Chapter 4 Chapter 1 Justice is Fairness-2
Distinguish as a matter of principle the claims to liberty and rights on the one hand, and the benefits of increasing the general welfare of society on the other, while giving some priority, if not absolute importance, to the former. Consider, it seems to many philosophers; we do, and belief in common sense seems to favor it.Every member of society is considered to have a certain inviolability.The basis of this inviolability is justice, or, as some say, the natural right over which no one else's welfare can override.Justice denies that the loss of liberty for some is justified by the greater good enjoyed by others.This kind of reasoning cannot be established by treating different people as one person so that their gains and losses can be balanced.Thus, in a just society, fundamental liberties are taken for granted, and rights guaranteed by justice are not subject to political bargaining or the weighing of social interests.
The theory of justice as fairness attempts to account for the common-sense belief that justice takes precedence, pointing out that this belief is the result of some principles that might have been chosen in the original position.Such judgments reflect reasonable choices and the original equality of the contracting parties.Although the utilitarian admits that, strictly speaking, his theory contradicts these views of justice, he maintains that the commonsense maxims of justice and the concept of natural rights have only a subordinate role as secondary maxims.These maxims have arisen from their great social utility under the conditions of a civilized society.Follow them in most cases and only violate them in exceptional cases.We tend to affirm these maxims and rely on these rights with an excess of enthusiasm, so that even this enthusiasm itself produces a certain effect, because it counteracts the natural tendency of men to violate these maxims by means that are not sanctioned by utility. .Once we understand this, the apparent difference between utilitarian principles and the power of belief in justice ceases to be a philosophical conundrum.Thus, while contractarianism admits that our beliefs about the primacy of justice are largely correct, utilitarianism seeks to present these beliefs as a socially useful illusion.
The second comparison is that utilitarians extend to society as a whole principles that apply to individuals, whereas justice as fairness, as a contractual conception, assumes that the principles of social choice, and thus of justice, are themselves The target of some sort of primitive protocol.There is no reason to think that the principles governing groups of people are merely extensions of the principles of choice that apply to individuals.If, on the contrary, we assume that the correct governing principles for anything depend on the nature of that thing, and that the diversity of different people with their own systemic goals is an essential feature of human society, then we should not expect any The principle is utilitarian.To be sure, nothing has been said so far to suggest that the parties in the original position would not choose utilitarian principles to regulate the conditions of social cooperation.This is a very difficult problem, which I intend to study later.From all that is known at the moment, it is quite possible to adopt some principle of utility, so that the theory of the contract may at last provide a deeper and more indirect justification for utilitarianism.In fact, Bentham and Edgeworth sometimes alluded to this bias, though they did not formulate it systematically, and, so far as I know, it is absent in Sidgwick. of.For the present, I will only assume that men in the original position might reject the principle of utility, and instead adopt the two principles of justice already mentioned for the reasons outlined above.In any event, it is impossible to derive principles about social choice from the point of view of contract theory simply by extending the principle of rational prudence to systematic desires conceived by impartial spectators.Such a principle cannot be obtained without taking seriously the multiplicity of individual differences, nor by acknowledging that what people are likely to agree with is the basis of justice.Here, we can see a strange anomaly.People have traditionally thought of utilitarianism as individualistic, and there are certainly good reasons for this view.Utilitarians are staunch defenders of liberty and freedom of thought, arguing that the good of society consists of individual interests.But utilitarianism is not individualistic, at least not through a more natural process of reflection, because it combines all desires into one, thereby applying to society as a whole the principles of choice that apply to the individual .We can therefore see that this second comparison is connected with the first.For it is this unification, and the principles upon which it is based, that makes the right guaranteed by justice subject to a balance of social interests.
The last comparison I want to mention now is this: utilitarianism is a teleology, while justice as fairness theory is not.The latter, as the name suggests, is a deontology.It neither defines interests apart from rights nor interprets right as maximizing the good. (It should be noted that deontology is non-teleological; it is not an argument for the justification of institutions and actions regardless of consequences. All ethical theories worth our attention consider their consequences in judging whether institutions and actions are justified. If Any theory of ethics that doesn't do this is an irrational, stupid theory.) Justice as fairness is another deontology.If it is assumed that persons in the original position might choose some principle of equal liberty, and confine social and economic inequalities to inequalities of everyone's interests, then there is no reason to think that just institutions maximize the good (here , I agree with utilitarianism. Assume that the good is the satisfaction of rational desires).Of course, the greatest good is not impossible, but that may be a coincidence.The question of how to achieve the maximum net balance of satisfaction never arises in a theory of justice as fairness; the principle of such a maximum is not used at all.
There is one more problem in this regard.According to utilitarianism, the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself, and this value must be taken into account in determining what is right.As to what this desire is, it is immaterial to the calculation of the greatest difference of satisfaction, except indirect effects.We arrange the system so as to maximize the total amount of satisfaction; we do not ask any questions about where these satisfactions come from or what their nature is, but how the satisfaction of these desires will affect the overall welfare.Social welfare depends directly and exclusively on the degree of individual satisfaction and dissatisfaction.If, for example, people take pleasure in discriminating against one another, by enabling others to have less liberty, as a means of increasing their self-esteem, then we must judge, as with other desires, whether they should be satisfied, according to their intensity, etc. , to be carefully considered.If society decides not to satisfy these desires, or even to suppress them, it is because they tend to be destructive to society, because greater welfare can be obtained through other means.
On the other hand, according to justice as fairness theory, people accept in advance a principle of equal liberty, but they do so without knowing their more specific goals.They unreservedly agree, therefore, to bring their conceptions of the good into conformity with the requirements of the principles of justice, or at least to refrain from insisting on requirements which directly violate them.A person who takes pleasure in seeing others in a position of less liberty knows that they have no right to enjoy it.To delight in the deprivation of others is wrong in itself: this satisfaction necessarily destroys principles with which he might have agreed in the original position.The principles of right, and thus of justice, place constraints on which satisfactions have value; they also place constraints on what is one's reasonable conception of the good.People must take these limitations into account when making plans and choosing to volunteer.Thus, according to the theory of justice as fairness, whatever one's inclinations and inclinations are, one does not take them as givens; one then seeks out the best means of satisfying them.Rather, their desires or aspirations are bounded from the outset by principles of justice that clearly define the boundaries that people's systematic desires must respect.To show this, we can say that in justice as fairness the concept of right takes precedence over the concept of good.A just social system stipulates the scope that individuals cannot go beyond in pursuing their own goals. This system provides a series of rights and opportunities, as well as the means of satisfaction. By following these means and using these means, these goals can be pursued fairly.The belief that benefits that can only be obtained by violating principles are of no value is partly an account of the primacy of justice.Since these interests are inherently worthless, they cannot exceed the requirements of justice.
According to the concept of justice as fairness, the priority of right over good turns out to be the main feature of this conception.It prescribes certain criteria for the design of the whole basic structure; these arrangements must not be conducive to tendencies and attitudes contrary to the two principles of justice (that is, to principles from the beginning to which specific content is given), they must guarantee justice. System stability.This sets the initial boundaries of what is good, what is a moral character, and what kind of person one should be.Any theory of justice, however, makes such restrictions as are necessary for its fundamental principles to be satisfied in particular circumstances.There are desires and inclinations that utilitarianism refuses to consider because encouraging or allowing them would produce a smaller net balance of satisfaction under the circumstances.But this limitation is largely formal, and without a fairly detailed knowledge of the situation it does not adequately indicate what desires and inclinations they are.This alone cannot be said to be a shortcoming of utilitarianism.It is a feature of utilitarian theory that it depends heavily on the facts of nature and the contingencies of human life in determining which moral qualities should be encouraged in a just society.The moral ideal of justice as fairness theory is deeply rooted in the fundamental principles of ethical theory.This is what characterizes the natural rights view (the contractarian tradition) in contrast to the utilitarian theory.
In comparing the theory of justice as fairness with utilitarianism, I have only the classical utilitarian theory in mind.This is the view of Bentham and Sidgwick, as well as that of the utilitarian economists Edgeworth and Pigou.The kind of utilitarianism that Hume endorsed may not apply to my thesis; in fact, it is not, strictly speaking, utilitarianism.Hume, for example, insists in his famous argument against Locke's contract theory that the principles of conscientiousness and allegiance both have the same utilitarian basis, and that nothing is gained by basing political obligations on some sort of original agreement.For Hume, Locke's theory represented an unnecessary confusion: one might as well resort directly to utility.However, what Hume refers to as utility seems to be the general interests and needs of society.The principles of duty and allegiance arise from utility in this sense, that is, unless these principles are generally respected, social order cannot be maintained.However, Hume went on to argue that if the law and the government abide by the principles based on utility, then from the perspective of a person's long-term interests, he must benefit.It is not mentioned that some gain more than others lose.Thus, utility and some common good seem to Hume to be the same thing; as long as institutions are in everyone's interest, they satisfy utility, at least in the long run.However, if this interpretation of Hume is correct, then the contradiction with the priority of justice disappears immediately, and the inconsistency with Locke's contract theory disappears immediately.For in Locke's theory the role of equal rights is to ensure that the only permissible departures from the state of nature are those that respect those rights and serve the common good.Clearly, all changes in the state of nature that Locke approves of satisfy this condition, and are therefore changes that reasonable beings, concerned with advancing their own ends, can agree to in equal conditions.Hume does not in any way question the propriety of these restrictions.His critique of Locke's contract theory in no way negates the theory's basic thesis, and he even seems to acknowledge it.
The merit of the classical view advanced by Bentham, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick is that it clearly recognizes what is at stake, that is, the principles of justice and the rights deriving from them. relative priority issues.The question is whether the loss of some people will become unimportant due to the greater total interests of others; economic and social inequalities that are permissible.In a comparison of classical utilitarianism and the theory of justice as fairness, there is no doubt that there are some differences between some basic views of society.On the one hand, we see a well-ordered society as a cooperative arrangement for mutual benefit, governed by principles that men might choose in a fair original position; See this society in turn as the efficient management of social resources used to maximize the satisfaction of systems of desires that the just spectator has conceived from the systems of desires known to many individuals.This difference is revealed only by comparing it with the natural bias of classical utilitarianism.
I shall consider intuitionism in a more general way than is usual, that is, as a theory which has a set of irreducible fundamental principles which we must ask ourselves and in our considered judgments , what kind of balance is the most just balance; and then weigh these principles to determine their merits and demerits.As soon as we reach a certain height of generalization, the intuitionists would argue that there are no higher presumptive criteria for determining the proper emphases of the different principles of justice.Although the complexity of ethical situations calls for several different principles, there is no single criterion by which these principles can be described and their focus determined.Thus, intuitionist theories have two characteristics: first, they are composed of a multitude of fundamental principles which, in a given situation, may conflict with each other to give diametrically opposed instructions; second, they do not involve weighing these Any clear method and prioritization rules for the pros and cons of principles: we can only rely on intuition, relying on what seems to us to be about right to establish a balance.Or, if there are any precedence rules, they are treated as more or less frivolous, without any practical assistance in making a judgment.
Other arguments of all sorts are generally related to intuition, for example, that the concepts of right and good are unanalyzable, and that properly formulated moral principles express the self-evident theme of legitimate moral claims, and so on.But I will leave these issues aside.These epistemological theories are not a necessary part of intuitionism as I understand it.Perhaps it is best to speak of this generalized intuitionism as a kind of pluralism.However, a conception of justice can also be pluralistic in that it does not require us to rely on our intuition to weigh its principles.It may contain necessary precedence rules.It seems appropriate to consider intuitionism in this more general way in order to emphasize the direct recourse to our considered judgments in weighing principles.To what extent this view has to do with some kind of epistemology is another question.
Understood in this way, there are many kinds of intuitionism.Not only our everyday notions of this kind, but perhaps the most philosophical of theories.One way to distinguish various intuitionist views is by the level of generalization to which their principles reach.Common-sense intuitionism takes the form of several fairly definite classes of maxims, each of which applies to a specific question of justice.One set of maxims applies to questions of fair wages, another to questions of taxes, still another to questions of punishment, and so on.For example, if we want to get an idea of a reasonable wage, we must not only consider the question of needs, but also try to compare various standards, such as requirements for skill, training, diligence, responsibility, and job hazards.There is probably no one who has not made a decision on the basis of any one of these maxims alone, and from which a compromise must be found.To fix wages according to the existing system, in fact, means to make some evaluation of these demands.However, such evaluations are often influenced by the demands of different social interests, as well as by the relative status of power.As such, it may not fit anyone's view of a reasonable wage.This is especially likely because people with different interests may emphasize those standards that further their interests.People with greater ability and education tend to emphasize the requirements for skills and training, while those who do not have these conditions try to make requirements for needs.But our everyday conceptions of justice are not only shaped by our own position but also strongly colored by habit and existing expectations.By what standard, then, should we judge the justice of the custom itself and the legitimacy of these expectations?In order to achieve some degree of understanding and agreement, regardless of what is merely a practical settlement of differing interests, and without relying on custom and established expectations, it is necessary to move towards some more general arrangement in order to determine the balance between the norms, Or at least limit the balance to a narrower range.
In this way we can consider questions of justice in light of some of the aims of social policy.However, this approach may also rely on intuition, as it usually takes the form of comparing various economic and social objectives.For example, it is assumed that distributional efficiency, full employment, greater national income, and a more equitable distribution of national income are all considered social goals.Thus, the norms of fair wages, proper taxation, etc. will be properly emphasized, provided that these goals are properly weighed against the existing institutional structures.In order to achieve greater efficiency and fairness, one may pursue a policy that has the practical effect of emphasizing skill and hard work in wage compensation, while regulating need in some other way, perhaps in the form of welfare transfers to deal with.Since taxation is inevitable, is there any practical significance in determining reasonable wages?Intuitionism about social goals provides a basis for solving this problem.How we weigh one class of maxims corresponds to how we weigh another class of maxims.In this way, we have made our own judgments of justice have a certain internal connection; we have stepped out of the narrow range of actually taking into account various interests, and entered a wider world.Of course, we still have a problem of recourse to intuition in balancing higher order policy goals.The differences in emphases on these goals are by no means subtle differences, but often correspond to deeply opposed political beliefs.
Principles in philosophical concepts are the most general principles.These principles are not only intended to illustrate social policy objectives, but the emphasis placed on them should accordingly determine the balance of these objectives.For the sake of illustration, let's discuss a rather simple and common concept based on the aggregation-distribution dichotomy.This concept has two principles: the purpose of the basic structure of society is, first, the greatest good in the sense of producing the greatest net balance of satisfaction, and second, the equal distribution of satisfaction.Of course, both of these principles have the additional clause "if all else is equal".The first principle, the principle of utility, serves here as a standard of efficiency, urging us to produce the greatest total amount of satisfaction as far as possible when other conditions are equal; Welfare behavior is restricted and the distribution of benefits is evened out.
This concept is intuitive because it does not provide any precedence rules for determining how to balance these two principles.The very different emphases are consistent with the recognition of the two principles.It is certainly natural to make certain assumptions about how most people would in fact weigh these principles.First, we would presumably place different emphasis on these principles at different combinations of total satisfaction and degree of equality.For example, if there is a great aggregate satisfaction that is unequally distributed, then nine times out of ten we would consider it more urgent to extend equality than whether this great aggregate welfare has been averaged be shared.This can be expressed more formally using the method of economists' indifference curves.Suppose we can measure the extent to which the specific arrangements of the basic structure of society satisfy these principles, and show total satisfaction on a positive x-axis and equality on a positive y-axis (the latter should perhaps have an upper bound on perfect equality).The degree to which these principles are realized by a certain arrangement of the basic structure of society can now be represented by a point on the plane.
Obviously, the point northeast of the other point is a better arrangement: it has two advantages.For example, point B is better than point A in Figure 1.Indifference curves are formed by connecting points judged to be equally just.Therefore, what constitutes curve I in Figure 1 are the points that are equal to point A on the curve; what constitute curve II are the points that are juxtaposed with point B.We can assume that these curves slope downward to the right and do not intersect each other, otherwise the judgments they represent might not agree.The slope of the curve to any point indicates the relative importance of equality and total satisfaction at the junction represented by that point; the slope along an indifference curve indicates how the relative urgency of these principles tends to vary with their or Changed by being more or less satisfied.Thus, simply going along either of the indifference curves in Figure 1, we can see that as equality decreases, a larger and greater total amount of satisfaction is required to compensate for further decreases in equality.
Furthermore, quite different emphases are consistent with these principles.Let Figure 2 represent the judgments of two different people.The solid line represents the judgment of a person who values equality more.The dashed line represents the judgment of another person who places more emphasis on total welfare.Thus, although the first person regards the arrangement for D as equally important as C, the second person judges D to be superior.This conception of justice places no restrictions on what is the right emphasis; thus, it allows different people to weigh principles differently.Nevertheless, if this intuitionist view accords with our considered judgment, it is by no means unimportant.At the very least, it can single out a meaningful standard—the boresight, so to speak, of our considered judgments of social justice.Intuitionists hope that once these axes or principles are found, one can weigh them in a more or less similar way.At least, in their performance justice.You can do this when you are not moved by too much attention to your own interests.Or, if this is not the case.They can at least agree on an arrangement that will allow them to compromise on priorities.
It is most important to see that intuitionists do not deny that we can explain how we weigh different principles, or, when we give them different emphases, how any one weighs them.Intuitionists admit that these points can be represented by indifference curves.Knowing only the nature of these points, one can foresee what judgments will be made.In this sense, the judgments have a coherent definite structure.Of course, one could argue that our priorities are unconsciously governed by some higher standard, or by ideas about how to best achieve certain goals.If we are to apply these criteria, or pursue this goal, then the emphases we identify are the emphases we may end up with.Admittedly, any known balance of principles is subject to this interpretation.But intuitionists claim that such an explanation does not in fact exist.Intuitionists believe that there is no articulated ethical view underlying these points, which can be illustrated by a geometric figure or a mathematical function, but no putative, justifiable moral standard.Intuitionism holds that, in our judgments about society, we will probably end up encountering a plurality of fundamental principles.All we can say about this matter is that it seems to us more correct to weigh principles in this way than in another.
There is nothing inherently irrational about this intuitive theory.In fact, it might as well be correct.We must never take it for granted that our judgments of social justice necessarily depart entirely from accepted ethical principles.Intuitionists, by contrast, argue that the complexity of moral situations prevents us from adequately accounting for our judgments, thereby necessitating a plurality of different principles.Intuitionists believe that there is an attempt to transcend these principles.Either it becomes banal (eg, social justice is treating everyone the same), or it leads to delusions and oversimplifications (eg, one relies on the principle of utility to solve all problems).Therefore; the only way to refute intuitionism is to present ethical standards that can be accepted to illustrate the point, and in our considered judgment we think it appropriate to give importance to the plurality of principles.To refute intuitionism is to propose those putative standards that are said not to exist.Admittedly, the concept of accepted ethical principles is vague, although it is easy to cite many examples from tradition and common sense.However, it is pointless to discuss this issue in the abstract.Once the critics of the intuitionists come up with a more systematic account, the intuitionists and their critics will have to work this out.
One might ask whether intuitionist theories are teleological or deontological.They may be both, and on many issues any ethical outlook must necessarily rely to some extent on intuition.For example, people may think, like Moore, that human feelings and mutual understanding, the creation and appreciation of beauty, the acquisition and comprehension of knowledge, have become the first-class good things together with happiness.But one might also think (and Moore does not) that these are the only actual goods.Since the determination of these values does not shift with the right, if the determination of the right is to maximize the good, it is a teleology of the perfectionism type.However, in judging what produces the greatest good, such a theory might say that these values must be weighed intuitively: it might say that there is no real guiding criterion here.However, intuitionistic theories are often deontological.According to Ross's authority, the distribution of good things according to moral value (distributive justice) is contained in the good to be extended; although the principle that produces the greatest good is one of the basic principles, it is only one that must be relied on. The principle that balances intuition with the requirements of all other valid principles.The distinguishing feature of intuitionist perspectives, therefore, is not that they are teleological or deontological, but that they feature particularly appeals to our intuitive faculties that are not putative and accepted ethical standards can control.Intuitionism does not recognize any valid and definite solutions to priority problems.We now proceed to briefly discuss this issue.
We have seen that intuitionism raises the question of the extent to which we can systematically account for our considered judgments of justice and injustice.In particular, it considers that it is impossible to give any positive answer to the question of determining the focus of the different principles of justice.In this matter, we must rely on our intuitive abilities.Of course, classical utilitarianism strives to avoid resorting to intuition entirely.This is a single-principle view with only one final criterion; in theory at least, the adjustment of emphasis is determined by reference to the utilitarian principle.Mill believes that there can only be one such standard, otherwise there can be no arbiter between different standards, so Sidgwick argues at length that the utilitarian principle is the only one capable of undertaking this task.They argue that our moral judgments are undoubtedly utilitarian in the sense that we have no choice but to adopt utilitarianism when faced with conflicting maxims, or when confronted with ambiguous concepts.Mill and Sidgwick argued that on certain issues we must correct and systematize our judgments with a single principle.Admittedly, one of the great fascinations of this traditional theory is its approach to prioritizing problems and trying to avoid relying on intuition.
I have already said that there is nothing necessarily irrational about relying on intuition to resolve priorities.We must admit that there may be no way out of the problem of pluralism of principles.No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely to some extent on intuition.But even so, we should make as little direct recourse to our considered judgment as possible.For if men weigh the last principle differently (as they presumably often do), then their conceptions of justice are different.Determining focus is a fundamental rather than a secondary component of a conception of justice.If we cannot show how these priorities should be determined by sound ethical standards, then there is no means for sound discussion.It can be said that the intuitionists' conception of justice is only an incomplete conception.Even if reliance on intuition cannot be completely ruled out, we should try to come up with clear principles for priority problems.
According to justice as fairness theory, the role of intuition is limited in several ways.Since the whole matter is rather complex, I will here only offer a few observations, the full implications of which will not become apparent until later.The first has to do with the fact that the principles of justice are those which would have been chosen in the original position.These principles are the result of a certain state of choice, and since people in the original state are rational beings, they admit that the priority of these principles should be considered.If they wish to establish agreed standards for adjudicating mutual claims, they will need principles by which to set priorities.They must never assume that their intuitive judgments about priority questions are roughly the same; they certainly will not be the same because of their position in society.I therefore assume that the parties in the original position want to reach some kind of agreement on how to weigh the principles of justice.Part of the value of the concept of principles of choice is that the reasons that motivated them to adopt certain principles in the first place may also be the reasons why they give them some emphasis.According to the theory of justice as fairness, the principles of justice are not considered self-evident, their justification lies in the fact that they may be chosen.That being the case.We can then find guidelines or constraints on how to weigh them according to their acceptance.Considering the circumstances of the original position, it may be clear that some priority rules are preferable to others for the same reason that certain principles were unanimously agreed from the outset.Emphasizing the role of justice and the characteristics of the original choice state can make the priority problem more tractable.
Another possibility is that we might be able to find some principles that can be illustrated in terms of what I call continuous sequences or lexical sequences (the correct term is "lexicographic sequence", but it is too cumbersome).This sequence requires us to satisfy the first principle in the sequence before we can move to the second principle; the second principle is satisfied before considering the third principle, and so on.A principle does not come into play until those preceding it are either fully satisfied or inapplicable.The successive series, therefore, need not weigh the principles; the first in the series may be said to have an absolute emphasis on the latter, and are without exception valid.我们可以把这种排列看作是类似于一些受到限制的最高原则的先后次序。我们可以假定，这个序列中的任何原则只有在前面的原则得到充分满足时才可以得到全面的考虑。事实上，我将作为一个重要特例提出这样一种次序，把平等自由原则置于控制经济和社会不平等的原则之前。这实际上是说，社会基本结构应该按照与前面的原则所要求的平等自由权相一致的方式来安排财富和权力的不平等。当然，乍看起来，词汇序列或连续序列这个概念似乎并不显得很有前途。事实上，它似乎立即同我们的稳健思想和良好判断格格不入。此外，它必须预先假定序列中的所有原则都是一种相当特殊的原则。例如，除非前面的原则只有一个有限的适用范围并规定了能够得到满足的明确条件，否则后面的原则就决不会起作用。这样，平等自由权原则就可以占据一种优先的地位，因为我们假定它是能够得到满足的。而如果功利原则是第一位的，那么它就会使后来的所有标准成为多余的东西。我将努力证明，至少在某些社会环境下，正义原则的某种连续序列为优先问题提供了一种近似的解决办法。
最后，可以提出一些内容比较有限的问题和用审慎的判断代替道德判断，来减少对直觉的依赖。这样，面对某种直觉主义观念原则的人就可以回答说，如果没有某些指导审慎思考的准则，他就不知道该说些什么。例如，他可能会认为，在对满足的分配中，他无法解决总功利和平等的矛盾。不但这里所涉及的概念过于抽象。内容过于广泛，使他没有把握来作出任何判断，而且即使是解释这些概念的含义，也是一个十分复杂的问题。总合－分配二分法无疑是一个吸引人的概念，但此时此地又似乎是难以处理的。它没有把正义问题分解成足够小的部分。按照正义即公平理论，求助于直觉的做法集中表现在两个方面。首先，我们从社会制度中挑出某个地位，并按照这个地位来评价社会制度，然后再提出这样的问题：从这种地位中的一个有代表性的人的观点来看，选择基本结构的这种安排而不是那种安排是否合理？根据某些假定，经济和社会的不平等是按照地位最不利的社会集团的长远期望来予以判断的。当然，对这种集团的说明不很准确，我们的审慎判断也必然会给予直觉以相当大的余地，因为我们也许还不能提出决定这种判断的原则。尽管如此，但我们已经提出了一个内容有限得多的问题，并用一种合理审慎的判断代替了道德判断。我们应怎样作出决定，这常常是十分清楚的。对直觉的依赖是一种不同性质的依赖，而且远不如在直觉主义观念的总合－分配二分法中对直觉的依赖。
在解决优先问题时，任务就是要减少而不是完全排除对直觉判断的依赖。没有理由假定我们能够避免所有求助于直觉的做法，不管是什么样的直觉，也没有理由假定我们应该努力那样去做。这个住务的实际目的是要在判断方面取得一种相当可靠的协议，以便产生一种共同的正义观。如果人们在直觉上的优先判断是相同的，那么几乎可以说，即使它们不能提出说明这些信念的原则，或者甚至这些原则是否存在，都是无关紧要的。然而，相反的判断却产生了困难，因为这时裁决不同要求的基础甚至是不明确的。因此，我们的目标应该是提出这样一种正义观，不管它多么依赖于伦理的或审慎的直觉，它都有助于使我们对正义的深思熟虑的判断殊途同归。如果这种正义观确实存在，那么，从原始状态的观点出发，就可以有充分的理由去接受它，因为在我们对正义的共同信念中引进更多的一致是合理的。事实上，一旦我们从原始状态的观点来看问题，优先问题就不再是如何去应付既定的无法改变的道德情况的复杂性问题，而是为了达成关于判断的理想协议而提出合理的、普遍可以接受的方案问题了。按照契约论的观点，道德情况决定于在原始状态中可能选择的原则。这些原则明确规定了哪些考虑从社会正义的观点看是恰当的。既然这些原则是由原始状态中的人来选择的，那么也应由他们来决定他们希望道德情况简单或复杂到什么程度。原始协议决定了他们在多大程度上准备妥协，从而使事情变得简单一些，以便确定为共同正义观所必需的优先规则。
我已考察了根据推定来处理优先问题的两个明显而又简单的方法，这就是：或者利用一种单一的无所不包的原则，或者利用词汇序列中的许多原则。其他方法无疑是存在的，但我不打算去考虑它们可能是什么样的方法。传统的道德理论在大多数情况下或者是单一原则的，或者是直觉主义的，因此，提出一种连续序列从一开始就是一种新奇的方法。虽然一般说来，词汇序列不可能完全正确，这一点似乎是显而易见的，但在某些特殊的然而重要的情况下（第82节），它大概还是可以给人以启发的。这样，它就可以表明正义观的更广泛的结构，并指出能够找到更合适方法的方向。
为防止误解，在这里简短地讨论一下道德理论的性质，似乎是可取的。我的讨论将是比较详细地说明反思平衡中深思熟虑的判断这个概念以及采用这个概念的理由。
让我们假定，每个过了一定年龄并具有必要智能的人，在正常的社会环境下养成了一种正义感。我们获得了判断事物是否正义的本领，也学会了依靠理智来支持这种判断的本领。此外，我们通常还有按照这些见解办事的某种欲望，并希望别人也有同样的欲望。显然，这种道德能力是非常复杂的。要明白这一点，只要指出我们准备作出的判断可能是不计其数而且是形形色色这一点就够了。我们常常不知道怎样说才好，有时又觉得自己犹豫不决，这一点也并不有损于我们的能力的复杂性。
人们开始时（我着重这种观点的临时性质）可能认为，道德哲学就是试图说明我们的道德能力的；或者，就眼前来说，人们可能认为，正义理论就是说明我们的正义感的。这件事很难办。因为这种所谓的说明，并不就是说列举出我们准备对体制和行动作出的判断以及随之而来的支持这些判断的理由，而是说需要提出一批原则，一旦这些原则同我们的信仰以及对环境的认识结合起来，同时，如果我们又能自觉而聪明地应用这些原则，那么，它们就会使我们作出这样的判断，并提出支持这些判断的理由。我们作出的日常判断符合正义观的原则，那么正义观也就表达了我们的道德感情。这些原则可以作为得出配合判断的某种论点的前提的一部分。直到我们以某种涉及广泛情况的系统方法知道了它们是什么样的原则，我们才能对我们的正义感有所了解。如果对我们的日常判断，对我们作出这种判断的天然意愿，只有似是而非的了解，那只会掩盖一个事实，即说明我们的道德能力乃是一项复杂任务。必须假定说明我们的道德能力的原则具有一种复杂的结构，同时所涉及的种种概念也必须予以认真的研究。
这里，把说明道德能力问题和说明我们对本族语句子的语法意识问题比较一下是有益的。这里的目的是通过提出明确的原则来说明识别好句子的能力，而这些原则和说本族语的人一样。是各不相同的。这种说明是一项很困难的任务，这个任务虽然还没有完成，但大家知道，它需要从理论上予以解释，而不为我们明确的语法知识的特定准则所囿。道德哲学大概也有与此相类似的情况。没有理由假定我们的正义感可以用众所周知的常识性准则来予以充分的说明，也没有理由假定我们的正义感可以从比较明显的学习原则中派生出来。对道德能力的正确说明，肯定要涉及一些原则和理论解释，而这些原则和解释是远远超出日常生活中引用的规范和标准的；它最后还可能需要用相当复杂的数学手段。既然按照契约观点，正义理论是合理选择理论的一部分，那样做也就在意料之中了。这样，原始状态的概念以及在原始状态中取得对原则的协议的概念，也就似乎不太复杂或不是十分不必要的了。事实上，这些概念相当简单，可以作为研究的入门。
然而，到目前为止，我还没有谈到任何关于深思熟虑的判断问题。正如已经假定的那样，深思熟虑的判断就是在我们的道德能力极可能得到如实的表现时所作出的那些判断。因此，在决定应该考虑我们的哪些判断时，我们可以合理地选择某些判断而排除另一些判断。例如，我们可以抛弃在犹豫不决中作出的那些判断，或我们对之很少有把握的那些判断。同样，我们在心烦意乱时或受到恐吓时所作出的判断，或我们一心要以某种方式获得好处时所作的判断，也可以弃置不顾。所有这些判断很可能都是错误的，或都是受我们过分注意自身利益的影响的。深思熟虑的判断就是在有利于运用正义感的条件下所作出的判断，因而也就是在不能给犯错误找到比较普通的借口或解释的情况下所作出的判断。这样说来，也就是假定作出判断的人都有作出正确决定的能力、机会和欲望（或至少不是不要作出正确决定的欲望）。此外，鉴别这些判断的标准也不是任意的。事实上，它们同选择任何深思熟虑的判断所使用的标准是相似的。一旦我们把正义感看作是一种思想能力，是与运用思想有关的，那么恰当的判断也就是在有利于审慎考虑和一般判断的条件下所作出的判断。
现在，我们来着手讨论反思平衡这个概念。需要这个概念有如下原因。根据道德哲学的临时目标，人们可能会说，正义即公平理论只是一种假设，它认为，在原始状态中可能选择的原则，也就是符合我们深思熟虑的判断的那些原则，正是这些原则说明了我们的正义感。但是，这个解释显然是过分简单化了。在说明我们的正义感时，还必须考虑到这样的可能性，即尽管深思熟虑的判断是在有利的情况下作出的，但在一定程度上，它们无疑是参差不齐的，是容易被歪曲的。如果一个人碰到了一种在直觉上具有吸引力的对自己的正义感的说明（比如，一种包含有对各种合理而自然的假定的说明），他很可能修改他的判断，使之符合正义即公平理论的原则，即使这个理论并不完全适合他的现有判断。如果他能找到一种解释，说明为什么会发生这种偏差，使他对自己原始判断的信心遭到破坏，如果所提出的观念产生了一种他认为现在可以接受的判断，他尤其可能会那样去做的。从道德哲学的观点来看，对一个人的正义感的最好说明，不是那种在他考察任何正义观之前就已符合自己判断的说明，而是那种配合了他在反思平衡中所作出的判断的说明。我们已经看到，要达到这一步，一个人先要对所提出来的各种观念加以权衡，然后或者修改自己的判断，使之符合其中的一种观念，或者坚持自己的原始信念（和相应的观念）。
反思平衡这个概念引起了一些需要予以说明的复杂问题。首先，它是研究那些由自我省察所形成的行动指导原则所特有的一种概念。道德哲学是苏格拉底式的哲学：一旦支配我们目前深思熟虑的判断的原则被揭示出来，我们也许就会希望改变这些判断。即使这些原则完全合适，我们也仍然可能希望这样做。了解这些原则，可能意味着去进一步思考，从而使我们修改我们的判断。然而，这种特点不是道德哲学所独有的，也不是其他哲学原则，如归纳法和科学方法原则所独有的。例如，我们虽然可能不会指望由于某种语言学理论（这种理论的原则在我们看来似乎是特别自然的）而大大修改我们正确的语法意识，但这种改变并不是不可想象的，毫无疑问，我们的语法意识可能在某种程度上受到这方面知识的影响。但在物理学方面，情况就不同了。举一个极端的例子：即使我们对自己不感兴趣的天体运动作出了准确的说明，我们也无法改变这些运动来使之符合某种更吸引人的理论。幸运的是，天体力学的原则有其自身的智力之美。
然而，关于反思平衡也有几种不同的解释。一个人可能碰到的只是那些除次要差异外或多或少与自己现有判断相一致的说明，或者，一个人可能碰到的就是他也许能够使自己的判断和支持这些判断的全部有关哲学论点相一致的所有可能的说明。反思平衡的概念因这些情况的不同而异。在第一种情况下，我们可能是在多多少少如实地说明一个人的正义感，虽然我们也考虑了如何去消除某些不一致之处；在第二种情况下，一个人的正义感可能要经历也可能不经历某种根本的改变。显然，在道德哲学中人们关心的是第二种反思平衡。当然，一个人能否达到这一步，那是值得怀疑的。这是因为，即使关于所有可能的说明和全部有关哲学论点的概念很明确（这一点也是有向题的），我们也不可能对这些说明和哲学论点—一加以审查。充其量我们只能通过道德哲学的传统去研究我们已知的各种正义观和我们所想到的任何其他正义观，然后对这些正义观加以考虑。这差不多也是我所要做的，因为在提出正义即公平理论时，我要把这一理论的原则和论据同其他一些众所周知的观点相比较。按照以上说法，可以懂得正义即公平理论说的就是：在原始状态中可能选择的就是前面提到的那两个原则，而不是其他传统的正义观，如功利观和至善观；经过认真的思考，这两个原则比这些公认的选择办法更符合我们深思熟虑的判断。这样，正义即公平理论就使我们更接近于哲学的最终目标；当然，它还没有达到这种目标。
对反思平衡的这种解释立刻又引起了若干新的问题。例如，反思平衡（从哲学最终目标这个意义上说）是否存在？如果存在的话，它是否就是独一无二的？即使是独一无二的，这一点能够做到吗？也许，我们用以开始思考的判断，或思考过程本身（或两者），会影响我们的最后归宿，如果有这种归宿的话。然而，在这里推究这些问题是没有意义的。我甚至不打算去问，说明一个人深思熟虑的判断的原则，是否就是说明另一个人深思熟虑的判断的那些原则。我将理所当然地认为，对于在反思平衡中作出判断的人来说，这些原则是大致相同的，如果不同，那么他们的判断就沿着以一批（我将予以讨论的）传统理论为代表的几条主线而产生歧异（事实上，一个人可能发现自己同时徘徊于相互对立的正义观之间而无所适从）。如果人们的正义观最终证明是各不相同的，那么它们在哪些方面不同，就成了一个头等重要的问题。只有等到我们对这些正义观有了比较正确的说明，我们才能知道它们何以不同，甚至知道它们是否真的不同。但我们现在还不能做到这一点，即使是对一个人或一批相似的人，我们都不能做到。这可能同语言学也有某种类似之处：如果我们能够说明一个人的语法意识，我们当然就会知道许多关于语言的一般结构的情况。同样，如果我们能够说明一个（受过教育的）人的正义感，我们就能为提出某种正义理论作出一个良好的开端。我们可以假定每个人都有自己的一套道德观。这样，对本书的论题来说。读者和作者的观点就是唯一有价值的观点。别人的意见不过是用来使我们的头脑变得更清楚而已。
我希望强调的是，正义理论完全说得上是一种理论。它是一种关于道德感情（借用十八世纪一本书的名字）的理论，它提出了指导我们的道德力量的原则，或者说得更明确些，指导我们的正义感的原则。有一类虽然有限然而明确的事实，可以用来检验一些假设的原则，这些事实就是我们反思平衡中的深思熟虑的判断。正义理论同其他理论一样，也要受同样的方法规则的支配。定义和意义分析并不占有特殊的地位：定义不过是一种用来建立一般理论结构的手段。一旦提出了整个理论结构，定义就不再占有显著的地位，而是与理论本身同其兴废。无论如何，要提出一种完全以逻辑和定义的真实性为基础的真正的正义理论，显然是不可能的。对道德概念进行分析并由原因推出结果，这种做法无论在传统上是多么不言而喻，但却是一种过分脆弱的基础。道德哲学必须能够自由地按照自己的意愿去利用某些可能的假定和一般事实。要说明我们反思平衡中的深思熟虑的判断，舍此更无他法。这是直到西奇威克为止的大多数英国古典作家对这个问题的看法。我看不出有任何理由要改变这种看法。
此外，如果我们能为我们的道德观找到一种准确的说明，那么，要回答关于意义和理由的问题，可能要容易得多。事实上，有些问题可能根本不再是真正的问题。例如，自弗雷格和坎托以来的发展，使我们能够特别加深对用逻辑和数学来表述的意义和理由的理解。关于逻辑和集合理论的基本结构及其与数学的关系的知识，以概念分析和语言学调查所无法做到的方法，改变了关于这些问题的哲学。理论分化了，有的成了能够决定而又全面的理论，有的成了不能决定然而全面的理论，有的成了既不全面也不能决定的理论。人们只需注意一下这种分化的结果就行了。说明这些概念的逻辑体系的发现，深刻地改变了关于逻辑和数学的意义及真实性问题。一旦人们更好地了解了道德观的真正内容，某种类似的变化就可能发生。除此以外，很可能没有其他办法为道德判断的意义和理由找到令人信服的答案。
therefore.我希望强调我们的真正道德观的研究重点。但是，承认道德观的复杂性，必然就是承认我们现有的理论是粗糙的和有着严重缺点的。如果简单化的做法显示了并大致说明了我们的判断的概貌，我们就必须予以容忍。用相反的例子来提出不同意见，必须谨慎从事，因为这些意见可能只是告诉我们已经知道的东西，就是说，我们的理论在某个地方有错误。重要的是，要弄清楚它错了多少次和错到什么程度。所有的理论大概都有某些错误，不管在什么时候，真正的问题始终是：在已经提出的各种观点中，哪种观点总的来说是最为近似的。为了弄清这一点，多少了解相互颉颃的理论的结构，是肯定必要的。正是由于这个缘故，我一直试图通过基本的直觉概念把正义观加以分类和讨论，因为基本的直觉概念可以揭示各种正义观的主要差异。
在提出正义即公平理论时，我将把它拿来同功利主义作一比较。我这样做是出于各种原因，一部分是因为这个理论是一种说明手段，一部分是因为功利主义观点的几个变种长期以来一直支配着我们的哲学传统，并且在继续这样做。尽管长期存在着对功利主义所轻易引起的疑虑，但这种支配作用仍维持不衰。这种奇怪状态的存在，我认为其原因就在于还不曾有人提出过既有在明晰性和系统性方面的可比优点，又能减少这种怀疑的任何建设性的可供选择的理论。直觉论不是建设性的，至善论是不可接受的。我猜想，恰当地提出来的契约论能够弥补这个陷缺。我认为，提出正义即公平理论就是在这方面所作的一次努力。
当然，我将要提出的契约理论容易受到我刚才提到的那些责难。现有的道德理论的简单粗糙的特点，毫无例外地也会受到这种责难。例如，关于优先规则问题，我们现在所能说的是多么之少，这一点就足以使人感到沮丧；虽然词汇序列对一些重要情况可能相当有用，但我敢说它不会完全令人满意。尽管如此，我们仍然可以去利用一些简单的方法，而这也正是我经常做的。我们应该把正义理论看作是一种指导基础，其目的就是对准我们的道德感觉，并把比较有限而易于处理的问题交给我们的直觉能力去判断。正义原则指出某些考虑是与道德有关的，优先规则指出了在这些考虑发生抵触时的恰当的优先次序，而原始状态观则规定了告诉我们应予审慎考虑的基本概念。如果这整个安排在经过认真思考之后似乎使我们的思想得到澄清和整理，如果它有助手减少分歧，有助于使各不相同的信念比较协调一致，那么，它就是做了一个人可以合理地要求它去做的一切。如果把无数简单化的做法理解为一种似乎确有帮助的结构的组成部分，那就可以把这种做法看作是暂时有理的。