Chapter 8 Volume 2 Knowledge-3

But then you even extend this surface, extending it into a mathematical object, just as you just admitted that you extended lines into surfaces.You also assume that behind the surface of the object there is a physically existing interior of the object.So tell me, can you see, touch, or perceive with any of the senses something behind this surface? " Me: "Absolutely not; the space behind this surface, I cannot see, cannot touch, and cannot be perceived by any of my senses." Elf: "After all, you admit that you can't perceive such an internal thing at all." Me: "I admit it; therefore I am even more strange."

Elf: "What is behind the surface of your imagination?" Me: "Oh, I'm imagining something like an appearance, something that can feel." Genie: "We must make this clear.—Can you separate the matter that you imagine the objects are made of?" Me: "I can divide it infinitely, not with tools, of course, but in thought. No possible part is the smallest part, so that it seems impossible to divide it." Spirit: "You divide in this way to the point where you can conceive of itself—and by itself I mean, apart from what your senses can perceive—something that you can no longer perceive, see, touch, etc. part?"

Me: "Absolutely not." Elf: "Can objects be seen and touched in general, or can they be seen and touched only by specific properties such as color, smoothness, roughness, etc.?" Me: "The last case. There can never be anything that can be seen or touched in general, because there can never be a visual or tactile activity in general." Spirit: "So you extend qualia, and qualia that is inherent in you and familiar to you—visibility of color, palpability of smoothness or roughness, etc.—to the whole of matter. gone; and this matter itself, wherever it is, is nothing but a sensible thing itself. Do you think so, or do you think otherwise?"

Me: "Absolutely nothing else. What you say can be inferred from what I have just seen and admitted." Genie: "However, don't you actually feel anything behind this surface right now? Didn't you feel anything behind it in the past too? " Me: "If I could see through this surface, I would feel it." Genie: "You see, this is what you knew in advance. You say that you will never encounter something that is absolutely imperceptible in an infinite division. This division Haven't you ever done it before? Don't you know how to?" Me: "I'm not going to do this split."

Elf: "So, you're imagining a feeling you don't have on top of a feeling you actually have?" Me: "I only feel what I put on the surface; I don't feel what is behind the surface, but I suppose there is and feels there.—Yes, I must admit you are right." Elf: "Will the actual feeling be partly consistent with the feeling you predicted?" Me: "If I could see through the surface of objects, as I prophesied, I should indeed find something sensible behind the surface.—Yes, I must admit that you are right about that too." Genie: "However, part of what you say is something beyond perception, which simply cannot arise in any actual perception."

Me: "I say that I divide the matter of bodies infinitely, after all I never come across a part which is not perceptible in itself, because after all I do not think it possible for me to divide matter into infinity.—Yes, I must admit you It is also correct on this point." Spirit: "It follows that nothing remains in your object but the sensible, that is, as an attribute; you extend this sensible to the continuous, infinitely divisible Therefore, the real bearer of the attribute of the object you are looking for may be the space occupied by this object?" Me: "Although I can't be content with this statement, I feel in my heart that besides this sensible thing and space, I should imagine that there is something else in the object, but I can't point out this other thing to you, so I have to confess to you that, so far, I have not found any bearers other than the space itself."

Elf: "You must always admit what you are seeing right now. The unclear things that still exist will gradually become clear, and the unfamiliar things will gradually become familiar. But the space itself will not be perceived; Don't you understand how you got the notion of space, how you extended the sensible into it?" Me: "That's right." Elf: "You also don't understand how you can generally admit that there is something sensible outside of you, do you? Because after all you are only aware of your own feelings within you, which are not things. attributes, but feelings about yourself.”

Me: "That's right. I clearly see that I only perceive myself and my own state, not the object of perception; I also clearly see that I do not see, touch, or hear the object, but rather Rather, precisely where the object should be placed, all visual activity, tactile activity, etc., come to an end. "But I have a presentiment. Sensation, as the feeling of myself, is by no means an extended thing, but a simple thing; different sensations are not juxtaposed in space, but successive in time. But I After all, they are expanded into space. Perhaps it is because of this expansion, and directly related to this expansion, that what was originally a mere sensation becomes a perceivable thing for me? Perhaps it is this Dots produce awareness of objects outside of me?"

Elf: "Your hunch may come true. But even when we profess it directly, we never fully understand it, because there always remains a higher question to be answered: How on earth did you Sensation extended into space? So let's discuss this right away, and we are -- and I have my reasons for doing so -- discussing it more generally in the following way: How do you generally use your Consciousness—which is only awareness of yourself directly—beyond yourself? How do you add to the sensations you perceive the perceived and the perceivable that you are not aware of?" Me: "Sweet or bitter, fragrant or stinky, smooth or rough, cold or hot, all signify in things what such a taste, smell, and such a touch arouse in me. The same is true of sound. This always marks a relation to me, and it never occurred to me that the sweetness or bitterness, fragrance or odour, etc., existed in the thing; Although the case of sight seems different, as color, for instance, seems to be less than a mere sensation, but a medium; but if I consider the case carefully, red and other colors are likewise a definite object of sight to me. What arises within me. This makes me understand how I generally know things outside me.

I feel, I know absolutely; this feeling of mine must have a basis which is not within me and therefore must be outside me.This is how I infer, quickly and unconsciously; I set such a basis, the object.This ground must be such a ground according to which precisely this particular sensation can be explained; I have sensations in the way I call sweetness, and therefore the object must also be of the kind that causes sweetness, or Put more simply, the object itself is sweet.This is how I get the provisions of the object. " Elf: "Although what you say is not all the truth that ought to be said on the subject, there may be some truth. What it is; we shall no doubt know in due time, however, since you are otherwise quite indisputable In accordance with the law of causality—you have just made the assertion that something (in this case your feelings) must have a basis, which I would call causality—invents some truth for you, because you, as I That being said, it is done in other cases indisputably in accordance with the law of causality, so it will not be superfluous to study the practice carefully, to find out exactly what you actually do when you adopt it. If we Assuming for the moment that your interpretation is entirely correct, and that you generally recognize a thing by an unconscious method of inference from effect to cause, what is it that you are conscious of as your perception?"

Me: "It's something that I feel in a certain way." Elf: "But, you're not aware of what you're feeling, are you? At least not aware that it's a perception, right?" Me: "Absolutely not, I have already admitted this to you." Elf: "Then, with the help of the law of causality, you set up another kind of knowledge that you don't have on top of your existing knowledge?" Me: "What you said is strange." Elf: "Perhaps I can dispel the wonder. But whatever it may make you think, let me explain it to you. I say it only to put you in your To have an idea in mind like I have had in me, not for you to use as a norm to speak from. Once you have firmly and firmly grasped the idea, how do you want to say it , just say it, willing to express it in various ways, just express it; you have no problem anyway, you will always express it well. "And how and in what manner did you come to know that feeling about yourself?" Me: "It's hard for me to answer myself in words. Because as far as I am an intellectual force in general, my consciousness as subjective, as my determination, is directly related to this feeling as what it is conscious of. and are therefore inseparably connected; for I am generally conscious only in so far as I have knowledge of such a feeling, and I am as aware of such a feeling as I am generally aware of myself." Elf: "It can be seen that you seem to have a sense, that is, consciousness itself. You are aware of your own feelings through this sense, right?" Yes I am." Spirit: "But don't you have a sense by which you perceive objects?" Me: "Since you have convinced me that I neither see nor touch objects nor perceive them with any external senses, I find myself compelled to admit that I never have any such senses." Genie: "You have to think about this. Perhaps you will be reproached for admitting this to me. So what is your general external sense? If it neither involves external objects nor perceives external The senses of the object, how can you call it external?" Me: "I hunger for truth, and I don't care what people will reproach me for. I can distinguish between green, sweet, red, smooth, bitter, savory, rough, fiddles, stinks, and trumpets only because I do Distinguishes them. I identify several of these sensations in one respect as completely as I distinguish them in other respects; thus I feel green and red, sweet and bitter, smooth and rough, etc. They are equivalent to each other, and this equality I feel is the act of seeing, tasting, touching, etc. The act of seeing, tasting, etc., is certainly not an actual sensation in itself, because, as you have already pointed out, I have never See or taste in general, but always see red or green, etc., taste sweet or bitter, etc. Sight, taste, etc. are not higher determinations of actual sensations, but categories into which I divide them, but This class is not arbitrary, but is guided by the immediate sensation itself. Therefore, I never regard sight, taste, etc., anywhere as external sensations, but only as peculiarities of internal sense-objects. as specific rules of my own feelings. How they become external sensations to me, or rather how I come to regard them as such and call them that, is the question now. I I once admitted that I have no sense of the object of perception, and I still do not take back this statement." Genie: "However, when you speak of objects, it seems that you actually know them, and have a sense to know them, is that so?" Yes I am." Genie: "As you previously assumed, you do this from knowledge you actually have; for this you have a sense, and for this knowledge." Me: "That's right." Genie: "Your actual knowledge, the knowledge of your feelings, appears to you as an incomplete knowledge which, according to your claim, must be supplemented by another knowledge. You imagine that this other New knowledge, describing this other new knowledge, but not as knowledge you actually have, because you don't have it at all, but as knowledge that you should really acquire on top of what you already know knowledge, which you might have acquired if you had the senses to acquire it. You seem to be saying: Of course I know nothing about things, but things exist; if only I could discover They, they will be discovered. You imagine another sense, which you do not actually have, and apply it to things, thereby grasping them-it goes without saying, always only grasping in thought. Strictly speaking, you There is no consciousness of things, but only a consciousness of a (natural and necessary, though not yours) consciousness of things (deduced precisely from your actual consciousness by the law of causality). Now you will see You see that you are indeed, on your assumptions, adding to what you actually know another kind of knowledge that you don't have." Me: "I have to admit it." Elf: "From now on we shall call this second kind of knowledge, derived from other knowledge, indirect knowledge, and the first kind of knowledge direct knowledge. A certain school describes what we have just described to a certain extent. The method is called synthesis; and by synthesis, at least you do not imagine here merely the joining of two moments that already existed before the joining, but the joining and addition of a completely new moment, produced by joining, to another. A pre-existing link that does not depend on the combination." "In short, as soon as you discover yourself, you discover the first consciousness, and you cannot discover yourself without the first; the second consciousness is what you create out of the first."