Chapter 93 Chapter 16 The Fall of Socialism 5

5 The evolution that took place between 1989 and 1990 can actually be seen as an Eastern European revolution.This view seems quite reasonable, not to mention that the time is the 200th anniversary of 1789.As far as these events completely overthrew the regime in power, they did have a revolutionary nature to speak of.However, the word revolution, although appropriate, is inevitably somewhat misleading here.Because in fact, none of these Eastern European regimes were "overthrown" by the people.With the exception of Poland, there is no single internal force, either organized or ad hoc, that poses a serious threat to the authorities.What's more, just because Poland has such a strong political opposition force, it is more and more guaranteed that its communist system will not collapse overnight.Poland, by contrast, replaced the old system through a process of constantly negotiated reforms, similar to Spain's transition to democracy following the death of General Franco in 1975.At that time, the biggest threat facing the Eastern European satellite countries could only come from Moscow, but the latter has made it clear that it will never interfere with their affairs like it did in 1956 and 1968—perhaps because of the Cold War It has come to an end, and their strategic position to the Soviet Union is no longer so important.If these countries are going to survive, in Moscow's view, they had better hurry and follow the liberalizing, flexible reforms of the Polish and Hungarian communist parties.Likewise, Moscow will not go to Berlin or Prague and help them force diehards into submission.All in all, they are all on their own now.

The Soviet Union let go of its hands, which increasingly led to the bankruptcy of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.They are still there simply because over the years they have created a vacuum around themselves.Apart from the emigration of dissidents (if possible), or some insignificant groups of intellectuals (the number is very small), under the current situation, there is no second force to replace the power of the Communist government. , Many Eastern European people can only accept everything in front of them, because they have no second choice.But anyone who is energetic, talented, and ambitious can only work within the system, because all positions that require these abilities, or even any way for them to openly display their talents, exist only within the system, or they are supported by the system. Allowed to proceed.Even non-political activities like pole vaulting or skills like chess.This principle even extends to the registered opposition groups, which are mainly a group of literati (the Communist Party’s system is gradually declining, so these forces are allowed to exist openly).But these dissident writers, who had never chosen to emigrate, suffered after the fall of Communism and found themselves listed as accomplices of the old regime.No wonder most people prefer to live in peace—although now that authority is gone and voices of discontent are no longer severely punished—a way of living that includes acts of continued support for the system, such as ceremonial voting or procession.But deep down, only innocent elementary school students still believe in this system.After the fall of the old regime, people were angry and criticized. One of the reasons is that:

In those window-dressing elections, most people vote primarily to avoid unpleasant consequences—though not serious ones.They participate in mandatory parades... because the police can easily recruit informers.With only a small favor and a little pressure, the latter agreed to obey (Kolakowski, 1992, pp. 55-56). But despite superficial obedience, few people sincerely believe in this system, and no one remains loyal to it, even those in power.But when the crowd finally stopped being passive and began to shout their dissatisfaction, the authorities were obviously taken aback—this moment of astonishment has been captured on video forever.That is to say, in December 1989, Romanian President Ceausescu faced the crowd all over the floor, but he didn’t want the crowd to boo instead of applause—but what surprised the leaders of the Communist Party was not the dissatisfaction of the people. Rather, they actually put it into action.Therefore, at the moment when public opinion was difficult to disobey, no Eastern European government ordered the shooting, and all regimes automatically and quietly surrendered their power.The only exception was Romania, and even there the resistance before its collapse was short-lived.In fact, they may no longer be able to regain power, and none have tried.Not a single one of the extreme communists in various places stood up for their beliefs—even for the few places where the achievements of the Communist Party in the past 40 years were not mediocre—and died in the trenches.For if they rise up to fight, what are they defending?Is it the fact that they have fallen far behind their western neighbors, and now they have fallen all the way, proving to be completely hopeless, an economy that cannot be cured even by serious reforms and smart prescriptions?Or is it the system that once supported the struggle of its Communist Party predecessors in the past, but has lost its reason for existence now, that is, the so-called "socialism is superior to capitalism and is destined to replace it"?Now, who still believes in this Arabian Nights? — Although going back to the 1940s or even the 1950s, this theory does not seem unfeasible.Nowadays, even the communist countries are no longer united, and sometimes even go to war with each other (such as the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979), so what "communist camp" can we talk about?The only remaining hope of the old ideal is the fact that the country of the October Revolution - the Soviet Union - remains one of the two global superpowers.Perhaps except for China, all other communist governments, as well as many communist factions, regimes and movements in the third world, everyone knows very well that thanks to the support of this big brother, they can compete with the economic and strategic hegemony of the opposing camp. Restore a little balance.But today's Soviet Union can no longer afford it, and is obviously determined to unload this political and military burden.Even countries that do not depend on Moscow for their livelihoods, such as Yugoslavia and Albania, suddenly feel a sense of loss.Only then did I realize how great the loss was when the Soviet Union left.

In any case, in Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, the communists, who used to be supported by old beliefs, are now a thing of the past. In 1989, few people under the age of 60 had any experience combining communism and patriotism - that is, the Second World War and the underground resistance movement - and no one under the age of 50 , even fewer people have first-hand personal memories of that era.Therefore, the legal status of those in power depends entirely on official rhetoric and anecdotes told by the older generation.A generation beyond, and even the party members themselves, may not be the Communist Party in the old sense; Communist Party rule.When the time changes—if the situation permits—they will immediately switch to the sect and put on different outfits without saying a word.Simply put, the people in charge of the Soviet satellite regime have long since lost faith in their own system - perhaps never had.If the system works, they keep running it.When it became clear that even Big Brother Soviet Union himself cut the cables and let them drift away, reformist regimes tried to seek a peaceful transfer (as in Poland and Hungary).The hardliners persisted (as in Czechoslovakia and East Germany) until the tide had passed and it became clear that the people were no longer obedient, before surrendering - despite the fact that they could still command the military and police.But no matter what the situation is, once the original communist regime realized that it was doomed, it would quietly step down on its own.This move is actually giving Western propagandists a slap in the face.Because the latter has long argued that the "totalitarian regime" is required to automatically and quietly hand over power, which is tantamount to seeking fish.

For a short time, it was replaced by a group of men and women who represented different voices (again, very few women), or those who had organized, or even successfully called the masses to demonstrate and signal the peaceful abdication of the old regime.Except for Poland, which has churches and trade unions as the cornerstone of its opposition, the above-mentioned people are mostly some very courageous intellectuals, and they are stage leaders-and just as in the revolution of 1848 (the author just recalls this precedent), Most of them belonged to people in the academic world or literati—for a while, they found that they suddenly became the leaders of the people of a country, so the Hungarian philosophers who belonged to different political views, and the scholars of medieval history in Poland were all included in the consideration of candidates for the president or prime minister .In Czechoslovakia, even a playwright, Vaclav Havel, actually became president, surrounded by a group of strange advisers, ranging from scandal-ridden American rock musicians to members of the Habsburg noble family— —Prince Schwarzenberg.Discussions about "civil society" (Civil society) have set off a wave like a tsunami in various places-that is, a large combination of citizen voluntary groups or private activities will replace the role of the authoritative government in the past.In addition, everyone is talking about how to return to the original revolutionary principles and restore its original appearance.Ah, as in 1848, this moment of freedom and truth did not last long.The new atmosphere is fleeting.The politics of nations, and their governing offices, soon returned to the hands of those who would normally have occupied them, and the "fronts" or so-called "citizens' movements" which arose on a special mission, were as fleeting as they were born. Thank you suddenly.

This situation also appeared in the Soviet Union.The overthrow of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union progressed slowly until August 1991. The failure of the "reconstruction" policy, and consequent popular opposition to Gorbachev, is becoming more apparent every day.However, the West has never had a clear understanding of the domestic phenomenon in the Soviet Union, and has always maintained a very high (in fact, it should) evaluation of Gorbachev.All kinds of changes forced the Soviet leader to take the next best thing, conspired behind the scenes, and from time to time changed and selected his comrades-in-arms among the different political groups and power groups that emerged after the Soviet Union’s politics became parliamentary. He has lost the trust of the reformists who fought alongside him earlier (the latter has become a force that plays a decisive role in national affairs under his single-handed support), and the party group whose power has been broken by him is equally suspicious of him Overgrown.Gorbachev, in the past and future history, is a tragic figure, a Communist version of the "Liberator Tsar" (Tsar-Liberator) like "Alexander II" (1855-1881) ).He destroyed the very things he was trying to reform, and in the end, he himself was destroyed in the process.

Gorbachev, who is charming, sincere, and sincerely moved by the ideal of communism, but has seen it fail since the rise of Stalin, is contradictory to say, but in fact he is a strongly colored organizer who is in line with his own creation. Democracy is out of place.His style of sitting in committees and planning seminars is too strong to take decisive action; he is too far away from the Russian experience of urban and industrial character-he has never had such management experience-and cannot be as profound as the old Communist Party chiefs. Understand the reality of the grassroots masses.The problem with Gorbachev is not entirely that he lacks an effective economic reform strategy (since he stepped down, no one has), but that he is too far away from the daily experience of the people of his country.

His deficiencies in this regard can be seen at a glance when compared with another Communist leader of the same generation.Nazarbayev, who is also in his 50s, took over the Republic of Kazakhstan in Asia in 1984 during this wave of reforms.But he, like many other politicians in the Soviet Union (but unlike Gorbachev, and indeed, unlike any politician in a non-socialist country), started at the factory floor and worked his way up to a full-fledged public career. .He moved from party to government work, became president of his republic, and pushed through necessary reforms, including localization and marketization.He also survived the two turmoil of Gorbachev's resignation and the disintegration of the Soviet Communist Party - but he did not welcome these two developments.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he also remained one of the most influential figures in the empty and pale "Community of Independent States".Nazarbayev has always been a practical faction. He spared no effort to organize and promote various reform policies that can improve people's lives.He has also been careful to ensure that market reforms do not create social chaos.Market functioning is necessary, but uncontrolled price increases are absolutely not.His favored strategies are bilateral deals with other Soviet (or ex-Soviet) republics - he favors the formation of a "Central Asian Soviet" common market - and starting businesses with foreign capital.He also did not object to the radicals' economic ideas, because he not only summoned a group of scholars of this faction from Russia, but even went to non-Communist countries to invite a think tank who created the Korean economic miracle.Various measures show that he has a good understanding of the truly successful capitalist economic paradigm after World War II.The way to survive, and even the way to success, is probably not so much in the kindness of motives, but in the firm actions of realism.

The state of the Soviet Union in its final years resembled a slow-motion catastrophe. The disintegration of the European satellite regimes in 1989, coupled with the fact that Moscow reluctantly accepted the reunification of Germany, proved that the Soviet Union was no longer a major international power, let alone its superhegemonic world status. In the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the Soviet Union remained powerless and unable to play any role, except to re-emphasize its irreparable decline.From an international point of view, the Soviet Union seemed to have experienced a major war and was completely defeated-only there was no such war.However, it still retains its military power and military-industrial complex (militaty-industrial complex) as a former superpower, which instead imposes certain limitations on its political activities.However, the decline of the Soviet Union's international standing, while fueling secessionist claims in some republics with strong nationalist sentiments, notably the Baltic states and Georgia - first tried by Lithuania, which provocatively declared independence in March 1990 - —The final disintegration of the Soviet Union did not come from the pressure of nationalism.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was mainly due to the disintegration of central power, which forced various regions or subordinate units in the territory to take care of themselves and try their best to rescue the messy remaining economy.There are two factors behind the big and small things that happened in the last two years of the Soviet Union: hunger and shortage.Disappointed and discouraged, the reformers (most of whom were the most obvious beneficiaries of the Open Policy—the academics) were forced to go to a prophetic extreme: unless the old system collapsed and everything about it was destroyed, the At a loss.From an economic point of view, it is imperative to completely smash the old system with complete privatization and immediately replace it with a 100% free market, regardless of any cost.And so within weeks or months, an amazing blueprint for moving the program forward quickly emerged.There was even a so-called "500-day plan" at that time.However, these policies are not based on any understanding of the free market and capitalist economy, but visiting scholars and financial experts from the British and American economic circles warmly recommend them.The latter opinion, too, was not based on any knowledge of the realities of the Soviet economy.Both sides argue that the existing system (or, in other words, the system of central command that still exists) is far inferior to an economic system based on private property and private enterprise.They also see that the old system is doomed, even if it is patched up.The above views are quite correct, but they have not dealt with the practical problem, that is, how to transform such a centrally planned command economy into any kind of market-driven economy.Instead, they just make abstract arguments about the benefits of a market economy over a five-year economic period.Once the laws of supply and demand have their way, they claim, shelves will automatically fill up with goods once held back by manufacturers, at affordable prices.But the people of the Soviet Union, who have suffered for a long time, know that this kind of good thing will not happen-after the old system disappeared, this kind of shock-style liberal therapy was also implemented for a short period of time, but the dream did not come true.What's more, all serious observers at the time believed that by the year 2000 AD, the state sector of the Soviet economy would still account for a very large proportion.This kind of mixed economy with parallel public and private systems is simply refuted by followers of Hayek and Friedman.They have no good strategy for manipulating or transforming this economy.

But when the last moment came, it was not an economic crisis but a political storm.Because in the entire existing system of the Soviet Union, starting from the party, planners, scientists, government, military, security agencies, and sports units, it is simply unacceptable to say that the so-called Soviet system is completely divided.As for leaving the three Baltic states, whether any other people so desired, or even imagined such a situation - even after 1989 - we cannot speculate.However, in fact, it is unlikely, because in a referendum in March 1991, after all, 76% of Soviet voters still wanted to maintain the Soviet structure-although we may have reservations about this figure-" In a newer form of federation, composed of sovereign and equal union republics, the right to liberty is guaranteed to all, regardless of nationality or race" (Prauda, ​​25/1/91).The disintegration of the Soviet Union was, of course, not the official policy of any important political figure in the Federation.However, the dissolution of the central power will inevitably strengthen the power of the centrifugal forces, and the split is a foregone conclusion.What's more, Yeltsin was involved in it. As Gorbachev's main star faded, his lucky star went straight to the sky.Now the Union is a shadow, and the republics alone are the real thing. At the end of April, with the support of nine major republics, Gorbachev began negotiating a "Treaty of Union" that was somewhat of a compromise of the 1867 "Austro-Hungarian Compromise" Flavor, its main spirit is to maintain the power of a central federation (and establish a directly elected federal president), in charge of military diplomacy, and coordinate economic matters with countries around the world.The treaty is set to enter into force on August 20. For the old party-government forces, this was another Gorbachev's rhetoric on paper, as doomed to failure as his previous prescriptions, so this faction regards the treaty as the tombstone of the alliance.So just two days before it came into effect, almost all the heavyweights in the Soviet Central Committee included: the Minister of Defense and the Interior, the head of the Soviet National Security Council (KGB), the Vice President and Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and important figures in the party, announced that the President and President The secretary was put out of business (he was placed under house arrest while on vacation), and an Emergency Committee took over state power.It wasn't really a coup d'état - no one was arrested in Moscow, not even a radio station was picked up - but it was a declaration that the real machine of power was now back in charge, order and rule, believed The people will welcome it enthusiastically, or at least accept the facts in silence.And the failure of this move was not because the people rose up for revolution or riots, because the citizens of Moscow remained quiet all the time, and the request to call on everyone to strike together and oppose the coup was ignored.As in so many pages of Soviet history, it was a show in which a small number of actors stomped on the heads of a long-suffering populace. But that's not always the case - just 10 years ago, it only took an order to announce who the real power should be, and major events could be finalized.But on the other hand, even at this time 10 years later, most Soviet people still bowed their heads and obeyed without saying a word.According to a survey, 48% of the Soviet people, and 70% of the party committees (not surprising), supported this "coup" (Di Leo, 1992, pp. 141, 143n).Equally important, many governments abroad believed that the coup d'état would succeed, although they would not admit it.However, the recognition of the power of the old-fashioned party, government and military lies in the comprehensive, universal and automatic approval, rather than counting heads one by one.Yet by 1991 in the Soviet Union, central authority had ceased to exist, and there was no trace of popular obedience.If this was a real coup d'état, it might succeed in most parts of the Soviet Union and win the support of the majority of the people.Moreover, even with internal rifts and instability in the military and security services, it should be possible to muster enough troops to stage a successful mutiny in the capital.But today's situation has changed, and it is no longer enough to declare power symbolically in vain.After all, Gorbachev was right: the policy of "reconstruction" transformed society and thwarted the attempts of the mutineers.However, he also defeated himself. A symbolic coup can be repulsed with a symbolic revolt.For the last thing the masterminds were prepared for, and the last thing they wanted, was civil war.In fact, the intention of their actions coincides with public opinion, that is, to prevent the change that the people are most afraid of, that is, to turn into a conflict.So while the shadowy Union of Soviets moved in step with the masterminds, the less gray Russian Republic - now under Yeltsin, who had just been elected president by a sizable majority - did not go with it .Thousands of people rushed to Yeltsin's headquarters to defend and cheer, while Yeltsin himself made a big show for the global TV audience, deliberately challenging the tank troops stationed at his gate, and the troops were greatly embarrassed.After this confrontation, the mastermind has nothing to do but admit defeat.Yeltsin's political talent and decisive ability are in contrast to Gorbachev's style.At this time, seeing the opportunity, he boldly and safely disbanded the Communist Party, and put the remaining assets of the Soviet Union into the pockets of Russia.A few months later, the Soviet Union officially ended, and Gorbachev himself was pushed into oblivion.The outside world, which was prepared to accept that coup, now naturally accepts this apparently effective Yeltsin coup and sees Russia as the natural heir of the late Soviet Union at the UN and all.What was supposed to be a salvage attempt to salvage the old skeleton of the Soviet Union was completely torn apart more abruptly and more irrevocably than anyone could have imagined. However, none of the economic, national, and social issues have been resolved.In a way, it is worse now than it was before, because the younger brothers of the other republics are starting to fear Big Brother Russia—before that, they didn’t have to worry about the non-nationalist Soviet Union at all.What's more, Russian nationalism is the most useful card in Yeltsin's hands. It can be used to win over the army with the people of Great Russia at its core. Moreover, since there are a large number of ethnic Russian residents living in other republics, Yeltsin also hinted that it is possible to It was necessary to renegotiate the territory, so the pace of complete separation was accelerated: Ukraine immediately declared independence.Suddenly, the vast population (including the native people of Great Russia) who had been treated equally by centralized power now began to worry for the first time that Moscow would bully the small and bully them for its own interests.In fact, this concern also put an end to the semblance of maintaining a union, for the phantom of the "CIS" that followed the Soviet Union soon lost all reality.Even the last remaining Soviet team, the highly successful United team that beat the United States in the 1992 Olympics, was not destined to last.So the collapse of the Soviet Union reversed almost 400 years of Russian history, allowing the country to return to its size and international status before Peter the Great (1672-1752).Since the mid-18th century, Russia has been a great power in the world, whether under the tsars or the Soviet Union.Its disintegration thus created, between Trieste and Vladivostok, an international power vacuum unprecedented in modern world history, with the exception of a brief period during the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920.This vast expanse of land is full of chaos, conflict, and potential upheaval.And this is also a subject to be dealt with and resolved by diplomats and military strategists in the world at the end of this millennium.