Chapter 45 (b) Inversion ①

①Inversion (Verstellung) has the meaning of reversing the position or misplacing it. For the convenience of writing, it is sometimes translated as inversion, inversion, abolishment, or even negation below.The original intention is to point out the contradiction of Kant's morality.The original German text of this word has the meaning of artificiality, pretense, and fooling around.Therefore, at the end of this section, we talk about the hypocrisy caused by the inversion of morality. - translator In the moral worldview we see, on the one hand, that consciousness itself consciously creates its own object; in front of it.Rather, it is everywhere reasoning according to grounds, thus assuming this objective essence or objective essence.It therefore knows that the objective essence is itself, because it knows itself to be the active thing (das Tatige) which produces the object.Consciousness here, therefore, seems to have attained its tranquility and contentment, for it can only be satisfied and quiet when it no longer needs to go beyond its object, since at that point its object no longer goes beyond it.But on the other hand, we see that consciousness rather sets its objects outside itself, as its own other shore.But this being for itself is at the same time assumed to exist not independently of self-consciousness, but for self-consciousness and because of self-consciousness.

I．Contradictions in the Moral Worldview The moral worldview is thus in fact nothing but the full development of this fundamental contradiction into its various aspects; and, to use Kant's term, which is very aptly employed here, it is the whole Wo ① no ideological contradictions.What consciousness does in this development is this: it establishes one moment, then immediately turns to another, and discards the first; This second link, on the contrary, takes its opposite as its essence.At the same time it is well aware of its contradictions and inversions [actions], because it is directly connected with the moment itself when it passes from one moment to its opposite; just because a moment has no reality for it, It just wants to posit this moment as real, or, to put it another way, in order to claim that a moment exists in itself, it asserts that its opposite moment is a moment in itself.In this way, it amounts to an admission that it does not in fact take either of these two links seriously at all.And this we can examine in detail from the moments of this inverted (deceitful) movement.

① Kant called the proof of cosmology "a whole nest of dialectical (contradictory) preposters". (, Philosophy Series Vol. 37, Ninth Edition, p. 524, line 18.) - Original Editor First we let the presupposition "there is an actual moral consciousness" be grounded in itself, since this assumption has no direct connection with anything before, and then we examine the first postulate of the harmony between morality and nature. The harmony between morality and nature should be a natural (or potential) harmony, a harmony not known to actual consciousness, a harmony that does not appear in consciousness, on the contrary, what is presented in consciousness is, rather, only morality and nature The contradiction between the two.So far as it is presented to consciousness, morality is taken as a given, and reality is assumed to be incompatible with morality.But the actual moral consciousness is an acting consciousness, and precisely because it is acting, its morality has reality.But in the act, or the act itself, that position is directly reversed; for the act is nothing but the fulfillment of an inner moral purpose, to produce a reality determined by the moral purpose, or, rather, to be To create harmony in the reality of moral purpose itself.At the same time, the completion of the act is also known to consciousness as the present present in consciousness of this unity of reality and purpose; and because in the completed act consciousness has realized itself as this individual consciousness, or That is to say, consciousness sees that it has retrieved objective existence, and that enjoyment consists in this retrieval, so the realization of moral ends also involves the realization of the moral ends called enjoyment and happiness. ——So in fact, the behavior directly realizes what was originally regarded as unrealizable, as a postulate, as a beyond.

Consciousness then shows by what it does that it does not take its postulates seriously, because then the point of the action is rather to make present what would not be present.And since harmony is posited for action—for anything that becomes actual by action must be itself (or potentially) what it is, or it cannot be actual,— The relation between action and postulate thus becomes this: for the sake of action, that is to say, for the sake of the actual harmony of purpose and reality, this harmony is posited as unreal, otherworldly. Now that there is action, the incompatibility of purpose and reality is not serious at all, but on the contrary, the action itself seems to be taken seriously.However, actual behavior is in fact only the behavior of individual consciousness, because the behavior itself is only an individual thing, and the enterprise (or work) it produces is nothing but an accidental thing.But the end of reason, as an all-encompassing general end, is no less than the whole world; it is an ultimate end, which goes beyond the content of individual actions, and therefore should be placed at the root of all actual actions. superior.Since the ordinary supreme good remains to be realized, nothing good can be done.But in fact, the nihility of the actual act, and the reality of the whole purpose, which has not been posited until now, have also been inverted in every respect.Moral action is not something accidental and finite, since it is essentially pure duty; pure duty constitutes the only whole end; It is the completion of the entire absolute purpose.

Or, let us assume again; what if reality is nature, and nature has its own laws, which are the opposite of pure duty, and therefore duty cannot realize its own laws in it?That is, since the duty itself is the essence, it has in fact nothing to do with the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the pure duty which constitutes the whole end; stuff, reality.But the point of indifference to reality is turned upside down again; for pure duty, according to the concept of moral action, is essentially the consciousness of action; therefore, in any case, there should be action, absolute duty should be expressed in the whole of nature, moral Laws should become laws of nature.

So if we let this highest good be the essence, then consciousness is not taking morality seriously at all.For in this highest good there is naturally no other law than the moral law.And then the moral action itself disappears, since there is action only on the assumption that there is a negativity which needs to be overcome by the action.But if nature is in accordance with the moral law, then through action, through the overcoming and sublation of the existing existence, the moral law is not violated. —This assumption is therefore tantamount to admitting an essential state in which moral action is superfluous or even non-existent.Hence the postulate of the harmony between morality and nature (which harmony is posited by the concept of moral action which brings them together) can only be expressed in this respect as follows: For moral action is the absolute end , so the absolute purpose means: moral behavior does not exist at all.

If we bring together the moments through which consciousness develops and progresses in its own moral representation, we see clearly that consciousness resublates each moment in its opposite.From this it follows that morality and reality appear to consciousness to be disharmonious; but it does not take this disharmony seriously, because in behavior the harmony of morality and reality is present to consciousness.But since action is an individual thing, consciousness does not take it seriously either; for it has the lofty purpose of the highest good.But this, too, is just another inversion of the matter, for here all behavior and all morality are supposed to disappear.In other words, consciousness does not really take moral action seriously, but rather thinks that the most desirable and absolute situation is when the highest good is realized and moral action becomes superfluous.

Ⅱ.morality transformed into its opposite Proceeding from this consequence, consciousness must continue its contradictory movement and must again abolish its sublation of moral action.Morality is in itself; if it is to be realized, the ultimate purpose of the world cannot be realized, moral consciousness must be for itself, and there must be a nature opposed to it.But moral consciousness must be accomplished in itself.This leads to the second postulate: moral consciousness is in harmony with nature, that is, sensibility, immediately within itself.Moral self-consciousness assumes its own ends to be pure and independent of desires and impulses, so that sensual ends have been purged of them. —But this sublation of the sensuous essence which it has just established, it immediately abolishes.It acts to realize its purpose, and this conscious sensibility, which should have been superseded, is this middle term between pure consciousness and reality, the instrument or organ which pure consciousness uses to realize itself, and which It is the so-called impulse, desire.Therefore, consciousness is not seriously sublating desires and impulses, because desires and impulses are self-consciousness that realizes itself.But desires and impulses should not be suppressed, but should be in line with reason.They are also indeed rational, since moral action is nothing but a self-realizing consciousness that gives itself a form of impulse, that is to say, moral action is directly the realization between impulse and morality. harmony.But in fact impulse is not just a form of emptiness, as if it had some other spring in itself to push it.Because sensibility is a kind of nature, and this nature itself has its inherent laws and springs; therefore, morality cannot be seriously regarded as the mobilizing spring of impulse and the adjusting square of desire.For, since impulses and desires have their own fixed determinate and unique content, it is not so much that they correspond to consciousness as consciousness does to them; Impossible to do.Therefore, the harmony between the two parties is only comfortable and set. —The present harmony between morality and sensibility, which has just been established in moral conduct, is now denied or abolished; the harmony is beyond consciousness, in a dim distance, where neither No definite distinction can be made any more, since we have just tried to grasp this unity, and it has proved impossible. — But in this ease [harmony] fundamentally consciousness has completely abandoned itself.This freedom (harmony) is the moral completion of consciousness in which the struggle between morality and sensibility has ceased, and the sensibility has conformed to morality in some intangible way. —Then this consummation is again only an inversion of the matter, since in fact it is morality itself that abandons itself in this consummation, since morality is only the absolute end, the pure end, that is, with all other ends Consciousness of opposing ends; morality is at the same time the activity of this pure end, and at the same time the consciousness that it rises above sensibility, that sensibility is mixed into itself, and that it is Fight against sensibility. —The fact that consciousness does not take moral fulfillment seriously can be seen directly in its own actions, since it has transposed moral fulfillment upside down into the infinite, that is to say, it considers moral fulfillment to be eternal. unattainable.

Therefore, what can be regarded as valid and accurate for consciousness is such an incomplete intermediate state. Although this intermediate state is not completed, it is at least a progressive process that should tend to be completed.But this intermediate state cannot be progress either; for progress in morality would be a progress towards the extinction of morality.Because this kind of progress will aim at the above-mentioned nothingness or annihilation of morality and consciousness itself; and approaching nothingness step by step forever is called regression.And there is another level, that progress, as well as regression, will admit that there are quantitative differences in morality, but in this field, there is no such thing as a small difference at all.In morality, in the consciousness of an ethical purpose as a pure duty, one cannot conceive of any difference at all, especially not such a superficial difference of magnitude; there is only one virtue, there is only one pure duty, there is only one morality.

Then, since consciousness does not take seriously the completion of morality, but takes seriously the intermediate state, which is the immoral [state] we just discussed, then we come back to the content of the first postulate from another aspect .For we do not see how we can claim happiness for a moral consciousness for the sake of its dignity or worth.The moral consciousness is well aware that it has not accomplished itself, so that in fact it demands happiness not from a reward it seems to be entitled to, but rather only from a free gift, that is to say, of all that it can claim. Happiness is happiness itself (alssolche) in itself and for itself; and it cannot expect happiness from any absolute ground, but only from accident and arbitrariness. — Here the immorality [state] is precisely revealed: it is not morality at first, but the happiness in itself and for itself which has nothing to do with morality.

Through this second aspect of the moral worldview, another assertion of the first, namely the assertion that morality and happiness are assumed to be incompatible, is concomitantly discarded. —One would fancy that it is an empirical fact that in our present world the virtuous are often unlucky, and the immoral are often fortunate.But the incomplete moral intermediate state, which has shown itself to be of essential importance, clearly indicates that this perception and so-called experience is only a perversion of the matter.For since morality is something incomplete, that is, since there is in fact no morality, what meaning can there be in such an experience of moral misfortune? —Since the truth at the same time shows that happiness in itself and for itself is at stake, it is also clear that when people make the assertion that "immoral people live well," they do not have in mind what they have in mind. Not the kind of injustice, immorality that actually happens here.Since morality in general is incomplete, the notion of calling someone an immoral disappears in itself, and thus has only an arbitrary justification.Therefore, the content meaning of this empirical assertion is nothing more than saying that some people do not deserve happiness in and for themselves, that is to say, the real meaning of this assertion is a kind of envy dressed in a moral cloak.But people also say that there are other people who deserve what is called happiness. What is the reason for it?This is actually out of a good friendship, and because of the friendship, I hope that those of them and myself can enjoy this gift and this opportunity. Ⅲ.The Truth of Moral Self-Consciousness Morality is thus incomplete in moral consciousness.This point is now set.However, the essence of morality is only that it is a completed and pure thing; therefore, morality that is not completed is impure morality, and it can also be said to be immoral.So morality itself is in another essence than actual consciousness, and this essence is a divine moral law-maker or moral legislator. —The incomplete morality in consciousness, that is, the morality on which this postulate is grounded, originally had the meaning that morality, since it is posited as actual in consciousness, is related to an other, a definite being. It is related, and therefore contains in itself other things or differences, and because it contains other things or differences in itself, it produces a large number of moral commandments.But moral self-consciousness at the same time regards these many duties as unessential and unimportant; Specific, impure, has no truth.They thus acquire their truth only in an Other, and they are not divine in the eyes of the moral self-consciousness, but only in virtue of a divine lawgiver. ①—But this situation itself is once again nothing but an inversion of the matter.For moral self-consciousness is its own absolute, and duty is only that duty which it knows.But it only knows that pure duty is duty; that which it considers unholy is unholy in itself, and that which is unholy in itself cannot be sanctified for the sake of the divine essence.Nor is the moral consciousness at all serious about sanctifying the unholy through a consciousness other than itself; What is holy is holy. —It therefore does not take seriously the fact that this other essence is a divine essence, since in this other essence something which is not inherently essential to the moral consciousness acquires essential. ① Kant himself said: "Moral laws ... lead to religion, that is to say, they make people realize that all duties are divine precepts, not ... but the essential laws of every free will itself, But these laws should be regarded as the precepts of the highest existence." Refer to "Critique of Practical Reason", Business Edition, p. 132. - translator If, then, the Divine Essence was supposed to be such that the duty valid in it was not a pure duty but a multitude of definite duties, this positing must also be overthrown, and the other essence , must be sacred only in such a case, that is, only insofar as in it only pure obligations have validity.In fact pure duty is indeed valid only in another essence, not in moral consciousness.Although it seems that pure morality is the only valid in moral consciousness, after all, moral consciousness must be posited in another way, because it is not only moral consciousness but also natural consciousness.Morality, in its [moral consciousness], is inspired by sensibility and is produced by sensibility's constraints, so it is not for itself, but an accidental result of free will; but in it, if it is pure Will, then morality is a contingent result of knowledge; therefore morality is not in it, but only in another essence. This essence is now pure and complete morality, since in this essence morality has no relation to nature and sensibility.However, the reality of pure duty lies in its realization in nature and sensibility.Moral consciousness regards itself as incomplete in that morality maintains a positive relation to nature and sensibility, because it considers morality to be moral only if it maintains a negative relation to nature and sensibility. where the essential link is.The pure moral essence, on the contrary, does not have a negative relation to nature and sensibility because it transcends the struggle with nature and sensibility.In reality, therefore, there remains only one relation, a positive relation, to them, that is to say, the relation left to it is that which has just been called unfinished immorality.But pure morality, since it is completely isolated from reality, so that it has no positive relationship with reality, should be an unconscious and unreal abstraction, and in this abstraction, morality is a kind of pure duty. One kind of thinking and one kind of will and action, the concept of which should have been completely sublated.So this pure moral essence, which is nothing but an inversion of the matter, must also be discarded. But in this pure moral essence, the moments of the contradiction in which this composite representation moved back and forth, approach each other; In the same way, these opposite thoughts, these "also" words, which this synthetic representation does not bring together but makes (successively) appear successively and constantly replace by their opposites, approach each other; So close to each other that consciousness can now flee to itself without abandoning its moral worldview. The reason why the moral consciousness realizes that its morality is incomplete is that it is affected by a sensibility and nature that is opposed to morality. On the one hand, sensibility and nature confuse morality itself so that it cannot be pure morality, on the other hand, it creates A collection of duties to perplex the moral consciousness in the particular events of actual conduct; for each event is a convergence of moral relations, just as each object of perception is a thing containing many attributes; and Since a particular duty is an end, it has a content, and its content is part of the end, so morality is impure. — Morality is then for itself, — for itself, that is to say, it is a conscious morality, and in itself, that is to say, it has a specific existence and reality. —In the first unfinished consciousness, morality is not practiced, it is there a being in itself, that is to say, it is a thinking thing, because it is with nature and sensibility, with the reality of existence and consciousness. Reality is bound together, with this reality as its content; nature and sensibility are moral nothingness. —In the second consciousness, morality appears as accomplished and not as an unexecuted thought thing.But this fulfillment consists precisely in the fact that morality has reality in a consciousness, and a free reality, a specific existence in general, so that morality is not something empty, but something full of content;—that is to say, The completion of morality consists in the fact that what has just been defined as the moral nothing is pervasive throughout morality.Morality is then sometimes said to be valid only as a purely abstract, unreal thought-thing, and sometimes it is said to be completely ineffective just in this case; its truth consists suddenly in its opposition to reality, in its Completely free from reality, and suddenly it is reality. In the past, these contradictions were differentiated, decomposed, and unfolded in the moral worldview. They used to be a complex collection of contradictions; now, this complicated pile of contradictions has disappeared by itself.For the distinction on which the contradictions rest, which had to be conceived, was posited as a last resort, and at the same time was not essential, has now become a distinction even between words and sentences. There is no longer any distinction.As a result, what is posited as differential, whether as nothing equal to zero or as a real thing, is exactly the same thing, specific existence and reality; , which at the same time exists absolutely only in moral consciousness, and which, as a beyond, ought to be nothing, is pure duty and the knowledge that pure duty is essence.Consciousness, which makes this distinction which is not a distinction, which declares reality to be both nothing and a real thing at the same time, which expresses that pure morality is both true essence and at the same time nothing of essence, this consciousness which now separates what it had previously divided into articulated together those thoughts of the present, and it shows itself that it does not take this determination nor the distinction between the two moments of self and being-in-itself seriously, but rather takes it What it proclaims to exist absolutely outside consciousness remains within the self-conscious ego, and thus treats what it proclaims to be absolute thought or absolute in itself as a thing without truth. —Consciousness now clearly recognizes that to distinguish and place these links separately is a confusion of things, and if it really continues to be reversed, then it is hypocrisy.But it, pure self-consciousness as morality, now casts aside this dissimilarity between its representation and its essence, this proclaiming as true what it considers untrue. Untruth, fleeing back to itself in disgust.It is pure conscience, which despises such a moral outlook on the world; it is the simple self-confirmed spirit in itself, which acts directly on conscience without the intermediary of the above appearances, and whose truth is In this immediacy. —But if this world of inversions of truth and falsehood is nothing but the development of moral self-consciousness in its own moment, and thus its reality, then by its very nature its return to itself will also be It becomes nothing else; its return to itself means only that it has become aware that its truth is a false truth. But it cannot but always use this false truth to confuse its truth, because it cannot but express and present itself as an objective appearance, but at the same time it knows that doing so is just a confuse and perversion; In fact, it is hypocrisy, and the attitude of contempt for the above-mentioned upside-down and fooling is already the initial manifestation of hypocrisy.