Chapter 44 (a) Moral worldview

Ⅰ.The posited harmony between duty and reality Self-consciousness knows duty as the absolute essence; it is bound only by duty, and this substance is its inherent pure consciousness; for duty cannot appear in the form of an alien thing to self-consciousness.But closed within itself in this way, moral self-consciousness is not yet conceived as consciousness.The object is an immediate knowledge, and such an object, which is completely permeated by the ego, is not an object.However, since self-consciousness is essentially mediation and negation, its concept contains its relationship with an other being, so it is consciousness.Since duty constitutes the only essential purpose and object of self-consciousness, this otherness is, on the one hand, a completely meaningless reality for self-consciousness.But since this consciousness is so completely enclosed within itself, its relation to this otherness is completely free and independent, and therefore, on the other hand, his being is a kind of self-consciousness entirely independent of self-consciousness. emancipated and therefore only related to itself; the freer the self-consciousness is, the freer is the negative object of its consciousness.The object is thus a world that realizes its individuality in itself, an independent whole with its own laws, and an independent process and free realization of these laws—a natural general, which A nature, its laws and actions, are subordinate to itself, and itself, as an essence, is as indifferent to moral self-consciousness as moral self-consciousness is indifferent to it. ①From this stipulation, a moral world view is formed, which is composed of the relationship between moral being-for-itself and natural being-for-itself.This relation is based on two assumptions, on the one hand, the assumption that nature and morality (moral purpose and activity) are completely independent and independent of each other, and on the other hand, the consciousness that only duty is essential. Nature, on the other hand, has no independence or essence.The moral world outlook involves the development of two stages, and these two stages are in the relationship between the two completely contradictory assumptions mentioned above.

① Moral self-consciousness has only one purpose and object, and that is duty; but since it is consciousness, it has a natural relationship with an other being, just as Kant set in "Critique of Practical Reason".And because of this duality and duality, Kant's and even Fichte's moral world view came into being. - translator First, then, moral consciousness in general is assumed; this moral consciousness in general is real and active, it fulfills obligations in its actuality and in its actions, it takes obligations as its essence.But at the same time, this moral consciousness presupposes the freedom of nature, in other words, it knows from experience that nature is indifferent to its awareness of the unity of its reality with that of nature, and knows that nature may Make it happy or not make it happy.Conversely, the immoral consciousness may occasionally be realized, in which case the moral consciousness sees only the motives for action, but does not derive from the action the fulfillment of happiness and the fulfillment of what is due to practice. Enjoy it.Moral consciousness, therefore, rather has good reason to complain of this inconsistency and injustice between itself and particular beings, in which moral consciousness can only have its object without seeing its object, its realized self or self.

Moral consciousness must never abandon happiness, never exclude the moment of happiness from its absolute purpose.The end, expressed as pure duty, itself necessarily entails this individual self-consciousness; for the individual's beliefs and the knowledge of them constitute an absolute moment in morality.The moment in the objectified end, that is, in the fulfilled duty, is the individual consciousness intuiting the realized self, in other words, the moment of enjoyment, which, of course, is not directly contained in the act. In the moral conception of an intention, it is contained in the moral conception of an actualization.But then enjoyment is included in morality as disposition, since morality does not seek to maintain itself as an disposition opposed to action, but rather to do something, in other words, to realize itself.The end, therefore, as the whole expressed as being aware of the moments it contains, has the meaning that the fulfilled duty is both a purely moral act and embodied individuality, and naturally, as The aspect of individuality, as opposed to the abstract end, is also united with this end. —The incongruity between these two aspects must appear empirically because, while nature is free, duty is likewise the only essential thing, whereas nature, in contrast to duty, is selfless. thing.The whole purpose mentioned above, constituted by the harmony of both parties, contains within itself reality itself.This purpose is at the same time the actual thought.The harmony between morality and nature—or, to put it another way, since nature comes into consideration only when consciousness experiences its own unity with nature, let us replace nature with happiness—between morality and happiness Harmony is conceived as necessarily existing, or in other words, this harmony is set.For to posit or to require means to say that something which is not yet actual is conceived to exist; the necessity shown here is not a necessity of the concept as a concept but a necessity of existence.However, necessity is also essentially a relationship produced by concepts.The existence thus required or posited is not that which belongs to the appearance of accidental consciousness, but is contained in the moral concept itself, the real content of which is the unity of pure consciousness with individual consciousness; It sees that this unity is for it a reality which, as the content of the end, is happiness, and as the form of the end, specific being in general. —Therefore, the particular being or unity of the two that is demanded here is not a desire, or, if it is taken as an end, it is not a condition whose realization is uncertain. A purpose, on the contrary, is rather a requirement of reason, or rather an immediate certainty and precondition of reason.

The first kind of experience mentioned above and the setting (or postulat Postulat) we are talking about now are not the only experience and the only postulate; instead, there is a whole series of postulates, which are now displayed.For nature is not only this external mode of [being] which is completely free and independent, or it is not only a pure object by which consciousness must, as it were, achieve its own ends.Consciousness, in itself, is essentially that for which there exists this other free and independent reality, that is to say, itself a contingent and natural thing.This nature, which for consciousness belongs to consciousness, is sensibility in the form of will, as impulse and passion, which for itself has a definite essentiality inherent in itself, That is to say, there is an individual purpose; it is thus opposed to pure will and its pure purpose.However, for pure consciousness, the essence is not so much the opposition between the two sides, but rather the relationship between sensibility and pure consciousness, the absolute unity of sensibility and pure consciousness.Pure thought and the sensibility of consciousness are both in themselves one and the same consciousness, and it is for pure thought and precisely in pure thought that there is this pure unity; but when pure thought as consciousness There is, for it, its own opposition to the impulse.In the case of such a conflict between reason and sensibility, the essential thing for reason is that the conflict is eliminated and unity arises, and that this unity as a result of the elimination of conflict is not due to the original The unity of the two, but the unity that arises from the knowledge of the opposition between the two.Such a unity is real morality, because it contains the antithesis through which the self is consciousness or a real and factual self and at the same time a universal ; in other words, because it is in this unity that the mediation that we consider to be of essential importance to morality emerges. —Since, in the two moments of opposition, sensibility is entirely other-being or negation, and the pure thought of duty is the essence, in which there is nothing to give up, it seems that only through the way of sublating sensibility can the To that unity which has been produced.But since sensibility itself is a moment in this process of realization, the real moment, one will have to say for the moment that this unity is the agreement of sensibility with morality. —This unity is likewise an established being, which does not actually exist; for what actually exists is consciousness, in other words, the opposition of sensibility to pure consciousness.However, this unity is not a self-existence at the same time. Like the first postulate, in the first postulate, the free and independent nature constitutes an opposite, so the harmony between the opposite nature and moral consciousness appears in The latter is also outside moral consciousness; here, on the contrary, it is naturally in moral consciousness itself; and it is morality itself that we are considering here, a harmony inherent in the acting self; therefore , consciousness must itself create this harmony, must always move forward in morality.But the fulfillment of morality can be deduced to infinity; for if morality does appear, moral consciousness will sublate itself.Since morality is only a moral consciousness as a negative essence, sensibility has only a negative meaning for the pure duty of moral consciousness, and is only something that is inconsistent [with pure duty].But in moral harmony, morality, as moral consciousness or as moral reality, disappears, just as moral harmony disappears in moral consciousness or in moral reality.Moral fulfillment, therefore, cannot actually be attained, but rather is an absolute task which can only be conceived, that is to say, a task which remains forever to be accomplished.At the same time, the content of this kind of task can be conceived as absolutely indispensable, so it will not always be just a task; no matter whether people imagine that moral consciousness is completely abandoned when this moral goal is achieved. Well, it doesn’t matter whether it’s sublated or not; anyway, what the real situation is like, because the achievement of the goal must be pushed to the infinite distance, so in such a vague infinite distance, it can no longer be clearly distinguished.In truth, we shall have to say that the above-mentioned particular imagination or "thought" is not of interest to one, nor is it one to seek, for to do so would necessarily lead to a contradiction: ——

This is the contradiction involved in a task that should never be accomplished, yet should have been accomplished; it is the contradiction involved in a morality [as a Realistic moral consciousness] should no longer be a consciousness, no longer realistic.But if we accept this view, admitting that there is a contradiction in morality fully realized, then the essential sanctity of morality must be tainted, and absolute duty must appear as something unreal. The first postulate is the harmony between morality and objective nature, which is the ultimate goal of the world; the other postulate is the harmony between morality and perceptual will, which is the ultimate goal of self-consciousness itself; therefore, the first postulate is in the form of self-existence Another postulate is harmony in the form of being-for-itself.But the middle term which connects these two extremities, that is, the two conceived ultimate ends, is the movement of the actual action itself.These are two harmonies, each of which contains moments of difference, but these moments have not yet become objects of each other in their abstract difference; Present in true consciousness, each aspect present as the other of the other.The resulting postulates are different from the previous postulates, which only contained respectively the harmony of being-in-itself and the harmony of being-for-itself, but now it contains the harmony of being-in-itself and for-itself.

Ⅱ.The Divine Lawgiver and Incomplete Moral Self-Awareness Moral consciousness, as the simple knowledge and simple will of pure duty, in the process of acting, is related to the object that is contrary to its simplicity, that is, to the complex and diverse reality, thus achieving a complex and diverse moral relationship .Now, in terms of content, numerous general laws emerge, and in terms of form, conflicting forces of what belongs to the knowing consciousness and what belongs to the unconscious. —In the first place, as far as the multitude of duties is concerned, it is only the pure duty among the multitude that is generally valid for the moral consciousness; , so there is nothing sacred to the moral consciousness.But at the same time, through the concept of action, these numerous duties must be regarded as existing in themselves and for themselves, because the action itself contains a variety of realities and thus a variety of relations.Moreover, since they can exist only in one moral consciousness, they all exist at the same time in another moral consciousness different from the previous moral consciousness, and for this other moral consciousness, only pure duty as pure duty can exist. It is in and for itself and a sacred duty.

Thus, the existence of another consciousness presupposes that it is this other consciousness which sanctifies, or recognizes and desires, duties as duties.The first sense regards pure duty as indifferent to all definite content, and duty is precisely this indifference to definite content.But another consciousness maintains an equally important relation to action and recognizes the necessity of a particular content; Consciousness is as essential as the form by which content becomes duty.This other consciousness is, therefore, that consciousness in which the universal and the particular are perfectly united, and whose concepts are those of morality and happiness in harmony with each other.For this opposition likewise shows the division between the self-equal moral consciousness and the reality which, as a plurality of beings, conflicts with the simple nature of duty.But if at first the first postulate only expressed the existing harmony between morality and nature, because there nature is the negation of self-consciousness, the moment of existence, now, on the contrary, here, in essence, this Freedom (harmony) is posited as a consciousness.For what exists now assumes the form of the content of the obligation, in other words, becomes a determinate character in the particular obligation.In-itself [harmony] is thus the unity of thinking essences which, as simple essences, can exist only in one consciousness.This consciousness is now a master and ruler of the world, which harmonizes morality and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties as duties of a plurality.The sanctification of duties implies that, in the sense of pure duty, specific duties cannot be immediately sacred; If it is equally necessary, then the necessity of a specific obligation goes beyond the above-mentioned consciousness and falls into another consciousness, and this other consciousness is then the intermediary consciousness between the specific duty and the pure duty, and it is the consciousness that the specific duty can effectively implement. basis.

But in actual action consciousness takes itself as this (specific) ego, as an entirely individual consciousness; it is directed against reality itself, and aims at reality; Finish.Duty generally then falls into another essence than it [this actual consciousness], and this other essence is the pure consciousness and divine lawgiver of duty.The acting consciousness, because it actually acts, sees the other or other (of pure duty) only as directly valid, and therefore pure duty is the content of another consciousness and is only indirectly acted upon. One's consciousness is considered divine, indirectly, because it belongs to another consciousness.

In this way, since the validity of duty as a sacred thing for itself is assumed to fall outside the actual consciousness, then the actual consciousness, as an incomplete moral consciousness, is only on one side. one-sided.Just as the imperfect moral consciousness, on the part of its knowledge, knows that its knowledge and confidence are imperfect and accidental, so also, on the part of its will, it knows that its ends are influenced by sensibility.Because of its low value, it cannot regard happiness as necessary, but only as an accident, and can only hope to obtain happiness by gift. But in spite of the incomplete reality of the imperfect moral consciousness, its pure will and knowledge take duty as its essence; In thought, it is complete.But the Absolute Essence is precisely what is thought, what is posited beyond reality; it is thus the thought in which morally incomplete knowledge and willingness are treated as perfect knowledge and will, and in this kind of thinking, just because this incomplete knowledge and will are regarded as the most important things, so it is also in accordance with high moral values, that is to say, in accordance with what this incomplete moral consciousness should be. Get the evaluation, give happiness.

Ⅲ.On Moral World View The moral worldview is complete here.For, in the concept of moral self-consciousness, the two aspects of pure duty and reality are placed in a unity, so that neither exists in and for itself, but rather is discarded as a moment or as a sublation. stuff.This is recognized by consciousness in the final stage of the formation of the moral world-view; it places the pure duty in an essence different from itself, that is to say, on the one hand it posits the pure duty as a represented On the other hand, it presupposes it as something that is not valid in its own right, but considers that what is immoral is perfect.Consciousness, likewise, posits itself as a consciousness whose reality, which does not correspond to duty, has been superseded, and as superseded reality, or in the representation (or idea) of the Absolute Essence Reality is no longer contradictory to morality.

However, for moral consciousness itself, its moral world view does not mean that it has developed its own concepts in this moral world view and made its concepts its objects. There is no awareness of the opposition between the two aspects, it does not connect and compare the two opposite sides, it does not combine the concept of the opposite link, but it is constantly developing and advancing.For it knows only that the pure essence or object, if the object is duty, if the object is the abstract object of its pure consciousness, is a pure knowledge or itself.Its activities are thus only thinking, not conceptual understanding.Therefore, for it, the object of its actual consciousness is not yet transparent and thoroughly understood; it is not an absolute concept, and only the absolute concept understands itself or its absolute counterpart as itself.Its own reality, as well as all objective reality, seem to it to be inessential; but its freedom is the freedom of pure thought, and therefore nature, which is opposed to the freedom of pure thought, appears at the same time. To be something that is equally free.Because the freedom of being and the confinement of being to consciousness exist in it in the same way, its object becomes an object that exists and is at the same time merely thought; in its moral world-view In the last stage of the ideology, the content is essentially posited in such a way that its being is a represented being; and this union of being and thinking is expressed as it really is as representation (das Vorstellen). Since when we examine the moral worldview, we realize that this objective way of the moral worldview is nothing but the concept of moral self-consciousness itself, but moral self-consciousness makes its own concept an object, then because With this awareness of the originating form of the moral worldview, another form of representation of the moral worldview now arises. —The first proposition, and the proposition from which it proceeds, is that there is actually a moral self-consciousness, or that there is such a thing.For the concept assumes that moral self-consciousness contains the determination that all reality in general has an essence only in so far as it corresponds to duty, and that this essence is knowledge, that is to say, It is assumed that this essence is directly integrated with the real self and is directly in the unity; therefore, this unity itself is real, that is, a real moral consciousness. ——The actual moral consciousness, as consciousness, now regards its own content as the object, that is, as the ultimate goal of the world, as the harmony between morality and all reality.But since it represents this unity as an object, and the object is not yet the concept capable of transcending the object itself, it regards this unity as a negation of self-consciousness, in other words, this unity The body is outside itself, an other side of its reality, but this other side is at the same time what exists, but only thought as existing. Since moral self-consciousness, as self-consciousness, is something else than the object, what remains of it is only between the consciousness of duty and reality, or more precisely, only the consciousness of duty and its own reality. disharmony between.Thus now comes the proposition: there is no morally accomplished actual self-consciousness;—and since the moral is moral only in so far as it is accomplished, because duty is pure freedom in itself without any , and morality is moral only because it is consistent with this pure in-itself, so the second proposition becomes like this: there is nothing morally real. But since, thirdly, moral self-consciousness is an ego [or subject], it is in itself the unity of duty and reality; this unity then becomes its object, morality completed,—but this completes Its morality is at the same time an other shore of its reality—but this other shore should be actual. In the ultimate goal of the synthesis and unity of the first two propositions, both self-conscious reality and duty are only set as a sublated link; Because they are not individual and isolated, but, according to their essence, they should all get rid of each other. Since now in the unity, each link is no longer separated from the other, so each link is was sublated; Moreover, in content, they, as sublated moments, have become objects, each of them valid for the other, while in form, their being the object of each other is at the same time only present in appearance. —Or, it can also be said that what is actually immoral, because it is also a pure thought and transcends its reality, is moral in appearance (or idea), and is regarded as a perfectly valid quasi of.Thus the first proposition "There is a moral self-consciousness" is established, but it is combined with the second proposition "There is no moral self-consciousness"; that is to say, there is a, But this one exists only in appearance or idea; or, indeed, there is none, but another consciousness proves and admits the existence of such a moral consciousness.