Chapter 15 Geometrically Proves the Existence of God and the Difference Between Man's Spirit and Body

1. By thought (pensee), I mean whatever exists within us so much that we have immediate knowledge of it.Thus, every act of the will, of the intellect, of the imagination, and of the senses is thinking.But I add the word "directly" in order to exclude from it what is additional and depends on our thinking.For example, voluntary movement, though really having will as its principle, is not itself thinking. ① French second edition: "so that we perceive it directly by ourselves and have an internal knowledge of it". ②There is another sentence below this sentence in the second French edition: "A walk is not a thought, therefore, but our feeling or knowledge about what we have while walking".

2. Idea, by which I mean that form of each of our thoughts, of which we are cognizant by virtue of the immediate perception of this form.Therefore, when I understand what I say, I can express nothing with words unless I must have in my mind an idea of ​​what I mean by them.Therefore, images that are merely arbitrarily drawn, I do not call them ideas; I do not call them ideas when they are not, but only when they inform the mind itself of this part of the brain. 3. The objective reality of a concept, I mean the substantiality or existence of the thing represented by the concept①, as far as this substantiality is in the concept.

Likewise, one can speak of an objective perfection, or an objective skill, and so on.For whatever we perceive to be in the object of the idea exists objectively or through representation in the idea itself. ① French second edition: "This idea". 4. When these things are in the object of the idea as we perceive them, they are said to exist formally in the object of the idea; When they are so great that they can make up for this defect by their superiority, they are said to exist eminently in the objects of ideas. 5. Whatever is immediately inhabited by something else as its ①subject, or something we apprehend (that is, have in us some quality, quality, or attribute of its real idea) The thing that exists from it is called an entity (Substance).For a substance is that in which exists formally or preeminently what we perceive, or which is objectively in an idea of ​​ours; concept, because the light of nature tells us that "nothing" cannot have any real attributes.

① "Qi", the second edition of French is "a". ② "Comprehension", the second French version is "perception". ③ "Things", the second edition of French is "this characteristic or attribute". 6. The substance in which thinking immediately resides is here called spirit (or mind) (esprit).Even so, the name is ambiguous, since it is also sometimes used to refer to wind and very thin liquids; though I do not know of a better name. ① "heart", the Latin version is mens. 7. The immediate subject that is extension and the accidents that presuppose extension (such as shape, position, movement of place, etc.) is called body (or flesh, body) (corps).Whether, however, the substance called mind is at the same time the substance called body, or whether they are two distinct substances,1 is left to a later study.

① French second edition: "Two different, separate entities". 8. That entity which we understand to be supremely perfect, in which we cannot comprehend anything containing any defect or limitation to perfection, is called God (Dieu). 9. When we say that a certain property is contained in the nature of a thing or in its concept, this is the same as when we say that this property is really a property of this thing, and we can be sure that it is in this thing. 10. Two substances are actually different when one of them can exist without the other. First, I ask my readers to consider that the reasons which have hitherto led them to believe in their senses are very feeble, and the judgments which they have hitherto relied on them are very doubtful.I ask them to think about it long and often, till at last they are accustomed to trust their senses no longer so strongly; for I think this is necessary to be able to know the truth of metaphysical things.Metaphysical things do not depend on the senses.

Secondly, I ask them to consider their own minds, and all their attributes, which they shall see, and which they must never doubt, though they assume as utterly false what they have hitherto acquired through the senses. of.I ask them to keep thinking about this point until they are first accustomed to apprehend it clearly and believe it to be easier to know than anything bodily. Thirdly, I ask them to devote themselves to those propositions which can be known without proof, and in which every concept is found in itself.For example: a thing cannot simultaneously be and not be; "nothing" cannot be the efficient cause of anything, and so on.I ask them to make use of this intellectual clarity which nature has given them, which is so often obscured by the disturbances of the senses.I say that I ask them to use this intellectual clarity which is quite pure and freed from their prejudices, because in this way the truth of the axioms to be spoken of later will appear to them quite clearly. .

Fourthly, I ask them to study the idea of ​​nature, in which there is a sum of many attributes, such as the nature of a triangle, or of a quadrilateral, or of any other shape; The nature of the body, the nature of the physical body, plus the nature of God or a supremely perfect being.They will note that one can believe with certainty that all those things are in the ideas, and we clearly understand that they are contained therein.For example, since the sum of the triangles equals two right angles is contained in the property of a rectilinear triangle, the decomposability is contained in the property of a body or an extended thing (for whatever is extended, no matter how much it is Small, we all understand that it is not indivisible, at least it can be divided by thinking), so it is not wrong to say that the sum of all straight triangles and triangles is equal to two right angles, and all objects are divisible.

Fifthly, I ask them to go on for a long time to think about the nature of the supreme and perfect being, and I also ask them to consider that although in the idea of ​​all other qualities there is a possible existence, yet in the idea of ​​​​God , contains not only possible existence, but also absolutely necessary existence.For, from this alone, they can recognize the existence of God absolutely without reasoning.Evidently, it will be equally clear to them, too, that it is clear that two is an even number, three is an odd number, and so on.Because some things can be known in this way without proof for some people, but for others, it takes a long argument and reasoning to understand.

Sixth, To require them to accustom themselves, after careful consideration of the instances of a clear and distinct perception to those of a vague and indistinct one, which I have given in my Meditations, to distinguish Those things that are well known and things that are obscure; for it is better to explain by examples than by laws, and I think that no example can be given without talking about something. Seventh, I ask the readers that since they notice that they never recognize any falsity in what they apprehend clearly, on the contrary, except by chance, they never find any falsity in what they apprehend dimly. True, therefore they consider that if they should doubt what the intellect perceives clearly and distinctly, by some prejudice of the senses, or by some presumption made by pleasure, and founded upon something obscure, That makes no sense.In this way they will readily regard the following axioms as true and beyond doubt, though I admit that many of them could be explained better if I were willing to be more precise, and should not be Not as an axiom, but as a theorem, if I will then.

1. There is nothing that exists that cannot be questioned by what causes it to exist.For even God may ask why he exists; not because he needs any cause for his existence, but because the immensity of his nature is itself the cause, or the reason for his being without any cause. Two, the present time does not depend on the time immediately before it; that's why saving a thing requires one as large as the initial creation of the thing. 3. Nothing, or any perfection of this actually existing thing, can have nothing or a non-existing thing as the cause of its existence. 4. All reality or perfection in a thing exists formally or preeminently in its first or general cause.

5. The objective reality of our ideas thus requires a cause in which the objective reality of our ideas is contained not only objectively, but also formally or preeminently.It must be observed that it is extremely necessary to accept this axiom, upon which the knowledge of all things, whether sensible or insensible, depends.For, for example, where do we know that heaven exists?Is it because we see it?But if "seeing" is not an idea (I mean, not an idea inherent in the mind itself) but an arbitrarily drawn image, it does not involve the mind; and if we do not assume that any idea should have If there is a reason of objective reality, this reason really exists, so we cannot conclude that the sky exists because of this concept; this reason makes us conclude that this is the sky, and the same goes for other things. 6. There are different degrees of reality or substantiality,1 because substances have more reality than accidents or modes, and infinite substances have more reality than finite substances.Hence there is more objective reality in substances than in accidents, and more objective reality in infinite substances than in finite ones. ① "or substantiveness", the second French edition is: "that is to say substantiveness or perfection." 7. The will is voluntary and free (because this is its essence), but it is necessary to advance towards the good it knows.This is why, if it recognizes certain perfections which it does not have, it will at once give them to itself, if it is within its power.For it will realize that it is a greater good to have these perfections than not to have them. 8. Since you can do more or more difficult things, you can do less or easier things. 9. To create or preserve a substance is greater and more difficult than to create or preserve its attributes or characteristics; but to create a thing is no greater and more difficult than to preserve a thing, as has been said. 10. The idea or concept of every thing contains existence, because we can understand something only in the form of an existing thing; but the difference is that in the concept of a finite thing, only possible or contingent existence, while in the concept of a supremely perfect being there is full and necessary existence. To say that a certain property is contained in the nature of a thing or in its concept is equivalent to saying that this property really belongs to this thing, and people can be sure that it is in this thing (see definition 9). And the necessary existence is contained in the nature of God or in the concept of God (see axiom 10). So the necessary existence is in God, or God exists. This syllogism is the same one I have used in my reply to the sixth of these objections (referring to the second set of objections—the translator); Yes, as stated in the fifth requirement.Since, however, such a great spiritual clarity is not easily attained, we try to prove it in other ways. The objective reality of each of our ideas requires a cause, and this reality is not objectively but formally or eminently contained in this cause (see Axiom 5). And in us there is the idea of ​​God (see Definitions 2 and 8), and the objective reality of this idea is neither formally nor preeminently contained in us, (see Axiom 6) it can only be contained in God himself , cannot be included in other things (see Definition 8). Therefore, the idea of ​​God in us requires God as its cause, and therefore God exists (see Axiom 3). If I have the power to preserve myself, I have the more reason to think that I will also have the power to give to myself (by Axioms 8 and 9) all the perfections that I lack; for these perfections are but properties of substances, And I am an entity. But I am not in a position to give me all perfections; for otherwise I would already have them (by axiom VII). So I did not preserve my own integrity. Then, while I exist, I cannot exist (by axioms 1 and 2) unless I am preserved by myself (if I have the power to do so), or by someone else who has the power to do so. And I exist, but I am incapable of preserving myself, as I have just demonstrated. So I was saved by someone else. Moreover, the man from whom I am preserved has in him, formally or eminently, everything that is in me (by axiom 4). And I have in me many ideas or concepts of perfection1 which I lack, as well as the concept of God (by definition 2, 8).So these conceptions of perfection are also in the person from whom I am preserved.Finally, the man from whom I am preserved cannot have any conception of perfection that he lacks (that is, that he himself possesses formally or eminently). ② ① "idea or concept", the second edition of French is "perception". ② "Concept", the second edition of French is "perception". (by Axiom VII); for, as I have just said, being capable of preserving me, if he does not have those perfections, there is still more reason to think that he has power to bring them to himself (Axioms VIII, IX ). And he has the conception of all perfections that I realize I lack, and that I realize can exist only in God Himself, as I have just demonstrated.Therefore he already has in himself, formally or eminently,2 all perfections, and therefore he is God. ① "Concept", the second edition of French is "perception". ② "Already", the second edition of French is missing. God made the heavens and the earth, and all that is contained therein; besides this, he can make all that we clearly understand, as we understand it. All these things follow clearly from the preceding proposition. For there we prove the existence of God, because there must exist a being in which, formally or preeminently, contains all perfections that have their ideas in us. And we have in us the idea of ​​a very great power, not only the heavens, the earth, etc., but everything else that we understand as possible should also have been created by the one who has the idea of ​​this very great power. So, in proving the existence of God, we also prove all these things. Everything that we clearly understand may have been made by God (according to the previous relationship) according to our understanding. We understand, however, very clearly a mind (that is, a thinking entity) without a body (that is, an extended substance (according to claim 2)); The flesh also understands clearly (which everyone readily agrees with). So, at least because of the omnipotence of God, the spirit can exist without the body, and the body can exist without the spirit. Now, these two entities that can be separated from each other are actually distinct (by definition 10). And the mind and the body are two entities (by definition 5, 6, 7) inseparable (as I just proved) from each other. So there is actually a difference between mind and body. It must be noted that I have here used the omnipotence of God in my proof; not because any special power was required to separate the mind from the body, but because in the foregoing propositions I have only spoken of God himself, and I have From God no proof can be given elsewhere.And it doesn't matter much to know by what power two things are separated.