Chapter 3 Chapter 1 Justice is Fairness-1

In this introductory chapter I shall briefly state some of the main ideas of a theory of justice which I wish to develop.This account is informal, and its purpose is to pave the way for a more detailed argument later.There will inevitably be some overlap between the discussions in this chapter and the ones that follow.I begin by explaining the role of justice in social cooperation and briefly introducing the subject of justice.the basic structure of society.Then, I will put forward the main idea that justice is fairness, that is, a theory of justice, which summarizes the traditional social contract theory and raises it to a higher level of abstraction.The social contract is replaced by an initial position that involves procedural restrictions on certain arguments designed to achieve some original agreement on the principles of justice.For the sake of illustration and comparison, I will also discuss classical utilitarian and intuitionistic views of justice, and consider some of the differences between these views and justice as fairness.My main purpose is to present a theory of justice.enabling it to replace those theories that have long dominated our philosophical tradition.

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is the first virtue of systems of thought.A theory that is untrue, no matter how elegant and simple, must be rejected or revised; likewise, laws and institutions, however efficient and orderly they may be, cannot be justified if they are unjust. It is bound to be reformed or abolished by the people.Everyone has an inviolability based on justice, which cannot be overridden even by the welfare of the whole society.Thus justice denies that someone's loss of liberty is justified by the greater good enjoyed by others.It does not recognize that the sacrifices imposed on the few can be trivialized by the greater good enjoyed by the many.In a just society, therefore, the liberties of equal citizens are held to be certain; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining, or to the balance of social interests.The only reason we acquiesce to a false theory is that we do not have a better one. In the same way, a certain injustice is tolerated only because a greater injustice is to be avoided.As the first virtues of human activity, truth and justice are irreconcilable.

These claims seem to demonstrate our intuitive belief in the primacy of justice.There is no doubt that these claims are too strong.In any case, I wished to inquire whether these arguments, or others like them, are true, and if so, how they can be accounted for.Therefore, a theory of justice must be developed that can explain and evaluate these claims.First, I shall examine the operation of the principles of justice. In order to establish the concept, let us assume that a society is a more or less self-sufficient group of people who, in their mutual relations, recognize certain rules of conduct as binding. , and in most cases acted in accordance with these guidelines.Assume further that these guidelines specify a system of cooperation designed to promote the interests of those who participate in the cooperation.Thus, although society is a cooperative enterprise promoting mutual interests, it is not only characterized by common interests, but also by contradictions and conflicts.Since social cooperation has the potential to make life better for all than for any individual striving alone, there is a common good.Since people are not indifferent to how the greater benefits of their cooperation are distributed, a conflict of interest arises, since each of them wants a larger share in pursuit of his own goals.rather than a smaller portion.This requires a series of principles for selecting the various social arrangements that determine the distribution of such benefits, and to ensure that some kind of agreement on the appropriate distribution of shares is reached.These principles are also principles of social justice: they prescribe the method of allocating rights and duties in the basic institutions of society, and at the same time prescribe the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.

Now, let us assume that a society is well-ordered not only because its purpose is to promote the interests of its members, but also because it is effectively governed by a general conception of justice.that is.It is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that all others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic institutions of society generally conform and are generally known to conform to these principles .In this case, although people may make exorbitant demands on each other, they all accept a common point of view by which their claims can be adjudicated.If men's self-interested tendencies make it necessary for them to be wary of one another, their general sense of justice can also make them into strong groups.Common justice now forges bonds of civic friendship between individuals with different ends; the universal desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends.One can think of universal justice as the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human community.

In this sense, of course, existing societies are seldom well-ordered, since what is just and what is unjust is usually a matter of debate.People disagree as to which principles should define the basic conditions of their groups.However, despite this difference, we can still say that each of them has some conception of justice.That is, they understand that they need a specific set of principles and are prepared to endorse these principles in order to use them to assign basic rights and duties.to determine what they consider to be the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.It seems natural, therefore, to regard this conception of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice, as determined by the roles these different principles, these different ideas, have in common.Thus, even people with different conceptions of justice will still agree that as long as fundamental rights and duties are allocated without arbitrarily creating differences among people, and as long as these maxims establish the proper balance between competing interests in social life, then The system is just.One can agree with this description of the regime of justice, because the concepts of arbitrary difference and of proper balance are included in the concept of justice, and each can interpret them in terms of the principles of justice he accepts.These principles point out which similarities and differences among people are relevant for establishing rights and duties, and also specify which distribution of benefits is appropriate.Clearly, the difference between this concept and the various conceptions of justice does not resolve any significant issues.It helps only to recognize the role of the principles of social justice.

Some degree of coherence in some conceptions of justice, however, is not the only prerequisite for a viable human society.There are other fundamental social issues, especially those related to coordination, efficiency and stability.For example, the plans of individuals must fit together so that their activities are coordinated and their plans can all be accomplished without seriously frustrating anyone's legitimate expectations.Furthermore, the execution of these plans should lead to the achievement of social goals in an efficient and just manner.Finally, a social cooperative arrangement must be stable, it must have more or less formal consent, its ground rules must be voluntarily observed; if violations occur, there should be stabilizing forces to prevent further violations and to help restore original arrangement.These three questions are clearly connected with justice.Without some degree of agreement on what is just and what is unjust, it is obviously more difficult for individuals to effectively coordinate their plans to ensure that mutually beneficial arrangements are maintained.Distrust and dissatisfaction destroy friendly relations; suspicion and hostility induce people to take actions they could have avoided.Thus, while the unique role of a conception of justice is to specify fundamental rights and duties and to determine the appropriate distributive share, the manner in which a conception of justice does so necessarily affects issues of efficiency, coordination, and stability.In general, we cannot evaluate a conception of justice solely in terms of its distributive role, no matter how useful that role may be for understanding the concept of justice.We must consider its wider connection; for although justice has a certain priority and is the most important virtue of the system, other things being equal, a conception of justice is less likely to have a more desirable and wider effect than It is still true to say that another conception of justice is preferable.

It is said that many different things can be classified as just and unjust: not only laws, institutions, and social institutions, but also many specific actions, including decisions, judgments, and condemnations.We also call man's attitudes and tendencies, and man himself, just and unjust.However, the issues we are discussing here; are social justice issues.For us, the basic subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or, more precisely, the way in which the major social institutions distribute basic rights and duties and determine the distribution of benefits arising from social cooperation.As I understand it, major institutions refer to political formations and major economic and social arrangements.In this way, legal protection of the right to freedom of thought and conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of social institutions.Viewed as an arrangement, the major institutions define people's rights and obligations and affect people's life prospects, that is, what they are expected to be and what they can achieve.The basic structure of society becomes the subject of justice because it is far-reaching and has existed from the beginning.Here, the intuitive concept suggests that this structure includes different social positions and that people born with different positions have different expectations of life, which depends partly on the economic and social environment, but also on the political system.In this way, social institutions favor some starting points and disadvantageous others.This is particularly profound inequality.Not only are such inequalities pervasive, but they also affect people's initial chances in life; however, they cannot be justified by concepts such as merit and demerit.Such inequalities are presumably unavoidable in the basic structure of any society, and the principles of social justice must first be applied to such inequalities.These principles thus dictate the choice of political constitution and the basis of economic and social institutions.The justice of social arrangements is fundamentally determined by the distribution of basic rights and duties, as well as by the economic opportunities and social conditions of various parts of society.

The scope of our study is limited to two aspects.First, I am concerned with a special case of justice.I shall not consider questions of justice of institutions and social practices in general, nor, except in passing, of international law and international relations (Section 58).Thus, if we assume that the concept of justice applies wherever it is reasonable to think that there are favorable and unfavorable distributions, we are concerned with only one aspect of that application.There is no reason to assume in advance that the principles applicable to the basic structure will apply in all cases.These principles may not apply to the rules and practices of private groups and to less broad social groups.They may also have nothing to do with the informal customs of everyday life; they may not account for issues of justice.Perhaps even less can it explain the fairness of voluntary cooperative arrangements or contractual agreement procedures.Circumstances in international law may call for different principles, obtained in more or less different ways.I would be content if I could develop a reasonable conception of justice about the basic structure of society (considered, for the moment, as a closed system cut off from other societies).The significance of this special case is obvious and needs no explanation.It is fair and natural to suppose that once we have a reasonable theory applicable to the case, the rest of the problems of justice will be easier to deal with by means of that theory.Suitably modified, this theory should provide clues to some of these questions.

Another limitation on our discussion is that, for the most part, I am dealing with those principles which are likely to govern a well-ordered society.Everyone is expected to act fairly and to play his part in maintaining a just system.Although, as Hume puts it, justice may be a prudent, watchful virtue.But we can still ask, what would a perfectly just society be like?My first consideration, therefore, is what I call the theory of strict compliance as opposed to partial compliance (sections 25, 39).Part of the study of compliance theory are the principles that guide how we respond to injustice.It includes such issues as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of various methods of opposing unjust regimes, from civil and armed resistance to revolution and rebellion.Also included here are issues of compensatory justice and of comparing the injustice of one system with the injustice of another.Clearly, the problems in partial compliance theory are urgent problems that need to be solved, problems that we face in our daily lives.We start with ideal theory because I believe that this theory provides the only basis for our systematic understanding of these more pressing problems.For example, discussions of nonviolent resistance cannot do without this theory (Sections 55-59).At least I can assume that only in this way can a deeper understanding be gained of the nature and aims of a perfectly just society as an essential part of a theory of justice.

It is undeniable, however, that the concept of the basic structure of society is somewhat vague.It is also not always clear which institutions and institutional features should be included in this structure.But it is too early to worry about this issue.I shall begin by discussing certain principles, as they intuitively do apply to those aspects which undoubtedly form part of the basic structure; Those aspects of the foundation of the structure.It is possible, though unlikely, that these principles will turn out to be quite general in the end.As long as they apply to the most important cases of social justice.It should be borne in mind that a conception of justice applicable to the basic structure is worth acquiring even for its own sake, and should not be dismissed because its principles cannot be applied everywhere.

The conception of social justice should therefore be seen as first providing a criterion against which the distributional aspects of the basic structure of society can be evaluated.This criterion, however, must not be confused with the principles which prescribe all other virtues, since basic structures and social arrangements in general are not only just or unjust, but also efficient or inefficient, open or inaccessible, etc.A comprehensive conception of the principles that lay down all the virtues of the basic structure, and the respective degrees of importance of these principles in conflict, is not just a question of justice but a question of social ideals.The principles of justice are but a part, though perhaps the most important, of this conception of justice.The social ideal is related to a certain social view, and the so-called social view is a view on how to understand the purpose of social cooperation.The various conceptions of justice are the products of different social views, and their background is the opposing views of natural needs and human opportunities.To fully understand a conception of justice.We have to figure out the concept of social cooperation that produces this concept of justice.But in doing so, we should not forget the special role of the principles of justice, nor the principal to whom they apply. In these introductory remarks I have distinguished the concept of justice from a conception of justice: a conception of some proper balance between competing claims, and a conception of justice as the recognition of A series of related principles for various considerations of this balance.I also speak of justice as merely part of a certain social ideal, although the theory I am about to present no doubt extends its ordinary meaning.The theory is not presented as an illustration of ordinary meanings, but as an illustration of certain distributive principles applicable to the basic structure of society.I think that any reasonably comprehensive theory of ethics presumably includes principles that apply to this fundamental question and, whatever they are, constitute the theory's doctrine of justice.Thus, I think, the concept of justice is defined by its role in the distribution of rights and duties, as well as in its role in determining the proper distribution of social interests.The concept of justice is an explanation of this role. However, this approach to research may seem unconventional, but I think it is.Aristotle's more explicit definition of justice, and the most familiar formulations derived from it, are all about restraining covetousness, that is, not doing things to gain some advantage for yourself. To seize what belongs to another person, such as his property, his reward, his position, etc.; nor to deprive him of what is due to him, such as fulfilling promises to him, repaying debts owed to him, expressing to him With due respect, etc.Evidently, this definition has been proposed to apply to actions where men have some firm and effective desire to act justly, and regard this desire as one of the permanent elements of their character. , then they can be considered just.However, Aristotle's definition must first clearly state what things originally belonged to a certain person and what things he deserved.However, I believe that these rights usually arise from social institutions and legitimate expectations created by social institutions.There is no reason to think that Aristotle would disagree with this, and he certainly held some conception of justice that accounts for these requirements.The definitions I have adopted are intended to be directly applicable to this most important case, that of basic structural justice.This does not contradict the traditional concept in any way. My purpose is to propose a conception of justice that generalizes social contract theories such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, and raises them to a higher level of abstraction.In doing so, we do not intend to regard the original contract as a contract entered into to join a society or establish some form of government.Instead, we are guided by the idea that the principles of justice applicable to the basic structure of society are the purpose of the original agreement.Free and rational persons concerned with the advancement of their own interests recognize, in an original position of equality, that these principles lay down the basic conditions of their community.These principles also govern all further agreements; they define what social cooperation may be entered into and what kind of government may be established.This view of the principles of justice I will call justice as fairness. Therefore, it is conceivable that those who participate in social cooperation jointly choose the principle of distributing basic rights and duties and determining the distribution of social benefits.People can decide in advance how to align their demands on each other and what is the fundamental charter of their society.Each must decide by rational thought what constitutes their good, that is, the set of goals they can reasonably pursue.Likewise, a group of people must decide once and for all what is just and what is unjust for them.The principles of justice are determined by the choices that rational persons might make in this hypothetical state of equal liberty, assuming, for the moment, that the problem of choice will be resolved. The original state of equality in justice as fairness theory is consistent with the natural state in traditional social contract theory.Of course, this primitive state is not to be regarded as an actual historical situation, still less a cultural primitive state.It is understood as a purely hypothetical state, put forward in order to obtain a certain conception of justice.This state has many characteristics, one of which is that no one knows his place in society, his class position and social status; no one knows his fate in the distribution of natural assets, his abilities, His wit and strength, and so on.I would even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good, nor their particular psychological dispositions.The choice of principles of justice is made under a veil of ignorance.This assures that no one can choose principles to his advantage or disadvantage either as a result of natural chance or by accident of social circumstances.Since everyone is in the same state, no one can devise principles that favor his particular situation, and the result of a fair agreement or transaction is a principle of justice.Given the circumstances of the original position and the symmetry of people's mutual relations, if each person is a moral agent, that is, a rational being, who has his own goals, and I assume that they all have some sense of justice , then this primitive state is fair to them.It can also be said that this original state is the appropriate initial state, and therefore the agreement reached in this state is also fair.This point shows that the formulation "justice is fairness" is appropriate, which expresses the idea that the principles of justice are unanimously agreed in an original state of fairness.This formulation does not imply that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more than the statement "poetry is metaphor" implies that the concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same. I have already said that justice as fairness first identifies the most general choice among all the choices that people may make together, that is, chooses first the basic principles of a certain conception of justice that should guide subsequent criticisms and reforms of the system. in principle.So, after choosing a conception of justice, we assume that they should also choose a constitution, a legislature that makes laws, etc., all in accordance with the originally agreed upon principles of justice.Our state of society is just if it enables us to establish a set of rules governing that state in accordance with this series of hypothetical agreements.Moreover, assuming that the original position does prescribe a set of principles (that is, assuming that some kind of justice is now possible to be chosen), then, so long as social institutions conform to these principles, people participating in these institutions may well say to each other that they are acting according to their co-operate on terms agreed upon, and they can agree on the terms of their co-operation only if they are all free and equal beings, and their mutual relations are fair.They can all regard their arrangements as conforming to all the requirements they might admit in an original position which broadly embodies some accepted and reasonable limits imposed on the principle of choice.The general recognition of this fact will provide the basis for the general recognition of the corresponding principles of justice.No society can, of course, be a cooperative arrangement of persons in which men are truly voluntary; each individual is born into a certain state in a particular society, and the nature of this state actually affects his life prospects.But if a society conforms to the principle that justice is fair, then it is in fact almost a voluntary arrangement, since it conforms to principles that free and equal persons might agree to if they were fair.In this sense, members of this society are self-disciplined, and the obligations they recognize are voluntary. A feature of justice as fairness is the view of the parties in the original position as rational and disinterested persons.This is not to say that all parties are egoists, that is, individuals with some interest in things like wealth, prestige, and dominance.They're just seen as people who have no interest in each other's interests.They will assume that even their spiritual goals may be opposed to each other, just as the goals of people of different religious beliefs are opposed to each other.Moreover, the concept of rationality must be interpreted as narrowly as possible, that is, as the most effective means for a given end, according to the standards of economic theory.I intend to modify this concept somewhat, as explained below (section 25), but one must avoid introducing any controversial ethical elements into it.The original state must be characterized by widely recognized provisions. A major task in formulating justice as fairness is obviously to determine which principles of justice might have been chosen in the original position.To do this, we must describe this state of affairs in some detail and carefully formulate the problems of choice it raises.In the next few chapters I shall bring this question up for discussion.It might be argued, however, that once the principles of justice are recognized as arising from some agreement in some state of equality, it becomes a matter of debate whether the principle of utility will be recognized.It is scarcely possible from the outset that persons who regard themselves as equals, each entitled to compel the other to accept what they want, will agree, entirely for the greater good of others, to a principle which may require some to sacrifice a portion of their own life prospects. possible.Since each wishes to protect his own interests, his entitlement to formulate his own conceptions of the good, there is no reason for anyone to acquiesce to his own long-term loss in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction.Without strong and persistent benevolent impulses, a rational person will not disregard the long-term effects on his basic rights and interests of some basic structure, simply because this structure maximizes the algebraic sum of interests. Just go and accept it.It follows that the principle of utility seems incompatible with the notion of social cooperation between peers for mutual benefit.It also seems inconsistent with the idea of ​​reciprocity embedded in the concept of a well-ordered society.At least, that's how I'll argue. I think, on the contrary, that a man in the original position might choose two rather different principles.The first principle calls for an equal distribution of basic rights and duties.The second principle holds that social and economic inequalities, such as those of wealth and power, can only be compensated if they are ultimately in the interests of everyone, especially the least advantaged members of society That is justice.These principles reject the justification of institutions on the grounds that the suffering of some is compensated by a greater general good.It may be convenient to justify the system, but it is, after all, unjust to require some people to incur their own losses for the prosperity of others.However, if the greater good for some improves the less fortunate situation of some, then there is no injustice.Intuitively, since everyone's welfare depends on cooperative arrangements without which no one can live a satisfactory life, the distribution of benefits should be such that everyone participates in voluntary cooperation, including those less advantaged.However, this can only be expected to happen if reasonable conditions are put forward.The two principles mentioned above seem to be a fair agreement, on the basis of which those who are more fortunate, or socially more fortunate (it cannot be said that we take these two advantages for granted) ), may count on the voluntary co-operation of others when some practicable arrangement becomes necessary for the welfare of all.There is a conception of justice that does not regard accidents caused by natural talents and the randomness of social environment as capital for the pursuit of political and economic interests.Once we decide to seek this conception of justice, we are moving towards these principles.These principles show that they ultimately discard those aspects of social life that, from a certain moral point of view, seem random. However, choosing a principle is an extremely difficult problem.I do not expect the answers I propose to be convincing to everyone.It is therefore worth noting from the outset that justice as fairness, like other contractual views, consists of two parts: (1) an account of the original position and the problems of choice that this position entails, and (2) ) is said to be a set of principles on which there may be unanimous agreement.One can accept the first part of the theory (or some theory different from it) and not the other, or vice versa.The state concept of the original contract might seem reasonable, although certain principles proposed were rejected.Admittedly, what I want to emphasize is that the most appropriate view of the original position does lead to principles of justice that are diametrically opposed to utilitarianism and perfectionism, and thus contractarianism offers an alternative to these views.However, this view can still be questioned, even though it is recognized that the contractarian approach is a useful one for studying ethical theory and formulating its basic assumptions. The concept of justice as fairness is an example of what I call contract theory.Still, one might object to the word "contract" and what it says about it, but I think it's quite useful.The meaning of many words is misleading and can cause confusion at first. The words "utility" and "utilitarianism" are certainly no exception.They can also create inappropriate associations, which can be exploited deliberately by hostile critics; however, to those who are prepared to study utilitarianism, they are quite clear.The same should be true of the word "contract" as applied to moral theory.I said that in order to understand the meaning of the word, one has to remember that it connotes some degree of abstraction.In particular, the content of the agreement is not to join a particular society, nor to adopt a particular regime, but to accept certain moral principles.Moreover, the guarantees mentioned in the agreement are also purely hypothetical: a contractual view holds that certain principles may be recognized in some clearly stated original position. The advantage of the term contract is that it expresses the idea that some conceptions of justice can be explained and justified by viewing principles of justice as principles that a rational person might choose.The theory of justice is part of the theory of rational choice, perhaps the most important part.In addition, the principles of justice deal with conflicting claims to the benefits of social cooperation; these principles also apply to the relations between different individuals and different groups. The word "contract" not only raises the condition that the proper distribution of benefits must be based on principles acceptable to all parties, it also raises the question of this plurality.The publicity condition of the principles of justice is also contained in the terms of the contract.Therefore, if these principles are the result of some kind of agreement, then citizens also know the principles adhered to by others.The characteristic of contract theory is to highlight the openness of political principles.Finally, contract theory also has a long tradition.Revealing a connection to this thought helps to define the concept and is also in line with natural integrity.Thus, the use of the word "contract" has several advantages.With due care, the word is not misleading. Conclusion.The theory of justice as fairness is not a complete theory of contract, since contractarian ideas can obviously be extended to the selection of a more or less complete system of ethics, that is to say, to an ethical system which applies not only to justice but to all virtues The same principles apply to the systems included.For the most part, however, I shall consider only the principles of justice and others closely related to it; I do not intend to deal systematically with the question of virtue.Obviously, if the notion that justice is fair is to hold water, the next step is to examine the more general point that the notion "right is fair" suggests.But even this broader theory does not cover all moral relations, it seems to cover only our relations with other human beings, leaving aside the question of how we should treat animals and the rest of nature.I do not think that the contract view offers a solution to these problems, which are certainly the most important; so I shall have to set them aside.We must admit that the justice-as-fairness view, and the generally representative type of view it embodies, is limited in its reach.一旦对这些不同的问题有了充分的理解，那么必须在多大程度上修改它的结论，这是事先无法决定的。 我说过，原始状态是一种合宜的初始状态，它保证了在这种状态下达成的基本协议是公平的。这个事实产生了“正义即公平”这个提法。团此，显而易见，我所要说的就是，如果这种初始状态中有理性的人为了使正义发挥作用，可能会去选择某种正义观的原则，而不去选择另一种正义观的原则，那么这种正义观就比另一种正义观更合理，或者说，更能证明其为正当。正义观可以按照它们能否为原始状态中的人所接受来排列次序。照此理解，正当理由问题是通过提出审慎考虑这一问题来解决的：我们必须弄清楚的是，对特定的契约状态来说，采用哪些原则才可能是合理的。这样就把正义理论同合理选择理论联系了起乘。 如果这个关于正当理由的观点可以成立，那么我们当然就必须多少详细地说明一下这个选择问题的性质。只有我们知道了各方的信仰和利益，知道了他们的相互关系，他们将要作出的取舍，以及使他们下定决心的过程，等等，合理决定的问题才能有明确的答案。环境的表现方式不同，因而所接受的原则也不同。原始状态这个概念，是在哲学上为了某种正义理论的目的而对这种初始选择状态作出最好的解释时所用的一种概念。这一点我将在下文说明。 但是，我们怎样来判定什么是最好的解释呢？首先，我假定有一种广泛的一致意见认为应在一定条件下选择正义原则。为了证明对这种初始状态的具体说明是正确的，人们指出这种说明体现了这些共同持有的假定。人们可以从得到广泛承认而又不充分的前提开始论述，一直到得出比较明确的结论。每一种假定本身都应该是自然的和能自圆其说的；有些假定看去可能无关痛痒，甚至微不足道。契约论研究方法的目的，是要确认这样的事实：从总体来看，这些假定对可以接受的正义原则规定了重要的范围。理想的结果可能是这些条件确定了一批独一无二的原则；但是，如果这些原则能够胜过一些主要的传统的教会正义观，我也就感到满足了。 因此，人们不应被体现原始状态特征的多少有点奇怪的条件引入歧途。这里的目的只是要让我们明白对赞成正义原则的论据必须有所限制，因而也就是对这些原则本身有所限制，这似乎是合理的。例如，任何人都不应由于天生命运或社会环境而在选择原则时处于有利地位或不利地位，这一点似乎合理的，也是普遍能够接受的。不能让原则来适应一个人自己的情况，这一点也似乎得到了广泛的同意。我们还应进一步保证不使某种倾向和愿望以及个人的关于善的观念来影响所采用的原则。这样做的目的是要排除某些原则，这些原则认为，只要一个人知道某些事从正义的观点看是毫不相干的，那么把这些原则提出来让人们接受（不管成功的可能性是多么小），可能是合理的。例如，如果某个人知道自己富有，他就可能认为，提出把对福利措施征收的各种税看作是不正义的原则是合理的。如果他知道自己贫穷。他很可能会提出完全相反的原则。为了提出所需要的限制，人们设想了一种状态，处于这种状态的每一个人都被剥夺了这方面的知识。人们排除了关于引起纷争、使人们听任偏见支配的这些偶然因素的知识。于是，自然而然就有了无知之幕。如果我们记住无知之幕这个概念是要表明对论据的限制。那么它就不会有任何难解之处了。在任何时候，只要遵循某种程序，即按照这些限制来提出赞成正义原则的论据，我们就能进入所谓的原始状态了． 原始状态中的各方都是平等的，这个假定看来是合理的。就是说，在选择原则的过程中，所有的人都拥有相同的权利；每个人都可以提出建议，提出他们接受建议的理由，等等。显然，这些条件的目的是要表明，作为道德的主体，作为具有自己的关于善的观念和某种正义感的人，他们彼此都是平等的。在这两个方面，平等的基础被认为是相同的。目标系统在价值观中不分等级；每个人都被假定为对所采纳的任何原则具有必要的理解能力和按这些原则行动的能力。这些条件和无知之幕一起，在已知没有任何人由于社会和自然的偶然因素而处于有利或不利地位的情况下，把正义原则规定为关心增进自身利益的有理性的人作为平等的人而可能同意的原则。 然而，还可以从另一方面来证明对原始状态的具体说明是否正确。这就是要弄清楚可能被选择的这些原则是否符合我们对正义的深思熟虑的信念，是否以某种可以接受的方式扩大了这种信念。我们可以注意一下，应用这些原则是否会使我们对社会的基本结构作出同样的判断；而对于这种结构，我们现在都是根据直觉来判断的，同时，我们对这种结构又具有极大的信心。或者，如果我们当前的判断还有可疑之处，而且在作出判断时犹豫不决，那么就要看这些原则是否提供了一种我们在经过反思后能够予以肯定的解决办法。有些问题我们确信是必须以某种方式来作出回答的。例如，我们确信，宗教上不容异己和种族歧视都是不正义的。我们认为，我们已经仔细地研究了这些情况，并且作出了我们相信是公正的判断，因为这种判断不大可能会由于我们过分注意自己的利益而遭到歪曲。这种信念是临时的固定点，我们以为，任何正义观都必须与这个固定点相配合。但对什么是财富和权力的正确分配，我们就不那么有把握。这里，我们可以去寻找一种能够消除我们的疑虑的办法。然后，我就可以对某种关于原始状态的解释进行检查。看它的原则是否能符合我们最坚定的信念，是否能在需要指导的地方提供指导。 在寻找对原始状态的最好说明时，我们可以从两方面进行。首先，我们的说明要能体现普遍具有的、即使有缺陷也是比较可取的条件。然后，我们再来看一看这些条件是不是还能产生一批重要的原则。如果不能，我们再去寻找另外的同样合理的前提。但如果能，而所产生的原则又符合我们对正义的深思熟虑的信念，那就一切顺利。不过，大概也会有不尽如人意之处。如果发生了这种情况，我们也有办法。或者我们可以修改对原始状态的说明，或者我们可以修改我们现有的判断，因为甚至我们临时当作固定点的判断，也是可以修改的。这样反反复复，有时改变契约环境的条件，有时收回我们的判断并使我们的判断与原则相一致，这样，我认为我们最终将会找到一种对原始状态的说明，这种说明既体现了合理的条件，又产生了符合我们经过适当修改和调整的深思熟虑的判断。这种情况我称之为反思平衡。说它是一种平衡，是因为我们的原则与判断终于一致起来了；说它是反思的。是因为我们知道我们的判断与哪些原则相一致，知道这些原则所由产生的前提。这时，一切都是井井有条。但这种平衡不一定是稳定的。由于进一步研究对契约状态所必须规定的条件，由于可能会使我们修改我们的判断的一些特殊情况，这种平衡可能会遭到破坏。然而，就眼前来说，我们已努力做到了使我们对社会正义的信念合乎逻辑，并证明这种信念是正确的。我们已经得到了一种原始状态观。 当然，实际上我不会按照这个过程来做。但我们仍然可以把我将要对原始状态作出的解释看作是这种假定的反思过程的结果。这种解释代表了一种尝试，即在一个安排内不但要使这种解释符合我们对正义的深思熟虑的判断，也要使它符合在哲学上对某些原则所规定的合理条件。在作出对初始状态的最好解释时，无论是对一般观念还是特殊信仰，都无法求助于传统意义上的不证自明性。就拟议中的正义原则来说，我并不认为它们就是必要的真理，或是从这些真理中引伸出来的什么东西，任何正义观都不能从不证自明的前提或从对原则所加的条件中推演出来；相反，一种正义现是否正当，这是一个许多考虑互相印证的问题，是把各方面情况结合成一个合乎逻辑的观点的问题。 结束语。我打算说明的是，某些正义原则之所以正当，是因为它们可能会在一种平等的原始状态中得到一致同意。我已着重指出，这种原始状态是一种纯粹假设的状态。人们自然要问：如果实际上决不会达成这种协议，那么我们为什么还会对道德原则或其他原则感到兴趣呢？对这个问题的回答是；对原始状态的说明中所包含的条件，是我们事实上接受了的条件。或者，如果我们没有接受这些条件，那么我们也许会在通过哲学思考后予以接受。可以对契约状态的每一个方面提出赞同的理由。因此，我们所要做的就是把对原则的若干条件集合成一个观念，而对于这些条件，我们本来就是准备在经过适当的思考后承认它们是合理的。这些限制表明了什么是我们准备把它们看作对社会合作的公平条件所规定的范围。因此，考虑原始状态这个概念的一个方法，就是把它看作是一种说明手段，这种手段概括了这些条件的含义，并帮助我们推断出它们的结果。另一方面，这个概念也是一种直觉概念，它提出了它自己的一套复杂的理论，在这种理论的指导下，我们可以更明确地规定我们能够用来最好地解释道德关系的立场。我们需要一种能使我们从远处展望我们目标的观念：关于原始状态的直觉概念能够帮助我们做到这一点。 有许多种功利主义，功利主义的理论近年来也一直在持续发展。这里我不打算研究所有这些功利主义，也不打算考虑当代这方面讨论中的无数细微差别。我的目的是要提出一种正义理论，它要能为一般的功利主义思想，从而也为这种思想的种种不同翻版，提供一种替代理论。就各方面情况来看，我认为契约观点与功利主义之间的明显差异基本未变。因此，我打算将正义即公平观同众所周知的直觉主义、至善论以及功利主义的各个变种作一比较，以便用最简单的方式指出它们之间的根本差异。从这个目的考虑，我这里将要介绍的那种功利主义是严格的古典理论，它的最明确、最易理解的表述大概来自西奇威克。这个理论的主要思想是；如果社会主要体制的安排获得了社会全体成员总满足的最大净差额，那么这个社会就是一个井井有条的社会，因而也是一个正义的社会。 首先，我们可以指出，事实上有一种关于社会的思想方法，很容易把最合理的正义观设想为功利主义的。试想：每一个人在实现自己的利益时，肯定都要把自己的得失权衡一番。为了以后的更大利益，我们现在可以让自己承受某种牺牲。为了获得自己的最大的善，为了尽可能地推进自己的目标，一个人在至少不影响别人的情况下采取了十分适当的行动。那么，一个社会为什么就不能完全按照适用于集体的那些原则来行动，从而认为对一个人来说是合理的行动，对人们的团体来说也同样是合理的呢？一个人的福利是由他在一生中的不同时刻所感受到的满足构成的。同样，社会的福利基本上也应该是通过实现社会上许多个人的一系列欲望来构成的。既然适用于个人的原则是要尽可能地增进他自己的福利，实现他自己的一系列欲望，那么适用于社会的原则也应该尽可能地去增进集体的福利，最大限度地去实现社会成员的一系列无所不包的欲望。正如个人要在当前与未来的得失之间进行权衡一样，一个社会也可以对不同个人之间的满足与不满足进行权衡。这样，经过了这一番思考，一个人就自然而然地获得了功利原则：如果一个社会的体制最大限度地提高了满足的净差额，这个社会就是一个得到适当安排的社会。适用于人们的团体的选择原则，被认为是适用于一个人的选择原则的延伸。社会正义是适用于某种集体综合福利观的合理审慎原则（第30节）。 进一步的考虑使这种思想变得更有吸引力了。伦理学的两个主要概念是关于正当和善的概念；关于道德高尚的人的概念，我想也是由这两个概念而来的。因此，伦理学理论的结构主要决定于它如何规定和联系这两个基本概念。不过，把它们联系起来的最简单的办法似乎是目的理论：脱离正当而独立地对善作出规定，然后把正当规定为就是最大限度地扩大善。说得更准确些，那些可供选择的、产生最大的善的体制和行动都是正当的，或者至少同实际上可能存在的任何其他体制和行动几乎一样好（如果不是唯一最好的，那就需要有一个附加条件）。目的理论在直觉上有一种强大的吸引力，因为这些理论似乎体现了合理性的概念。人们自然会认为，合理性就是对某件事予以充分的重视，因而在道德上也必定对善于以充分重视。它总是想要假定，对事情的安排要能导致最大的善，这是不证自明的。 最重要的是要记住，在目的论中，善是脱离正当来规定的。这有两个意思。第一，这种理论把我们对哪些事是善的这种经过深思熟虑的判断（我们的价值判断），说成是一种依靠常识就可以从直觉上区别出来的独立判断、接着它提出了一种假设，认为正当最大限度地增进了业已明确规定的善。第二，这种理论使一个人能够对事情的好不好作出判断，而不论其是否正当。例如，如果说享乐是唯一的善。那么根据不是以任何正当标准为先决条件的标准，或者根据我们通常认为的标准。享乐大概也会得到承认并取得其价值地位。而如果把善的分配也算作一种善，可能还是更高一级的善，同时这个理论又指导我们产生最大的善（包括在其他人当中进行的对善的分配），那么我们的观点就不再是传统意义上的目的论的观点了。分配问题是受到正当概念的影响的，人们从直觉上懂得了这一点，'因此，这个理论就不可能独立地对善作出规定。传统的目的论理论的明晰性和单纯性来自这样的事实，即：它们将我们的道德判断分为两类，对一类判断予以单独说明，然后又用一种最大限度原则把另一类判断同它联系起来。 相当明显的是，目的论按照它们对关于善的观念的说明方式而有所不同。如果把关于善的观念看作是在各种文化形态中实现人的优点，那么这也许就是所谓至善论了。除其他一些人外；亚里士多德和尼采也都有这种观点。如果把善规定为享乐，那就是享乐主义；如果把善规定为幸福，那就是幸福论，如此等等。我将把古典的功利原则理解为把善规定为欲望的满足，或者也许更多地是合理欲望的满足。这基本上是同这种观点一致的。而且我认为，它还对这种观点提供了一种合理的解释。 在此情况下，无论什么事情，只要能使个人的合理欲望获得最大总量的满足，就都可以用来决定社会合作的适当条件。无可否认，这种观念初看起来似乎有理，有其吸引人之处。 功利主义的正义观的显著特征是：这种满足的总量如何在个人之间进行分配，除了间接影响外，是无关紧要的，正如一个人如何对各个时期分配自己的满足，除间接影响外，是无关紧要的一样。在这两种情况中，正确的分配都能产生最大限度的满足。社会必须把它所拥有的任何满足手段拿来分配，而不论这些手段是权利和义务、机会和特权以及形形色色的财富，以便尽可能地实现这种最大限度的满足。没有任何一种对满足的分配其本身会比另一种更好，除非为了打破僵局而选择更平等的分配。诚然，关于正义的某些常识性准则，尤其是涉及保护自由权和权利的准则，或体现对赏罚要求的准则，似乎是同这种论点相矛盾的。但根据某种功利主义的观点，对这些准则及其表面严格性质的解释是：经验表明，如果要最大限度地提高利益总量，那么这些准则就是应当予以严格尊重的准则，只有在特殊情况下才可以背离。然而，同其他所有准则一样，正义的准则是从实现满足的最大差额这个唯一目的派生出来的。例如，从原则上说，没有理由不以某些人的有余去补另一些人的不足；或者更重要的是，没有理由可以不去用许多人共同享有的较大利益来纠正少数人的自由权所遭到的破坏。在大多数情况下，至少在文明的相当高级阶段，利益的最大总量才偶尔不是用这种办法得到的。毫无疑问，正义的常识性准则为严格性对限制人们的不正义倾向，对限制危害社会的行为倾向，具有某种用途，但功利主义者认为，断言这种严格性就是道德的一个基本原则，那是错误的。正如一个人最大限度地实现自己的一系列欲望是合理的一样，一个社会最大限度地提高它的全体成员的满足的净差额也是理所当然的。 因此，达到功利主义的最自然的办法（虽然肯定不是唯一的办法），就是为整个社会采用适合于个人的合理选择原则。一旦这一点得到承认，公正旁观者的地位和功利主义思想史对同情的强调也就容易理解了。正是由于这种公正旁观者的观念，由于用对同情的认同作用来指导我们的想象，适用于个人的原则得以运用于社会。在人们的想象中，正是这种旁观者把所有人的欲望结合成一个必要的合乎逻辑的欲望系统；正是由于这种结合，许多人就融合成了一个人。这个公正的旁观者是一个具有同情能力和想象力的理想人物，因而也是一个完全有理性的人，他认为自己的欲望和别人的欲望是一致的，他能体会别人的欲望，就像是他自己的欲望一样。这样，他查明了这些欲望的强烈程度，并确定了它们在这一个欲望系统中的适当比重，然后，由理想的立法者通过对社会制度的各种规章进行调整，努力使这些欲望得到最大限度的满足。按照这种社会观，不同的个人被看作是许多不同的尺度，权利和义务以及不多的满足手段都要用这些尺度按章予以确定和分配，以便最大限度地满足需要。因此，理想的立法者作出的决定与企业家或消费者作出的决定，实质上并没有什么不同：企业家的决定是如何通过生产这种或那种产品来使自己获得最大限度的利润，而消费者的决定则是通过购买这种或那种商品来使自己获得最大限度的满足。在每一种情况下，都只有单独一个人，他的系统欲望决定了有限手段的最佳分配。正确的决定基本上是一个有效管理的问题。这种关于社会合作的观点，是把适用于个人的选择原则扩大应用于社会，然后为了实现这种扩大应用，通过公正而富有同情心的旁观者富有想象力的行动，把所有的人融合成一个人的结果。功利主义对人们之间的差异是并不认真看待的。