Chapter 19 The Author's Reply to the Fourth Group of Objections to Mr. Arnaud, the Master of Theology①

Letter from the Author to Father Mercena Dear priest: I could hardly have found a wiser and more helpful examiner of my work than the man to whom you sent me criticisms, for he treated me with such gentleness that I could see him clearly My plans are not against me, nor against the cause I am engaged in.Nevertheless, he was so careful in examining what he attacked that I have reason to believe that he missed nothing.Besides, he was so vehemently opposed to what he disagreed with that I had no reason to fear that it should be thought that this gesture of politeness concealed something. That is why I am not so distressed by his rebuttals as I am pleased to see that he does not object to much more in my work.

① The title of the second French edition is: "The Author's Reply to the Fourth Group of Objections". On the Nature of the Human Spirit I shall not pause here to thank him for his assistance in backing me up with the authority of St. Augustine, and for presenting my reasons in such a way that he seemed afraid that other The reasons are not strong and convincing. But I'll start by saying where I set out to prove how, from the fact that I don't know anything else of my essence (that is, the essence of my spirit) except that I am a thinking thing , with the consequence that nothing else actually belongs to it either.It is at the same place that I prove that there is a God, that I say that this God is capable of doing everything that I clearly and unequivocally perceive as possible.

For, although there may be many things in me that I do not yet know (as I assume in that place I do not know that the spirit has the power to move the body, or that the spirit and the body are actually united); Realizing that there is something in me, and that alone is enough for me to exist, I know for sure that God could have created me without other things that I do not know, and thus are not of the essence of my spirit.For I think that nothing without which something else could exist is not contained in the essence of that other; and although the spirit is the essence of man, yet, in all seriousness, the spirit is related to the body of man. Unity, too, is not the essence of the spirit.

I must also explain here what I mean when I say the following: that to apprehend one thing without reference to another by means of a mental abstraction which comprehends it incompletely does not lead to two A real difference between two things; a real difference between two things can be drawn only if either is understood without reference to the other, completely or as a whole. For I do not think that, as M. Arnaud says,1 a total and complete knowledge is required; but there is the distinction that a knowledge, to be complete and complete, must itself contain all Everything and every quality in what is known, so only God Himself knows that He has full and perfect knowledge of all things.

①The second French version is in "that", followed by "in order to establish a real distinction between two things". But even though a created intellect might indeed have full and perfect knowledge of many things, he could never know that he had these knowledge unless God himself specially revealed it to him.For, in order for him to have a complete and complete knowledge of something, it is easy to require only that the faculty of knowledge in him be equal to that thing; but for him to know that he has such a knowledge, Or that God has not put more in this thing than he knows, then it must be that by virtue of his knowing power he is equal to the infinite power of God, which is quite impossible.

② Refers to human reason. However, in order to know a real difference between two things, it is not necessary that our knowledge of the two things be complete and complete, unless we also already know that our knowledge of the two things is complete and complete. of.However, as I just proved, we can never know whether our cognition is complete and complete, so such a requirement is unnecessary. It is for this reason that when I say that it is not enough to apprehend one thing without reference to another by a mental abstraction which comprehends things incompletely, I do not think of deriving from this Conclusion, that in order to establish a real distinction, such a total and complete knowledge is required, but only such a knowledge that we do not blur it through the abstraction and limitation of our mind. Incomplete and flawed.

For there is a great difference between two kinds of knowledge, that which is complete and complete, which no one knows for sure, unless God Himself reveals it to him; This degree of knowledge, which we know is not imperfected by any abstraction of our minds. Thus, when we have to comprehend something completely, I do not mean that our comprehension should be complete and complete, but that we should know enough of the thing to know that it is complete. This I think is obvious, partly from what I have said before, and partly from what has followed since, since a little while ago I distinguished the imperfect from the perfect, and I also Say: Every such distinct thing must be understood as something that exists by itself and is different from everything else.

A little later, I say in the same sense, that I fully understand what the flesh is; I went on to say at that place that I also understand that the spirit is a complete thing.The two expressions of fully comprehending and comprehending that this is a complete thing mean the same thing. But there is reason to ask here: what does a complete mean? How can I prove that as long as two things are understood as two complete things and the one does not involve the other, then there is a real difference between the two things? My answer to the first question is: by a complete thing I mean only a substance with forms or properties sufficient for me to recognize it as a substance.

For, as I have already pointed out elsewhere, we do not know substances directly from themselves, but from our perceptions of certain forms or properties, to which they ought to be attached, which we The thing they are attached to is called the entity. However, if we later try to free this substance from all these properties by which we know it, we destroy all our knowledge of it, and so, yes, we can say a little about substance, But everything we say is only a verbal word, from which we cannot clearly and distinctly grasp its meaning. I know, of course, that there are some substances which are colloquially called incomplete; but I think it contradictory to call them substances on this point, if they are so called because they cannot exist by themselves without other support. Yes, that is to say, some things exist by themselves and at the same time incomplete, that is, some things cannot exist by themselves.Yes, in another sense we may call them imperfect substances, not because they are imperfect as substances, but because, in their relation to some other substance, They and that entity combine to form a whole, which exists by itself and is distinct from anything else.Thus a hand is an incomplete entity, which is a part of the whole if you look at it in relation to the whole body; but if you look at it alone, it is a complete entity.Likewise, mind and body are incomplete substances when viewed in relation to the man of which they are composed; but, when viewed separately, they are complete substances.

For the extended, the divisible, the shaped, etc., are forms or attributes by which I know this substance which is called the body [body]; , skeptical, etc., are the forms through which I come to know this entity which is called spirit. I understand that the substance in thinking is a complete thing, no less than I understand that the substance with extension is a complete thing. The words added by M. Arnault: Perhaps the flesh is to the spirit as the "genus" is to the "species", and in no case can this be said, for although the genus can be done without this special distinction, or without the species is understood by us, but the species cannot be understood by us apart from the genus under any circumstances.

Thus, for example, we easily grasp shapes without having to think of figures (although the concept is not very clear if it is not related to some particular shape; a complete thing); but we cannot apprehend a particular distinction of any figure without also thinking of shape. But we can apprehend the mind clearly and completely, that is to say, with all the necessary conditions for being a complete thing, without any form through which the body is recognized as a substance, as I think in As already amply pointed out in the second meditation; we also clearly apprehend the body as a complete thing, needing nothing of the spirit. Nevertheless, M. Arnaud here goes a step further: Although I may have a concept of myself without the concept of body, it cannot be concluded from this that this concept is complete and complete, so that I can know with certainty that when I am not mistaken when I exclude bodies from my essence. He uses the example of a triangle inscribed in a semicircle to show that we can clearly and distinctly perceive this as an equilateral triangle, although we do not know or even deny that the square on its hypotenuse is equal to the square on its two right sides.Nevertheless, we cannot follow from it that we can make an equilateral triangle whose square on the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum of the squares on the two right angles. As far as this example is concerned, however, it differs in many respects from what was proposed; for, first, although perhaps we may understand a triangle as a solid which is triangular in shape, but which has The property that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right angles is certainly not a substance, so that neither of these two things can be understood as a complete thing.The same is true of spirit and body.Even this characteristic cannot be called a thing, and in the sense that I have said that it is sufficient to enable me to comprehend one thing (meaning a complete thing) without another, etc., the following is very easy to understand: , I find some functions in it, and so on.For, I am not saying that these functions are things, but I am specifically trying to make a distinction between things (that is, entities) and the ways of these things (that is, the functions of these entities). The second point is that although we can clearly and clearly understand that a triangle inscribed in a semicircle is an equilateral triangle, we do not need to perceive that the square on its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right-angled sides, but we cannot clearly understand that To perceive that the square on the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right-angled sides is not necessary to comprehend at the same time that the triangle is equiangular; but we do not need the body to comprehend the spirit clearly and distinctly, and vice versa, we use The flesh is clearly and distinctly understood without being distracted. Thirdly, although the concept or idea of ​​a triangle inscribed in a semicircle may not imply that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right angles, it cannot be such that we cannot comprehend that There is no proportional relationship between the square on the hypotenuse and the squares on the two right angles that belongs to the triangle.Therefore, when we do not know what this proportional relation is, we cannot deny any other proportional relation except that which we clearly grasp does not belong to it.But it is absolutely impossible to understand this in terms of equal proportion between the two of them. But there is nothing of the spirit contained in the concept of the body; and conversely, nothing of the body is contained in the concept of the spirit. Therefore, although I have said that it is enough if I can clearly and distinctly comprehend something without needing anything else, etc., this minor premise does not follow from that: But I clearly and distinctly comprehend that this triangle is a right angle. A triangle, though I doubt or deny that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right sides, etc. First, because the relation of equal proportions between the square on the hypotenuse and the squares on the two right angles is not a complete thing; Second, because this equal proportional relationship can only be clearly understood in a right triangle. Thirdly, because, if we deny the proportional relationship between the square on the hypotenuse of a triangle and the squares on its two right angles, we cannot apprehend the triangle clearly. But now I must come to the second question, and show why it is true that I know with certainty that they are mutually exclusive of one another simply because I apprehend one entity clearly and distinctly without the need for another, and I point out thus : The concept of substance is such that we grasp it as something capable of existing by itself (that is, without the help of any other substance); no one ever comprehends it in two different concepts Two entities without doubting that they are actually distinct. ①The second edition of French also has: "And in fact there is a difference". Therefore, if I do not seek greater than ordinary reliability, I am content with what has already been pointed out in the second meditation: the mind is understood as a persistent thing, although nothing is added to it bodily [body]; likewise, the body [body] is understood as a persistent thing, although nothing of the spirit is added to it.Since we generally conclude that all things are in fact as they appear to our minds, I need not say much to prove that the mind is in fact distinct from the body. However, since one of the exaggerated doubts I raised in my first meditations was this: whenever I assume that I do not know the Author [God] of my source, when I cannot be sure Knowing that these things are in fact what we understand them to be.What I have said about God and truth in the third, fourth, and fifth meditations are all useful to the conclusion that there is a real difference between mind and body, a conclusion which I did not actually know until the sixth meditation. It's finally over. Mr. Arnaud said, I understand the properties of a triangle inscribed in a semicircle very clearly, without knowing that the square on its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two right angles.To this I replied: Yes, we can understand this triangle without thinking of the proportional relationship between the square on its hypotenuse and the squares on its two right-angled sides, but we cannot understand that this proportional relationship should be negated, nor That is to say, this proportional relationship does not belong to the properties of triangles.Not so with the mind; for not only do we perceive its existence without the body,1 but we can deny that whatever is of the body belongs to the mind; for such is the nature of the mutual exclusion of substance and substance.What M. Arnaud then said did not contradict me at all, that when I draw the conclusion from my thinking that I exist, if I make my own ideas from this point, it only appears to me as a thinking It's not surprising.For, likewise, when I examine the nature of the body, I find nothing in it that smells of thought; We cannot find anything in the one that is not quite different from the other, nor any stronger argument than this. ①The second French edition printed sans as dans, so the meaning of the whole sentence became "because not only we understand that it is in the flesh". Nor do I see why this argument seems to prove too much; for I do not think that in order to show that one thing is actually different from another, it cannot be done except by the omnipotence of God that the one thing can be separated from the other. Say no more; I think I have been careful enough that no one should be led to think that man is nothing but a spirit using flesh. For, even in the sixth meditation (where I spoke of the distinction between mind and body), I pointed out that the mind is essentially united with the body; To prove it, I use arguments stronger and more convincing than these that I don't recall seeing anywhere else. ① "dans la meme sixieme Meditation", the second French version is "meme dans la sixieme Meditation", the position of "meme" in the sentence is different, so the part of speech is also different, and the meaning is also different accordingly. Just as the man who says that the arm of a man is a substance actually distinct from the rest of the body does not thereby deny that it belongs to the essence of all men; does not therefore give an opportunity to believe that it cannot persist by itself, and likewise I do not think that much has been proved in pointing out that the mind can exist without a body, nor that it is substantially united with the body. Too little has been said above together; for this substantive union does not prevent us from having a clear and distinct idea or conception of the mind alone as a complete thing; therefore the conception of the mind has nothing to do with area and line. The concepts of area and line cannot thus be understood as complete things without adding height to them in addition to length and breadth. Finally, from the fact that in a child the faculty of thought is insensible, while in a madman it is not actually extinguished but confused, it should not be thought that the faculty of thought is bound to the bodily organs to such an extent that it cannot be without Organs of the flesh.For by no means can it be concluded that it is produced by these organs from the fact that we often see it blocked by them; Even so, I do not deny that the close connection of the mind and the body that we experience every day is what makes it so difficult for us, without deep contemplation, to discover the actual difference between them. I think, however, that those who have often considered in their minds what I wrote in the second meditation will easily believe that the difference between the mind and the body is not due to a mere fiction or intellectual abstraction, but to Because it is recognized as something other than the body, because in fact it is. I do not want to answer what M. Arnaud says here about the immortality of the soul, because what he says agrees with what I say; explanation, I cannot say more than what I have already said in the fifth part of my "On Method"; In the body of an animal, or even in our body, no motion is possible without all the organs and instruments by which motion can be made, as by a machine. .Therefore, even within us, it is not the spirit (or soul) that directly moves the outer limbs, but only it (the spirit) is able to regulate the flow of this very thin fluid that we call animal spirits, this fluid Constantly flowing from the heart through the brain to the muscles, it is the cause of all the motions of our limbs, and is often capable of causing many different motions with equal ease, and it does not always even dictate animal spirits, for in us humans Many of the movements done are by no means dependent on the mind, such as the beating of the heart, the digestion of food, nutrition, breathing while one is asleep, and even walking when awake, when the mind is not thinking, Singing, and other similar actions.As for the person who falls from a height to protect his head with his hands first, it is not their rationality that tells him to do this action. This action does not depend on their spirit, but only on their sense organs. , these senses, sensing the danger at hand, cause what movement on the brain, which determines the passage from there of the animal spirit to the nerves, to be produced in the same manner as is required in a machine, without The spirit interferes. Since we experience this in ourselves, why should we be so surprised if the light reflected from a wolf into the eyes of a sheep has the same power to cause the sheep to flee? Having pointed this out, if we wish to reason a little, as to whether certain movements of animals are not much the same as those which are accomplished mentally in us humans, or which depend only on the dominion of the spirit and organs of animals, we must consider There are differences between each other, and these differences I have explained in the fifth part of "On Method", because I think it is impossible to find other words, so we will easily see that all the actions of animals are different from each other. As much as we act without our spirit participating. We shall therefore be compelled to conclude that in animals we know virtually no other principle of motion, but only the control of the organs and the continual influx of animal spirits.This animal spirit is produced by the heat of the heart.The heat of the heart slows and thins the blood.At the same time, we shall realize that nothing heretofore affords us the opportunity to assign them another, except by virtue of these two principles of motion indistinguishable, and seeing one (which depends only on the animal spirit and Senses) are both in animals and in us, and we foolishly believe that the other one (which depends on spirit and thinking) is also in animals. Of course, when we have believed something since we were young, and our prejudices have grown stronger with age, no matter what reason people give us to see its error, or rather, although we notice it. If we do not constantly think of these two principles in our minds, and get used to gradually digging out that which is not by reason but by habit, it will still be very difficult to get rid of us. This kind of prejudice is completely removed from the trust. about god Hitherto I have tried to solve the arguments presented to me by M. Arnaud and to parry all his attacks; It's not directly facing this edge. In this part he speaks of only three things which, as he understands them, can agree with him.However, when I wrote these three things, I took another meaning, and that meaning, I think, can also be accepted as true. The first thing is this: There are some ideas which are materially wrong, that is to say, as I mean them, they are such that they give wrong material or opportunity to judgment; When thinking about the above concept, think that there is no error in the concept. The second thing is: God exists positively by himself, as by a cause, and at that point I simply meant to say that the reason why God does not need any efficient cause in order to exist is based on a positive The immensity of God itself is the most positive thing that can exist; but he [Arno] is not like this, he proves that God is not produced by himself, nor is he preserved by a positive action of the efficient cause.I also agree on this point. Finally, the third thing is this: no matter what, if we do not know about it, it cannot exist in us. By this I mean function, but he [Arno] denies it in terms of potentiality. But I'm going to explain this a bit more.First, where he said that coldness is only a lack, and that there cannot be a concept to represent a positive thing to me, he obviously meant the concept in form. For, as ideas themselves are but forms, and they are not composed of matter, every time they are considered to represent something, they are used not in matter, but in form, if they were not used as If they are considered to represent this or that, but merely as intellectual operations, then of course they may be said to be used materially; , and has absolutely nothing to do with the "wrongness" of things. It is for this reason that I do not think that they can be said to be materially false, in the sense that I have already explained, namely: whether cold is a positive thing, or a lack, I do not therefore have a different idea of ​​it, but this idea is in me the same idea as I have always had; and if coldness is really a lack, and has not as much reality as heat, then this idea gives My wrong matter or occasion, for, in considering separately this and that idea which I have received from my senses, I do not recognize a greater reality represented by the one idea than by the other. More. I do not, of course, confuse judgments with ideas; for I have said that in ideas there is a material error; but in judgments there can be nothing but formal errors.When he says that the idea of ​​cold is cold itself, in so far as it exists objectively in the intellect, I think a distinction must be made, because in vague ideas (the idea of ​​cold and that of heat should be placed In these ideas), it often happens that they are about something other than what it really represents. Thus, if coldness is merely a lack, the idea of ​​coldness, insofar as it exists objectively in the intellect, is not coldness itself, but something else, which is mistakenly taken for this A lack, a certain feeling, which never exists outside the intellect. The idea of ​​God is not like that, at least not the clear and distinct idea, because it cannot be said to be about something that does not suit it. As to those vague notions of gods invented by idolaters, so far as they give them false judgments, I see no reason why they should not also be called materially false. Indeed, those ideas which give (let us say) no chance of any error, or very slight error, to judgment should not be said to be materially wrong on the same level as those which give very great chance of error. of.Again, it is easy to show by many examples that some ideas give a greater chance of error than others. For the chance of error is not so great in those vague ideas fabricated by our mind itself (as are those of false gods) as in those vaguely given to us by the senses, as Cold ideas, like hot ideas, do not represent anything real, if it is really what I say. But greatest of all opportunities for error are those ideas that produce the feeling of hunger and thirst.For example, is not the idea of ​​thirst in a edematous patient actually an opportunity for error when it leads him to believe that drinking water will do him good, when in fact it will do him harm? But M. Arnaud asked what this cold idea represented to me, and I said that it was materially false, because, he said, if it represented a lack, it was true; if it represented a positive then it is not a cold idea.On this, I agree.But I call it false only because, since it is indistinct, I cannot tell whether what it represents to me is positive outside my perception; that is why I have Chances are though perhaps simply a lack of something judged as positive. It should therefore not be asked what, in my opinion, is the cause of that positive, objective thing that makes this idea materially false; for I do not say that it is materially false from what positive But only to say that this is only due to ambiguity, and the subject and basis of this ambiguity is a positive thing, that is, sensation itself. It is true that this positive thing is in me, because I am a real thing; but it is vague, and only it gives me the opportunity to judge that this idea of ​​feeling represents something outside me, which people call cold, which There is no real reason, it just comes from the imperfection of my nature. And that definitely doesn't disprove my reasoning.My greatest fear, however, is that, as I have never been very careful in my reading of philosophers, I may not have been accurate enough when I said that those ideas which gave judgment the wrong matter or chance were qualitatively wrong. According to them, fortunately, by chance, I saw that the word "material" mentioned in Chapter Nine, Section Two, and Fourth Section of Suarez's "Controversy" has the same meaning as I use. What Mr. Arnaud is most dissatisfied with, and at the same time, what I think he should least object to, is this: I say that we can easily think that God is in some sense about himself as the cause is about him. For, just above, I object to what he considers crude and untrue, that God is the efficient cause of himself, because, when I say that he is in some sense the same, I point out that I do not believe this are exactly the same; and at the same time, putting the words we easily think of at the beginning of the sentence, I point out that I interpret these things in this way only because of the imperfection of the human spirit. Besides, I keep making the same distinction throughout the rest of my book. For from the beginning, where I said that there is nothing that cannot be attributed to its efficient cause, I add: Or, if it has no efficient cause, ask why it does not; There is no need for an efficient cause for things to exist. But what is this but God?Even a little later, I said that in God there is such a vast, such an inexhaustible power that he exists without any help, is preserved without any help, and therefore he is in a way self- because of. In that place, the word self-cause cannot be understood as a dynamic cause, but can only be understood as this inexhaustible power in God as the cause, or as the reason why he does not need a cause. Since this inexhaustible power, or the immensity of this essence, is very positive, I say that the cause or reason why God does not need a cause is positive.This is at any rate impossible for anything finite, though such a thing is very perfect in its kind. For, if such a thing1 is self-causal, it can only be understood negatively, since no reason can be found in the positive nature of this thing, from which we should understand that it does not require an efficient cause. . ① "such a thing", the second French edition is: "a limited thing". In the same way everywhere else I compare this cause or reason, which arises from the essence of God, which requires no cause to exist and to be preserved, with the efficient cause without which finite things cannot exist, so that,从我的专门术语来看，无论什么地方都可以很容易地认识出它和动力因完全是两回事。 在任何对方都找不到我曾说过上帝是由一种正面的作用来保存自己的，和造物都是由他保存的一样；我只是说他的能力或他的本质的广大无垠性（这种广大无垠性是他之所以不需要保存者的原故）是一件正面的东西。 这样一来，我就能够很容易同意凡是阿尔诺先生为了证明上帝不是他自己的动力因、不是由任何一种正面的作用或者由一种他自己的不断再产生而自我保存所提出来的东西，而这些东西是人们从他的理由中所能推论出来的全部东西。 但是，我希望他也不会否认上帝不需要原因而存在的这种广大无垠的能力，在上帝里是一件正面的东西，而在其他一切东西里，人们不能领会到任何类似的正面的，因而不需要动力因就能存在的东西；当我说任何东西都只能反面地被领会为由自己而存在，只有上帝除外，我的意思要说的就是这个。为了答复阿尔诺先生所提出的诘难，我用不着再说别的了。 但是，由于阿尔诺先生在这里严重地警告我说，神学家们很少不是反对下面的命题的：即上帝就如同由一个原因那样正面地由自己而存在，我在这里将要说出为什么我以为这种说法在这个问题上不仅非常有用，而且是必要的，以及没有人能有理由认为这种说法不好①的道理。 ①“以及……不好”，法文第二版：“而且与凡是能够给机会来反对它的东西离开得非常远”。 我知道我们的神学家们在谈论神圣的事物时，当问题在于列举三位一体的三位的行列、并且在希腊人不加区别地用α'ι′τιον和α｀ρχη′ν时，他们使用本原这一唯一的词，采取这一词的最普通的意义，怕的是在这上面给人以机会认为圣子比圣父小。 但是，在没有象这样一种错误的机会上，当问题不在于三位一体的三位，而仅仅在于上帝的单一本质时，我看不出为什么应该那么躲避原因这一词，主要当人们来到这一点，即似乎是使用这一词非常有用而且在某种意义上是非常必要的时候。 然而，使用这一词没有比证明上帝的存在更有用的了，而且没有比使用它更必要的了。如果不使用它，就不能把上帝的存在性说明得那么清楚。 对动力因的考虑是我们用来证明上帝的存在性所具有的如果不说是唯一的方法的话，那么至少是第一的、主要的方法，我想这是人人皆知的。 如果我们不放任我们的精神去追寻世界上一切事物的动力因，就连上帝也不例外，那么我们就不能使用它；因为在我们证明上帝存在之前，我们有什么理由不去追寻上帝存在的动力因呢？ 因此，我们可以问每一个东西，它是由自己而存在的呢，还是由别的东西而存在的？不错，用这种办法我们可以得出上帝存在的结论，虽然我们不用形式的、严谨的词句解释我们应该怎么理解由自己而存在这几个字。 因为，凡是只遵照自然的光明领导而行事的人，都立刻在他们的心中在这里形成某一种概念，这种概念既有动力因，也有形式因，它对二者是共同的，也就是说，由别的东西而存在的就是象由一个动力因那样由别的东西而存在的，而由自己而存在的就是象由一个形式因那样，也就是说，它具有一种不需要动力因的那种性质而存在的。这就是为什么我没有在我的沉思里解释这一点，以及我把它当作一个自明的东西而省略去，不需要作任何说明的原故。 但是，当那些由于长期习惯而有这种意见，即断定任何东西都不能是它自己的动力因，而且认真把这种原因同形式区分开来的人，看到人们问什么东西不是由自己而存在的，很容易是这样的，即在他们的心里只想到纯粹的动力因，他们想不到由自己这几个字应该被理解为就象由一个原因那样，而只想到其反面，即没有原因；因此他们认为有一个什么东西存在，我们不应该问它为什么存在。 由自己这几个字的这样解释法，如果它被接受的话，它会使我们抛弃能够证明上帝由于结果而存在的办法，就如同由第一组反驳的作者所已经证明的那样：这就是为什么我们绝对不能同意的原故。 可是，为了恰当地回答他的反驳，我认为有必要证明在真正的动力因和没有原因之间有一个什么中间的东西，即一个东西的正面本质，动力因的观念或概念可以如同我们在几何学里习惯地用同样的方式那样延伸到它。在几何学里我们把要多大有多大的一条弧线的概念延伸到一条直线上去，或者一个具有无穷的边的多边形的概念延伸到圆的概念上去。 我认为没有比我以前做过的更好的解释了，那时我曾说过：在这个问题上我们不应该把动力因的意义限制到那样的一些原因上，那些原因与它们的结果不同，或者在时间上在其结果之先。因为一方面那会是没有意义的，而且毫无用处，因为没有人不知道一个同一的东西不能与其本身不同，也不能在时间上在它本身之先；另一方面也因为这两个条件中的一个可以从它的概念中被取消，而并不妨碍动力因的概念保持完整。 因为没有必要让它在时间上在它的结果之先，这是非常明显的，因为只有当它象我们所说过的那样产生它的结果时，它才有动力因的名称和性质。 但是从另外一个条件之不能被取消，我们只应得出这样的结论，即这并不是一个真正的动力因，这我承认；不过这并不能说它绝不是一个正面的原因，这个原因可以认为和动力因相类似，而这正是在所提出的问题上所要求的。因为就是由于自然的光明，我领会到，如果我把存在给了我，我就会把凡是在我心里有其观念的完满性都给我，同时我也领会到，没有什么东西能够按照人们习惯于用限制真正的动力因的意义的办法来把存在给予自己，即同一的东西，由于它给了自己存在，它就不同于它自己，因为它接受了存在；在这二者之间有矛盾：是它本身，又不是它本身或不同于它本身。 因此，当我们问道是否有什么东西能把存在给予它自己的时候，这只能这样去理解，即某一个东西的本性或本质是否是这样的，即这个东西不需要动力因就能存在。 当我们接着说：如果什么东西是这样的，即如果它真地是还不具备它有其观念的一切完满性的话，它就会把这些完满性都给它自己。这就是说，它现实不可能不具备它有其观念的一切完满性；因为自然的光明使我们认识到，一个东西，它的本质是如此地广大无垠以致它不需要动力因就能存在，那么它也不需要动力因就能具备它有其观念的一切完满性，而且它自己的本质卓越地把凡是我们能够想象到可以由动力因给予其他东西的完满性都给它自己。 如果它还没有这些完满性，它就会把这些完满性给它自己。这句话仅仅作为解释之用；因为由于同一的自然光明，我们懂得，在我说话的时候这个东西不可能有把什么新的东西给它自己的这种能力和意志；而是，它的本质是这样的，即凡是我们现在想得出（假如它还没有）它会给它自己的东西，它都已经永远地具备了。 虽然如此，所有这些与动力因有关和相类似的说法，对于引导自然的光明，使我们清楚分明地领会这些东西，是非常必要的；和这一样，阿几米德关于由曲线组成的球形和其他形状，拿这些形状同由直线组成的形状相比较，证明了许多东西。如果不这样，就很难使人理解。 由于这样的证明没有遭到反对，虽然球形在那里被看作是一个具有很多边的形状，同样我不认为能够在这里重新用我使用过的同动力因的类比来解释属于形式因的东西，也就是说，属于上帝的本质本身。 在这上面用不着害怕有任何产生错误的机会，因为凡是单独属于动力因的特性，以及不能被延伸到形式因上去的东西，本身都含有一种明显的矛盾，从而，决不能被任何人相信，例如，任何东西和它本身不同，或者是同一的东西同时又不是同一的东西。 必须注意：我把原因这个高贵的头衔归之于上帝，可是不能由此得出结论说我把结果这个不完满性也归之于上帝； 因为，就象神学家们吧，当他们说圣父是圣子的本原时，他们并不因此就认为圣子是由本原而生的，同样，虽然我说上帝从某种方式上可以被说成是他自己的原因，可是在任何地方都找不出来我说过是他自己的结果；这是因为我们习惯于主要地把结果联系在动力因上，并且把它断定为不如原因高贵，虽然它经常比它的其他的原因更高贵。 不过，当我把事物的全部本质当做形式因时，我在这上面是追随亚里士多德的足迹；因为在他的《分析后篇》卷二，第十六章里在取消了质料因之后，他举出的第一个原因就是就是形式因，他把这种形式因延伸到一切事物的一切本质上去，因为他在那个地方还没有谈到物理组成的东西的原因（我在这里也没有谈到它），而是一般地谈到人们可以由之而得出什么认识的原因。 然而，为了表示在所提出的问题里不把原因这一名称归之于上帝是很不容易办到的起见，从阿尔诺先生已经试求用另外一个办法得出和我同样的结论然而却没有成功这件事，就是最好的证明，至少我认为是这样。 因为，在大量指出上帝不是他自己的动力因（因为，动力因不同于它结果，这是动力因的本性）的同时，也指出上帝不是正面地（正面地这一词指原因的一种正面作用而言）由自己而存在，并且认真说来，他自己不保存他自己（保存这一词指事物的一种不断再产生而言）——所有这些，我都同意——在所有这些以后，他想再证明上帝不应该被说成是他自己的动力因；他说：因为问一个东西的动力因，这只是从它的存在性上来问的，决不是从它的本质上来问的。然而，一个无限的存在体之存在的本质并不少于一个三角形之有它的三角之和等于二直角的本质；所以当人们问上帝为什么存在时，不应该用动力因来回答，这和当人们问三角形的三个角之和为什么等于两直角时不应该用动力因来回答是一样的。 这个三段论式可以很容易按照这个样子倒转过来反对它的作者本身：虽然我们不能从本质上来问动力因，可是我们可以从存在性上来问动力因；不过在上帝身上本质和存在是没有区别的，所以我们可以问上帝的动力因。 但是，为了把这二者谐调起来，我们应该说，对于问上帝为什么存在的人，不应该用真正的动力因来回答，只能用事物的本质本身，或者用形式因来回答。本质或形式因，由于在上帝身上存在和本质是没有区别的，和动力因有非常大的联系，从而可以被称为“准动力因”。 最后他接着说：对于问上帝的动力因的人，必须回答说他不需要动力因；对于再问他为什么不需要动力因的人，必须回答说：因为他是一个无限的存在体，他的存在性就是他的本质；因为只有这样的一些东西才需要动力因，在这些东西里，允许把现实的存在性同本质分别开。 由此他得出结论说，我以前说的话完全被推翻了：即如果我想任何东西以某种方式对它自己的关系就是动力因对它的结果的关系，在追寻事物的原因上，我永远达不到第一个。 可是我认为绝对没有被推翻，甚至一点都没有被消弱或被动摇；因为，肯定的是：不仅是我的论证的主要力量，就连人们提供用结果来证明上帝的存在性的一切论证的力量都完全取决于此。然而，差不多所有的神学家都主张如果不根据结果就提供不出来任何一个论证来。 因此，当他不允许人们把上帝对于他自己的动力因的类似关系归于上帝时，他远没有给上帝的存在性的证明和论证提供什么阐明，相反，他把读者们弄糊涂了，阻碍读者们能够弄懂这个证明，特别是在结尾时，他结论说：如果他想必须追求每一个东西的动力因或者准动力因，他就会追求一个与这个东西不同的原因。 因为那些还不认识上帝的人，如果不认为人们可以追求每一个东西的动力因，他们怎么会追求别的东西的动力因以便用这个办法来达到对上帝的认识呢？ 最后，如果他们认为每一个东西的动力因都必须被追求出来同这个东西不同，他们怎么会象停止在第一因上那样停止在上帝身上，并且在上帝身上终止他们的追求呢？ 阿几米德在谈到他在用和内切于圆形本身里的一些直线形状的类比关系证明圆形的东西时也许会说：如果我认为圆形不能被当作一个具有无穷的边的直线形或准直线形，那么我就不会给这个证明以任何力量，因为，真正说来，这个证明不把圆形看作是一个曲线图形，而仅仅是把它看作是一个具有无穷数目的边的图形。不错，阿尔诺先生所做的和阿几米德一样。 如果阿尔诺先生认为这样称呼圆形不好，却去希望保留阿几米德的证明，说：如果我认为在这里得出来的结论必须是指一个具有无穷数目的边的图形说的，那么我就决不相信这是一个圆形，因为我确实知道圆形并不是一个直线形。用这些话，他无疑不会和阿几米德做的一样，而恰恰相反，他给他自己一个障碍，并且阻碍别人去很好地理解他的证明。 我在这里讲得太多了，好象事物本身不值得讲得这么多，这是为了指出我十分小心，怕是在我的书里出现一点点使神学家们有理由挑出毛病的地方。 最后，我已经在我对第二组反驳的答辩的第三点和第四点①里足够清楚地指出，当我说我们确知我们非常清楚、非常明白地领会的东西之所以都是真的是因为上帝存在，而我们确知上帝存在是因为我们对上帝存在领会得非常清楚、非常分明。我这样说并没有陷入循环论证中，我是把我们事实上领会得非常清楚的东西同我们记得以前曾领会得非常清楚的东西区别开来。 ①“第三点和第四点”，法文第二版缺。 因为，首先，我们确知上帝存在，因为我们注意那些证明上帝存在的理由；不过在这以后，还需要我们记得曾经把一个东西领会得清清楚楚以便确知它是真的，如果我们不知道上帝存在，不知道他不可能是骗子，这就不行。 关于是否任何东西都不能存在于我们的精神里（就精神之是一个在思维的东西而言），假如精神本身对那个东西没有实现认识的话，这个问题，我认为非常容易解决，因为当我们这样认为它的时候，我们看得很清楚，除了思维或者完全取决于思维的东西之外，没有什么东西存在于它里边，否则就不属于精神，就精神之是一个在思维着的东西而言；而在我们心中不可能有任何思维（在它存在于我们心中的同时）是我们对之没有一种现实认识的。 因此我不怀疑精神一渗入到一个小孩子的身体里就开始思维，从这时起他就知道他思维，虽然他以后不记得他思维什么，因为他所思维的东西没有刻印在他的记忆里。 不过必须注意，我们对于我们的精神的行为或活动有一种现实的认识而不总是对于它的功能才有现实的认识，除非是潜在的。因此，当我们打算使用什么功能的时候，如果这个功能是在我们的精神里，我们立刻就得到关于它的现实认识。就是因为这个原故，如果我们不能得到关于它的这种现实认识，我们就可以确实无疑地否认它在那里。 我反对阿尔诺先生的头几个理由，我试求招架其次的几个理由，我完全同意后来的那些理由，最后一个除外，在那个问题上，我希望用不着费多大力气就能让他同意我的意见。 因此我坦率地跟他一起承认，在第一个沉思里，甚至在其余的几个沉思里，所包含的东西并不是对各种人都合适的，也并不适合一切人的才能；不过这不是到今天我才做这个声明的。这个声明我已经做过了，而且只要有机会，我将来还要声明多少次。 这也是阻止我在《谈方法》一书中谈论这些事的唯一理由，因为《谈方法》是用普通语言写的①，我把这样的问题留给《沉思集》，因为它应该是仅仅为最有才华的人看的，这我说过不止一次了。 ①指用法文而不是用拉丁文写的。 不能说这些东西既然并不是对大家都合适、都有用，我就最好不写；因为我认为这些东西非常必要，我相信如果没有它们，人们就决不能在哲学上建立任何坚实可靠的东西。 虽然铁器和火如果让孩子们或者不谨慎的人拿到是会发生危险的，可是，因为它们在生活上是有用的，没有人认为由于危险而不使用这些东西。 然而，在第四个沉思里，我的计划是谈论在分辨真和假上所犯的错误，而不是在追求善和恶上所发生的错误，并且在我说我们应该仅仅相信我们明显地认识的东西时，我总是排除有关信仰和我们生活上的行为的东西，这在我的《沉思集》的全部内容里都可以证明。除此而外，我特意在对第二组反驳的第五点①里做过声明，在我的《沉思集》的《内容提要》里，我也声明过，我说这些话的目的是为了指出我是多么尊重阿尔诺先生的判断，多么重视他的劝告。 ①“第五点”，法文第二版缺。 还剩下圣体圣事的问题了。阿尔诺先生认为我的意见不合适，他说，因为面包的实体一旦从圣体的面包里去掉，就只剩下一些偶性了，这是我们的一个信条。然而他认为，我不承认实在的偶性，而只承认样态，这些样态如果离开它们所依附的实体就不能被领会，从而不能离开实体而存在。 对于这个反驳，我可以很容易用这样的话避免回答，说直到现在我从来没有否认过偶性是实在的①；因为，虽然我在《折光学》里和在《论气象》里都没有用过它来解释我那时研究的东西，可是我在《论气象》第164页②里特意说，我不愿意否认偶性是实在的③。 ①“偶性是实在的”，法文第二版是“有一些实在的偶性”。 ②“第164页”，法文第二版缺。 ③法文第二版：“我不愿否认有偶性”。 在这些沉思里，不错，我曾假定我还没有很好地认识这些偶性，可是不能因此就说没有偶性；因为，我在那里所用的分析写法在我们还没有足够仔细地检查事物的时候，有时容许做一些假定，比如在第一个沉思里，在那里我曾经假定过很多东西，而后来，在以后的几个沉思里我又否定掉了。 当然，关于偶性的性质，我并不打算在这里下什么定义，不过我只指出我认为首先要的东西；最后，从我说过样态离开它们所依附的实体就不能被领会的这句话，不要推论说我否认由于上帝的全能它们可以被分开，因为上帝可以做出无穷无尽的事情而我们不能理解①，这是我坚信不疑的。 ①法文第二版：“而我们既不能理解，也不能领会”。 但是，我更加坦率地说，我将不隐瞒我的看法，即：我相信我们的感官所接触的东西除了被感官感觉或知觉的物体体积最外层的表面以外，没有别的东西。因为，接触只能在表面上接触，接触对于感官来说是非常必要的；我认为，如果没有它，我们的任何一个感官都不能被触动，而有这种看法的人不止我一个，亚里士多德本人以及在我之前的很多别的哲学家都是如此。因而，比如说，面包和酒，如果它们的表面不是直接地或者间接地通过空气或者别的物体的办法，象我认为的那样，或者象许多哲学家们所说的那样，通过“有意外貌”①的办法而被感官所触动的话，它们就不会被知觉。 ①我们直接知觉到的只是物体外貌，这种外貌是物体通过媒介而传播出来的。这样的一种学说就叫做“有意外貌”（especesintentionelles）。 要注意，这并不是在手指上和在手上所感觉的、应该当作这种表面的、物体的唯一外形，而是也应该考虑到比如做成面包的面粉中的细小部分之间混合做成酒的烧酒、淡水、醋、酒糟或酒石等分子之间以及其他一些物体的细小部分之间的一切小空隙，并且想到这些空隙终止之处的所有的小表面就做成了每个物体的表面的部分。 因为，不错，一切物体的这些小部分有着各式各样的形状、大小和不同的运动，它们从来不能被安排得这么合适，也不能结合得这么妥贴，以致在它们的周围不剩有许多空隙，而这些空隙并不是空的，而是充满了空气或什么别的物质，就象在面包里看见的那样，在那里空隙是相当大的，这些空隙不仅可以充满空气，而且可以充满水、酒、或别的液体，而且因为面包永远是面包，虽然空气或包含在气孔里的其他物质变了，这些东西确实是不属于面包的实体，从而它的表面并不是由于一种小小的包围圈把它全都围绕过来的那个表面，而是直接接触①它的每个细小部分的那个表面。 ①法文第二版：“直接接触并且围绕”。 也要注意，这个表面，当整块面包从一个地方拿到另外一个地方时，它不仅是被整个地动了，而且，当它的细小的部分之中的几个部分被进到它的气孔里的空气或别的物体所动摇时，它也部分地动了；这样，如果有些物体是这样的性质，即：如果它们的部分之中的几个或构成它们的所有的部分不断地动起来（我认为面包的许多部分和酒的所有部分都是这样），就必须也领会到，它们的表面是在不断地运动中的。 最后，要注意，面包或者酒或者无论什么别的物体，它们的表面在这里并不是指实体的任何部分，也不是指这个物体的量的任何部分以及围绕它的其他物体的任何部分说的，而仅仅是指人们领会为物体的各个分子和围绕它们的物体之间的东西的这个极限说的，这个极限除了样态而外没有别的实体（entite）。 这样，由于接触就是在这个极限发生的，而如果不接触就什么都感觉不到，那么显然是，仅仅由于面包和酒的实体被说成是如此地改变成为什么其他东西的实体，以致这个新的实体恰好被包含在包含了其他实体的同一的极限之内，或者它存在于面包和酒以前存在过的同一地方里（或者勿宁说，由于它们的极限不断地被动摇，如果它们呈现出来，它们就会存在于那个地方里），其结果必然地是，这个新的实体如果没有变体①，它就应该跟面包和酒同样的方式来触动我们的一切感官。 然而教会在特兰托公会议②的第十三次会议，法规2和4里说：面包的全部实体变成吾主耶稣基督的身体，只有面包的外貌还保留着。在这里，面包的外貌，我看只能是指面包的每一个细小部分和包围着这些部分的物体之间的这种表面说的。 ①“变体”即基督教（包括天主教）的圣餐中面包和酒变为耶稣的肉体和血液。 ②在1545至1563年召开的天主教公会议，在这个会议上订出许多新的教规和仪式。 因为，就象说过的那样，接触只有在这个表面上才能发生；而且亚里士多德本人也承认，不仅仅是这一感官由于一种特权被人称之为触觉，即使其他一切感官也都是通过接触这一办法而感觉的。在第三卷《灵魂篇》，第十三章里写着这句话：然而没有人认为外貌在这里是指恰好被要求去触动感官的东西。也没有人相信面包变成基督的肉体，没有人不认为基督这个肉体恰好包含在包含着面包的同一表面之下，如果面包现在在在这里的话，虽然它不在那里象正式地在一个地方那样，而是按照圣事般在那里并且以这种方式存在，这种方式，虽然我们难以用言词来表示，却在我们的精神由信仰之光所照耀之后，我们能够领会为对上帝来说是可能的，而这种方式我们不得不确信无疑。所有这些东西对我来说是通过我的原则如此合适地解释过了，以致不仅我不怕能够冒犯我们神学家们的话我什么都没说，而且相反，我希望他们将要感谢我，由于我在物理上提的意见比起一般在这上面提的意见对神学家来说要得当得多。因为实在说来，据我所知，教会从来没有说过在圣体圣事里的面包和酒的外貌是一些实在的偶性，这些偶性在它们所依附的实体被去掉以后还奇迹般地独自继续存在。 但是，由于也许最初用自然哲学的道理来解释这个问题的那些神学家如此坚信触动我们感官的这些偶性是不同于实体的什么实在的偶性，以致他们甚至认为人们决不会怀疑它，他们没有任何有效的理由，没有很好地思考，就假定面包的外貌是这个性质的实在偶性；然后，他们全力以赴地解释这些偶性如何能没有主体而继续存在。在这方面他们遇到了非常多的困难，使得他们离开了正路，就象行路的人走进了死胡同那样。 因为，首先，当他们假定在物体里边除了各式各样的表面而外还需要什么别的东西来触动感官时，他们好象是自相矛盾了，至少是那些坚信物体只有由于接触才能触动我们的感官的那些人；因为只有表面才足以受接触，这是自明的道理；如果有什么人不愿意赞成不接触就什么也感觉不到的话，他们关于感官的对象怎么触动感官的方式就不能说得出任何有道理的话。 除此而外，人类精神不能领会面包的偶性是实在的却能离开实体而存在，而不按照实体的方式领会它们。因此，象教会所认为的那样，面包的全部实体都变了而以前存在于面包里的什么实在的东西却一直不变，这似乎是矛盾的；因为，除了继续存在的东西以外，我们领会不到有什么实在的东西一直不变；尽管把这说成是偶性，可是人们仍然把它当做一个实体来领会。如果人们说，面包的全部实体都改变了，而人们称之为实在的偶性的一部分实体却一直不变，这实际上是一回事；在以上这些话里如果没有矛盾，在概念里肯定有很大的矛盾。 有些人不相信罗马教会了，其主要原因似乎就在这个问题上。但是，谁能否认，当我怕可以随便选择并且没有任何理由（不论是神学的理由或哲学的理由）强迫我们采取这一个意见而不采取另外一个意见时，我们应该主要选择那些不能给予任何人以机会和借口来脱离信仰的真理的意见呢？可是，承认实在的偶性，这个意见不合神学的道理，我认为在这里是很清楚的；而这个意见与哲学的道理完全相反这一点，我希望不久在我打算出版讨论原理的书里明显地指出来，并且在那里解释颜色、滋味、重量、以及触动我们的感官的其他一切性质都是如何仅仅取决于物体的外表的。 再说，不能假定偶性是实在的，除非由于变体的奇迹，只有从成圣体的言词里才可以结论出变体的奇迹，人们没有必要增加一个新的、不可理解的奇迹，由于这个奇迹，这些实在的偶性如此地离开面包的实体而存在，以致它们并不是由实体做成的；这不仅跟人类理性相矛盾，而且甚至跟神学家们的定理相反。神学家们的定理说，成圣体的言词只有产生言词所意味着的东西；神学家们不愿意把能够用自然的道理解释得通的东西归之于奇迹。所有这些难题都完全被我给这些东西的解释而消除了。因为，根据我给的解释，决不需要什么奇迹在面包的实体被除掉后去保存偶性，相反，没有一个新的奇迹（即：由这个奇迹，体积改变了），偶性就不能被除掉。历史告诉我们这种事情有时会发生，代替成圣体的面包，在神父的两手中出现的是一块肉或者一个小孩子；因为人们决不相信这是由于奇迹停止了而发生的，而是人们总是把这样一个结果归之于一个新的奇迹。 再说，因为，一切事物的创造者——上帝能够把一种实体改变成为另一种实体，后一种实体恰好呆在包含过前一种实体的同一表面里，这也没有什么不可理解的或者困难的。不仅一切感觉，甚至一般地来说，这一个物体施加于另一个物体的一切行动，都在于接触，从而显然是：同一的表面总应该是以同一方式而主动或者被动，不管在它所覆盖的本质发生了什么变化，对于这一点，人们说不出什么更合乎道理的东西来，也说不出什么能为哲学家们一致接受的东西来。 因此，如果说我胆敢在这里说出我不想说的真话，那么我敢希望，承认实在的偶性这个意见将被神学家们所遗弃，认为它在信仰上是靠不住的，对于理性是矛盾的，完全是不可理解的；而我的意见将会代替它，当做可靠的，无可置疑的，这样的时刻将会到来。这就是我认为不应该在这里掩饰的东西，以便尽可能地对付那些人的恶意中伤，那些人想要显示比其他人的知识更渊博，不能忍受别人提出的任何与他们的意见不同的，被认为是真实的、重要的意见，他们惯于说那种意见跟信仰的真理相矛盾，以便企图用权威来废除他们用理性反对不了的东西。但是我提请把他们的宣判上诉给善良的、正统的神学家们，我心甘情愿地屈服于他们的判断和审查之下。