Chapter 31 Chapter 24 Towards War, 1929-1939 (Part 1)

The late 1920s were years of prosperity, stability, and reconciliation; the 1930s were a decade of depression, crisis, and war. Reconciliation in the 1920s was based on the French alliance system in Europe and on the Washington Conference agreements in the Far East, both aimed at maintaining the status quo in both regions.This goal was achieved in the 1920s, but in the following decade everything was suddenly and decisively reversed.The new leaders of Germany and Japan were determined to revise the territorial peace treaties of World War I, and had the means and determination to do so.Their massive rearmament plans and spectacular acts of aggression drastically changed the balance of power.A weaker Italy was no longer the only revisionist state trying in vain to challenge the status quo; the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire also added strength to the revisionist movement, leading to a whole new configuration of forces, due to the fact that Great Britain, France and their Allies in continental Europe insisted on maintaining the status quo, Germany, Italy, and Japan worked hard to change the status quo, and the Soviet Union, which became stronger because of the Five-Year Plan, played an increasingly important role. Interactions explain the recurring crises of the 1930s and the eventual outbreak of World War II.

The first major act of aggression was made by Japan, as it pursued its long-held ambition to acquire continental territory.To take advantage of what appeared to be an unmissable opportunity, the Japanese had earlier entered World War I quickly.They took over German islands in the Pacific and privileges on the Shantung peninsula without much difficulty.However, their full ambition was expressed in the "Twenty-One" presented to China in January 1915.These terms, if realized, would transform China into a Japanese protectorate.The presence of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Siberia after the withdrawal of British and American troops in 1920 was another manifestation of its continental ambitions.

These wishes of the Japanese are largely unfulfilled. The "21" was successfully resisted, in part due to a warning from US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan that the US would not recognize any breach of China's territorial integrity or violation of "Open Door" Treaty of Principles.At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan secured the former German islands, but only as a third-level trusteeship rather than an authentic territory.President Wilson desperately opposed Japanese claims to the undisputed Chinese territory of Shantung.As a compromise, Japan was allowed to occupy the peninsula "temporarily", but Japan stepped back and admitted that its "policy" was to return the territory to China at a certain date, "retaining only the economic privileges 'always' granted to Germany".

At the Washington Conference on Limiting Naval Armaments, Japan formally abandoned any territorial ambitions it might still have.The nine countries at the meeting signed the "Nine-Power Pact" (February 6, 1922), guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China and reaffirming the "open door" principle.At this meeting, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan also signed the Four Powers Treaty (December 13, 1921); by which they agreed to respect each other's rights in the Pacific "island territories," and by Negotiate to resolve all future disputes.Furthermore, after active mediation by the United States, Japan agreed to return Shandong to China and withdraw troops from Siberia; both promises were fulfilled in 1922.

Having ended — at least temporarily — its foreign adventures, Japan now turned its attention to domestic issues: the aftermath of the 1923 earthquake and the tumultuous vote.Earthquake devastated three-quarters of Tokyo, causing 160,000 fatalities and $2 billion in property damage; voting issues caused riots and political unrest until universal male suffrage was accepted in 1925, moving voters from 300 Ten thousand people increased to 14 million people. The most serious are economic problems, especially those of the poor peasants.Japan, like the United States, prospered greatly during World War I by providing munitions and merchant shipping. Between 1914 and 1920, the value of foreign trade nearly quadrupled, from $1.2 billion to $4.3 billion.This prosperity was poorly distributed, though, because economic power was concentrated like never before in the hands of so-called Zaibatsu (Zai means rich man, batSS means group). "zaibatsu" is the general term for the four family-centered conglomerates (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda); these four conglomerates controlled three-quarters of all corporate capital in Japan by World War II , owns one-third of all deposits in Japanese private banks, three-quarters of all trust deposits and one-fifth of all life insurance policies.Farmers, who made up half the population, were impoverished by high land rents and heavy debts.Only 7 percent of them own five acres or more; the average household owns less than three acres.Urban workers suffered from high food prices, low wages, and lack of union freedom.As speculators drove up prices, rice riots broke out in 1918, forcing the government to use the military to restore order.

Lower living standards for workers and farmers meant that the domestic market was severely restricted.As a result, Japanese industry was largely dependent on foreign markets to sell its products; this dependence spelled disaster when the Great Depression hit. Between 1929 and 1931, foreign trade fell by almost 50%.Farmers who had previously supplemented their meager incomes by raising silkworms were severely hurt by the sharp decline in silk exports to a depressed United States.Urban workers are correspondingly suffering from unemployment. Army leaders and other advocates of territorial expansion could now argue convincingly that dependence on foreign markets was at the root of Japan's troubles.Japan should conquer an empire that would make Japan self-sufficient and economically independent of the rest of the world.Military spokesmen had been preaching this doctrine for the past few years, but the devastation of the Great Depression now provided them with a responsive audience, as Hitler had in Germany. In 1927, Japanese Prime Minister General Tanaka wrote in a proposal to the Emperor: Britain can get raw materials from India and Australia, and the United States can get resources from Canada and South America. "But in Japan, food supplies and raw materials are dwindling compared to the population. If we only hope to develop trade, we will eventually be defeated. ... In the end, we will get nothing. ... Jinghao policy consists in taking active measures to obtain The rights and privileges of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia.  …”

Japanese expansionists were not only motivated by economic reasons, but were also disturbed by the growing power of the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek's increasing success in unifying China.Moreover, they were fully aware of unemployment and other problems that were attracting the attention of Western politicians at the time.These careful analytical considerations were reflected in a memorandum submitted by General Honjo to the Minister of War in the summer of 1931, just six months before the Japanese army invaded Manchuria: It was no accident that both Tanaka and Honjo listed Manchuria as the first target of their expansionist plans.The province in the northeastern corner of China has two advantages: loose ties to the central government in Nanking and rich natural resources, including iron, coal and vast, fertile plains.In addition, Japan had acquired certain privileges in Manchuria through treaties negotiated in the past; these privileges could be used to justify its aggressive actions.When the Japanese military decided in the fall of 1931 that the time was right for an invasion, they did exactly that.

On the night of September 18, 1931, a bomb damaged a small section of the Japanese-controlled Nanman Railway leading to the northern part of Shenyang.Since a southbound train passed the line without difficulty a few minutes later, the Japanese refused to allow journalists to go to the "accident" - which the Japanese then prudently called the bombing - for the next five days. — Live interviews, so most people at the time thought this whole thing was a fabrication.It is only now clear that this happened, as Baron Kijuro Kijuro testified in June 1946 at the International War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo.The baron, who was foreign secretary in 1931, admitted that officers at the time had planned the incident, which he tried unsuccessfully to stop.His testimony is substantiated by the speed and precision with which the Japanese troops stationed on the Kanto peninsula, known at the time as the "Kwantung Army," moved into action immediately.The Kwantung Army captured Shenyang and Changchun within 24 hours without declaring war, and then fanned out in all directions. The occupation of Harbin in late January 1932 meant the end of all forms of organized resistance in Manchuria. In March 1932, the victors renamed their territory "Manchukuo".Needing a puppet emperor, they pulled out the abdicated Emperor Boyi, a survivor of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, and formally appointed him regent.

At that time, the Chinese government sought help from the League of Nations and the United States in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Paris ("Kellogg-Briand Treaty").The result is only repeated discussions without actual assistance.Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson expressed "heartfelt sympathy" but declined to cite the Paris Convention.The Council of the League of Nations met three times to discuss the situation in Manchuria, on September 19, October 13, and November 16;Many in Geneva and Washington remained convinced that the Japanese cabinet could restrain the military and end the crisis. On 21 November, the Japanese delegation accepted the original Chinese proposal for an impartial commission of inquiry, but members of the committee were not selected until 14 January 1932, and they did not actually arrive in Shenyang until 21 April ; At this time, Manchuria has become Manchuria.

On January 7, 1932, the U.S. government announced the so-called "Stimson Doctrine", which stipulated that any treaty that would damage China's independence and territorial integrity and violate the "Open Door" policy, and any The United States does not recognize the treaty.This provision had little practical effect, as the Japanese military responded only to superior power, and no country at the time was strong enough to stand up to Japan in the Far East.In addition, all Western governments are distracted by pressing domestic problems.President Hoover, for example, faced two major problems: the national elections and the Great Depression; the Great Depression was at its worst.Therefore, it is completely understandable that he wants to "get rid of" international disputes and devote all his energy to solving domestic problems.

During this period, the League of Nations Inquiry, the Lytton Inquiry, had been collecting evidence in Japan, China and Manchuria under the leadership of its leader, Lord Lytton.Its report, submitted in October 1932, was carefully worded so as not to offend the Japanese.It denied Japanese aggression as a legitimate means of self-defense and condemned New Manchukuo as a Japanese puppet regime.However, it did not order Japan to withdraw its troops.Instead, the report proposed a solution: recognition of Japan's special interests in Manchuria, and the transformation of Manchuria into an autonomous state within Chinese sovereignty but under Japanese jurisdiction. On February 25, 1933, the League of Nations officially adopted the report, and Japan withdrew from the League of Nations the following month. In retrospect, the events in Manchuria are remarkable as the first serious blow to the League of Nations and to the entire diplomatic structure designed to preserve the status quo - the Treaty of Versailles, the agreements of the Washington Conference and the Treaty of Paris .It was not out of the question that Japan's effortless acquisition of large and fertile new territories was to the revisionist leaders of Italy and Germany; events in Manchuria set off a chain of aggressions that culminated in World War II. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria was a brutal challenge to the status quo in the Far East, but even more troubling was Hitler's threat to the status quo in Europe.Until then, the French system of alliances ruled the Continent almost effortlessly.Mussolini had tried to organize opposition blocs, but his pacts with lower revisionist states such as Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania were of little value.Likewise, the USSR was cut off from the outside world by the "blockade" and, in any case, devoted itself only to "building socialism in one country."Only Germany stood aside, a country that had made peace with its wartime enemies under Streismann when it accepted the Treaty of Locarno and joined the League of Nations. In 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, this comforting situation was drastically changed.The Nazi leader had been demanding more living space for the Germans for some time.The following passages from (1924) reflect his basic ideas and aims, which he continued to revisit without significant change in the following years. It is hardly surprising that when the author of these passages became the master of Germany, there were immediate diplomatic repercussions, starting with the revival of the Little Entente, which had been dormant for several years. In February 1933, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania established a standing committee composed of foreign ministers of the three countries to facilitate the coordination and implementation of their foreign policies.Likewise, this spring, French Foreign Minister Louis Bardot toured the Little Entente capitals as well as Warsaw, strengthening France's ties with the Eastern European countries. Even Mussolini, who later formed the "Rome-Berlin Axis" with Hitler, strongly opposed his dictatorial partner at first.With many German minorities in South Tyrol, Mussolini was uncomfortable with the expansionist Nazi regime with the slogan "One Nation, One Reich, One Führer".Therefore, on July 15, 1933, he took the initiative to conclude the "Four Powers Pact" with Britain, France and Germany.The convention reaffirmed that the signatories must uphold the "League of Nations Treaty", "Locarno Treaty" and "Kellogg-Briand Treaty", and no changes should be made to the "Versailles Peace Treaty" without the consent of the four countries.This approach proved futile, as Hitler repeatedly broke these promises—even ignoring the countries he signed with. In October 1933, he announced Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.While he did not immediately reveal his rearmament plan, its existence—if not its pace and scale—is widely known. These developments led to another regional grouping of Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, which had considerable German minorities. On August 9, 1934, the four countries signed the "Balkan Convention", which stipulated that the four countries should cooperate with each other and jointly maintain the status quo in Southeast Europe. Even more noteworthy than the composition of the Balkan Entente was the radical change in Soviet foreign policy at this time.Traditionally, Soviet leaders viewed the League of Nations as a coalition of predatory imperialist powers.However, when the American journalist Walter Duranty asked in December 1933 whether the Soviet Union had always maintained a negative attitude towards the League of Nations, Stalin replied: This passage reflects that the Soviet government was extremely worried about the emergence of Hitler.Because of this fear, the Soviets now viewed the League of Nations as a possible tool for organizing a common resistance against pre-emptive Nazi aggression.This new attitude was encouraged by French Foreign Minister Louis Bardot.Bardus was a conservative on domestic issues, and on foreign affairs his simple, consistent goal was to build a coalition strong enough to dissuade Hitler from expansionist adventures.In addition to consolidating relations between France, the Little Entente and Poland, Bardu was now trying to bring the Soviet Union into the status quo bloc.It was largely because of his efforts that the League of Nations invited the Soviet Union to join its ranks, which the Soviet Union accepted on September 19, 1934. The following month, an assassin shot Baldu and King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles.This was a turning point in the history of European diplomacy, as Bardu's successors pursued a more erroneous and contradictory policy towards Germany.This was especially true of Pierre Laval, whose intrigues had Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu yelling: "Laval is a pig." de Laval and Mussolini, in which they agreed to fight together if Hitler took action; they also settled various disputes over their African possessions.France ceded to Italy some inhospitable areas bordering the Italian colonies of Libya and Eritrea, and Mussolini relinquished his hold on Tunisia, home to many Italian residents.However, the verbal agreement on Ethiopia led to considerable controversy: Mussolini claimed that he had been promised complete freedom of movement in the country, while Laval insisted that the agreement was limited to economic matters.Anthony Eden concluded: "The true content of this verbal agreement will never be known. . . . These two master sophists . . . will continue to argue after the downfall of Laval. . . My own opinion is that Laval's ambiguity at the time gave Mussolini the opportunity to take advantage of his ambiguity." Undoubtedly, this "leader" got the worst written agreement and the best Oral promise. Two months later, on the double day of March 1935, Germany officially abandoned the terms of the "Versailles Peace Treaty" on the disarmament of Germany, proposed conscription again, and announced that the German army would increase to 36 divisions.Britain, France, and Italy responded at the Stresa Conference on April 11, when they agreed to act together against the German threat.This "Front Stresa" proved to be as useless as the Quadruple Pact of two years earlier.The signatories soon began to go their own way: Italy was busy preparing to invade Ethiopia; Britain signed a separate naval agreement with Germany on June 18, allowing Germany to build a navy equivalent to 35% of British naval strength; France concluded a five-year alliance treaty with the Soviet Union on May 8. The two sides agreed that if one side encountered an unprovoked attack, the other would provide assistance.Czechoslovakia signed a similar treaty with the Soviet Union on 16 May, although Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia depended on France, which was also obliged to provide assistance under the 1924 alliance treaty. In short, spurred by Hitler's rise to power, within two years several new diplomatic blocs emerged aimed at preventing any aggression by the "Führer" - the Balkan Entente, the revived Lesser Entente, the Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Blocs.However, there are also serious differences in these diplomatic blocs. For example, the "British-German Naval Agreement" aroused dissatisfaction in Paris, and the "German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact" signed in January 1934 was also not accepted by Paris. Appreciatively, the elusive Laval did not trust his Soviet allies at all, preferring to make separate deals on his own.With the eruption of the Ethiopian crisis, these divisions became the ever-widening rifts that shattered the League of Nations and the entire postwar diplomatic structure. On October 3, 1935, Mussolini's legions invaded the independent African kingdom of Ethiopia.There are several factors that contributed to this naked aggression, one factor was that the fascists wanted to expand their territory for their own sake.Mussolini declared: "The development of the empire is the main expression of vitality, and vice versa is the expression of decline." The Italian army of 1,000 was defeated at the hands of the tribesmen - and it was strengthened.The effects of the Great Depression also left their mark, as unemployment in Italy rose from 110,000 in 1926 to 730,000 in 1931 to over a million in 1933, leading to such a The usual theoretical explanation was the assertion that colonial expansion was necessary to relieve domestic economic pressures.The Italians were particularly keen on this, since Britain and France had acquired all the good possessions in Africa, leaving the Italians only the sandy wastelands of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland. At that time, an Italian engineer expressed his determination to expand, and he complained that he could not get gold in Eritrea. "But in Abyssinia," he added, "there's platinum and platinum, and you can find it for a small price. But it's all buried in the ground. People do nothing but wander in the sun. Do neither. When you really observe this, if you still think that one people can embargo untold wealth out of sheer laziness, while other peoples must struggle with the forces of nature on barren land It would be immoral to fight.” Mussolini immediately decided to take action after making up his mind, because he believed that the diplomatic situation at that time was very favorable to him.He assumed that Laval had given him the green light, and assumed that opposition from other regions would not be strong enough to stop him—an assumption that proved entirely justified. The Italian pretext for aggression was reminiscent of what the Japanese had created in Manchuria. On December 5, 1934, Ethiopian troops clashed with Italian troops in Warwar, near the border between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia.Emperor Haile Selassie proposed that the question of whether Varvar was on Italian or Ethiopian territory be referred to a commission of arbitration.Mussolini rejected the offer and instead made demands while publicly preparing for the invasion. On September 11, 1935, Sir Samuel Hall, the British Foreign Secretary, delivered a famous speech at the General Assembly of the League of Nations. In his speech, he assured that Britain would support actions against aggression: "In accordance with the obligations clearly stipulated by the League of Nations, for the sake of Together to preserve the whole of the Covenant, and above all to stand firmly together against all unprovoked aggression, the League of Nations will stand on the side against aggression, and our country will stand on the side against aggression.  …” As one delegate put it.The speech was "one of the most exciting pages in the history of the League of Nations".However, Hall seems to have been focusing on the British voters who are about to go to the polls, because his subsequent behavior is not to support but to undermine the "common resistance to unwarranted aggression". More than a week after the Italians began their aggression, the Council of the League of Nations declared Italy the aggressor, and the General Assembly of the League of Nations voted in favor of economic sanctions against Italy under Article XVI of the Covenant.These sanctions came into force on November 18, 1935, and they included a ban on sending arms, loans, and raw materials to Italy, but excluded the main raw materials—oil, coal, iron, and steel—to name a few.Despite such limitations, these sanctions were an important first step in stopping Italy's advance.Moreover, world public opinion also overwhelmingly opposed Mussolini's aggression.The Ethiopians resisted stubbornly, but the Italians' initial difficulty in advancing was not due to the combat effectiveness of their opponents but to the almost total lack of roads. At this point, the cunning Laval abused the small opportunity to stop the Italian advance. In early December 1935, he persuaded Hall to accept a plan under which Italy would gain about half of Ethiopia outright and would control the remaining half as an "area of ​​economic expansion and settlement".Both negotiators have agreed to keep the plan secret until it is presented to Italy, Ethiopia and the League of Nations.However, anticipating trouble in England for the plan, Laval agreed to bring it to the attention of the French press.To his surprise, news of the secret agreement aroused great outrage in London and Paris.Hall was forced to resign and was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Anthony Eden.The following month, Laval also had to resign after being hammered by the House of Representatives. This situation looked for a while as a great victory for those who supported the League of Nations against aggression, but the fundamental dispute still remained, that is, whether to make economic sanctions effective by embargoing major raw materials, especially oil.Eden was in favor of doing so, but the new French foreign minister, Pierre Frandin, was deliberately delaying it."Frondin's attitude is indistinguishable from Laval's, it's just more subtly and more consistent," Wenden said. Ferndin's main argument was that if oil sanctions were voted, Mussolini would Withdrew from the country; he insisted that another solution should be sought.Since the British cabinet failed to rally behind Eden, Ferendin was able to go his own way and effective sanctions were never implemented.The significance of this decision is clear from the following passage, revealed by Hitler's interpreter, Dr. Paul Schmidt: With Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, any remaining hope of effective sanctions was dashed.The profound effect of the occupation of the Rhineland (see next section) was that it made the British and French governments more vulnerable to the German threat and more determined to appease Mussolini in order to get him on their side, And stay within the League of Nations.Consequently, the Council of the League of Nations voted on April 20, 1936, to continue economic sanctions, excluding oil, thereby bringing about the demise of the Ethiopian army, which at this time was fighting the Italians almost solely by valor. Mussolini was determined to rule out any possibility of a second Adova fiasco, and he prepared an army of 250,000 men, which, with reinforcements and labor from Africa, totaled 400,000.This army is equipped with formidable tanks, motorized units and aircraft.By comparison, the Ethiopian army has fewer than 300,000 men, and nearly all of them are less equipped than Italian non-combatants.Equally as serious as the lack of tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery is the astonishingly low level of Ethiopia's leadership.The Moroccan victories had proved effective guerrilla tactics against well-armed European armies, but the Ethiopian tribal chiefs, with their self-destructive arrogance and ignorance, despised guerrilla warfare as worthless and demeaning.Instead, they attempted positional warfare and were met with relentless shelling, bombing, and even mustard gas spraying. Marshal Badoglio swaggered into Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936, after a seven-month campaign.On the same day, Mussolini proclaimed "the peace of Rome, embodied in the simple, unalterable, unambiguous phrase 'Ethiopia is Italian'".Four days later, the King of Italy accepted the title of "Emperor of Ethiopia".Thus, after sacrificing 3,000 people and losing $1 billion, Mussolini won an empire with 350,000 square miles of land, 10 million people, and abundant natural resources. The significance of events in Ethiopia, as far as Europe and the rest of the world are concerned, is that it weakened the League of Nations.Many small states such as Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia loyally supported the League of Nations during the crisis, imposing economic sanctions on Italy, but the only reward they got was to suffer severe economic losses and to punish themselves by the victorious "leader".The obvious lesson is that collective security is a trap and deceit if the major Western powers are weak and timid.Henceforth, the small nations turned their backs on the League of Nations and pursued a policy of scattering and fleeing.Ironically, the sacrifice of the League of Nations did not bring Italy to the side of the Western powers against Germany, which had been the biggest goal of those countries that insisted on placating Mussolini.Soothing had the exact opposite effect; Mussolini and Hitler were impressed by their astonishing victories in Ethiopia and the Rhineland, and saw the great possibilities of their coordinated aggression.Therefore, the final result was not the isolation of Nazi Germany, but the formation of the "Rome-Berlin Axis". Early in the Ethiopian crisis, Hitler adopted a wait-and-see strategy.If Mussolini lost, Hitler would have one less Central European adversary. If he won, the collective security system would be undermined, and Hitler's "living space" program would be strengthened accordingly. On March 7, 1936, Hitler ended this passive policy dramatically, sending an army of 35,000 troops into the Rhineland. The "Versailles Peace Treaty" has stipulated that Germany shall not have fortifications or troops on the left bank of the Rhine, nor on the 50-kilometer zone on the right bank.Hitler's violation of this provision was a most strategic move: the French alliance system was based on the easy access of French troops to Central Europe; No longer easy access to Central Europe.France was cut off from its allies, while Germany's power grew enormously because its lifeline was no longer vulnerable to the demilitarized Rhineland.In short, Hitler's sudden action on the Rhineland meant that the military and diplomatic balance of power in Europe was completely broken. France was unable to respond adequately to this major challenge, as the country was preparing for general elections and was governed by an interim cabinet.Chancellor Saro and Foreign Minister Frandin wanted to stop Hitler by mobilizing troops and issuing ultimatums.Had this plan been carried out, it would have worked, because it is now known that Hitler decided to act on the Rhineland against the advice of almost all his generals.The German army was not ready for a major war, and all but two German military chiefs opposed the reoccupation of the Rhineland, which they naturally believed would lead to a conflict with France.Therefore, Hitler ordered that if France moved its troops and sent its troops across the border, his divisions should voluntarily withdraw without firing a shot.Hitler, like Mussolini, was bluffing and intimidating, and both were playing tricks. Salo and Flandin were dissuaded from taking action, partly because their military advisers objected to any action directly related to the risk of war, but also because the British government balked as did the previous French government during the Ethiopian crisis .When Frandin consulted with British Prime Minister Baldwin, the latter refused to have anything to do with the proposal to send French troops to the Rhineland.Baldwin said: "You may be right, but as long as there is a 1% chance that war will break out because of your police actions, I have no right to involve the United Kingdom. ... The United Kingdom is not in a state of war right now." The French government, being itself divided, was unable to act decisively without British support, and it was because of this that Hitler achieved a major victory without encountering any resistance.One consequence of this victory was the beginning of the end of the French league system.Not only did the "Siegfeld Line" cut off France from Central and Eastern Europe, but at the same time, Germany also launched an economic offensive against Southeastern Europe, making this region effectively an economic dependency.By 1936, Germany received 51 percent of all exports from Turkey, 48 percent from Bulgaria, 36 percent from Greece, 24 percent from Yugoslavia, and 23 percent from Hungary.Such close economic ties necessarily had political consequences, not least because some of the dictatorships emerging in southeastern Europe at this time were ideologically more sympathetic to the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy than to Western democracies.Undoubtedly, the foreign policy of General Metax, King Carol, and Prince Paul was radically different from that of Venizelos, Titulescu, and King Alexander. The sudden action on the Rhineland also had the effect of reconciling the previously hostile "Führer" and "Leader".Hitler deflected the attention of the League of Nations when oil sanctions were still a possibility, and Mussolini was grateful for that.In a short time, the two dictators formed an effective partnership that quickly disrupted the existing diplomatic structures. Under the Austro-German Pact of July 1936, Hitler promised to respect Austria's territorial integrity, thereby removing a major source of discord between Rome and Berlin.A week later, civil war broke out in Spain, a tragic event (see next section) that dragged on for three years, during which time Hitler and Mussolini, acting together, contributed to the demise of the Spanish Republic. On October 24, 1936, the "Rome-Berlin Axis" was officially formed; Italy and Germany agreed not only on specific issues such as Germany's recognition of Italian Ethiopia in return for certain economic concessions, but also on comprehensive cooperation A consensus was reached.second month.Japan joined this axis by signing anti-Comintern pacts with Germany and then with Italy. Thus, by the end of 1936, the diplomatic balance was completely different from the situation when Hitler came to power.Italy and Germany were now in effective partnership.France has lost its former hegemony and has fallen into relative isolation.Its old allies in central Europe were fading away, and its new alliance with the Soviet Union remained largely on paper.The French government mistrusted the Soviet regime so much that it refused to sign the military agreements necessary to make their alliance fully effective.同样，法国和英国的关系也不十分密切，彼此之间互不信任。由于满洲和埃塞俄比亚事件使维护现状集团陷入混乱，使国际联盟遭到严重削弱，“罗马-柏林轴心”能在以后3年中掌握主动权，在实际未遇抵抗的情况下取得一个又一个胜利。