Chapter 7 Volume 2 Knowledge-2

You said you saw, touched and heard these things.Then in what way, that is, with what attribute do you see or touch them? " Me: "I see this object is red, and that object is blue; if I touch them, I feel smooth, that is rough, this is cold, and that is hot." Elf: "So, do you know what red, blue, smooth, rough, cold, and hot mean?" Me: "No doubt I know what that means." Elf: "Can you describe it to me?" Me: "That is indescribable. You see, turn your eyes to this object; when you look at this object, what you perceive through vision, I call it red; touch the surface of this object, what you feel , which I call smooth. That is how I have acquired this kind of knowledge, and there is no other way to acquire it."

Elf: "But can't we, at least from some of the properties already known by direct sense, discover others different from them by inference? For example, if someone has seen red, green, and yellow, but has not Having seen blue, he has tasted sour, sweet, and salty, but has not tasted bitter, so he cannot know what is blue and what is bitter, just by thinking and comparing, without seeing or tasting such things ?" Me: "Absolutely not. Anything that is a sensory fact can only be felt, not thought about; it is not a deduced thing, but a completely immediate thing." Elf: "Strange! You boast of knowledge, but you can't explain to me how you got this knowledge. You see, you said that this attribute of the object is to be seen, and the other attribute is to be touched. The three attributes are to be heard; and so you must be able to distinguish visual activity from tactile activity, and both from auditory activity, is that so?"

Me: "No doubt." Elf: "You also said that this object looks red, and that object looks blue; this object feels smooth, and that object feels rough; in this way, you must be able to distinguish red from blue." Come on, the difference between smooth and rough, is that right?" Me: "No doubt." Genie: "As you just assured, you do not know such a difference by thinking and comparing these feelings within yourself. But you may, however, compare objects outside yourself by their redness or Blue, smooth or rough, knowing within yourself you must feel what is red or blue, what is smooth or rough, is that so?"

Me: "This is impossible; for my perception of objects begins with my perception of my own state, and the former is conditioned by the latter, not vice versa. I distinguish objects only because I can distinguish states of myself. I know that this particular sensation can be represented by the quite arbitrary symbol 'red' and another by the symbols 'blue', 'smooth' and 'rough'; but I Not knowing that the sensations themselves are different, nor how they are different. I know they are different only because I know myself, I feel myself, and in both cases I feel How they differ I cannot describe; but I know that they are as different as my sense of myself is different in the two cases; and this difference in feeling is direct, never indirect. Obtained, deduced."

Elf: "Can you tell the difference between these things without relying on any knowledge about them?" Me: "I must distinguish them independently of this knowledge, because this knowledge itself does not depend on that distinction." Genie: "Then this distinction is given to you directly through a mere sense of self?" Me: "Exactly." Genie: "But then you should be content with the following statement: I feel myself affected in such a way as I call red, blue, smooth, rough. You should take these Feelings belong to you alone, and they should not be transferred to an object quite outside of you, passing off as a property of that object what is, after all, only your own metamorphosis.

"Or, tell me: When you think an object looks red and feels smooth, do you perceive more than yourself being affected in a certain way?" Me: "From what has been said above, it has become clear to me that I really do not perceive anything more than what you have said; to transfer that feeling that exists only within me to something outside of me." Something going up—which, after all, I couldn’t avoid—seemed to me now the strangest thing. "I feel in myself, not in the object, because I am myself, not the object; therefore, I feel only myself and my state, not the state of the object. If there is a consciousness of the object, Then it's not feeling or perception at least—that's clear."

Genie: "You're jumping to conclusions too quickly. Let us consider the matter in all its aspects so as to assure me that you will never break your word about what you are now willing to admit." In the object, then, is it as you normally imagine? Is there anything else than its red color, its smooth surface, etc., in short, some of its characteristics which you get by direct sensation? " Me: "I think there are; besides these attributes, there is something that contains these attributes, that is, the bearer of these attributes." Elf: "So, through what senses do you perceive the bearer of these attributes? Do you see it, touch it, hear it? Or is there another special sense that perceives it?"

Me: "No, I think I saw it and touched it." Elf: "Really? Let's examine this in detail! Are you conscious of your general visual activity at all times, or only one specific visual activity at all times?" Me: "I always have one particular vision at all times." Elf: "What is this particular vision in terms of objects?" Me: "It's the vision of red." Elf: "This red is something empirical, a pure feeling, a certain state of yourself." Me: "I already understand this." Elf: "So, you should see that red is pure like a mathematical point, and you can only see it in this way. At least the red is in you, as your feeling, it is obviously pure. A specific state, without any compositional components, we can only describe it as a mathematical point. Do you think so, or do you think otherwise?"

Me: "I have to admit that you are right." Elf: "But now you extend this pure red to a vast plane, which you certainly do not see, because you only see pure red. How do you know this plane?" Me: "Of course it's weird. However, I thought I had found an explanation. I didn't really see the plane, but when I put my hand on it, I could feel it. I was doing this tactile activity At the same time, my vision has never changed. So, I extend this red color to the whole plane I touch while always looking at the same red color." Genie: "If you really felt the plane, that might be the case. But let's see if that's possible. Don't you never feel normally? You don't feel what you feel, and thus realize Is this the feeling?"

Me: "Never. Every feeling is a specific feeling. I never just see, touch or hear, but always see, touch or hear something specific, like seeing red, green, blue, To touch cold, hot, smooth, rough, to hear violins, human voices, and so on.—on that matter, we shall stop here." Elf: "Okay! So, when you say you touch a flat surface, do you just directly feel smoothness, roughness, or something like that?" Me: "Of course." Elf: "After all, this smoothness or roughness is like red. Is it a simple thing? Is it a point in you, the senser? I just asked you based on a reason, why do you extend the simple sense of touch to the plane? Now, on the same ground, I ask you, why do you take the same attitude towards mere sight?"

Me: "But this smooth plane may not be equally smooth at all points, but not smooth at all points. Although I lack the skill to distinguish such degrees from each other clearly, and I have no written symbols to Documenting and labeling these different degrees, but I still unintentionally distinguish them, juxtapose them with each other, so that I form a plane." Genie: "Can you have opposite sensations in the same undivided instant? Or, feelings that cancel each other out?" Me: "Absolutely not." Spirit: "In order to explain what you cannot explain, you want to assume those different degrees of smoothness; since they are different, are they not opposite sensations successively occurring in you?" Me: "I can't deny that." Genie: "Then you should treat these different degrees of smoothness, as you actually feel them, as successive variations of the same mathematical point, as you actually do in other cases; but never Don't put them juxtaposed with each other, as the properties that many points on the two planes have at the same time." Me: "I understand this, and I also find that my assumption does not explain anything. But the hand I use to touch and cover the object is itself a plane, so I perceive the object as a plane, which is bigger than my hand. a larger surface for my hand, because I can lay this hand several times over it." Genie: "Is your hand a flat surface? How do you know it's flat? How do you generally become aware of your hand? You either use your hand to feel something else, so the hand is the tool, or Is there any other way to be aware of your hand than you feel your hand itself with another part of your body, so the hand is the object?" Me: "No, there is no other way. I use my hand to feel something specific, or another part of my body to feel my hand. I have no direct, absolute general sensation, just as there is no general visual or tactile activity." Spirit: "Now, let us consider the case of using your hand as an instrument, because this case also determines another case.—In this case, in addition to what belongs to the senses in direct perception, apart from the You yourself, there can be nothing here, especially your wrist as the subject of touch, the subject of sensation. Either you feel the same thing, then I don't understand why you put this simple Sensation extends over some sensible plane, not content with one sensible point; either you feel different things, then you feel the same thing successively, and I don't see why you don't These sensations appear to be continuous with each other in the same point.—You see your hand as a plane, just as you generally think a plane exists outside you, which is inexplicable. So, when you Let us not use the first to explain the second until the first has been explained.—When your hand, or any part of your body, is itself an object of sensation, the second is very It is easy to judge from the first case. You feel this part of your body by means of another part of your body which is now the subject of sensation. As for the other part of your body, I can propose The same question is posed by your hand, and you cannot give me an answer to this question as to that one. "The same is true with regard to the plane of your eyes and every plane of your body. While awareness of the extension beyond you can begin with awareness of your own extension—the physical body—and can Subject to the latter, but then you must first account for this extension of your physical body." I: "Enough, now that I have clearly seen that I neither see nor touch physical properties I do not grasp the extension of the plane in my body, nor through any other sense; What should be regarded as successive are juxtaposed with each other, because in mere sensation there are never juxtaposed states, but only successive states. I found that the method I adopted was actually very similar to that of a geometer who asked me to construct His graphic approach, extending points into lines and lines into areas. I wonder how I could do that." Genie: "And you do still more and stranger things. Of course, you can neither see nor touch nor perceive with any senses (II, 209) such surfaces as you suppose on objects; But in a certain sense we can say that you see red or touch smooth on this surface.