.The once-sensational Vietnam New Year's Offensive fell into this category of "shock"; it was a last-ditch effort, and as an offense, a costly failure.Just because President Johnson had assured the American people that the South Vietnamese communists were finished.So the New Year's Day Offensive gave the public such a boost that those who were less enthusiastic about war lost enthusiasm and the calls for peace gained the upper hand. The situation in World War II was different.If the forces at MacArthur's beachhead were eliminated, that might have affected the terms of the peace talks, but Long exaggerated its impact.The American people supported that war.The submarine warfare that strangled Japan, the Eisenhower-Russian two-pronged German offensive: it all went on.As for President Roosevelt losing the election, that is an assumption that cannot be decided by your will. Long's claims about certain facts are unreliable.Spruance's plan to take Okinawa still had to deal with a logistical problem, namely, the transfer of heavy weapons and ammunition by sea.Marching to the Philippines was approved by Nimitz after research. I think Takashi made some frivolous and superficial criticisms of Kurita and Halsey.To gain insight into the nature of the battle at Leyte Gulf, it is necessary to have a knowledge of how it was conducted, of the terrain there, and of the effect that distance by sea and air had on the bloody struggle.I was on the battlefield, and I was able to point out Ryu's words, which were obviously out of prejudice and anger. Kurita's mistakes are now listed as Takashi's criticisms of Kurita's operation on October 25: 1. Ordering a "full-scale attack" Long blamed the action, according to Morrison. However, we should take into account that Kurita's surface fleet encountered the aircraft carrier suddenly.Before that, the aircraft carrier had dealt him a terrible blow, sinking the Musashi.Before the warships and aircraft carriers launch an offensive, there is always time to get into a more favorable position. If Kurita can rush at them before they are ready to mobilize, and sink them with artillery fire, then he can master the opponent's strategy. Best chance.That's why he mobilized all his ships and immediately launched a general attack.This was not some "Asian agitation mistake", this was a decidedly bold attack.Long's racially discriminatory remarks are regrettable. Kurita continued to gain the upper hand, preventing the carriers from attacking and regrouping in the pursuit.He also has a well-thought-out plan in fighting like this.In fact, his ships had finally caught up with Sprague, and the "Taffy III" was able to survive, just as Sprague said in his battle report, only because "God Almighty obviously Protected." 2. Stop chasing Sprague If you can see it as clearly as you can with the 20/20 gauge, this action is clearly a mistake.But it was on the Yamato, far to the north, and Kurita couldn't see clearly.Instead of avoiding the torpedo track, he should turn south, drive in and clear the torpedo.Then he would be able to stand a chance of winning. Kurita received some untrue reports from his commanding officer.This repeats Formosa's mistake.If he did not believe the reports, he would have won his greatest victory since Midway.But the airstrikes were more frequent, time was passing, and his three heavy cruisers were crippled at sea, burning.His warships are all scattered scattered on the ocean surface of forty square nautical miles.He decided to gather them together and sail into the bay.If we take into account his erroneous intelligence, it should be said that his actions were reasonable. 3. Leaving Leyte Gulf is inexcusable.However, the word "stupid" is not a derogatory term used by a professional soldier after all.Long ignores those factors that can be forgiven. It took Kurita more than three hours to assemble his ships.The air raid had delayed the operation, and the whizzing planes and constant explosion of bombs must have driven him almost into a frenzy.By the time he was ready to sail into the bay, it was nearly one o'clock in the afternoon.His raid plan has come to naught.As far as he guessed—and he was right—wherever Halsey was, he was on his way very quickly.There is no news from Ozawa, and the Southern Fleet clearly failed to enter the bay.Kurita felt that the bay had become a death trap, a place where land bases and aircraft carriers were swarming, and all his ships would be sunk before dark that day before they could meet MacArthur's fleet. there. Perhaps Kurita had panicked.We would all have thought: If it had been us, we would have broken into Leyte Gulf no matter what.However, if we can really think about it, then if we don't praise it, we will at least understand Kurita's actions. The one who really "solved the problem" for Wright Bay was the American hero Ziggy, whom only a few people still miss or admire.Sprague, who thwarted the "Number One," campaign plan, saved Halsey's reputation and MacArthur's beachhead.He caused Kurita to delay the decisive six hours of the battle: two and a half hours for the pursuit and three and a half hours for the regrouping of the ships.After noon, it is difficult to be sure of victory when sailing into the bay. Kurita did not lose the battle at Leyte Gulf through one bad decision or a lost telegram.The U.S. Navy won the war because of the heroism of some of its soldiers.In general, in the Battle of Wright Gulf, the Japanese Navy was beaten to the ground, and since then it has been unable to go to sea to fight.Although our side made some mistakes, the Battle of Leyte Gulf was a glorious rather than a "bad" victory, won after hard work.We have the advantage in the Surigao Strait and to the north, but we are inferior outside Leyte Gulf, where the fighting is most important. Sprague's three destroyers—the Johnston, the Hull, and the Hellman—strike through a curtain of smoke and rain and head straight for the main guns of Kurita's battleship and cruiser, which The image of that always reminds me of how Americans fight at a disadvantage.Our schoolchildren should know this, and our enemies should be inspired by it. Halsey's mistake I have never been more irritated in my life than I was with Halsey at Wright Gulf.To this day, I still remember the anger and disappointment at that time.The thought of the missed opportunity to fight in battleship formation outside the San Bernardino Straits gave me another pang. I don't even want to argue that Halsey fell for Ozawa's trick or failed to leave the fleet to attack Kurita.These are his mistakes.Long hits home when he criticizes the excuses he has published to pass the buck.Halsey was too keen on quick battles to be calm in analysis - something I noticed as a second lieutenant on his destroyer - and this was his downfall.If he had stayed in the San Bernardino Strait and sent Mitchell after Ozawa, or if he had only left Lee and the battle fleet on defense, he would have defeated both Japanese fleets, and William.Halsey's name would be associated with John.Paul.Jones goes down in history.But in the end, part of both fleets escaped, and the criticism he received could not be justified. However, I think that Armin.Feng.Long's criticism of General Halsey is also largely inaccurate. Halsey was worried about the shuttle bombing; it turned out that it wasn't his rhetorical, defensive excuse.October 25 had just begun, and in less than two hours, planes taking off from Luzon Island had already blown up the "Princeton".Halsey was right to fear another such attack.But if he's overly concerned, that's another story. Anyone who is a soldier has read (or should have read) Lev.Tolstoy's, which contains some questionable historical and military theory; among them is the insight that strategic and tactical planning actually play no role in war.There are infinite variations in war, the whole is chaos, and everything depends on chance.Tolstoy said so.And in combat, most of us tend to think the same way.However, this is not the case in reality.Taking the example of the United States as evidence, the campaigns commanded by Grant and Spruance showed that if you want to have a good chance of winning, you must first formulate a solid plan.However, the above-mentioned author makes a convincing point that victory depends on the individual display of valor on the battlefield, on one man cutting the flag of the village and shouting "Long live!"And this is a well-known truth. In the Pacific War, William.f.Halsey was such a character. Halsey's misconduct in Wright Bay was indeed called for to retire, but some powerful figures at the time insisted that he was a "national treasure" and could not do without him.These people are also right.Only a few career officers—and some senior generals—knew who Spruance was.Likewise, only a few people know who Nimitz and King are.However, all new recruits knew Halsey the "Bull" and felt safe and proud to sail and fight under his command.In those dark days on Guadalcanal, he shouted "Long live!" Our soldiers who had lost their fighting spirit regained their confidence, so they all went forward bravely and won the bloody battle war. On the afternoon of October 25th, Halsey called me to listen to the intercom.I was in command of the battleship Squadron VII on the Iowa, and he was on the New Jersey.We are preparing to lead most of the ships and rush back to rescue Kincaid.He asked me--not ordering me, but asking me--in the majestic and cheery tone of a great quarterback leading a counterattack--if I thought it possible to lead Seventh Squadron of the Battleship with the greatest Sailing speed takes the lead to attack the Central Fleet.I agree.He put me in charge of tactics, and we rode the wind and waves at twenty-eight knots. We didn't run into Kurita.Kurita decided not to enter the bay, having escaped through the San Bernardino Channel in the previous hours.We spotted a destroyer falling behind about two o'clock in the night, and our escort sank it.Halsey wrote in his book that it was the only artillery battle he had seen in forty-three years at sea. Although I was very angry with Halsey, after our ship-to-ship call that day, I forgave him.It was a rash move to hastily mobilize two battleships to engage Kurita in a night battle, perhaps as reckless as his pursuit of Ozawa.However, as soon as I heard him shout "Long live!", I couldn't help but follow suit.斯普鲁恩斯也许不会象那样勇往直前，但是斯普鲁恩斯也就不会率领六艘战列舰向北急驶三百海里，然后再向南返航三百海里，在整个一场大战中不曾发射一炮。这就是海尔赛的作风，在这种地方可以看到他的长处，也可以看到他的缺点。我和海尔赛在莱特湾执行了组成战列舰队的作战计划，在热带的黑夜里搜索敌舰，由于双方力量有巨大悬殊而捏着一把汗。结果一无所获，我也许是个傻子，然而我参加行伍一生中最后听到的那一次“万岁！”仍给我留下了一个美好的回忆。 “组成战列舰队” 人们不会再听到这样的命令了。海战的日子已经结束了。工业技术已经打破这种传统的军事概念了。也许，一个年纪极老的水手，最后还会漫谈几句从莱特湾获得的真正的教训。 在我们这个科学与工业时代里，莱特湾已经成为人类野蛮和愚蠢地进行了一场战争的遗迹。战争一向是一种暴烈的捉迷藏游戏，这游戏是用人的生命与国家的财富来玩耍的。然而，玩这种游戏的时代现在结束了。 当一个民族已经进步到不再用人作牺牲，不再以人充当奴隶，不再从事决斗时，他们就必须不再进行战争了。战争的手段已经使它的成果显得更无意义了，毁灭性的机器在政治中已经变成不值得采用的东西了。在莱特湾就是这个情形。发动了庞大的海军，在那里大战一场，耗费了几乎是无法想象的大量人力与国币，把国家的命运交托给一两个情绪激动、消息不灵通、精力衰弱的老人，凭他们在无法胜任的压力下作出决定：这确实是“愚蠢的”。做这样的笨事，要不是因为其结局十分悲惨，那倒象是在演出一场拙劣的闹剧。 不错，我们承认这一切，然而那时候除了在莱特湾打上一仗，又有什么别的办法呢？我们的处境当时就是如此，现在仍是如此。 四十年前，我还是一个海军少校的时候，我国的一般和平主义者就正确地指出，工业化的战争已经是过时的、愚蠢的，而希特勒和日本那些军国主义者，要实现其掠夺世界的罪恶目的，正为自己准备科学和工业所能供给的一切最可怕的武器。为了阻止这种罪恶行为，英语国家和俄国打了一场正义战争。我们付出了可怕的代价，方才赢得胜利，如果当时我们放下了武器，让纳粹德国占了上风，统治了全世界，那么这个世界又会变成一个什么样呢？ 现在，当每一位有识之士都对核武器忧心忡忡、隐怀着恐惧时，克里姆林宫里那些愚昧无知的马克思主义独裁者却统治着我们过去的战友，统治着那个非常伟大、非常英勇、非常不幸的民族；他们那样处理对外事务，就仿佛叶卡德琳娜女王仍旧在那里独揽大权一样；只不过他们称自己贪得无厌的沙皇政策为“反殖民主义斗争”而已。 我不知道如何解答这个永远困扰着人的问题，我也不指望能够活到这个问题获得解答的那一天。我尊敬我们军队中的青年人，尽管他们必须操纵那些威力可怕的机器，从事他们本国人民既蔑视又害怕的行业。我衷心地尊敬他们，同情他们。他们作出的牺牲远比我们从前所作出的为大。从前我们还对“组成战列舰队”的那个伟大时刻怀着信心与希望。我们的国家为此尊敬我们。我们也感到自豪。但那个时代已经过去了。自从遭了两次大灾难以后，人们想到了工业化的战争就痛恨。然而，当世界上某些地方还有一些好战的白痴或恶棍，认为战争是一个可供选择的政策时，那么自由人又有什么其他的办法呢，他们对付这一伙人，只好象在莱特湾对付日本人那样，象一九四O 年在英格兰上空对付阿道夫。希特勒那样：必须使出威慑一切的力量，必须具有准备使用这种力量的自我牺牲的英勇精神。 如果我们不能指望有一个“和平的君王”到来，那我们就只能指望多数人，甚至是最狂妄、最愚蠢的马克思主义者，甚至是最疯狂的民族主义者和革命论者，会从心底里爱他们的孩子，不情愿眼看着他们被活活烧死。肯定没有一个政客会那样愚蠢，甚至要发动一次莱特湾的核战争。现在看来，未来将取决于这样一个可怕的设想：要不就是我们结束了战争，要不就是战争结束了我们。