Chapter 18 The fourth group refutes Mr. Arnault, Doctor of Theology, as Mr. Arnault's letter to Father Mercena

Dear priest: I am very grateful to you for your kindness in entrusting me with the Meditations of M. Descartes for my reading.But since you know its value, you demand a high price, for you will not allow me the pleasure of reading this masterpiece without first promising to tell you what I think of it.Had it not been for the desire to see such a thing so strong, I would not have accepted it on condition that it was this admirable curiosity which had brought me to this world; if I thought it possible to obtain it easily Your pardon, I would rather ask that this condition be exempted, as the Roman consuls exempted those things promised under forced confession.

①Arnault (Antoine Arnauld, 1612-1694), French philosopher and theologian. Because, what do you want me to do?My judgment about the author?Not at all; you knew long ago how highly I thought of him personally, and how much I admired his wit and his learning.You are not ignorant of the business which now binds me; and if you think of me more than I deserve, it does not mean that I am ignorant of my shallow faculties.Nevertheless, what you have entrusted to me to examine requires a very high capacity and much peace and leisure, so that the mind, once freed from worldly affairs, thinks only of itself; Contemplation and a lot of mental concentration just can't do it.Nevertheless, since you asked me to do so, I had no choice but to obey.But on one condition, that you will be my guarantor, and all my faults will be borne by you.However, although philosophy may boast of having produced this work alone, since our author, very modest in this respect, himself comes before the theological court, I shall play two roles here:

In the first role, in which I appear as a philosopher, I will ask two main questions which I judge to be questions that people in this profession can ask, namely, questions about the nature of the human spirit and the existence of God. Sexual issues; after this, I put on the clothes of a theologian, and I will pose a problem that a theologian can encounter in this work. about human spiritual nature The first thing I come across here that is worth pointing out is to see that what Mr. Descartes established as the foundation and first principle of his whole philosophy was before him St. Augustine as the foundation and pillar of his philosophy. build something.St. Augustine is a man of great wisdom and superhuman knowledge both in theology and human philosophy.For, in Book II, Chapter III of Free Will, Aripius and Ivodius, arguing over their desire to prove that there is a God, say: First, in order to begin with the most obvious, I ask you , do you exist?Or are you perhaps afraid of making a mistake in answering my question?In any case, if you don't exist, you can never be mistaken.Our author's words are similar to the above: But there is a very powerful and very cunning liar, I don't know what, who always tries to deceive me by all means, so if he deceives me, there is no doubt that I It exists.Let us proceed, so as not to depart from our subject, and see how from this principle it follows that our spirit is distinct and separable from our body.

I can doubt whether I have a body, and I can even doubt whether there are objects in the world; but in any case when I doubt or I think, I cannot doubt that I exist. Therefore, I, who is doubting and thinking, am not an object; otherwise, while doubting the object, I also doubt myself. Even though I insist that there are no bodies in the world, the truth always remains that I am something and therefore I am not a body. This is of course delicate; but it will be said (and even our author objected) that the absence of any body does not follow from my doubt or even my denial of any body. But, he said, can it be the same: those things which I assume do not exist because I do not know them are no different from what I know?I have no idea.Regarding this point, I will not discuss it, I can only make judgments on those things I know: I know that I exist, and now I ask what is the self that knows my existence.It is quite certain, however, that this conception and knowledge of myself does not depend, strictly speaking, on that which I do not yet know exists.

However, because of the arguments he presents on page 34 of his "On Method", and since he himself admits that things have come to such a point that he excludes from his mind everything corporeal, it is not in accordance with the The way things really are, but only in the order of his train of thought and his reasoning, by which he means that he knows nothing of his essence except that he is a thinking thing.Clearly, with this reply,3 the controversy remains where it was, and thus the problem which he promises to solve for us remains completely unsolved, that is, he never recognizes anything as belonging to him except that he is a thinking thing. How does this of his essence follow that nothing else belongs to his essence.How gross my talent is, I found no answer in the second meditation from beginning to end; but the proof, as I conjecture, was in the sixth, since he thought it depended on a clear, distinct view of God. knowledge, which was not achieved in the second meditation.Here's how he proved and solved the puzzle.

① Page 34, missing from the second French edition. ② "That is to say, he excludes all corporeal things from his spirit", the second French version is: "that is, he has to exclude from his spirit all corporeal things and things that depend on objects". ③ See "Preface". Since, he said, since I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly apprehend can be produced by God as I apprehend it, so long as I can clearly and distinctly apprehend one thing without reference to another, It is sufficient to determine whether one thing is different or not the same from the other, because they can be separated, at least by the power of God; It doesn't matter.

Therefore, since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​myself, that I am only a thinking thing without extension, and on the other hand I have a clear idea of ​​the body, that it is an extended Therefore it is certain that this I, that is to say my soul, that which I am I, is completely and truly distinct from my body, and that the soul can exist without the body. Therefore, even if the body does not exist, the soul is still the soul. ① "So ... the soul", not in the sixth meditation, nor in the Latin version. A pause must be made here, because I think the difficulty lies in these few sentences.

First, in order for the major premise of this argument to be true, it should not be understood as knowledge of every kind, nor of all clear and distinct knowledge, but only complete knowledge (that is to say, it contains everything that can be known about things).For Mr. Descartes himself admits, in his reply to the first set of objections, that no real distinction is necessary, but only a formal one, in order to make a thing clear by a mental abstraction. It is at the point where he goes on to say: However, I comprehend fully what a body is when I merely think of it as an extended, shaped, movable, etc. ) though I deny everything in bodies that belongs to the nature of spirit.On the other hand, I understand spirit as a whole that doubts, understands, wants, etc., though I do not agree that there is in it anything contained in the idea of ​​a body.There is, therefore, a real distinction between body and mind.

However, if anyone doubts this minor premise and thinks that when you comprehend yourself (that is, your mind) as a thinking thing without extension, likewise you take yourself (that is, your body ) apprehend as something that has an extension and cannot think, when your conception of yourself is not complete, but only incomplete.Must see how it is proved in what you have said before; for I do not think it is a thing so clear that it should be treated as an unprovable principle without proof. As to his first part, that when you merely think of a body as a thing having extension, shape, motion, etc., you comprehend fully what a body is, though you deny that it has everything of a spiritual nature. Things, it does not matter; for whoever maintains that our minds are corporeal does not for that reason think that bodies are minds, and then bodies are to the mind as the genus is to the species.But "genus" can be understood without being separated from "species", although people deny everything that belongs to "species" from "genus"; logical theorem: although species is denied, genus is not denied; or, Where it belongs, the species does not necessarily exist, it just comes from here; in this way, I can understand the shape without understanding any feature that belongs to the circle alone.It is therefore also necessary to prove that the mind can be fully understood without the body.

But, for the proof of this proposition, I do not seem to find in the whole work any more suitable argument than that which I said at the beginning, namely, that I can deny that there is any body in the world, anything having extension; but When I deny or I think, I affirm that I exist: I am therefore a thinking thing and not an object, and the object does not belong to the knowledge I have of myself. But I see that from here only the conclusion that I can acquire knowledge of myself without knowledge of bodies; but this knowledge is complete, so that I can affirm that when I exclude bodies from my essence I'm not mistaken, it's not entirely obvious to me.for example:

Suppose someone knows that the angle of the circumference of a semicircle is a right angle, and that the triangle formed from this angle and the diameter of the circle is a right triangle, but he doubts and does not know for certain, and even being deceived by some sophistry, he denies that the angle formed by the right angle The square formed by the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by the two right-angled sides, according to Mr. Descartes, who seems bound to insist on his erroneous view.For he will say, I clearly and distinctly understand that this triangle is a right triangle, but I suspect that the square formed by its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by its two sides: therefore, by the right angle The fact that the square formed by the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by the two right angled sides does not belong to the essence of the triangle. Hereafter, although I deny that the square formed by its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by two right-angled sides, I do know that it is right-angled, and that one angle of this triangle is right-angled in my opinion. It has always been clear in my heart that even God Himself cannot make it not be a right triangle. Thus, what I doubt, what I can even deny, is that the idea that has always been in me does not belong to its essence. Moreover, since I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly apprehend was produced by God as I apprehended, it is sufficient for me to be able to clearly and distinctly apprehend one thing without needing another. Something is different from that one thing because God can separate them.But I clearly and distinctly perceive that this triangle is a right triangle, without knowing that the square formed by its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by its two right sides; The square formed by the hypotenuse is not equal to the sum of the two squares formed by its two right sides, at least God can make it so. I don't see what can be answered here, unless it is answered by someone who does not clearly and distinctly grasp the properties of right triangles.But how do I know that I know the nature of my spirit better than he knows the nature of this triangle?Because, he knows for sure that the circumference triangle of the semicircle has a right angle (this is the concept of the right triangle), and I know for sure that I think, so I exist, and it is the same. Therefore, he is mistaken about the fact that the square formed on the hypotenuse of this triangle is equal to the sum of the two squares formed on the two right angled sides, which is not the essence of this triangle (a right triangle he clearly and clearly knows) I am exactly the same as I am, perhaps I am not also thinking that there is nothing in my nature except that I am a thinking thing (I know clearly and distinctly that I am a thinking thing). Mistake in the matter, because perhaps the fact that I am an extended thing also belongs to my essence? It will be said that when I draw the conclusion from my thinking that I exist, it is certainly not surprising if I make my own ideas from this point only to my mind as a thinking thing, For the idea arose from my own thinking alone.I do not see, therefore, that any argument can be drawn from this idea that nothing else belongs to my essence than what is contained in it. At this point, one could go on, the argument presented seems to prove too much, and it brings us to the Platonist opinion (which our author objects to) that any Nothing bodily belongs to our essence.Man is therefore only a spirit; the body is only a vehicle for the spirit.So they define man as a spirit using a body. If you reply that the body is not absolutely excluded from my essence but only in so far as I am a thinking thing, then one may fear that someone will suspect that perhaps I am The concept or idea of ​​myself, in so far as I am a thinking thing, is not the idea or concept of a whole being, fully and fully apprehended, but only an incompletely apprehended and The idea or concept of an entity with some mental abstraction and limitation of thought. Thus, just as the geometers comprehend a line as length without breadth, and a surface as length and breadth without height, although there is no length without breadth and breadth without height, so one may doubt that anyone who thinks Is it not that a thing is not without extension, but that apart from the characteristics it has in common with other extended things, such as being movable, having a shape, etc., it also has this special ability of thinking and Function; thus, this thing can be apprehended by a mental abstraction with this single faculty as a thinking thing, although in fact the characteristics and properties of the body are suitable for everything that has a thinking function. Can be understood as having the same length alone, although in fact there is no size that does not have length, width, and height. The difficulty increased.That is, this faculty of thinking seems to be joined to the bodily organs, for in children it is weak, and in madmen it is completely absent; against our cause. This is what I have to say about the real difference between the mind and the body.However, since Mr. Descartes is engaged in demonstrating the immortality of the soul, one may rightly ask whether this conclusion is evident from this distinction.For this conclusion cannot be drawn from the principles of common philosophy; for these principles generally say that the souls of animals are distinct from their bodies, and yet their souls die with their bodies. I have carried my essay up to this point, with the intention of showing how, according to the principles of our author (which I think I have taken from his philosophical mode of thinking), it is easy to distinguish from the realities of the mind and the body. Having concluded that the spirit is immortal, I was then handed over to me a summary of six meditations by the same author, which, besides shedding great light on his whole work, contained the points on this question which I sought to resolve. And the same reasons for thinking. With regard to the soul of animals, he has made it clear elsewhere, and his opinion is that the animal has no soul, but only a body, equipped in a certain way, consisting of many different organs, arranged in this way , that is, all the activities we see on these organs can be in and made of the flesh. The fear, however, is that this opinion cannot find confidence in the minds of men, unless it is supported and proved by some very strong reasons.For it seems at first that, without any master of the soul, as the light reflecting the body of a wolf in the eyes of a sheep so agitates its little optic nerve network, that by this activity it goes all the way to the brain. That the animal's spirit be extended to its nerves in such a way as to cause the lamb to flee seems at first implausible. I will add only one sentence here: I am very much in agreement with what Mr. Descartes said about the distinction between the imagination and the mind, or intelligence; and what we apprehend by reason is more reliable than what the bodily senses make us perceive. Much more, this is also my opinion all the time.For I learned a long time ago, in the fifteenth chapter of St. Augustine's On the Quantities of the Soul, that there are those who believe that what we see with the mind is not as reliable as what we see with the eyes of the body, with What the spirit sees is always blurred by the mucus, and the insights of these people must be discarded.St. Augustine, in Book I, Chapter IV of his Soliloques, says that he experienced more than once in geometry: the senses are like ships. ① "Thinking", the second French edition is "pure comprehension". He said: For, for establishing and proving several propositions of geometry, when I let my senses take me where I intend to go, and as soon as I leave the senses, reviewing them with my mind seems to tell After all my things, I feel as unsteady in spirit as people who have just set their feet on the ground after a long voyage.I therefore think that it would be better to be able to find the art of sailing a ship on land than to be able to understand geometry only by the medium of the senses (though they seem to be of great help to beginners in geometry). about god The first reason our author gives for the existence of God, which he gives in the third Meditation, consists of two parts: the first part is: God exists because his idea is in me; The second part is: I have such a concept, I can only come from God. There is only one thing I cannot agree with about the first part, and that is, that Mr. Descartes, after pointing out that error really consists only in judgment, says not so far later that there are notions which can be seriously stated. Not in form, but in substance, which I think seems to contradict his principles. But, fearing that I cannot explain my thoughts clearly enough on such a vague matter, I will illustrate it more clearly by an example. He says that cold is nothing but the absence of heat, and that the idea of ​​representing to me a positive thing1 would be materially false. ① "Concept", the second French edition is missing. If, on the contrary, coldness were merely a lack, there could be no idea of ​​coldness to represent to me as a positive; here the author confuses judgment with idea. Because, what is the idea of ​​being cold?It is cold itself, so far as it is objectively in the intellect; but if cold is a lack, it cannot be objectively in the intellect by an idea, the idea of ​​an objective being being a positive existence.Therefore, if coldness is merely a lack, its idea can never be positive, with the consequence that no idea can be materially false. This is confirmed by the same arguments used by Mr. Descartes to prove that the idea of ​​an infinite being must be true.For although it may be held that such a being does not exist, it cannot be held that the idea of ​​such a being does not signify to me something real. The same may be said of all positive ideas; for, though it may be conceived that the cold which I regard as represented by a positive idea is not a positive thing, yet it cannot be supposed that a positive idea does not represent to me something real and positive. things, for ideas are positive not according to their existence as modes of thinking (for, in that case, all ideas would be positive), but by what they contain and give us The objective existence of mental representations.Therefore, even if this idea is not a cold idea, it cannot be a wrong idea. However, you may say: it is a wrong concept because it is not a cold concept.On the contrary, it is your judgment that is wrong, if you judge it to be a cold idea; but of course it is quite right about ideas; likewise the idea of ​​God should not be called wrong in material , though one can transform it into something that is not God, as idolaters do. Finally, this cold idea, which you say is materially wrong, what does it give your mental appearance?A lack?So it is real; a positive thing?Then it is not a cold concept.Furthermore, in your opinion, what is the cause of the positive, objective existence that makes this idea materially false?You say: it is myself in terms of my shared non-existence.Thus, the objective, positive existence of an idea can come from non-existence, but this is completely contradictory to your basic principles. Let us come to the second part of the question, in which it is asked whether I, with the idea of ​​God, can exist from something other than an infinite being, and mainly , do I exist by myself.Mr. Descartes thinks that I cannot exist by myself, because, if I give existence to myself, I can also give to myself all the perfection of any idea in me.However, the author of "The First Group of Rebuttals" answered well: Existence by oneself should not be understood from the positive side, but should be understood from the negative side; therefore, this is the same as existence without others.So (he went on), if a something exists by itself, that is, by no one else, how do you prove that it contains everything and is infinite?For if you say: by being by itself, it easily gives everything to itself, I don't want to hear it at the moment, because it does not exist by itself as by a cause, and before it has Nor can it foresee what it might be before it exists in order to choose what it will be later. In refutation of this argument, Mr. Descartes replies that the statement of existence by oneself should be taken not as a negative, but as a positive statement, even as regards the existence of God.God, therefore, is in a sense the same to himself as the efficient cause is to him.It's a bit blunt and unreal to me. That's why I partly agree with him and partly disagree. For I admit that I can only positively exist by myself, but I deny that God does the same.On the contrary, I think that a thing exists positively by itself as by a cause, which is obviously contradictory.It is for this reason that I have come to the same conclusions as the author, but by quite different methods, namely: In order to exist by myself, I should positively exist by myself and as by a cause; therefore I exist by myself, which is impossible.The main premise of this argument has been proved, for he himself said: the parts of time can be separated and independent of each other, and because I exist now it does not follow that I will exist in the future, except because there is in me Some real, positive force creates me almost every moment.As for the minor premise, that I cannot positively exist by myself and as a cause, I think that by the light of nature it is so obvious that there is no need to prove it, since it is proved by a little known fact. A thing everyone knows, it's a waste of effort.Our author himself, when he has not ventured to deny it openly, seems to admit it to be true.For, I invite you to come and study with me carefully what he says in reply to the first set of objections. He says: I have not said that a thing cannot be its own efficient cause; for, though it is evidently true that one confines the meaning of dynamics to those causes which are not the same as, or precede in time, their effects. Yes, but it seems in this matter that it should not be so restricted, since the light of nature does not tell us that the efficient cause is by its nature to precede its effect in time. The first part of this separation is very well said; but why did he omit the second part?Does he not go on to say that the same natural light does not tell us that the difference between the efficient cause and its effect is determined by the nature of the efficient cause, unless the natural light forbids him to say so?Since every effect depends on its cause and receives its existence from it, is it not clear that the same thing can neither depend on itself nor receive existence from itself? ? Again, every cause is the cause of the effect, and every effect the effect of the cause; thus there is a reciprocal relation between cause and effect: and a reciprocal relation is possible only between two things. Moreover, it cannot but be absurd to take a thing as receiving existence, but this same thing has that existence before we apprehend that it accepted it.And if we add the notions of cause and effect to a thing which is identical in itself, then such absurdities are possible.For, what is the concept of cause?Given being; what is the concept of result?Accept being.The concept of cause then naturally precedes that of effect. Now, if we cannot comprehend that a thing has existence, we cannot comprehend it under the concept of giving a cause of existence, because no one can give what he does not have.So we will first understand that a thing has existence before we understand that it accepts existence.Nevertheless, for the receiver, receiving comes before having. This principle can also be stated in another way: no one can give what he does not have, so everyone can only give himself the existence he has: but since he himself has existence , why does he give this existence to himself? Finally he said: The light of nature tells us that creation and preservation can only be distinguished by reason, which is very obvious.However, the light of nature also tells us that nothing can create itself, and therefore can not preserve itself, which is also very obvious. And if we descend from the general topic to the particular topic—God, it seems to me that it becomes more obvious that God cannot exist positively by himself, but only negatively by himself. , that is, cannot exist by something else. First of all, because the reason Mr. Descartes puts forward as a proof is very clear: if a body exists by itself, it must positively exist by itself.Since, he says, the parts of time are independent of one another, it does not follow from the fact that a body is supposed to have existed hitherto by itself, that is to say, without a cause, that it will continue to exist later. It would exist if there were not some real, positive power within it which, so to speak, continually regenerates it. ① "Re-", missing in the second French edition. But this truth is far from being applicable to a supremely perfect and infinite being, on the contrary, because of completely opposite principles, a completely different conclusion must be drawn.For in the idea of ​​an infinite being there is also the infinity of the time of his existence, that is to say, the idea contains no limits, and is therefore at the same time indivisible, permanent, and Continuous existence, and because of our spiritual imperfection, we can only have a false apprehension of the past and the future in this conception. It is evident, therefore, that we cannot comprehend that an infinite being exists, even for a moment, without at the same time comprehending that he was and will be (as our author himself says somewhere), and that if we ask Why does he insist on continuing to exist, that is superfluous.Moreover, as St. Augustine taught (after all other holy writers, he spoke of God in a nobler and more valuable way than any other writer), in God there is neither past nor future, and there is It is only a continuous present; this clearly shows that it cannot but be absurd to ask God why he insists on continuing to exist, since the question obviously involves the before and the after, the past and the future, and these must be derived from an infinite Excluded from the concept of being. Moreover, it cannot be understood that God exists by himself in the positive sense, as if he were originally produced by himself; (as our author has said more than once) because in fact he preserved himself. Preservation, however, is no more suitable for infinite beings than first generation.For, let me ask you, what is preservation if not a constant reproduction of a thing?It follows that all preservation presupposes the first generation, and for this reason the name "continuation", like the name "preservation" (they are not so much functions as potentialities), Each has in itself some capacity or disposition to receive; yet the Infinite Being is a very pure function, and cannot be such dispositions. So let's draw a conclusion.We cannot comprehend God as existing by himself in a positive sense, unless it is through the imperfection of our spirit that it comprehends God in a creative way; and this is clearer from the following reason: To ask about the dynamic cause of a thing is to ask about its existence, not its essence.For example: when asking the efficient cause of a triangle, it is asking who caused this triangle to exist in the world; but if I ask what is the efficient cause of a triangle whose sum of three angles is equal to two right angles, it is ridiculous to the person who asks this question, not in terms of the efficient cause, but only in this way: because of the nature of the triangle here; therefore the mathematicians (who are not much concerned with the existence of their objects ) never argues from efficient and final causes.But just as it is by virtue of his nature that an infinite being exists, or, if you will, persists in continuing to exist, it is by virtue of his nature that the sum of the triangles of a triangle is equal to two right angles.Therefore, and to those who ask why the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, they should not answer from the motive cause, but can only answer in this way: For this is determined by the unchanging, eternal nature of the triangle; in the same way, if one asks why God exists, or why he does not cease to exist, one should not look for an efficient cause in or outside of God的东西（因为我在这里对于名称不去争辩，而只争辩事实），而是必须以全部理由来说；因为这是至上完满的存在体的性质所决定的。 就是因为这个原故，对笛卡尔先生所说的，自然的光明告诉我们没有任何东西是不许问它为什么存在，或者不能追寻它的动力因的，或者，假如它没有动力因，那么问它为什么不需要动力因，我回答说，如果问上帝为什么存在，不应该用动力因回答，而只能这样地回答：因为他是上帝，也就是说，一个无限的存在体。如果问他的动力因是什么，就应该这样地回答：他不需要动力因。最后，如果问他为什么不需要动力因，就必须回答说：因为他是一个无限的存在体，他的存在性就是他的本质；因为只有这样的一些东西才需要动力因，在这些东西里，允许把现实的存在性同本质分别开。 从而，他在紧接我刚刚引的一段话后所说的话就否定了他自己，即他说：如果我想任何东西以某种方式对它自己的关系就是动力因对它的结果的关系，从这里我决不是想要得出结论说有一个第一原因；相反，从人们称之为第一的这个原因本身，我再继续追寻原因，这样我就永远不会达到一个第一原因。 因为，相反，如果我想，从不管什么东西上应该追求动力因或者准动力因，那么就是在精神上寻求一个和这个东西不同的原因；因为显然，任何东西都不能以任何方式关涉到它自己就象动力因关涉到它的结果那样。 然而，我认为应该警告我们的著者去小心谨慎地考虑所有这些东西，因为我敢肯定差不多所有的神学家都会为以下的命题所困扰：上帝是正面地由于自己并且如同由于一个原因那样而存在。 我只剩下一个疑虑了，那就是，对于他所说的话，只有由于上帝存在，我们才肯定我们所清楚明白的领会的东西是真的，他怎么辩护才能免于陷入循环论证。 因为，我们之所以肯定上帝存在，只因为我们对这件事领会得非常清楚、非常明白，因此，在我们肯定上帝存在之先，我们必须先肯定凡是我们领会得清楚、分明的东西都是真的。 有一个我过去忘记的事情，我现在提出来，那就是，不管什么东西，如果对于这个东西他没有认识，就不能存在于他里边，就他是一个在思维的东西而言。这个命题我认为是错误的，而笛卡尔先生认为是非常正确的。因为在他里边，就其是一个在思维的东西而言这句话，在他里边的“他”①，除了指他的精神，不指别的东西，就精神之有别于肉体而言。但是，有谁看不出来，在精神里能够有很多东西，而精神本身对这些东西毫无认识？举例来说：一个在母亲的肚子里的小孩子的精神当然有思维的能力或功能，可是他对它没有认识。 类似这些东西还有很多，我就不讲了。 ①在法文里，“他”和阳性指物代词的“它”是同一个字，因此这一段以上这几句话里所有的“他”都可以是“它”。 能够给神学家们引起疑难的东西 最后，为了结束一个已经过于厌烦的辩论起见，我想在这里用尽可能简短的形式来讨论；这样，我的计划是仅指疑难之所在，不去详细辩论。 首先，我担心有些人会对怀疑一切事物这种自由方式的思辨感到疑虑。事实上，我们的著者自己在他的《谈方法》一书中也承认，这个办法对于理智薄弱的人是危险的；虽然如此；我承认，在他的关于第一个沉思的《内容提要》里已经稍微缓和了这种担心。 虽然如此，我不知道是否给它加上一个序言比较好一些，在序言里告诉读者说，怀疑这些事物并不是严肃认真的，而是为了在一时把凡是能够引起哪管是一点点怀疑的东西，或者，象我们的著者在另外一个地方说到的那样，把凡是给我们的精神一种机会来引起最夸张的怀疑的东西，都先放在一边之后，我们看到是否在这以后没有办法找到什么如此坚定、如此可靠以致最顽固的人都不能丝毫怀疑的真理。还有，说不认识我的来源的作者，我认为最好是改为假装不认识。 在论证真和假的第四个沉思里，由于种种理由（这些理由要是在这里说就太长了），我想笛卡尔先生最好是在他的《内容提要》里或在这个沉思的本文里，告诉读者两件事： 第一件是，在他解释错误的原因时，他的用意主要是说在辨认真和假上犯错误的原因，而不是在行为上的善和恶上犯错误的原因。 因为，既然这足以满足我们的著者的计划和目的，而且由于他在这里关于错误的原因所说的事情，如果把这些事情扩大到关于善和恶的行为上去就会引起很大的反对意见，所以我认为，为了谨慎起见，并且秩序本身（我们的著者对此似乎很在乎）也要求这样做，即凡是对主题无用、能够引起很多争论的事情都要取消，怕的是，在读者无益地争辩一些无关重要的事来取乐时，会忽略了对必要的东西的认识。 第二件事是，我认为我们的著者应该做一个说明，在他说我们只应该对我们领会得清楚明白的东西加以信任时，这只是指有关知识的，落于我们理智的一些东西，而不是指有关信仰和我们生活上的行为说的；这就是说，谴责那些强不知以为知的人们的狂妄自大；但是他从来没有谴责那些谨慎小心地接受他们信任的东西的人们的正当劝告。 因为，就象圣奥古斯丁在《信仰的用途》第十五章里非常明见地指出那样，在人的精神里有三个东西，这三个东西之间有一个非常大的关系，几乎就象是一个东西似的，不过必须非常小心地区别开来。这三个东西就是：理解、相信、发谬论。 谁·理·解是指谁由于一些确实可靠的道理而懂得了什么东西。谁·相·信是指谁由于什么严重的、强有力的权威的影响，把他由确实可靠的道理还弄不懂的东西信以为真。谁·发·谬·论是指谁自认为知道其实他不知道的东西。 然而·发·谬·论，这是一件可耻的、不配为人的一件事，理由有二：第一，因为他强不知以为知，他就不可能再学习了； 第二，因为狂妄自大本身就是无耻之徒的标志。 因此，我们所理解的，是由于·理·性的原故，我们所相信的，是由于·权·威的原故；我们所发的谬论，是由于·错·误的原故。我之所以说这话是为了让我们知道，相信我们还不理解的东西并不等于那些发谬论的人的狂妄自大。 因为，那些说除了我们知道的东西以外什么都不要相信的人，仅仅是不要上发谬论人的假话的当，而说假话本身是可耻可鄙的。不过，如果有谁仔细地考虑了在强不知以为知的人和虽然不理解却由于某个强有力的权威之言的影响而相信的人之间有着很大的区别，那么他将看到后者明智地避免了错误的危险，避免了缺少信义和人道的谴责，避免了狂妄自大的罪过。 不远以后，在第十二章里①，他接着说：可以提出好几个理由，这些理由使我们看出，如果我们决心除了能够确实可靠地认识的东西以外，我们什么都不相信，那么在人类社会里就没有什么东西是靠得住的了。一直到这里，都是圣奥古斯丁的话。 ①前面说“第十五章”，这里说“不远以后在第十二章里”，不是前面有错就是后面有错。 笛卡尔先生现在可能在判断，对于这些东西加以分别是多么必要，怕的是今天有些倾向于不信神的人能够利用他的话来反对信仰和我们信之不疑的真理。 不过，我预见到神学家们最反对的是，根据他的原则，似乎教会告诉我们关于圣体的神圣秘密的一些东西不能继续存在，不能保持它们的完整性了。 因为，面包的实体一旦从圣体的面包里出去，就只剩下一些偶性了，这是我们当作信条的。那么这些偶性就是广延、形状、颜色、气味、以及其他感性的性质。 这些感性的性质，我们的著者一律不承认，只承认围绕着我们的小物体的某些不同的运动，由于这些不同的运动，我们感觉这些不同的印象，这些印象，我们以后称之为颜色、滋味、气味等。这样一来，就只剩下形状、广延和可动性了。但是我们的著者否认这些功能可以不经它们所依附的实体而被理解，并且从而他们也不能离开实体而存在；这甚至是在他对第一组反驳的答辩中都不只一次这样说的。 他除了这些样态或属性与实体之间的形式的分别之外也不承认其他的分别，而形成的分别似乎不足以使这样的事物能够彼此分得开，就连上帝的全能都无法把它们分开。 笛卡尔先生的虔诚是众所周知的，我并不怀疑他对这些事情会认真进行检查和衡量的，他会很好地判断他必须仔细注意在试图支持上帝的事业、反对不信神的人的不虔诚上，不把武器交在他们的手中来打击他所保卫的上帝用他自己的权威所建筑起来的信仰，并且以同样的办法他希望得到不朽的生命，这种不朽的生命是他从事使人们相信的。