Chapter 8 Chapter 4 On the first class of objects of the subject, and the form of the principle of sufficient reason governing them 4

Section 22 Direct Object It is from bodily sensations, therefore, that we receive the material necessary for the first application of the law of causality, and it is through the use of the law of causality that the intuition of such objects arises.Thus their essence and existence arise only when the intellect functions and is exercised. I call the human organism the "immediate object" in so far as it is the starting point, the mediator, of the intuitions of all other objects; however, this cannot be taken in a strictly literal sense.For, although our bodily sensations are all directly apprehended, this direct apprehension still does not make our body itself an object for us to apprehend; .From this sensation begins the intuition of all other objects which are the causes of this class of sensations, and these causes then present themselves to us as objects; Feel.Our objective knowledge of this body can only be indirect, that is, as an object, like all other objects, as a result of subjectively given - and for this reason it is objective - its determination It manifests itself in our intellect or in our brain (which is the same) for reasons we know.This can only happen when its own organs are acted upon by its parts, for example, when the body is seen by the eye or touched by the hand, etc., and the brain (or intellect) immediately bases on these materials The body is constructed as shape and essence in space. —Thus, in our consciousness, the immediate existence of such representations depends on their relation in the chain of causation (by which all things are connected) relative to the subject (by which all things are known) to the body (now ) is determined by the position.

Section 23 Criticism of Kant's Grounds for the A priori Proof of the Concept of Causality One of the chief purposes of the law of causality is to show the general validity, a priori, of the law of causality with respect to all experience, and, as a corollary of this a priori, its limitations on possible experience.However, I am not in favor of giving an a priori proof to the principle of sufficient reason, which is essentially:—"Synthesis is given to multiplicity by imagination, (although this is necessary for all empirical cognition), and succession is given, but still is not a definite succession, that is, it has not yet decided which of the two states of perception is prior, and this is true not only of the imagination but of the object itself. But the definite succession of The order--only by which our sensations become experience, or in other words lead us to form objectively valid judgments--is first introduced by the purely intellectual conception of causality. The law of causality is thus the condition which makes experience possible , and because of this, it is given to us a priori." ①

-------- ① Kant: page 201 of the first edition; page 246 of the fifth edition (page 176 of Miller's English translation).It's not a literal citation, though. (English translator's note). This being the case, the sequence in which changes occur in succession in real objects is recognized by us as objective only by virtue of their causal relations.In Kant, especially in "The Second Analogy of Experience" ① and the end of "The Third Analogy", he repeatedly explained and explained this claim.I recommend the study of these passages to anyone who wishes to understand what I am trying to explain here.Everywhere in these passages he demonstrates that the objectivity of the succession of representations—which he defines as coincident with the succession of real objects—is known only by the laws by which they succeed each other, which The law is the law of cause and effect;

My pure understanding therefore does not establish the objective relation of appearances to one another, because I only perceive the succession of my own representations, but in my perception the succession does not lead me to any conclusions about the succession of objects. Judgment, unless this judgment is founded on the law of causality; and also because I may reverse the order in which these intuitions succeed one another in my understanding, since nothing can establish them as objective.To illustrate this claim, Kant cites the example of a house, saying that when we look at the parts of a house, we are free to consider them in any order, either from top to bottom or from bottom to top; In this case, the determination of the sequence is completely subjective and not based on the object, because we can do it at will.In contrast to this example, he cites our intuition of a boat going down the river as an example.We keep seeing the boat go lower and lower along the river, and the intuition aroused by the constant change of the boat's position is not changed by the onlookers.Thus, in the latter case, he derives the subjective result from the objective result of the phenomenon according to his perception, and so he calls it an event.I contend, on the contrary, that there is no difference in any way between the two cases, that both are events, and that our knowledge of both is objective, that is to say, the subject's knowledge of changes in real objects.Both are about changes in the relative positions of two objects.In the former, one of the objects is a part of the observer's own body, that is, the eyes, and the other part refers to the house, and the eyes can see different positions of the house by constantly moving.In the latter, the boat constantly changes position along the stream, so that the change takes place between two bodies.Both are events, the only difference is: in the former, the change begins with the observer's own body, and all his intuitions undoubtedly originate from the sensations of the body, but the body is still one of the objects, and therefore Obey the laws of the objective material world.For the observer, as a purely cognitive individual, any movement of his body is a fact perceived by experience.If it were as easy for the observer to steer the boat up the stream as to change the direction of his own eyes, it would be quite possible to reverse the order in which the changes follow in the first case as in the second.For Kant infers that the intuitive order of the different parts of the house is neither objective nor an event, since it depends on its own will.But the movement of his eyes in the direction from the roof to the bottom is one event, and the movement from the bottom to the roof is another event, which is the same as the movement of the boat, and there is no difference here.It doesn't make any difference whether I walk past a procession of fighters or a procession of fighters walks past me, as to whether they are events or not.If we stand on the shore and fix our eyes on a boat approaching the shore, we will immediately feel that the boat is standing still while the shore is moving.In this example we have mistaken the cause of the relative change of position, since we have not found the correct cause; known.If Kant can remember that his body is also an object among objects, the sequence of his empirical intuitions depends on the sequence of impressions his body receives from other objects, and is therefore an objective sequence, that is, an immediate (if not indirectly) takes place among the objects and is independent of the subject's will, so that it can be known with certainty even without any causal relation between the objects constantly acting on his body, then , he himself would have believed, that there was no difference between the two.

-------- ① Same as above, page 189 of the first edition; the fifth edition is the most comprehensive, see page 232. (Miller English translation p. 166) Time, says Kant, cannot be intuited; therefore the succession of representations cannot be objectively intuited empirically, i.e. it cannot be distinguished as a change in appearance from a purely subjective one.The law of causality, as the law by which states are produced orderly, is the only tool by which the objectivity of change can be known.Thus, the conclusion of Kant's claim is that succession in time cannot be objectively intuited by us (except causation), and that other succession of phenomena in intuition is determined only in this way, not by our own will.This point of view is in conflict with the point I have to make, that is, it is quite possible for phenomena to be born continuously, even if they do not follow each other.The law of causality suffers nothing from this; for it is still certain that every change is the effect of another change, a firm law established a priori; but not only does each change need only one change as its cause. , and requires all other changes that occur simultaneously with this cause, but without any causal connection with it.It cannot be visualized by me exactly in the regular order of causal succession, but in a quite different order.However, this completely different order does not detract from its objectivity, and is largely different from any subjective order based on my randomness, such as the picture in my imagination.The succession of events in time without any causal connection to each other is what we call chance.It was as if, as I was leaving my house, a tile happened to fall from the roof and hit me.There is no relation between my going out and the falling of the tiles; however, the order in which they follow—I go out before the tiles fall—seems to me to be objectively determined and beyond my will, otherwise, if Will to decide, the situation is likely to be the opposite.In musical compositions, the sequence of tonal progressions is also determined objectively and not subjectively by me, the listener; however, has anyone thought of the claim that the progression of tones is determined by the laws of causality?Doubtless, even the alternation of day and night is recognized by us as objective, but we certainly do not regard them as reciprocal causation; as far as their common cause is concerned, pre-Copernican perceptions were all erroneous. but the correct perception of this succession is not in the slightest disturbed by errors in perception.Incidentally, Hume's hypothesis: his hypothesis is thus refuted; for the alternation of day and night--the oldest and least exceptional of all successions--can never be misleading to regard them as reciprocal causation.

Kant also maintains elsewhere that a representation reflects reality only through our knowledge of its necessary connection with other representations subject to this law (the law of causality) and its place in the definite order of the temporal relations of all our representations ( By general, I mean it's not the same as a mere brain image).But how few appearances, in the chain of causality, we can perceive, which fix their place by causal laws!However, we never have the difficulty of distinguishing objective representations from subjective representations—real objects from imaginary objects.We cannot recognize this when we are deep asleep because our brain is now detached from the peripheral nervous system and therefore from external influences.Therefore, in dreams, we regard imaginary things as real things, and only when we wake up, that is, when we restore the sensitivity of the nerves, and the outside world enters our consciousness again through sensations, we realize our mistakes; Even if we are still asleep in the dream, as long as the dream continues, the law of causality still applies, but the usual material is often replaced by impossible material.We cannot help thinking here that Kant was influenced by Leibniz in writing the passage we quote, however much his philosophy might otherwise differ from that of Leibniz; especially when we consider This effect is all the more pronounced now that Reynolds expresses an entirely similar point of view.For example, Leslie said: "The reality of perceptual things lies only in the connection of phenomena, it must have a cause, which makes it different from dreams-matter as the object of perception, the standard is the connection between phenomena, for It guarantees truth to sensible things that exist outside of us.”1

-------- ①Leibniz: "A New Essay on Human Reason", Section 14, Chapter II, Volume IV. It is clear that Kant committed a strange and very serious mistake in arguing the a priori and necessity of the law of causality on the basis of the fact that the objective sequence of changes is known to us only through the law of causality, which in so far constitutes a condition of all experience. An obvious error, which we can only explain by assuming that he was so absorbed in the innate part of our knowledge that he failed to see what is obvious to others.What I have given in Section 21 of this book is the only correct account of the a priori nature of the law of causality.This a priori quality is at any time confirmed by the fact that we confidently expect experience to correspond to causal laws, that is to say, it has a certainty which we take to be indisputable, and this certainty is not the same as As with any other certainty based on inductive methods—for example, the certainty of natural laws known through experience—we cannot conceive of anything in the empirical world that could be independent of the laws of causality.For example, we may conceive that the law of gravitation does not work in one exceptional case, but cannot conceive that there is no reason for this case.

Kant's and Hume's proofs err on the contrary.Hume maintains that all inferences are nothing but a sequence; Kant wants to demonstrate that all sequences are necessarily inferences.It is true that pure understanding can only conceive inferences (effects of causes), and it cannot conceive either the difference between left and right, nor can it conceive a separate sequence, which, like a sequence, can only be grasped by pure sensibility.The empirical knowledge of the succession of events in time is indeed just as possible as the empirical knowledge of the juxtaposition of things in space (Kant denies this elsewhere), but the way in which things are always successive in time has to be The way in which one thing arises from another (as the effect of a cause) is likewise unexplained: the cognition of the former is conditioned and given by pure sensibility; the latter depends on pure intellect. .However, in arguing that knowledge of the objective order of phenomena can only be obtained through the law of causality, Kant made the same mistake that he accused Leibniz of: ① "intellectualization of sensuous forms". ——My views on Jiqi are as follows.What we get from the form of time is only the knowledge of the possibility of succession, which belongs to pure sensibility.The form of the succession of a real object is time, and we know its succession empirically and therefore as real.But it is only through the understanding, by virtue of the law of causality, that we can arrive at the subsequent necessity of two states (of changing); Known, but given to us a priori.The principle of sufficient reason, the general expression of the basic form of the necessary connection between all our objects, that is, representations, resides in the deepest recesses of our cognitive faculties: it is the common form of all representations, the sole source of the concept of necessity.Inevitability tells us: when the grounds are determined, the inference will follow, and it absolutely does not contain any other content and meaning besides this.Why this law in time determines the order of succession of the kind of representations we are studying, and appears in them in the form of a causal law, is this: Time is the form of these representations, and therefore necessarily connected here Appears by the law of succession.In the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the necessary connection which it always requires will appear in a form quite different from that of time, and therefore not in the form of succession; The law of identity of all forms of law, or the unity of the root of all laws expressed in common by this law, reveals itself through the characteristic of necessary connection.

-------- ① Kant: First Edition, p. 275; Fifth Edition, p. 331 (Miller's English translation, p. 236). If Kant's assertion is correct (which I disagree with), the only way we can know the reality of succession is through its necessity; It is an omniscient intellect.Kant imposes an impossibility on the intellect, just in order not to use sensibility as much as possible. On the one hand, Kant maintains that the only means by which we can recognize the objective reality of succession is through the necessity that the cause must produce an effect; Empirical criteria, how can we reconcile these two claims?Doesn't anyone see the obvious loop here?

-------- ① Kant: first edition, volume one, p. 203; fifth edition, p. 249; English translation, p. 178. If we recognize the objectivity of succession through the law of causality, then we have to regard this objectivity as the law of causality, and thus the law of causality.For if it were anything else, it would have to have other and different features by which it could be known; and this is precisely what Kant denies.It follows that, if Kant is right, we cannot say: "This state is the consequence of another state, and therefore it happened after"; for coming after and being a consequence should be the same thing; this proposition is Tautology.Also, if we exclude all distinction between causation and succession, we shall again agree with Hume, who says that all inferences are mere sequences, thus also denying this distinction.

Kant's proof thus boils down to this: We know the reality of succession only empirically, but in addition we know the necessity of succession in certain sequences of accidental events, even before all experience. A possible accident must have a fixed place in one of these sequences, and we will of course see the reality and a priori of the law of causality, the only correct proof of which is given in Section 21 of this work. Kant's theory asserts that only the chain of causation makes objective succession possible and our knowledge of it possible; another theory paralleling it is that coexistence and knowledge of it are possible only through correlation.In the book, Kant discussed it in the "Third Analysis of Experience".Kant even says here: "The coexistence of phenomena which have no relation to each other but are separated by a completely empty space can never become an object of possible intuition." (By the way, this could be a priori proof that there are no empty spaces between fixed stars), he also speaks of "the light that flickers between our eyes and the celestial bodies" - an expression that implies the idea that this starlight acts not only on On, and by, our eyes—"produce a common whole between us and them, and confirm their commonality." This last assertion is false even empirically; The light of the star that is observed cannot prove that it existed at the same time as the observer in any way, at most it can only prove that it existed several years or even centuries ago.Moreover, Kant's second theory is just as flimsy as the first, only the second is easier to see through; the meaninglessness of the whole concept of correlation was shown in Section 20. -------- ① Fidel: Section 29 of "On Space and Causality". I object that the proof proposed by Kant is comparable to the two previous objections made by Fidel1 and Schulz2. -------- ① Kant’s first edition, pages 212-213, and English translation, pages 185-186. ②Schultz: "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy" Volume II, page 422 and the following pages. I am not rashly attacking (in 1813) a theory that has been accepted as a proven truth and is repeated even in recent publications, and which again is Kantian. a major point of view, and I have great respect and admiration for the wisdom of Kant himself.To him I owe much, and his spirit may well have said to me in the words of Homer: "I have driven from your eyes the darkness that formerly hid them." -------- ① For example, in Frith's "Critique of Reason", Volume II, p. 85. § 24 Concerning the Misuse of the Law of Causality It can be seen from the foregoing that the law of causality is only applicable to changes in the material, experience-given world, otherwise it is a misuse of it.It is a misuse, for example, to apply it to the forces of nature by which change is produced; or to matter on which change occurs; The absolute objective existence of the world belongs to the world; besides, there are indeed many other situations.Readers are invited to refer to my masterpiece ① on this issue.Misuses of this kind always arise, partly because the concept of cause, like many other metaphysical and ethical concepts, is taken too broadly; A presupposition of the world by which it is possible for us to perceive things external to us; For in this faculty is its origin; nor can it be conceived of as the eternal order of the universe and of all beings. -------- ①Second Edition, Volume 2, Chapter 4, Page 42 and following pages; Third Edition, Volume 2, Page 46 and following pages. Section 25 The time in which the change was made Since the principle of sufficient reason of becoming applies only to change, it certainly cannot be omitted here without mentioning the question already posed by the ancient philosophers as to the time in which change occurs: change cannot occur in the existence of a previous state, nor Possibly after the new state succeeds.If, however, we consider the change to take place during a definite period of time between the two states, during which the body is neither in the first nor in the second, e.g. a dying person who is neither alive nor alive. The living are not the dead; matter is neither at rest nor in motion, which is absurd.The hesitation and ingenious sophistry aroused by this question are found in Sextus Empirico's Anti-Mathematicians, Volume IX, pp. 267-271, and in Hypotheses, Volume III, Chapter 14. Summarized material can be found in ; the matter is also dealt with by Grieus in Book VI, Chapter 13—a thorny issue that Plato1 handles by arguing that changes occur suddenly and do not occupy any time. Indiscreet; they arise suddenly, he says, which he calls a strange, timeless existence (yet they are in time). -------- ① Plato: "Parmenides", page 138. It is therefore left to the ingenuity of Aristotle to clarify this difficulty.He discussed this problem in depth and detail in Chapters 1-8 of Volume VI of "Physics".His proof is that there are no sudden (in Plato's sense) changes, but that any change occurs gradually and therefore takes a certain amount of time.Such a proof rests entirely on pure a priori intuitions of time and space; however, this remains elusive.Perhaps the gist of this lengthy proof may be reduced to the following proposition.When we say of objects that they are mutually constrained, we mean that two objects have a common boundary; therefore only two continuous things can have a common boundary, not two single objects , because then they are one—only lines, not pure points, can share a common boundary.In this way, he transfers it from space to time.Since there is a line between two points, there is time between the two instants; this is the time in which the change takes place—one state in the first instant, the other in the second.This time, like all other times, is infinitely divisible; therefore, whatever is changing, it always passes through the endless divisions of , the second state gradually emerges from the first state. —Perhaps the following explanation will make this process easier to understand.Between two states in which we can perceive their difference there are always intermediate states, the difference of which is not perceived by us; for, in order to be visualized by the senses, the nascent state must acquire a certain intensity or magnitude. , therefore, each preceded it by a lesser degree of intensity or extension, through which the nascent state gradually arose.In a word, the combination of these lesser degrees of intensity or extension is called change, and the time they occupy is the time of change.If we apply this to a body being propelled, the first result is a certain vibration of its inner parts, which, after transmitting this vibration to the other parts, produce an outer motion. . —Aristotle quite rightly deduces from infinitely divisible time: anything that occupies time, and thus every change, i.e. transition from one state to another, is equally infinitely divisible, Hence the origin of anything is in fact the result of the joining together of innumerable parts; therefore its origin is always gradual, never sudden.From these laws, and from the aspect by which each motion proceeds gradually, in the last chapter of this volume he draws an important corollary: that no single thing, a pure point, can move.Kant defined matter as: things moving in space, which is completely consistent with this conclusion. It can thus be seen that the law of continuity and agility of all changes was first proposed and demonstrated by Aristotle, and we find Kant mentioning this idea three times: in his "On the Form and Principles, Section XIV, in ①, and finally in The First Principles of Metaphysics of Natural Science ②.In all three places Kant's account is short and nowhere near as thorough as Aristotle's; however, as far as its main content is concerned, they are in complete agreement.We may therefore have no doubt that Kant borrowed these ideas from Aristotle, whether directly or indirectly, although Aristotle is not mentioned.Aristotle's proposition - "The present moment is not connected" - can be found expressed in this way: "There is always a period of time between two moments", which may be refuted as follows: "Even if the time between two centuries Nor is there anything; for in time as in space there must always be a pure limit." - Thus Kant, in the first and earliest of his three propositions, managed to make him The point of view is consistent with Leibniz's continuity (Lexcontinuitatis), without mentioning Aristotle.If their theories are indeed consistent, Leibniz must have derived from Aristotle.Leibniz ③ first spoke of this law of continuity in his letter to Bayer ④.However, there he calls it the universal principle of order, and in that name gives a very general, vague, mostly geometrical argument, which does not directly refer to changing times, and does not even mention . -------- ① Kant: first edition, p. 207; fifth edition, p. 253. ②Kant: At the end of "General Notes on Mechanics" in "The First Principles of Metaphysics of Natural Science". ③According to his own opinion, see "Complete Works of Philosophy" edited by Edelman. ④ Ibid., p. 104.