Chapter 92 Chapter 16 The Fall of Socialism 4

4 Gorbachev launched his campaign to transform Soviet socialism with two slogans, one was "reconstruction" with parallel political economy; the other was "opening up". It turns out that there are irreconcilable conflicts between reconstruction and opening up.Because the only thing that can make the Soviet system work or transform is the structure inherited from the Stalin era where the party and government united to issue orders.This structure, even going back to the Tsarist era, is a familiar sight in Russian history.Reform comes from above, but at the same time, the structure of the party and the state itself has become the biggest obstacle to reform.This system was created by it, and it also adapts to it. It has a huge vested interest in it. Now it is really difficult for it to find a second way for this system.Of course, this is definitely not the only obstacle in reality; moreover, reformists (not only in Russia) have always liked to blame the "bureaucratic system" for the reason for the cold response of the people of the country.But there is one thing that cannot be denied, that is, for any major reforms, the state apparatus is mostly slow to react, and there is even more hostility hidden in its bones. The purpose of "opening up" is to mobilize support from inside and outside the state apparatus to fight against this resistance force.But in this way, it happened to destroy the only force that could still act.We have also mentioned earlier that the Soviet system and operating methods are basically military in nature, and the democratization of the army cannot improve their efficiency.On the other hand, if this militarized system is no longer needed, careful planning should be done before destroying it, and an alternative literati system should be established first, otherwise the reform will not bring about reconstruction, but will lead to collapse.The Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev is caught in an increasingly deep fault line between "openness" and "reconstruction".

What's worse, in the minds of reformers, "opening up" has far more definite content than "reconstruction".Openness means introducing—or reintroducing—a constitutional democracy built on the rule of law and civil liberties.The meaning behind it is the separation of the party and the government, and will increase the role of the government, returning the party to the state (this is of course completely contrary to the development after the rise of Stalin).This will naturally lead to the end of the one-party dictatorship system, and the leading role played by the party will come to an end.This kind of result obviously also means that the "Soviet system" will be revived at all levels-but this time, it will be composed of representatives born through real elections, and the layers will continue until the "Supreme Soviet" at the top.The latter would be a powerful legislative assembly from which a powerful executive branch would be empowered and controlled.At least, in theory.

In fact, the new constitutional system was finally established.However, the reform system of the new economy hardly took shape during 1987-1988.Because first, the promotion of legalization of private small businesses—that is, the majority form of the “secondary economy”—is not sincere.Second, in principle but decided to let those state enterprises that lose money forever go bankrupt.The gap between the high-profile economic reforms and the reality of a declining economy is only getting wider. This situation is extremely dangerous.Because the reform of constitutionalism is nothing more than replacing one set of existing political mechanisms with another. As for what the new system should do, this question has not been answered.However, it is conceivable that the decision-making process of democratic politics is obviously more cumbersome than the military command system.For most people, there is a new system now. On the one hand, it means that there will be elections every once in a while, and everyone can make a sincere choice according to their own wishes; and between elections, they also have the opportunity to listen to opponents criticizing the government.On the other hand, the criterion on which "reconstruction" is based does not lie in the general principles of the economy, but in its day-to-day performance, and its effectiveness can be easily specified and measured-the criterion of judgment lies entirely in its results.As far as most Soviet people are concerned, the so-called achievements are reflected in their actual income, the price they have to pay for the income, the number and types of goods and services within the range of contact, and the degree of difficulty of obtaining them.Unfortunately, although the economic reformers have clearly defined what they are against and what they want to eliminate, on the other side of the positive side, that is, the road they put forward, the "socialist market economy" - a public-private Or small and large cooperative enterprises, economically viable, independent in operation, and coordinated with the economic society under the overall planning of the "economic decision-making center" - but it is always just a high-profile empty talk.This is in vain an ideal, which means that between the fish and the bear's paw, the reformers want to have both, on the one hand, the benefits of capitalism without losing the advantages of socialism on the other hand.However, no one has the slightest idea of ​​the actual method and how to transition from an economic system dominated by the state to an ideal new system.Equally important, no one knows exactly what to do in an economic system in which public and private institutions must run side by side for the foreseeable future.The extreme free marketism of Thatcher and Reagan’s school attracted young reform intellectuals because it offered not only a powerful medicine, but also promised them that all problems would be solved and healed automatically (the result was It doesn't have this miraculous effect - it should have been expected in advance).

The blueprint closest to the ideals of Gorbachev's reformers is probably the "New Economic Policy" from 1921 to 1928.The model of the year left some vague historical memories.Speaking of it, after all, this policy "has made great achievements, and there has been a renaissance in agriculture, trade, industry, and finance, and it has been maintained for several years after 1921."At the same time, it also "relys on the forces of the market" to restore health to a collapsed economy (Vernikov, 1989, p. 13).What's more, a very similar policy of market liberalization and decentralization has blossomed and borne fruit in China since the Maoist line was halted, with astonishing success. In the 1980s, China's GNP growth was second only to that of South Korea, averaging almost 10% per year (World Bank Atlas, 1990).In contrast, in Russia in the 1920s, the people were poor, with backward technology, and most of them were agricultural; while in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, it was already highly urbanized and industrialized.But the most advanced industrial sector in the country, the military-industrial-scientific conglomerate (including the space program), is dependent on a single customer.If we assume that Russia in the 1980s was the same as it was back then, with 80% of the population still peasants (just like China in the 1980s), the effect of "reconstruction" may be quite different.Because in the psychology of a rural resident, the greatest ambition for wealth in this life is probably just to own a TV-but as early as the 1970s, 70% of the people in the Soviet Union watched an average of one and a half hours of TV every day (Kerblay, pp. 140-141).

However, although China is lagging behind in time, this cannot fully explain the significant contrast in the effects of "reconstruction" between the two countries.As for the fact that the Chinese are still cautious and keep their central order system unchanged, it is not the whole reason for the two differences. How does the cultural tradition of the Far East help the Chinese?Can it generate momentum for economic development no matter what kind of society it is?This question must be left to the historians of the 21st century to explore. Did anyone seriously think in 1985 that six years later the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Communist Party would cease to exist?In fact, all other communist regimes in Europe will also disappear together?Judging from the signs that Western governments were completely unprepared for the defeat of the communist world in 1989-1991, the various predictions they made, such as the imminent collapse of the so-called ideological enemy of the West, are actually just a small modification of the usual public rhetoric.In fact, the real reason for accelerating the approach of the Soviet Union to the cliff is the disintegration of authority caused by "opening up" and the endless damage caused by "reconstruction" to the original mechanism. The level thus decreased further and further.At the same time, Soviet Russia embarked on multi-party electoral politics, and the country finally fell into a stateless economic chaos: for the first time since the advent of the planned economy, Russia did not see a five-year plan (DiLeo, 1992, p 100n).All kinds of factors came together to create a high degree of explosive power, and the weak foundation of the political and economic unity of the Soviet Union was completely destroyed so far.

Because the Soviet Union at this time is rapidly becoming localized structurally, especially during the years when Brezhnev was in power.The reason why its various republics can be united is mainly due to the integration of the party, government and military system and central planning that exist in the entire Soviet Union.In reality, however, the Union of Soviets was a system of "self-governing feudal lords," local chiefs—that is, the party secretary of the republic, the local commanders under him, and the directors of large and small production units that kept the economy running— Only on the point of dependence on the central apparatus of the Moscow party to form a family.The latter has the power to nominate, transfer, dismiss, and elect them, so as to complete Moscow's "well-designed" planned tasks as needed.Within these extremely broad jurisdictions, the heads of state actually have considerable autonomy.In fact, the Soviet economy would not have been able to move at all if it hadn't been for those responsible for the actual business to develop a network of operations and establish sideways relations outside the central government.In the Soviet Union's nominal central planning, the actual method is that local cadres from all over the country help each other through consultation, exchange, and mutual benefit. This system can also be called another "secondary economy."We can also say that as the Soviet Union became an increasingly complex industrialized and urbanized society, those who were responsible for the actual production, distribution, and people's livelihood were clearly more and more alienated from high-ranking political officials and purely party officials. .Because although the latter is their boss, but apart from enriching their own pockets, their duties and functions are not clear. During Brezhnev's time in power, there were many people who engaged in selfishness and fraud among these people, and their demands were endless. People are amazed.People's growing aversion to the phenomenon of corruption by the privileged class has contributed to the original impetus for reform.And Gorbachev's policy of "reconstruction" is also supported by cadres in the economic sector, especially those who serve in military-industrial production units. The economic system can be improved in management.No one knows better than them how bad things have become.What's more, these people don't need the party to continue to interfere. Even if the party's bureaucratic system does not exist, they will still exist.They are the ones who are indispensable, not the Party.As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union collapsed, but they survived, and today play the role of a pressure group in the newly formed Industrial-Scientific Union (NPS, 1990) and its successors.Later, when communism went bankrupt, he gained the possibility of becoming a legal owner of a company that he was originally responsible for managing but had no legal ownership of.

However, although the central command system led by the party is corrupt, although it is inefficient and almost completely insensitive, it is still an economic system based on control.Now that the party's prestige is gone, it is not replaced by constitutional and democratic power, but by a state of bewildered statelessness.In fact, this is exactly what happened at the time.Gorbachev, and his successor Boris Yeltsin, both shifted their power base from the party to the government.As a constitutional president, they accrued more legitimate power to govern themselves, in some cases, than any previous head of the Soviet Union, not even Stalin (Di Leo, 1992, p. 111).But outside of the newly formed Democratic Assembly (or the so-called constitutional public assembly), no one paid the "People's Congress" (People's Congress) and the "Supreme Soviet" the slightest attention at all.In the Soviet Union, no one is in charge, and no one listens to anyone.

So like a damaged huge oil tanker sailing to a reef, the unmanned Soviet Union gradually drifted towards the fate of disintegration.And the crack that will eventually lead to disintegration is already there: on the one hand is the local autonomous power system under the federal system, and on the other is the economic system with autonomous power.The official theory on which the Soviet system relied has always been based on national autonomy, including the 15 union republics and the autonomous regions within each republic, so the gaps in nationalism have long been hidden in the system—but Before 1988, with the exception of the three Baltic countries, there was no thought of "separation".It was not until 1988 that the first nationalist "front" and movement was established under the call for "openness" (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia).Even at this stage, however, the idea of ​​secession was not necessarily directed against the center—even in the Baltic states—mainly against the incompetent Gorbachev faction; or, as in Armenia, It was caused by the confrontation with neighboring Azerbaijan.None of their goals at the time was independence, but by 1989-1990, the voices of nationalism were rapidly trending to extremes.There are three reasons: first, the shock caused by the rush to catch the electoral democracy train; Thirdly, the rift between Gorbachev and his thorn in the side—that is, Yeltsin, who was his defeat, later his rival, and eventually became his successor—has also deepened day by day.

Radical reformers, in order to break through the high fortresses and deep trenches of party organizations at all levels, basically only seek support from the nationalists of the republics, so in the process, they have further consolidated and strengthened the strength of the latter.In Russia itself, the new goal of arguing that Russia's interests come first has also become a powerful weapon for the radicals, playing a major role in their struggle to drive out the party bureaucracy hiding behind the walls of the central authority.This claim that Russia's interests are higher than those of neighboring republics is quite attractive, because the latter not only receive subsidies from the former, but also live more comfortably than Russia itself.The feeling of injustice is getting stronger and stronger in the hearts of the Russian people.Yeltsin, on the other hand, was originally an old party leader from the old society. He was savvy and had a good chance. Create an atmosphere and know how to face the media).For him, the road to the top was seizing power in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), thus leapfrogging the Soviet system run by Gorbachev.Because up to that time there was really not much difference between the Soviet Union and its largest member, the Russian Federation.But Yeltsin single-handedly turned Russia into a republic like everyone else, which in effect sounded the death knell of the Soviet Union and replaced it with Russia under his rule.The actual situation that happened later in 1991 was indeed like this.

Economic disintegration hastened political disintegration; economic disintegration was brought about by political disintegration.With the cessation of the five-year "plan" and the end of the order of the Party Central Committee, the Soviet Union simply did not have a "national" economic system that could function effectively.Instead, every community, every place, every unit, as long as they can do it, is rushing to defend themselves, seek self-sufficiency, or conduct bilateral transactions.For the leaders of the party, government and military in local cities and towns with huge public institutions, this is actually their usual way of survival.Between production units and collective farms, barter has always been relied on, exchanging industrial products for food.Take an impressive incident as an example: Gidaspov, the leader of the Communist Party in Leningrad, resolved the serious food shortage crisis in the city with a phone call.Jedaspov called Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the two sides agreed to exchange the former's shoes and steel for the latter's grain (Yu Boldyrev, 1990).But even this type of deal, arranged by old party leaders, is in fact tantamount to a state-directed distribution system.As a result, "the real effect of the local economic liberalization law seems to be the rise of 'particularism' and self-government, and the return to the original trading behavior of barter" (Di Leo, p. 101) .

A long road of no return, finally in the second half of 1989, just as the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, reached the final hurdle where there was no turning back.At that time, French "revisionist" historians were busy proving that a revolution in that year did not actually exist or had little to do with 20th century politics.But like France in the 18th century, the Soviet political system in the late 20th century disintegrated in the same year after a newly established democratic (or roughly democratic) parliament convened in the summer. In the months between October 1989 and May 1990, economic disintegration became irreversible.At this time, however, the eyes of the world were fixed on another, though related, in fact secondary contingency: the sudden collapse of the Communist satellite regimes in Europe, an evolution that was also completely unforeseen. .From August 1989 to the end of the same year, the communist forces in Europe disintegrated one after another, either being driven out of power or disappearing from then on.Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic joined the ranks; except for Romania, not even a single shot was fired.Immediately afterwards, two non-Soviet communist countries in the Balkan Peninsula, Yugoslavia and Albania, also withdrew from the communist regime.East Germany was soon annexed to West Germany, and Yugoslavia soon fell into a divided civil war.This series of astonishing developments not only frequently appears on television screens in the Western world every day, but is also closely watched by the communist regimes in other continents.These closely watched communist states range from radically reformist China (at least in economic matters) to Cuba, which is hard-nosed for old-style statism (see Chapter 15).Regarding the Soviet authorities' bold style of letting go hastily, jumping into comprehensive opening up and weakening authority, I am afraid that they all have doubts and do not take it seriously.A wave of liberalization and democracy movements has hit China, and the Beijing government has decided - apparently after considerable hesitation and bitter internal disputes - to re-establish its authority in the most definitive of ways.It used what Napoleon, who at one time also sent troops to suppress civil unrest during the French Revolution, called "a shot of smoke."The CCP dispatched troops to disperse the large-scale student demonstrations in the main square of the capital.The Tiananmen incident shocked Western public opinion.However, this move by the CCP authorities has undoubtedly maintained the stability of its national regime and allowed it to continue its successful policy of economic liberalization without having to face immediate political troubles. The successive fall of communist regimes after 1989 was then confined to the Soviet Union and its orbiting satellite regimes (and including Outer Mongolia, which chose the Soviet wing over Chinese dominance between the two wars).The three surviving communist regimes in Asia (China, North Korea, and Vietnam), as well as remote and isolated Cuba, were not directly affected.