Chapter 9 Chapter 5 On the second class of objects of the subject and the forms in which the principle of sufficient reason governs

Section 26 Explanation of such objects Since ancient times, the only essential difference between the human race and animals has been attributed to a special cognitive ability that only humans have, namely reason.This distinction is based on the fact that man possesses a representation which no animal has, and that is the concept.This representation is opposed to the intuitive representation and is therefore abstract, but emerges from the intuitive representation.It is a direct consequence of the inability of animals to speak or laugh; and it is an indirect consequence of all the various important features of man which distinguish him from animal life.For the production of abstract representations has now made the formation of motives change its character.Although human behavior arises from the same strict necessity as animal behavior, yet through this new motivation—here in so far as it resides in the thought of making an alternative decision (i.e., awareness of conflicting motivations)— —According to plan and principle, in harmony with other things, purposive and deliberate, this action replaces the impulse purely produced by the object that can be visualized at the moment; What has made human life so luxurious, so false, and so horrible, that the white man of the Western Hemisphere, having abandoned the true and deep religion of his first birthplace in ancient times, now no longer regards animals as brothers, but mistakenly believes that they are related to He is fundamentally different, and seeks to confirm this illusion by calling them brutes, calling important functions of both men and animals by humble names, and claiming that they are difficult to tame; There is an identity between them, but this sameness is constantly bothering him.

The whole difference remains, as we have said, that besides the intuitive representations shared by animals examined in the last chapter, there is also an abstract representation derived from intuitive representations, which exists in the human brain. , the human brain is much larger than that of animals, mainly for this reason.Representations of this kind are called concepts, since every concept contains in itself, or rather under itself, countless individual things, and thus forms a complex.We can also define them as representations derived from representations.Because, in the process of their formation, the abstraction ability decomposes the complete and intuitive representation we discussed in the last chapter into various components, so as to think about the different essences of things one by one, or the relationship between things.Through this process, though, representation necessarily loses its immediacy; like water, when disintegrated, its fluidity and visibility are lost.For, though the separation and abstraction of each quality facilitates careful consideration, we cannot say that it can be intuited by itself.We form concepts by abandoning a great deal of material that intuition gives us, in order to think independently of other things.So to conceive is to think, and thinking is less than intuition.If, after we have considered several objects of intuition, we discard something different belonging to each, and retain something common to all, the result will be a class of that kind.Thus the concept of a genus, after removing all that is not possessed by each species, becomes the concept of all the species subsumed under it.Since every possible concept can be viewed as a class, concepts are always general and thus not intuitive.Every concept also has its own scope for this reason, as the sum of what can be thought under it.The more abstracted our thinking is, the more we discard, and the less there is left for thinking.The highest abstraction, that is, the most general concept, that is, the most impoverished, until at last it is completely a shell, such as being, essence, thing, change, etc., is such a concept. ——By the way, what is the use of a philosophical system that is woven only with such concepts and whose essence is only this fragile shell of thought?They are necessarily utterly empty, impoverished, and therefore especially wearisome.

-------- ① German is Begriff, which refers to the thought of understanding, derived from begreifen (understanding). ② German is Inbegriff, referring to all. As we have said, after representations have been sublimated and decomposed into abstract concepts, their intuition is lost. If they were not fixed and persisted in the senses through arbitrary symbols, they would not be in the process of thinking. used in our minds, and thus fade away from our awareness.Of course, this is not the case.The symbols we refer to here are words.So far as they constitute the content of a dictionary and thus a language, words can always denote general representations, concepts, but never intuitive objects; a dictionary enumerating concrete things, therefore, contains only proper names, not The word is therefore either a geographical dictionary or a historical dictionary, that is to say, its enumeration can be separated by time as well as by space; for, as the reader knows, time and space are the principles of individuation.It's just that animals are confined to intuitive representations, unable to perform any abstraction - and therefore cannot form concepts - so, even if they can articulate the sound of words, we would not say that they have language, but we have to admit that they Can understand proper names.This lack makes them incapable of laughter, as I have already shown in my theory of the absurd. ①

-------- ①See Section 13 of Volume I and Chapter 8 of Volume II. An analysis of a long passage uttered continuously by an uneducated person reveals that it contains a large number of logical forms.Clauses, diction, distinctions, nuances of all kinds are correctly expressed by grammatical forms, by means of inflections and syntactic structures, even by the frequent use of different tones in conversation, etc. Unanimity, this cannot but amaze us, and we have to admit that it is a broad and complete consensus.The acquisition of this kind of cognition is naturally based on the intuitive world, and reducing the essence of the intuitive world to abstract concepts is completely a rational work, and it can only be done with the help of language.Thus, in the process of learning to use language, the whole mechanism of reason—that is, everything essential to logic—is brought into our consciousness.Obviously, nothing can be done without a great deal of mental effort and concentration, and for children the desire to learn gives the necessary strength for this.Until then, this desire is powerful as long as it has something available and necessary, but it loses its vitality when we impose on children what is not suitable for them to understand.In this way, even a child who has not been well educated, in the process of learning the diction and nuances of the language, can, like other people, develop reason and acquire real concrete logic through his own conversation.This kind of logic does not lie in the number of logical laws contained, but in the appropriateness of their application; it is much like a musically gifted person can know the laws of harmony simply by playing the piano, without having to study music or study harmony. —The deaf-blind are the only ones who acquire the above-mentioned training of logic by learning to speak, and who, therefore, hardly As irrational as animals.

Section 27 Role of Concepts As we have seen, the fundamental nature of our rational and thinking abilities is the capacity for abstraction, or the ability to form concepts, and it is therefore the presence of these concepts in our consciousness that produces amazing results.The reason why this can be done is mainly based on the following reasons. Just because they come from appearances and contain less content than appearances, concepts are easier to express than appearances.In fact, the relation of concepts to representations is almost analogous to that between the formulas of higher arithmetic and the mental operations which produce them but are described by them, or the relation of a logarithm to its numbers.They contain only some of the representations that are needed from the many representations.This part of the representation is distilled from the many; if we do not do this, but try to recall all these representations through imagination, it is as if we were forced to drag a lot of insignificant clutter to and fro. can embarrass us; whereas, with the help of concepts, we have to consider only those parts and relations of all representations which are necessary for each individual purpose, so that we may liken their use to the removal of superfluous burdens, or to Drain the dross for the best—use quinine, not cinchona bark.What is a proper name for thinking, in its narrowest sense, is that the intellect is filled with concepts, that is, the representations we are now discussing exist in our consciousness.We also call it reflection: the word is a metaphor, borrowed from optics, and expressing at the same time the derivative and subordinate character of this kind of knowledge.It is this thought, this reflection, which gives man the capacity for deliberation which animals lack.For, since (the concept) enables one to think many things under the name of one concept, and always an essential part of each of these things, this concept allows one to drop at will every kind of distinction, even time and In this way, people not only acquire the ability to grasp the past and the future in their thinking, but also the ability to grasp the void; and animals are strictly bound to the present moment in any case.Indeed, the faculty of deliberation is at the root of man's theoretical and practical achievements, and gives him a great advantage over the animals; first, that he can look forward as well as backward; The planned, systematized, and step-by-step procedure in all things lies in the cooperation of many people for a common goal, so that there is law, order, state, and so on.Moreover, the use of concepts is especially important in science; for, strictly speaking, concepts are the stuff of science.Indeed, the ultimate aim of all science is the transformation of the general into knowledge of the particular; this is possible only through sentences that include everything and nothing, which in turn is possible only through conceptual beings.Thus Aristotle says: "Without generals, there can be no knowledge." Concepts are these generalities, and their mode of being constituted the subject of long-running disputes between realists and non-realists in the Middle Ages.

Section 28 Judgment of representation of concepts Concepts must never be confused with imaginary pictures, which are intuitive, complete, and therefore individual representations, although they do not result from sensory impressions and therefore do not belong to the complex of experiences.Even when used to represent a concept, imaginary pictures (visions) should be distinguished from the concept.When we take hold of the intuitive representation itself that produces the concept and make it correspond to the concept, we actually use the illusion as the representation of the concept, which is impossible in any case; for there is no For example, the representation of dogs in general, the representation of colors in general, the representation of triangles in general, the representation of numbers in general, and no imaginary picture is consistent with these concepts.Thus, the phantom of a certain dog and another is caused, which phantom as an appearance must in any case be determined, i.e. it must have a definite size, shape, color, etc., even though the The concept of has no such determined properties.When we use representations of these concepts, though, we always realize that they are inappropriate to the concepts presented, and that they are decided entirely arbitrarily.Hume himself agrees with this view at the end of the first part of his twelfth treatise in the Human Reason, and Rousseau expresses the same in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.On the contrary, Kant's teaching is quite different from this.Matter is a thing that can be determined only by reflection and clear reflection.Each of us, therefore, has to test himself whether he is aware of the "innate interweaving of pure imagination" in his conceptions.For example, when a man thinks of a dog, is he aware of an animal intermediate between a dog and a wolf; The representation of this concept is presented as a clear picture.

-------- ① See the middle of Part 1 of the book. In a wider sense, the whole of thinking, that is, the whole inner workings of the mind in general, necessarily requires either language or imaginative pictures: without the one or the other, mental activity cannot proceed.However, not both at the same time, although both can cooperate in supporting each other.Thinking, in the narrower sense, abstract thought through language, or purely logical reasoning, in which case it remains strictly within its sphere; The understanding of representations is attained in order to achieve thorough grasp by connecting the representations provided by experience and grasped by intuition with the abstract thoughts produced by clear reflection.In thinking, therefore, we explore either concepts, or the law to which a particular intuition belongs, or the specific circumstances which confirm a certain concept or law.Thinking, in this character, is an act of judgment, a determination in the first case a reflection, in the second an inductive act.Judgment is thus the mediator between intuition and abstract cognition, or between understanding and reason.For most people, it is only preliminary, and often even only in name; such people are destined to only follow what others say, so there is no need to talk to them more than necessary.

-------- ①Anyone who thinks that this assertion may appear exaggerated, please examine the conclusions of Goethe's "Theory of Colours", and if he is surprised at my discovery of further strengthening this conclusion, then he has once again confirmed this. in conclusion. The real core of the whole cognition is the reflection which can only be carried out with the help of intuitive representation; for in this way it is possible to return to the source and basis of all concepts.It thus enables the production of truly original ideas, of all major fundamental ideas, and of all inventions, in so far as chance does not predominate in them.The intellect predominates in this type of thinking, while reason is the main element in purely abstract reflection.Certain thoughts that roam our brains for a long time are such reflections: they turn over and over, now in the clothes of one kind of intuition, now in the clothes of another, until at last they become clear and fix themselves. To the concept and find the language to express it.It is true that some thoughts cannot be expressed in words, but unfortunately these are the best thoughts, as Apulius said: "their voice is better."

However, Aristotle argued that reflection is impossible without imaginary pictures.This is going too far.On this point, however, he said ①: "Without (with the aid of) the imagination the mind cannot think." And also: "Whatever is observed is accompanied by some imagination." and "Without imagination there is no thought. These statements had a strong influence on thinkers of the 15th and 16th centuries, so these thinkers often repeated with conviction what Aristotle had said.For example, Mirandola said ②: "Those who think and think must see the inevitable appearance of imagination." Melanchthon said ③: "Those who think must see the picture of imagination." And J.Brunus said ④: "Aristotle said: Whoever wants to know must imagine." Bourbonnatius also expressed the same meaning ⑤.Taken together, what has been said above asserts that every truly original concept, and even every philosophical principle worthy of the name, must have some kind of intuitive picture as its innermost core or root.This, though still a fleeting fragment, imparts life and soul to the whole analysis, however exhaustive it may be--just as a drop of the right reagent suffices to bring the whole solution with it. the color of the particles.When an analysis has this kind of core, it is like a bank note backed by hard currency; while any other analysis that proceeds entirely from a combination of abstract concepts is like a bank note backed only by other notes. Banknotes for which it is backed.Thus, all rational chatter can bring about greater clarity of certain concepts, but strictly speaking nothing new is produced.Therefore, this kind of talk is still left to the individual to do by himself, instead of filling the volume with endless articles every day.

-------- ① Aristotle: "On the Soul", Chapters 3, 7, and 8. ②Chapter 5 of "Imagination". ③ "On the Soul" page 130. ④ "The Composition of Imagination", page 10. ⑤ "On Immortality" pages 54 and 70. §29 The law of sufficient ground for knowledge But thinking, even in a narrower sense, consists not merely in the existence of abstract concepts in our consciousness, but rather in the integration of these concepts into Two or more connected or separated.We call this clearly thought-out and stated relation between concepts a judgment.With respect to these judgments the principle of sufficient reason applies here as well, but in a rather different form than explained in the last chapter; for here it appears as the principle of sufficient reason for cognition.This principle of substantiality asserts that if a judgment is to express a certain kind of knowledge, it must be well-grounded: it is due to this property that it acquires the truth-value of the predicate.Truth, then, is the relation of a judgment to something distinct from itself, that is, to its ground, which, as we shall presently discuss, itself admits of a great variety.However, since this ground is always something on which the judgment rests, it is fitting that the German term is called Grund.In Latin and all languages ​​derived from Latin, the same word that signifies the ground of knowledge is also used to signify the faculty of reason: both are called "ratio", "laragione", "laraison" , that is, "according to".From this, it is easy to see that the judgment of obtaining rational knowledge has always been regarded as the highest function of reason and its responsibility.These grounds upon which a judgment rests may be divided into four different kinds, and the truths to which a judgment is derived vary accordingly.They are discussed below.

30 Logical Truth A judgment may ground itself in another judgment; in this case it has logical or formal truth.Whether it still has material truth is an open question, depending on whether the judgment on which it is based has material truth, or whether the series of judgments on which it is based produce a judgment that contains material truth.The basing of one judgment on another always takes place in a comparison between them, which is made directly, either by pure transposition or transposition, or by adding a third judgment, so that , the truth of the judgments we are about to establish becomes clear by their relation to each other.This process is a thorough syllogism.It arises either by correspondence or by the minor premise of the concept.For the syllogism, which establishes one judgment on another by means of a third judgment, concerns judgements alone; and since judgments are nothing but combinations of concepts, which are the only objects of our reason, the syllogism Inference may properly be called a special function of reason.The whole science of syllogism is in fact nothing but the sum of the law of the reciprocal relations between judgments of the principle of sufficient reason; it is, therefore, the maxim of logical truth. Judgments whose truth is made clear by the four well-known laws of thought must likewise be regarded as grounded in other judgments; for these four well-known judgments are themselves judgments, from which the truth of his judgment is derived.For example: "A triangle is a space surrounded by three sides", this judgment takes the law of identity as its ultimate ground, that is to say, this idea is expressed through this law. "There is no body without extension", this judgment takes the law of contradiction as its ultimate basis.There is also "any judgment cannot be both true or false", this judgment takes the law of excluded middle as its ultimate basis.Finally, the judgment "no one admits something to be true without knowing its cause" has as its ultimate ground the principle of sufficient reason of cognition.In the general use of our reason, we cannot reduce the judgments drawn from the four laws of thought to the ultimate grounds which presuppose them, before admitting them to be true; for most people do not even realize the existence of these abstract laws.Judgments of this kind, which presuppose these abstract laws, are no less dependent on them than the first judgment, which presupposes the second, is no more dependent on the former than because no one It is necessary to understand the principle of "gravity" to say "take out the support of something, and the thing will fall" to reduce the fact.I therefore do not agree with the view of logic which has so far held that inner truths are found only in judgments based on the four laws of thought, that is to say, those judgments are justified, these Internal logical truths should be distinguished from external logical truths, that is, from logical truths that belong to all judgments based on another judgment.Every truth is a judgment related to something outside it, and the term inner truth is a contradiction in terms. 31 Empirical Truth A judgment can be based on representations of the first kind, namely intuitions through the senses, and therefore on experience.If this is the case, then such a judgment involves material truth, and, furthermore, if the judgment is based directly on experience, then this truth is empirical truth. When we say "a judgment contains material truth," we generally mean that it is deduced through intuitive representations and that its concepts are interconnected, separated, and limited according to the requirements of intuitive representations.Acquiring this knowledge is a direct function of judgment, which is the mediator between intuition and abstract or cognitive reasoning, in other words, between understanding and reason. Section 32 Transcendental Truth The intuition, the form of empirical knowledge, which exists in the understanding and in pure sensibility, as the condition of all possible experience, may be the ground of a judgment, which in this case is a synthetic a priori judgment.Since, however, a judgment of this kind involves material truth, its truth is a priori; for the judgment is based not only on experience but on the conditions of all possible experiences that exist in us.Because it is determined by what determines the experience itself, that is, it is either determined by our innate intuitive space-time form, or by our innate knowledge of the law of causality.Propositions such as the following: two straight lines cannot contain a space; there is no effect without a cause; matter is neither produced nor destroyed; 3×7=21 are examples of such judgments.The whole of pure mathematics, and likewise my admirable literature on the transcendental, and most of Kant's principles in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, can be used to demonstrate truths of this kind. -------- ①See third edition, volume two, chapter five, p.55. Section 33 Hyperlogical Truth Finally, a judgment may be based on the formal conditions of the whole of thought contained in reason; if this is the case, then its truth is best defined, in my opinion, as super-logical truth, an expression not unlike Salisbury's. The Paralogic, written in the twelfth century, has nothing to do with it, because he declares in the introduction that "I call my book a Paralogic because it is my duty to defend logic." And then The word is never used again.There are only four superlogical judgments of this kind, which were discovered a long time ago by means of induction and are called the laws of the whole thinking; Opinions, however, are completely unanimous as to the content of the meaning they express.They are:-- 1.The subject is equal to the sum of its predicates, or a = a; 2.The predicate cannot both belong to and not belong to the subject at the same time, or a=—a=0; 3.One of two opposite and contradictory predicates must belong to the subject; 4.Truth is the relation of a judgment to something outside it that is its sufficient ground. It is by this reflection, which I shall call rational self-examination, that we know that these judgments express the conditions of all thinking, and therefore take them as their ground.Since our reason thinks nothing in opposition to these laws, it recognizes them as the condition of all possible thought: thus we demonstrate that thinking contrary to these laws is impossible, just as it would be impossible for our bodies to It is equally impossible for the parts to move against the direction of the joint.If it is possible for the subject to know itself, then these laws will be known directly for us, and there is no need to experiment with them on the object, that is, the representation.In this respect it is exactly the same as the grounds of judgments which have a priori truth; for they too cannot enter our consciousness, but only in a concrete way, depending on objects, i.e. representations.For example, if we try to conceive a change without antecedents, or the arising and passing of matter, we realize that this is impossible; Impossibility is considered objective because we have no other way of bringing it into consciousness through subjective means.Taken together, the resemblance and close connection between transcendental and supralogical truths show that they all arise from a common source.In this chapter we have seen the principle of sufficient reason mainly as a superlogical truth; in the previous chapter it appeared as a transcendental truth; in the next chapter we shall see it in another form. Transcendental truth reappears.It is for this reason in the present essay that I have endeavored to establish the principle of sufficient reason as a judgment having fourfold grounds; not to show that four different grounds may happen to point to the same judgment, but that one Express yourself from four aspects, this is what I call the quadruple roots.The other three superlogical truths are so similar to each other that, when examining them, one cannot help looking for their common expression, as I did in Chapter 9 of the second volume of my magnum opus.On the other hand, they are quite different from the principle of sufficient reason.If we were to look for analogies to the other three superlogical truths from transcendental truths, the answer I would choose is: Substance (I mean matter) is eternal. Section 34 Reason For the representations which I have discussed in this chapter belong only to man, and because everything that distinguishes human life from animal life and gives man such a great Fundamental, therefore, is this faculty which duly constitutes reason, which has been enshrined as the prerogative of man from time immemorial.In the same way, no matter in which country or dynasty, everything that people think about is unquestionably regarded as the expression or function of reason, and reason can also be called the product or expression of reason.Obviously, all of this can only be used if it is abstract, inferential, reflective, indirect, and word-conditioned cognition, while purely intuitive, direct, and sensory cognition, which can be shared by animals, cannot be used. Absolutely impossible.Cicero rightly puts reason and speech together,1 describing them as "by teaching, learning, conveying, counseling, and judging men befriend one another." And "what I call, if you will, rational Things can also be called by more words: spirit, thinking, thinking and thinking." ② and "Reason is the only thing that makes us superior to animals. , to make certain arrangements and decisions”. ③However, in any age and country, philosophers have always expressed their views on reason in this sense. Even Kant himself defined reason as principles and the ability to reason; although it cannot be denied that he was making this definition The latter was the first to present those misinterpreted points.In my magnum opus, and in Two Fundamental Questions of Ethics, I have spoken at length of the agreement of philosophers on this and on the true nature of reason; Concept, this is the merit of the philosophy professors of this century, dare not mention it.Therefore, I will not repeat what has been said here If so, let’s focus on the following questions! ④ -------- ①Cicero: Chapter 16 of "On Duty" I. ② Cicero: "On the Nature of God" II Chapter 7. ③Cicero: Chapter 10 of "On the Law" Ⅰ. ④ See, Section 8, Volume 1, Second Edition, and Appendix 577-586 (Page 610-620, Third Edition) and Chapter 6, Volume 2; "pp. 148-154 (2nd edition, pp. 146-151). Now our professors of philosophy think that we should do away with the name which has been given to the faculty of thought and reflection through reflection and conception, which distinguishes man from the animals, which necessitates language and at the same time It makes us qualified to use language, through which human operations and human achievements can be linked.Accordingly, all nations and even all philosophers express their opinion of it and, in this sense, their understanding of it.Our professors, however, in spite of all reasonable taste and custom, hold that this faculty shall henceforth be called understanding and not reason, and that everything derived from it should be called intellectual and not rational, and that, of course, the There is also a strange and dissonant aura, resembling an out-of-tune in music.For in every country and dynasty the words intellect, reason, keenness, sagacity, shrewdness, etc., have been used to denote the more intuitive faculties, which were discussed in the last chapter; The rational result of the discussion is always called sane, shrewd, clever, etc.Intellectual and rational are therefore always distinct from each other, and are expressions of two entirely different psychic faculties.Our professional philosophers, however, do not take this into account; their cunning demands this sacrifice, and in such cases their appeal is: "Go away, truth; we have higher definite aims! Get out of the way, truth, for the high honor of God, you have learned this! Can you give a fee and a pension? Go away, truth, go away, get where you need to go, and squat in the corner Go!" The fact is that they want to use the place and the name of reason to designate a faculty of their own creation and manufacture, or, more correctly and bluntly, a purely fictitious faculty in order to use it to get rid of The dilemma into which they were driven by Kant; a faculty of immediate, metaphysical knowledge, that is to say, beyond all possible experience, capable of grasping the world of things-in-itself and their relations, and therefore, above all, of God. , that is, it can directly know God, explain a priori the way God created the universe, or, if this sounds too prosaic, that God produced the universe out of himself, or by some process that is more or less necessary, Or—as a convenience, however ludicrous it may appear—to tell it to "retire," as princes are customary after having issued an oracle, to support itself and go wherever it pleases.Seriously, only a utterly brazen, nonsensical crook like Hegel would have dared to take this last step.And yet it is this tawdry trifle that has grown enormously in the last fifty years, and has produced hundreds of books in the name of rational knowledge, and has been the source of so many works called philosophy by authors and celebrated by others. Arguments for writing in philosophy - it's ironic to think about it - has long since tired of such clichés.Falsely and recklessly attributing all wisdom to reason, and declaring it a "supersensible faculty" or "as ideas"; in short, a esoteric power in us, Designed directly for metaphysics.然而，在最近半个世纪，这些行家们对一切超感觉的奇迹之直观方式所表现出来的意见却大相径庭。据一种最为大胆的说法，理性能够直接直观到绝对，或者说，甚至可以任意地直接直观到无限以及无限到有限的演变。另外一些较为保守的人则认为，获得这种信息的方式是听觉而非视觉；因为确切地说它只能听而不能看到“理想国”所发生的一切，然后把所获得的一切忠实地传递给知性，再被整理为教科书。根据雅可比的一个双关语，甚至德语中理性的名称“Vernunft”，亦是由“听”（“Vernehmen”）装扮而来的；很显然，它所来源的“Vernehmen”又是由语言来表达并以理性为条件的，这样，词和词意的清楚知觉就通过理性得到称呼，而与动物也具有的纯粹感官上的听力相对应。然而，这种拙劣的文字游戏在半个世纪后仍然受到青睐；它被当作一种严肃思想，不啻如此，甚至被当作一个论据，一遍又一遍地加以重复。行家中最谦逊的人又主张，理性既看不见也听不到，因此接收不到所有这些奇观的画面和音响，只有完全模糊的“惩戒”（Ahndung），或对这些奇观的焦虑；但是，把这个词中的d去掉，即是“预感”，“预感”由此得到对愚蠢的独到感觉，此时智慧的使徒对之以温柔的目光相鼓励，这种感觉便步入殿堂，转而为知。 读者知道，我只在柏拉图的原始意义上承认观念这个词，并在我的代表作第三篇中详尽无遗地作了阐明。另一方面，法国人和英国人对单词“idea”或“idea”肯定具有一种非常普通且又非常清楚、明确的理解；而德国人一旦听到“ideen”①这个词便失去了头脑，一切镇定荡然无存，感到似乎马上就要驾气球飘然而上。因此，这里对我们的行家们而言是理智直观活动的领域；这样他们中最厚颜无耻的人，众所周知的骗子黑格尔，竟毫不费力地把他关于宇宙和万物的理论称为“理念”（DieIdee），其中当然包括了他们要去把握的某些东西的全部思想。假如我们还要询问这些据称是以理性为其能力的观念的本质，那么所给予的解释通常空泛无物、用语混乱且冗长之至，读者劳神阅读即使没有在读到一半时就昏昏欲睡，合卷时也会迷惑万分，不得要领；他甚至会怀疑这些观念简直就像是妄想。与此同时，假如有人还想对这类观念进一步加以了解，那他受到的款待可就丰富了。先是经院哲学命题中的主要课题——我这里指的是上帝、不朽的灵魂、实在的客观存在的世界及其法则的表象——遗憾的是，诚如我在《康德哲学批判》中已表明过的，康德本人错误地把它们称之为理性的理想，而这不过只是为了证实不可能对它们进行论证以及它们之缺乏理论根据。然后，变一下花样，就只是上帝，自由和不朽；在其他时候，它将是绝对，我们在第二十节已对它有所了解，作为宇宙论证明被迫隐姓匿名地传播；或者，它将是与有限相对的无限；因为，总起来说，德国读者倾向于以这种空洞的谈话来满足自己，而察觉不到他从中获得的唯一明净的思想是：“有目的而又一无所有之物”。而且，“善、真、美”作为所谓的理念得到易动情感和心肠柔软者的高度赞扬，虽然它们实际上不过是三个非常宽泛、抽象的概念，因为它们是从众多事物和关系中析取出来的；因此，像许多其它的这类抽象概念一样，它们完全是空洞的。至于它们的内容，我在前面（第二十九节）已表明，真理就其特性来说只属于判断，即只具有逻辑特性；至于另外两个抽象概念，我建议读者一部分参阅我的代表作第一卷第六十五节，一部分参阅我的代表作整个第三卷。假如我们设想每次提到这三个贫乏的抽象概念时，都端出一副庄严神秘的姿态，眉毛也扬到额头上，青年人便由此很容易相信它们后面藏有某种奇特而又不可言说的东西，使它们有资格被称为理念，有资格被套到自称为形而上学理性的马车上胜利前进。 -------- ①叔本华在这里补充到，“特别是当被宣称为UedaDhen的时候”。 因此，当有人对我们说我们拥有一种获得直接的、物质的（即不仅是形式的，而且是实体的）、超感觉的知识（即超越一切可能经验的知识）的能力，一种专用于形而上学远见卓识的能力，这种能力是我们生来就具有的——我不得不冒昧地把它称之为一个十足的谎言。因为只要稍稍公正地自我审查一下，就足以确信我们身上绝对没有这种能力。而且，一切诚实且富有才能的权威思想家在任何时代所取得的成果，都会与我的主张完全一致。我的主张如下：我们整个认识能力中所固有的一切，因此是先天的且独立于经验的一切，都严格地被限于认识的形式部分，即被限于理智所特有的功能以及所起作用的唯一方式的意识之中；但为了给出物质的认识，这些功能全部需要从外界获得材料。因此，在我们自身内存在的是外在的、客观的直观形式：时间和空间以及因果律——作为知性的一种纯粹形式可以使它建构客观的、物质的世界——最后是抽象认识的形式部分，即这最后一部分存在于逻辑中并与之相关，因此，我们的前辈恰当地把它称为“理性理论”。但是，这种逻辑又教导我们，依据一切逻辑法则而形成判断并获得结论的概念，必须借助于直观的认识获得它们的材料和内容；这恰如创造直观的认识的知性要仰仗感觉获得材料并把内容给予它的先天形式。 这样，我们认识中的任何材料，即一切不能被还原为我们理智的主观形式、活动的具体方式及其功能的东西，——因此，它的所有材料，——都是从外界来的；即说到底是从形体世界的客观直观中来的，它的根源就在感觉中。正是这种直观，就其所涉及的物质内容而言，也就是经验认识，被理性——真正的理性——加工整理为概念，并借助语词从感觉上固定下来；然后这些概念为组成判断和结论的概念组合提供材料，这就构成了我们思维世界的纬纱。因此，理性绝对不包含物质的而只包含形式的内容，这该是逻辑学的课题，因此，在其思维过程中，它只包括形式和法则。在反思过程中，理性不得不完全从外界即从知性已产生的直观表象中获得物质内容。在形成概念的过程中，知性的功能首先运用于这些物质内容，对事物的各种特性进行取舍，然后把留下的几种特性连接成一个概念。然而，如我已表明过的，表象通过这一过程丧失了可以直观地被知觉的能力，同时，它们也变得更易于理解。因此，理性的功效就在于此，也仅在于此；但它永远不能从自身的来源中提供物质内容。——它除形式之外别无所有，它的本质是阴性的；它只能受孕，但不能自孕。在所有的拉丁和日耳曼语言中，理性都是阴性的，并非纯粹的偶然现象；因而，知性必然是阳性的。 在使用诸如“健全的理性教导说”或“理性应该控制激情”这类表达式时，我们无论如何不是指理性从自身的材料中提供了物质认识，而是指理性反思的结果，即从某些原则所得到的逻辑推理，这些原则是抽象认识逐渐从经验中集中来的，我们由此才获得清楚全面的认识，这种认识不仅是关于经验中必然要发生的、因而在其发生时还可以被预见，而且甚至还是关于我们自身行为的根据和结果的。“合理性的”或“理性的”在任何情况下都与“始终如一的”或“合逻辑的”同义，反过来亦然；因为逻辑不过是由一个规则系统所表现出来的理性的必然过程本身；因此，这些表达（理性的和逻辑的）之间的关系就如同理论与实践之间的关系。严格地说也正是在这种意义上，当我们谈到理性行为时，我们指的是这一行为是始终如一的，因此又是从一般的概念中产生的，而非由当时转瞬即逝的印象所决定。然而，这种行为的品行绝没有因此而被决定：它可能是善的，也可能是恶的，与行为本身无关。详尽的说明在我的《康德哲学批判》①，以及《伦理学的两个基本问题》②中可以看到。最后，从纯粹理性中衍生出来的概念无论是直观的还是反思的，其来源都在我们认识能力的形式部分；因此，这些概念无须经验的帮助，即可先天地进入我们的意识。它们必然以拥有先验的或超逻辑的真理的原则为基础。 -------- ①第二版，第一卷第576页及以下各页；第三版第610页及以下各页。 ②《伦理学的两个基本问题》第152页，第2版第149页及以下各页。 另一方面，有人主张理性本来就可从自身的资源中提供物质认识并且可以超越于可能经验的领域传递确定性的信息；须知理性要做到这一点，必然要包含有内在观念，而这种理性不过是纯粹的虚构，是由我们的职业哲学家们发明出来的，是由于惧怕康德的而编造出来的。我现在要知道，这些先生们是否知道有一个洛克，是否读过他的著作？也许他们在很久以前粗略肤浅地看过他的著作，而看的时候自以为屈尊纡贵，看不起这个伟大的思想家，也可能这与拙劣的德文翻译有关；因为在我看来，现代语言知识的增加与古代语言知识令人可叹的减少是不相称的。另外，现在除了几位长者之外，已几乎没人正确彻底地认识康德哲学，谁还顾得上去理会洛克这种唠叨老头？现在已经成熟的一代人，他们的青春当然必须花费在研究“黑格尔的庞大精神”、“卓越的施莱马赫”、“敏锐的荷伯特”上。oops!oops!这种学院英雄崇拜以及掌权的高贵同事和有希望的后继者对大学著名人士的颂扬所带来的严重危害，确切地说，就是把一些平庸的理智——完全是自然的产物——作为大师、人类的旷世奇才和荣耀介绍给判断力尚不成熟、既轻信又诚实的青年人。学生们即刻集中精力投入到这种庸才粗制滥造、枯燥无味、贫乏而又无休止的作品之研究中，因而把用来接受高等教育之短暂而又宝贵的时间浪费了，没有利用这段时间从极端稀少但名副其实、确实罕见的思想家的作品中获得健全的知识，这些作品的作者在历史进程中要经过相当的一段时间才能出现一个，因为自然在每一类中只创造一件，然后就“把模型毁坏”。这一代人中本来也会出现几个这样的奇才，可惜这些年青人遭受了极其有害的、智力平庸的吹捧者、庸才们的庞大同盟以及兄弟会成员的欺骗。今日如同昨日，这种同流合污的现象还是方兴未艾，他们仍高举旗帜，坚持与使其承受羞辱的那些真正名副其实的哲学家对抗。正是由于他们，才使我们的时代如此衰弱不振，以致我们的父辈这么多年来曾潜心研究、努力理解和认真应用的康德哲学，对当今这一代人来说，又成为陌生的东西，在康德哲学面前他们好像是“七弦琴前的蠢驴”，有时会愚蠢粗野地加以攻击——就像野蛮人对某些陌生的希腊神像投掷石块一样。既然如此，我就有义务建议所有那些主张理性可以直接知觉、领会和认识的人——简言之，主张理性从自身的资源中提供物质认识的人——重新去读这150年来在全世界备受赞美的洛克著作的第一卷，特别是第三章第21～26节中的内容，这些内容是直接用来反对任何内在观念说的。因为，虽然洛克否定一切内在真理并不十分恰当，他甚至把这种否定扩展到我们的形式认识中——这一点已被康德的卓识所纠正——但是，他对整个物质认识的正确看法则是不可否认的，即一切认识都是对于实体的。 我已在我的《伦理学》中说过的这里还必须重复一下，因为这就像西班牙谚语所说的“蒙耳不听者最聋”，即假如理性是一种特别为形而上学设定的能力，一种提供认识材料并能显示它超越于一切可能的经验的能力，那么，如同数学问题的一致性那样，人们在形而上学和宗教问题（因为它们是一致的）之间就能取得完全的和谐，而观点与他人不一的人只能被看作为精神不正常。现在出现了完全相反的情况，正是在这些问题上分歧最大。自从人们第一次开始思考，哲学体系之间无一不相互对抗并争吵不休；事实上，它们之间经常是截然相反的。自从人们第一次开始信仰（这个历史就更为久远了），宗教之间就一直用火和剑、开除教籍和大炮进行战斗。而当信仰达到最癫狂的程度时，等待异教徒的不是精神病院，而是宗教法庭及其一切附属设施。因此，这里又一次绝对断然地驳斥了认为理性是一种直接领悟形而上学的能力，或者说得更明白一些，是一种来自于上苍的灵感的能力这样一种错误主张。现在到了给理性一个严格断语的时候了，因为说来可怕，这样一个经不起推敲、显而易见的谬误竞在半个世纪后仍然在德国到处散播，年复一年地从教授们的坐椅上游荡到学生们的座位上，又从学生的座位上荡回到教授席上，甚至在法国也确实找到了一些愿意相信的傻瓜，使之在那里得以传播。不过，在这个问题上法国人的常识将很快把先险的理论打发掉。 但这种谬误最初孕育在何处呢？这种虚构最先是如何来到这个世界的呢？我得承认，它最早起源于康德包括“绝对律令”在内的实践理性。因为实践理性一旦被承认，同至上的理论理性一样，进一步需要的，不过是增加一个类似的理性作为其对应物或孪生姐妹，用来宣布来自青铜三角祭坛的（extripode）形而上学真理。在《伦理学的两个基本问题》①中，我已描述了这一创造所取得的卓有成效的功绩，请读者参考。现在我虽然承认康德第一个提出了这一错误的构想，但我要补充说明，跳舞的人要找到一个流浪艺人是不必费很多时间的。因为就像对于人类的诅咒一样，由于一切腐败和邪恶的东西之间有着天然的亲合关系，这就使人们选择和钦佩卓越思想家著作中那些虽说不是完全错误、也是次等的部分，而对其中真正值得称颂的部分只是作为附属品才加以默认。在我们的时代，几乎没有什么人能认识到康德哲学所特有的深度和真实的崇高表现在何处；因为他们不再研究他的著作，所以他的著作必然不被理解。事实上，他们现在只是出于历史方面的目的，才去粗略地读康德的作品，他们错误地认为哲学已经前进，而不说始于康德。因此，我们很快就察觉到，尽管他们还在讨论康德哲学，但他们除了康德哲学之无价值的外表部分之外一无所知，他们也许在某处偶然地攫取到一个零星的句子或弄到一个粗略的梗概，但却从来没有探究过它深邃的意义和精神。在康德哲学中，这种人总是首先把主要精力用于二律背反，原因是因为其怪癖，而更多的却是包括“绝对律令”在内的“实践理性”，甚至是在其之上的“道德理论”，虽然康德对于“道德理论”从来都不是那么认真的；因为只具有实践有效性的理论信条很像我们允许孩子们玩的木枪，不担心会出危险，确切地说，它与“把我的皮肤洗一下，但不要把它弄湿”同属一个范畴。至于“绝对律令”，康德从未说它是一个事实，相反，而是多次反对这种说法；他只是把它看作是各种思想之极端奇特结合的结果，因为他要为道德提供一个最后的靠山。然而，我们的哲学教授们从未把这个问题追究到底，以致在我之前似乎还没人彻底研究过这个问题。不但不去研究，他们反而急匆匆地把“绝对律令”作为已经牢固确立的事实加以信赖，并在他们的正统用语中把它称为“道德律”——顺便一说，这总使我想起比格尔的“Mam′ZelleLaregle”；确实，他们从中制造了如同摩西训戒一样宏伟的东西并完全取而代之。在《论道德的基础》这篇论文中，我剖析了这同一个包含“绝对律令”在内的“实践理性”，所得出的清楚的结论是，它们绝对没有任何生命力和真理性，因此，我倒希望有人能有理有据地驳倒我，以此帮助“绝对律令”再次找到真正的根据。同时，我们的哲学教授们也不愿意就这样丢了面子。就跟他们离不开自由意志一样，他们也丝毫离不开“实践理性的道德律”，因为这一道德律可以作为一个方便的显示器，伦理学便以此为基础：这两者都是他们的老年妇女哲学的基点。不管我是否清除了这两个基点，对他们来说，这两个基点仍然存在，就像亡故的君主，出于政治上的原因，偶尔还允许他在死后继续统治几天。这些知名人士仍然采取传统的战术来对付我对这两个已过时的虚构所作的毁灭性打击：沉默，沉默；因此他们无声无息地从边上滑过去，佯装无知，使公众相信我以及我这类人不值得取信。无疑，他们的哲学感召来自于神职界，而我的只能来自于自然。说真的，我们最终也许会发现，这些英雄们的行为准则就如同不切实际的鸵鸟的做法，以为只要闭上眼睛就能躲开猎人。Ok!我们等待时机；到我去世后，他们可以随心所欲地裁剪我的作品之时，难道公众还是只相信那些无聊的废话、乏味得令人难以忍受的陈词滥调、“绝对”的任意构想以及这些先生们在幼儿院里用的道德说教？那我们就来看看吧！ -------- ①叔本华：《伦理学的两个基本问题》第148页及以下各页（第二版第146页及以下各页）。 “即使在今天 邪恶依然畅行无阻， 那也不必担心， 正义在明天，将受人拥戴。 "① -------- ①歌德：《东西诗集》第97页。 但这些先生们是否知道现在是什么时候了？一个被预言了很长久的时代已经开始；教会正在开始动摇，而且已经动摇到这样的程度，就连能否恢复它的重心尚是一个问题，因为信仰已丧失。启示之光也如同其他的光一样，需要一定量的黑暗作为它不可缺少的条件。具有一定程度和广度的知识者已大有人在，信仰已不适于他们。日益明显地露出桀骜不驯面目的浅薄的理性主义之得以传播就是明证。它暗中量布似地去衡量人们思索了若干个世纪的基督教奥理，提出质疑，并认为自身十足地聪明。然而，正是基督教的精髓，有关“原罪”的信条，特别为这些头脑简单的理性主义者选出来作为笑柄；因为在他们看来，似乎任何东西都不及我们每个人自出生之日起开始存在更为确定，因此我们带着罪孽来到人世是最为不可能的事情。多么锐敏！恰恰就在贫困肆虐、警惕放松时，狼便开始在村庄出现；以致过去曾潜伏着的唯物主义在这种情况下与它的伙伴、被有些人称为人道主义的兽行主义，抬起头来并手挽手地冲到了前排。我们对知识的渴望由于我们不再信仰宗教而变得愈加迫切。整个理智的发展已达到沸点，一切信仰、一切启示和一切权威随之蒸发散失，人们主张有权作出自己的判断；这一权力不仅是教导出来的，而且是让人信服的。他已离开了他的婴幼时期，要求独立行走。然而对形而上学的渴望跟肉体的需求一样不能熄灭。这样，对哲学的想往变得日益迫切，人们乞求于那些已经脱颖而出的所有名副其实的思想家的灵魂。空话和已被阉割了的理智之软弱无能的努力就再也不能满足人类的要求；因此觉得需要有严肃哲学，由于这种哲学所考虑的并非薪金酬劳，因此它几乎一点都不关心是否能让内阁大臣或议员称心如意，是否合乎这类或那类宗教团体的意图；相反，这种哲学清楚地表明它的天职完全不是为精神贫乏的庸才谋得生计。 还是回到我的主题上来。通过略具冒险性的扩张，理论神谕就被添加到了实践神谕上，康德错误地把后者赋予理性。这一发明的荣誉无疑应归功于雅可比，职业哲学家们欢乐雀跃地感谢这一前辈留下的这一珍贵礼物，因为这一礼物可以作为一种手段帮助他们摆脱康德从前曾经把他们逼入的困境。冷静、自若、审慎的理性，曾受到康德无情的批判，从此以后被贬为知性并以此名称为人所知；而理性被设想为拥有丰富的、虚构的能力，仿佛能够给我们提供一个眺望世外甚至是超自然的世界的小小窗口，通过这个窗口，我们就能获得所有现成的真理，而老派的、诚实且深虑的理性就这些真理长期争论、辩驳，结果是一无所获。作为这样一个纯粹想象的产物，这样一个彻底虚构的理性，这五十年来竟一直支撑着德国的冒牌哲学；首先，是作为“绝对自我”的自由建构和规划以及从自我中产生的“非我”；其次，是作为绝对统一或混沌未开的理智直观及其向自然的演化；或者，是作为上帝从他的黑暗的深渊中，或雅各布·波墨式地从无底洞里产生；最后，是作为纯粹的、独立思维的、绝对的理念，概念自我运动的芭蕾舞台——同时，还始终作为圣洁的、超感觉的、神的、真理的、美的以及这类东西的直接领悟，甚至纯粹是作为对所有这些奇迹的模糊的预感①。——因此，这就是理性，是吗？噢，不是，这不过是一出闹剧，我们的哲学教授们由于康德的致命抨击而痛苦地不知所措，想利用这出闹剧设法把他们国家业已确立的宗教课题继续进行下去，利用这出闹剧作为哲学答案，不管是对还是不对。 -------- ①这里是指前面所说没有“d”的“Ahnung” 对于所有的教授式哲学来说，首要的义务就是确立一种无可怀疑的学说并为之提供哲学基础，其学说是这样的，宇宙中有一个上帝、创世者和统治者，一个人格化的因而是个体的存在，它被赋予知性和意志，从无中创造了这个世界，并用无上的智慧、能力和善来统治它。然而，这一义务使我们的哲学教授在严肃哲学面前处于极其尴尬的境地。因为康德已现世，在六十多年前已写出，其结果是：在基督教时代已提出的关于上帝存在的证明（这些证明均可归为三种也只能有三种），没有任何一个能够完成预期的目的。而且，任何一个这类证明的不可能性以及由这种证明所建立起来的整个思辨神学的不可能性，终于得到了先天的说明，而不是用空话或黑格尔之正时兴的繁琐术语说明的，这些东西，坦率而严肃地说，只要你使用那种过时的老办法，就能说什么指什么；因此，无论它多么不适合很多人的趣味，60年来竟没能提出任何具有说服力的东西与之抗衡，结果，上帝存在的证明名誉扫地，再也不可信了。我们的哲学教授甚至已开始对之看不起并且明显地不屑一顾，认为这种举动无异于证明不言自明之物，实属荒谬又多余。cough!真可惜，这一点怎么没有早点被发现！不然的话，就不必好几个世纪费劲地去探求这些证明，康德也就完全不必对它们施加理性批判的压力并把它们碾碎了！有些人无疑会由于这一轻蔑而想起狐狸和葡萄的故事。但是，那些要看看这种无聊样本的人，可到谢林1809年的《哲学著作》第一卷第152页上去找。现在其他的人都在用康德的主张安慰自己，即证实上帝不存在同证实上帝存在一样是不可能的——好像这个爱说笑话的老头当然不懂得要证明的正是要提出的论断的依据——雅可比令人赞美的发明解救了我们惊慌失措的教授们，因为这一发明给予了本世纪的德国学者这种过去闻所未闻的特殊理性。 然而，所有这些伎俩都毫无必要。因为证明上帝存在的不可能性无论如何都不会妨碍上帝的存在，这是由于它现在万无一失地建立在更加坚实的基础上。它确实是一个启示问题，此外，这也更加可靠，因为这一启示是只赐给一类人的，正是这个原因，这类人被称为上帝的选民。上帝作为世界人格化的统治者和创造者并尽善尽美地支配万物这个概念，只有在犹太人的宗教以及从中分化出来的两种信仰（从而在更广泛的意义上可称之为犹太教的宗派）中才能发现，通过这一事实，更能够看清这一点。这样一个概念我们在其他宗教中（无论古代还是现代的），都不曾发现其踪迹。无疑，因为还没有人梦想着要把这一万能的创造者上帝与印度教的梵混为一谈，梵就在我、你、马、狗之中——或甚至同以生死为接替方式及承担世界创造之罪恶①的婆罗门混为一谈——更不会同受骗的萨图耳努斯②那好色的儿子、勇敢的普罗米修斯曾预言他要垮台的朱比特混为一谈。但是假如我们最后把注意力集中到追随者最众的宗教上，那么就这一方面说，最重要的首推佛教，我们再也不能闭上眼睛忽视这样一个事实：正如它是唯心论的和禁欲主义的，它还是坚决彻底的无神论的；而且其思想程度达到了无论何时出现了十足的有神论都会引起它的僧侣的极端厌恶。因此，在阿瓦的佛教高僧递交给天主教主教的一份文件③中，对于“有一个创造世界和万物的存在，唯有他值得崇拜”这一教义，就被算作六个邪恶异端④之一。施密特，一个最优秀的学术权威，完全证实了这一点。在我看来，他理所当然是欧洲学者中佛教知识最丰富的人，在他的著作《论诺斯第教义和佛教的联系》第9页中指出：“在佛教文献中，没有一字一句表明它承认有作为创业本原的最高存在。无论这一问题在其论证过程中何时呈现出来，似乎总是故意避开。”又说：“佛教学说不知有永恒的、非创造的在时间之前即已存在并创造一切有形和无形之物的唯一存在。这种观念与佛教无关，在佛教典籍中看不到这种踪迹。关于'创世'，我们能看到的也是如此。可见的宇宙确实不能没有开始，但它是按照始终如一、永不改变的自然法则生于虚空。假如我们设想任何东西——把这种东西称之为“命运”或“自然”——会被佛教徒奉为神圣的本原，那我们无论如何都是错误的；相反，恰恰由于虚空的发展，虚空猛然抛下或突然分为无限个部分，这才产生了物质，物质构成了宇宙在其内部的罪恶，或在宇宙的内外关系上构成宇宙之恶，从物质中产生罪恶，或者是依照同一个恶建立起来的永恒不变的法则而进行的持续不断的变化。”然后又说⑤：“创造这种表达与佛教无关，佛教只讲宇宙起源说；”“我们一定理解圣源创世观念与他们的学说是不相容的。”我能举出一百个这样确证的例子；但我只提一个，因为这个例子来源于官方，且广为人知。在深含启发意义的佛教典籍《大王统史》⑥第三卷中，有一段译文记载了大约1776年锡兰的荷兰总督对五大浮屠的高僧们分别依次进行的诘难。对话者之间差别甚大，彼此在领悟对方谈吐的意思方面又有很大的障碍，读来很是有趣。依照他们所信奉的学说，这些信徒对所有生灵都充满了爱心和同情，甚至对总督也不例外，他们在谈话中不遗余力地使总督满意。但是，尽管这些高僧们虔诚自制，他们那质朴天真的无神论还是跟总督那建立在犹太教基础上从小就接受熏陶的根深蒂固的赎罪说发生了冲突。这种信仰已成为他的第二天性；他一点都不明白这些高僧竟是无神论者，所以总是问起至高无上的存在，问他们是谁创造了世界等问题。于是他们答道，没有比佛陀释迦牟尼更高的存在了，他是全胜全善的，虽身为王子，却甘愿乞讨，终生宣讲他的崇高教义，拯救人类，使我们从不断轮回的痛苦中解脱出来。他们认为世界不是任何人创造的⑦，而是自我生成的，自然把它展开又把它收回；正因为如此，有即是无，即它必然与轮回同在，而轮回则因我们的罪恶行径而生，等等。提到这类事实只是为了说明直至今日德国学者们仍然在以一种可恶的方式普遍坚持宗教和有神论是一样的；事实上，宗教之于有神论犹如类之于单一的种的关系，只有犹太教和有神论才是一致的。所以，我们就把各国一切既不是犹太教徒、基督教徒，又不是伊斯兰教徒的人统贬为异教徒。基督徒甚至因为三位一体的教义而受到伊斯兰教徒和犹太教徒的指责，因为在后者看来这还不是纯粹的有神论。因为无论反过来说什么，基督教的血管里流着印度人的血，因此它总想着要从犹太教中解脱出来。给予这种有神论以最严厉的抨击——这就是为什么我们的哲学教授们匆匆把康德搁置一边的原因；但假如这部作品出现在佛教流行的国家，无疑会被看作为一部富有启发性的著作，用来更为彻底地驳斥异端邪说，有益于证实正统的唯心论——主张呈现在我们