Chapter 11 Part II World War II

After the end of the First World War, people in the European military circles had a heated discussion on the issue of tank combat.The general views formed at that time were: 1. Tanks are a tactical breakthrough weapon that can only be used within the tactical range; 2. Tanks are auxiliary tools for infantry and cavalry attacks, not independent arms; 3. Tanks are used The principle is to disperse to various infantry and cavalry units.Obviously, this conclusion did not exceed the scope of the actual use of tanks in World War I, so it was later called "traditional tank concept". However, a very small number of far-sighted soldiers, such as Fuller, Liddell Hart, Etienne, Martel, de Gaulle, etc., discovered that tanks have potential strategic value and will have a revolutionary impact on the future of warfare. .They pointed out that the future is an era of mechanized warfare, and their views include three main contents: 1. Tanks are the most important and important independent army arms in the future; 2. Tanks should be used in a concentrated manner, with it as the core plus Other motorized arms form mechanized units, which can be used in strategic operations; 3. The cooperation of mechanized units assault and tactical air force will be the main form of land warfare in the future.Their views sparked a lively discussion in the military circles of various European countries.

In Britain, the hometown of tanks, Fuller, the founder of the first British tank unit and a military genius, came to a conclusion after carefully studying several important details of the Battle of Amiens: the 3rd and 6th Tank Battalions of the British Army If motorized infantry follow up, they can easily occupy the high ground near Rehaus and Choernis, which control the supply railway lines of the German 2nd and 18th Army.If this is the case, all German troops facing the French 1st Army will be forced to retreat.Because tanks alone cannot occupy high ground, and infantry cannot quickly reach depths with tanks without motorization.He also noticed two other things, which had important implications for his inspiration and the formation of his later concept of mechanized warfare: a group of armored vehicles (actually armored cars) broke away from the infantry and entered the depth of the German army alone, raiding two A German command attacked a large transport convoy and destroyed a section of railway in the enemy's line, causing a German train to be captured by the following cavalry, and finally attacked a German unit that was having dinner; the second incident also Dramatically, a British chariot that lost contact with the cavalry penetrated into the German defense zone alone, first destroyed a German artillery position from behind, and then cooperated with two cavalry patrols to eliminate several German transport teams.

Fuller thought the confusion created by the twelve armored cars and one medium tank was astonishing.If on August 8th all the medium tanks were not restrained by the cavalry and were concentrated near Choernis alone, there would be a total of about 50 troops from Albert to Monte Didier and from Monte Didier to Lorong. On a mile-long front, the entire command and administrative system of the German army could be wiped out.A series of thoughts and imaginations on these details triggered Fuller's association with the concentrated and strategic use of tanks. In his imagined world, he presented a picture of the future battlefield of mechanized warfare.

Similarly, Liddell Hart, another British advocate of mechanized warfare, elaborated on the prospects of future mechanized warfare on the ground and in the air in his book "Paris or the Future of War".However, in 1925, the most influential British general, General Haig, who was the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force during the First World War, thought: "Today, some people are talking enthusiastically that horses may become obsolete, and predicting that airplanes, tanks, etc. and automobiles will take their place in future wars. I believe that the value of horses and their future usefulness will likely be as great as they have ever been... I am all for the use of tanks and airplanes, however they are mere appendages to man and horse. I am very I trust that in time you will find horses--thoroughbreds--as useful as ever." But the new ideas gradually prevailed, and in 1927 the world's first experimental fully mechanized army was launched at Sol Founded on the Wisbury Plain.Due to the success of the experiment, the Chief of Staff of the British Army even considered establishing an armored division, but in 1928, due to the opposition of conservative forces, this mechanized unit was disbanded again.A senior officer declared to the press that "cavalry is essential and tanks are no longer a threat"."On mechanization, we have to go slowly," the War Department chiefs declared in a statement of policy.

Liddell Hart also often had a vision of future mechanized warfare on his mind. He suggested in The Times and elsewhere from 1935 that the future British Expeditionary Force should have a strong air force and two Three armored divisions in order to counterattack in the event of a German breakthrough, the expeditionary force should not be composed of all infantry. In 1937, the British cabinet accepted this suggestion, but in early 1939, the expeditionary force was still formed in the traditional way.In the Battle of France in May 1940, the British army used two tank battalions to flank the Kleist Armored Corps when they counterattacked in Arras. Rommel's 7th Armored Division was passive, and the German High Command was also psychologically shaken for a while. , which further proves the foresight of Liddell Hart.

France is also the cradle of tanks. After the end of the First World War, a large number of outstanding veterans such as Joffre, Pétain, Foch, and Weygand occupied leading positions in the French army. Convinced, this influenced the promotion of many young officers with new ideas and the renewal of the French army under the guidance of new ideas. In February 1920, the French military authorities came to the easy conclusion that all the lessons of twentieth-century warfare had been learned between 1914 and 1918. However, General Etienne, known as the "Father of Tanks" in France, was an aged man with fresh thinking. He declared in a speech in Brussels in 1921: "I believe that in the near future, Tanks will shake not only the foundation of tactics, but also the foundation of strategy, and after that, the organizational foundation of all modern armies." He put forward a hypothesis: an independent armored force with 100,000 people, 4,000 A tank and 8,000 trucks can advance 50 miles a day or a night, quickly breaking through or crushing the enemy.This scenario prefigured with great accuracy the German storming into France and Belgium in May 1940. Ten years later, in 1931, he further believed that the armored force must be an independent arm. The main difference between it and other arms is that it needs a logistics force for refueling and supply. The cooperation between the independent armored force and the aircraft is very important. Aircraft should not only provide aerial reconnaissance of advancing tanks, but also participate in combat and pursuit.Estienne's conclusion: Armored forces will determine the fate of armies and peoples.

Inspired by Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, a young officer with quick thinking and sharp vision in the French army, published the striking book "Strive to Build a Professional Army" in 1934. booklet.He suggested that France should build a mechanized and professional assault force, and the subsequent French Prime Minister Renault also strongly supported this idea at the time.And 7 years ago, in 1927, Liddell Hart pointed out in his book "Reconstructing the Modern Army" that the models and theories of the French army were outdated and rigid to the point of danger. In the future war test, the army may be completely wiped out.

The old generals who hold the leadership of the French military regard the shocking remarks made by Etienne and Charles de Gaulle as fantasies for grandstanding.In an article in the military review magazine "Reserve Officer", General Bleckart, the French cavalry director, slammed the idea of ​​​​creating a light mechanized division and driving his beloved animals back to pasture. He appealed: "We are building a dangerous Utopia! We It is also unclear how far this mechanized division will be developed! We must protect the work of raising war horses!" General Wei Gang was quite enlightened and suggested that at least some armored vehicles should be added to the cavalry division.General Di Feio, Director of Infantry and Tank Forces, opposed Weygand's suggestion. He believed that it was absolutely impossible for a mechanized combat detachment to lead the entire operation alone.As for the establishment of an independent mechanized armored unit, the director is of course unwilling to listen.

The French army's understanding of tanks is reflected in the beginning of the "Instruction Manual for Using Tanks" formulated in 1930: "Battle tanks are machinery accompanying infantry... Tank troops are an integral part of infantry... Tanks are only an auxiliary means. Should be temporarily put into battle under the deployment of infantry. They can be quite effective in enhancing infantry combat operations, but they cannot replace infantry. Infantry should seize the moment to use their combat effects at the moment when tanks charge. Only the advance and occupation of infantry It is the aim of the operation that is decisive." In the September 1938 issue of the Infantry Review, nine months before the outbreak of World War II, Major Laporte's article showed that the latest thinking of the French High Command was still stuck in the On the level of 1918, the article argues: "Even the most modern tanks cannot charge into battle independently, nor can they exist independently. Their task must always be to advance with the firepower of the artillery and the heavy weapons of the infantry. , to serve as a cover and support for the attack... On the battlefield, the main enemy of the infantry in a stalemate is still the enemy's infantry. According to the guidance of our command manual, only the infantry can occupy, control and hold positions. In short , we must consider tanks as one of the auxiliary conditions for infantry."

At the beginning of 1939, the highly respected Marshal Pétain was writing "Is there still a possibility of invasion!" "In the preface, he made an authoritative judgment on the theory of armored warfare. He wrote: "It is asserted that an armored force can travel 125 miles a day, capture the fortress of a powerful country, and cause panic in the enemy's rear; It is imprudent to say that it is an invincible weapon. Decisive results obtained with such forces have no prospect... Under heavy anti-tank fire or in the face of mines, the armored division will fall into the The predicament of being counterattacked on the flank... Some people think that tanks can shorten the time of war, but in fact tanks are powerless in this regard."

The "Versailles Peace Treaty" banned Germany from making tanks. France originally led in this regard, but the conservativeness of the French military leadership made them lose their advantages in tank manufacturing.As early as 1921, Estienne designed and manufactured the first-class B-type heavy tank at that time. Its performance surpassed the tanks made by the Germans in almost every way, but 20 years later, on the battlefield in North Africa, Rommel Feeling helpless, the British Churchill tank and the American Grant tank are imitations of the French B heavy tank.Several B-type tanks originally designed were successfully tested, but they were suppressed by the Supreme Command for 4 years and discussed for 4 years. It was not until 1935 that under the pressure of Germany's rapid development of heavy tanks, it was decided to put B-type tanks into batches. Production, but the target is limited to 10 vehicles per month, but even this target cannot be achieved. When German armored forces invaded Austria and Czechoslovakia in early 1939, production of the B-tanks was only eight a month.In fact, shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933, France obtained information that the Germans were using tanks as the basis of their future army. However, the French did not believe in the huge strategic potential of tanks, and of course they would not pay attention to this trend of the Germans. In the Battle of Amiens in August 1918, the 432 Spade aircraft of the French 1st Air Division, the predecessor of the Stuka dive bomber, played a key role in coordinating the breakthrough of large-scale tanks on the ground.A young German captain witnessed with his own eyes that the planes of the French 1st Air Division and the ground tank group fought together and overwhelmed the German defense line. This scene made him unforgettable for a long time.This German captain was later Heinz Guderian, the founder of the German Armored Forces and known by the West as the "father of modern armored warfare". Guderian was originally a junior officer in the communications unit. After the end of World War I, he was transferred to the motorized unit to study wartime logistics.He accepted the concept of mechanized warfare from the works of Fuller, Liddell Hart, Martel, and de Gaulle, and in 1922 successively published articles in the German military "Military Weekly", advocating that the mechanized army is the future construction of the German army direction. In 1937, Guderian published "Attention!Armored Soldiers, thus becoming the forerunner of German mechanized warfare thought. However, the Treaty of Versailles banned German production of tanks, so they looked elsewhere. In 1921, Germany and Russia reached military and economic cooperation and established two cooperative institutions, the "Industrial Investment Promotion Association" and the "Peso United Stock Company".Germany helped Russia restore its industry and provided technology. Russia agreed with Germany to supervise the production of aircraft and tanks in Russian factories, and set up a branch factory in Kalfk, a suburb of Moscow, to research and produce various substances prohibited by the "Versailles Peace Treaty", including poisonous gas. weapons.At the same time, Russia also provided training bases to Germany, and opened tank schools and aviation schools in Carson and Karkov respectively to train German tank soldiers and aviation troops. When the Germans had their own small number of tanks, they also faced the problem of how to use them.Guderian concluded based on war history research, British exercises and his own simulation exercises: Unless all other supporting weapons have the same speed and cross-country ability, tanks can never be fully effective; Among them, the tank arm should play a major role, and the other arms should cooperate with the tank arm and have an auxiliary role.He firmly believed that it was an absolute mistake to organize tanks in infantry divisions. A new type of armored division should be established, including all other supporting arms, so that tank units could exert full combat effectiveness.His proposal was approved by some officers, such as General Lutz of the General Staff Headquarters, but opposed by others.Colonel Nazmir, the director of transport, had long been disgusted with the idea of ​​changing this transport unit into a combat unit. He once rudely said to Guderian: "Damn! What combat units, they are only used to transport flour!" The subsequent director, Stupnager, also prohibited the theoretical use of more than one regiment of armored units. He regarded the idea of ​​​​an armored division as a pure upanto fantasy. When he retired, he said to Guderian: " You are too impatient, please believe me, in our lifetime, don’t hope to see German tanks will do formal actions.” By 1933, Guderian was in the long-term tug-of-war with the conservatives in the army. He won and set up 2 armored divisions, but when he demanded that 3 divisions must be set up at the same time, the chief of staff, General Baker (later he committed suicide because of his defeat in murdering Hitler), said: "No! No! I don't want to have anything to do with you. You guys are going too fast for me." After Hitler took office as Chancellor of Germany, he began to reorganize his armaments. In 1933, at the modern weapons exhibition held by the German Ordnance Agency, Hitler greatly appreciated the performance of a small armored unit trained by Guderian. This is what I want! This is what I need!" By 1935, Germany had established three armored divisions. According to Guderian's repeated requests, German tanks were equipped with the first-class observation and communication command tools at that time. This advantage made up for many of the shortcomings of German tanks, and it maintained this advantage for a long time in the subsequent war. In 1938, the German military faced a choice between establishing a cavalry corps with traditional cavalry as its main force and armored forces as its supplementary force, or establishing a mechanized force with armored forces as its main force and cavalry as its supplementary force. Hitler supported Guderian’s proposition and believed that in Horses are useless in modern warfare.As a result, Germany converted most of its cavalry into motorized units or into armored units.So far, Guderian's idea of ​​using a large number of tanks and motorized infantry, combined with motorized artillery and air force, to launch blitzkrieg attacks has finally become a typical tactic of the German army.Subsequent facts have proved that it is precisely because of Guderian's vigorous advocacy and unremitting efforts that the construction of German armored forces is ahead of other countries. The Soviets seem to have a habit of discussing issues for a long time. Since the October Revolution, they have discussed the issue of proletarian military theory. Due to the emphasis on political dogma and pedantic thinking, the result is that even such a clear concept as "military academic" becomes more and more confused. .After nearly 9 years of marathon expressing their opinions, the Soviets finally put forward the theory of "great deep combat". The theory was first outlined by Trian Duffylov in 1926.The realistic roots of this theory are the deep breakthrough of Brusilov in the First World War and the experience of the Red Army in the civil war.The theoretical roots undoubtedly come from the military theory circles in Western Europe. The Red Army academies in the early Soviet Union often used military works from Western countries as textbooks.The famous Red Army general Tukhachavsky put forward specific means of implementing the theory of "Great Depth Combat", which is the offensive principle written in the 1929 "Field Combat Regulations": using two artillery and aviation support at the same time Tank groups (tank groups directly supporting infantry and long-range tank groups) destroy the enemy's defensive tactics in full depth. In the mid-1930s, the theory of "Great Depth Combat" was expanded from the original tactical scope to the strategic scope. Under the direct leadership of Marshal Tukhachavsky, the Soviet Army formed several mechanized armies, as well as aviation and paratrooper brigades. In 1936, the Soviet Army conducted a joint combat exercise of tanks, aviation, and paratroopers.In terms of accepting the idea of ​​mechanized warfare and forming mechanized troops, Germany and the Soviet Union started almost at the same time. In terms of actions, the Soviets were initially considered masters, but a series of factors later caused the loss of the Soviet Union's advantages in this regard.On the issue of cavalry, because Russia's Eurasian steppe has a cavalry tradition of more than 2,000 years and the Cossack cavalry has enjoyed a high reputation in modern times, as well as the great achievements of the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Red Army in the Civil Revolutionary War. Although the leaders saw that the status of the cavalry in Western countries has gradually weakened on the battlefield, they seemed to have an infinite attachment to the cavalry, and seemed unwilling to degrade the arms that brought them honor, authority, and benefits to other arms. This mentality affects the accuracy of thinking and judgment, and it must be manifested as military conservatism.One of the five early Marshals of the Red Army and the well-known former Commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Red Army, Bujon believed in the book "Tactical Principles of the Cavalry Corps" that: the cavalry has changed from an auxiliary force in the First World War to a decisive battle and military force. In combat forces, cavalry and mechanized troops have the same effect.Another marshal, Voroshilov, the former political commissar of the 1st Cavalry Corps of the Red Army, insisted in the article "Twenty Years of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Navy" that: the Red Cavalry is still an invincible and annihilated armed force capable of carrying out major missions on all battlefields. Task. When Stalin's counter-insurgency spread to the army, Hitler cleverly used Stalin's hands to get rid of Tukhachavsky, who advocated the mechanization of the Soviet army.At that time, Tukhachevsky was accused of being a representative of the Western bourgeoisie infiltrating the Red Army of Workers and Peasants, and that the essence of reforming the mechanization of the army was to destroy the construction of the Red Army.The ideological struggle seriously hindered the normal construction of the Red Army. In the Spanish War in 1936, due to the limited effect of tank troop clusters by the mountainous terrain of Spain, Pavlov, the Minister of Automobile Armor of the Soviet Army in charge of mechanized construction, came to the wrong conclusion: since tank clusters cannot achieve tactical breakthroughs, they cannot It would be impossible to develop tactical breakthroughs into operational breakthroughs; mechanized forces would not be able to fight independently in future wars.Starting from this erroneous summary of the Spanish War, the General Military Commission of the Soviet Union began to discuss the abolition of the original tank army in July 1939. On November 21, 1939, the General Military Commission of the Soviet Union agreed to the proposal of Kulik, the Minister of Equipment of the Red Army, and Pavlov, the head of the armored forces, to disband the four tank corps and form a mechanized division with half the number of tanks in the original tank division. The cavalry mechanized group, which mainly strikes troops, retains a small number of independent tank brigades, and the remaining tanks are organized into cavalry divisions as regiments or infantry divisions as battalions.It is not difficult to find that the Soviet army's understanding of tanks has regressed to the same level as the British and French armies. They regard tanks as auxiliary arms of infantry, and the principle of using tanks is to use them in a decentralized manner.At that time, it was Germany's large-scale use of mechanized corps, less than two months after its victory in the invasion of Poland. In the summer of 1940, the fact that Germany used the mechanized armored corps to promote the rapid collapse of France awakened the military and political leaders of the Soviet Union. When Stalin learned that France was quickly defeated, he said angrily: "The Germans are going to break our heads now." But until this time, Soviet military publications were still debating whether the tank should be used tactically or strategically, whether it should be an auxiliary tool for infantry or an independent unit, etc., which have long been proved by the battles of Poland and France. In June 1940, less than seven months before the tank army was abolished, the Soviet army hurriedly decided to rebuild nine mechanized armies, each with 1,000 to 1,200 tanks. In February 1941, it was planned to form 20 tank corps within one year to make up for it.But the war is only 4 months away, and the so-called mechanized army that has been put together in a hurry has a considerable gap with the German mechanized army that has gone through the battles of Poland and France in terms of technical equipment and joint combat training of various arms. The "Great Depth Combat" theory pursued by the Soviet Army in terms of military strategy was a purely offensive concept, but it failed to find the most effective means of implementation at that time, that is, the coordinated operations of mechanized ground forces and aviation.In the face of the experienced German army, with backward technical equipment, unreasonable military structure and the (and therefore necessarily) bad tactics produced on this basis, it is already very mature whether it can block the German attack with pure defense. There is a problem, and then the offensive thinking of "great depth combat" guides the battlefield operations, and the seeds of the disastrous defeat in the early stage of the war are planted. The development of armored forces in the United States has also gone through a tortuous process.At the end of the First World War, the United States had about 5,000 tanks, and the Tank Corps had 20,000 officers and soldiers. By 1920, it was downsized to 700 tanks and 2,600 officers and soldiers.At that time, the two tank battalions stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland, under the leadership of battalion commanders George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower, held several relatively successful tank drills, but the tank regiment was withdrawn.The U.S. Congress and the General Staff believe that tanks should support the decisive arms on the battlefield—infantry. The United States has never paid much attention to the study of mechanized warfare. In 1927, Secretary of War Davies, after visiting an exercise of the British armored forces, authorized the Staff to form a similar armored force.Similar to the situation in the European military circles, most officers in the US military dismissed the value of mechanization of the army. In 1931, MacArthur, the new chief of staff of the U.S. Army, ordered the mechanization of all ground troops in the army.American law forbade the cavalry to have tanks, so between 1933 and 1937 cavalry reformers created an experimental mechanized brigade.The characteristics of this experimental brigade are tanks as the core, cavalry in an auxiliary position, emphasizing the traditional mobility and suddenness of cavalry, but not emphasizing mobile firepower, and ignoring the mechanized infantry and mechanized artillery as part of the whole.By the eve of World War II, the U.S. military had made some progress in understanding mechanized warfare and training armored forces. Both infantry and cavalry field regulations required that tanks should be used in large numbers during assault operations.The U.S. War Department accepted the medium tank designed by inventor Christie and sold the tank chassis to the Soviet Union, who converted it into the famous T-34 tank. The debate between the "tank faction" and the "anti-tank faction" of the US military's top leadership continued to rage, although by this time the Germans had made large-scale use of armored forces on the European battlefield, as demonstrated in the Battle of Poland and the Battle of France. Despite the success of this use, the attitude of the "anti-tank faction" in the US military is still very stubborn.In order to determine the future development direction of the U.S. Army, the U.S. military held three consecutive large-scale tank combat and anti-tank combat exercises in Tennessee, Louisiana, and Carolina from June to December 1941 to test the mechanized army's operations ability.In the last Carolina exercise involving hundreds of thousands of people, Patton, the commander of the US 2nd Armored Division, killed the "anti-tank faction" figure and the commander of the 130,000 "Blue Army" in less than an hour after the attack began. Lieutenant General Ram was captured and hijacked out of the battlefield without whereabouts. Patton's prank forced the suspension of the exercise.The three outstanding performances of the U.S. armored forces finally gave the "armored fighters" the upper hand and strengthened the U.S. military's confidence in mechanized army building.