Chapter 14 Author's Response to the Second Set of Objections

Gentlemen: I have read with satisfaction what you have said about my little treatise on first philosophy.For these opinions make me aware of your kindness towards me, your devotion to God, and the care you take to enhance his glory. I cannot but be glad that not only have you judged my reasons to be worthy of your examination, but that you have said nothing against them, to which I feel I can answer with considerable ease. First, you remind me to recall that I discarded the idea or phantom of a body in order to conclude that I am a thinking thinking things.This is not honest and sincere, but merely a mental fiction.But I already pointed out in my second meditation that I had thought enough, because I used the words there: But it is also possible that those things which, because of my ignorance, I presume not to exist, in fact I'm no different from who I've known.I don't know at all, and I'm not going to discuss that now, etc.Through these few sentences, what I want to tell readers is that I haven’t checked whether the soul is different from the body here. I just checked which characteristics of the soul I can have a clear and reliable understanding of.Although I indicated many properties there, I cannot accept without distinction what you go on to say: I do not know what a thinking thing is.For, though I admit that I do not yet know whether this thinking thing is different from a body, or whether it is a body, I do not admit that I am therefore ignorant of it; So much that he knows that there is nothing in it but what he knows?But we think that it is best for us to know such a thing, which has more characteristics than what we know.In this way, we know more about the people with whom we talk every day than we do with those we only know by name or face.

We do not think, however, that we are ignorant of the latter.In this sense I think it is sufficient to account for the fact that the mind, considered alone without that which men are accustomed to ascribe to bodies, is better known than the body considered without the spirit : This is all that I intend to prove in the second meditation. But I quite understand what you are trying to say, that I have only written six meditations on First Philosophy, and readers are surprised that in the first two I have only concluded what I have just said, and they will find it too impoverished, It's not worth taking it out to see the world.

To this I simply reply that I do not fear that those who read the rest of what I have written with judgment will have the opportunity to suspect me of lack of material, but that I think it is very justified that those who call for special attention, Whether things that should be considered separately from each other are put into several contemplations separately. Therefore, in order to arrive at a solid and reliable perception of things, I know of no more profitable thing than to get used to doubting everything, and especially the corporeal, before establishing anything, though I've read several books on the subject a long time ago by skeptics and academicians, and it's as disgusting as I've been chewing on a very ordinary piece of meat that I've already chewed.It is for this reason that I have not been able to escape a full meditation on this subject.I want the reader not only to spend the necessary time reading it, but to spend months, or at least weeks, thinking about some of the things it talks about before reading anything else, because then I There is no doubt that they derive greater benefit from the rest of the book.

Also, since we have hitherto had no idea of ​​what is spiritual that is not very vague and mingled with the sensible, and since this is why men have not been able to comprehend clearly enough anything that is said about God and the soul. the first cause of things, so I thought I would have done a great deal if I showed why the qualities or qualities of the mind must be distinguished from those of the body, and how they must be known; for, Although many have said that in order to understand well the immaterial or metaphysical it is necessary to free the mind from the senses, yet, so far as I know, no one has shown the means by which this can be done.I think, however, that the real and only way of doing this is already contained in my second meditation, but this way is such that it is not enough to use it once, it has to be checked often and for a long time. Consider it time and time, so that the habit of confounding the mental with the bodily, which is rooted in us all life, is replaced by an opposite habit which comes from the exercise of a few days' time to separate them. to erase.This is why I think it is quite justified not to talk about anything else in the second meditation.

① French second edition: "understand". Here you ask me how to demonstrate that objects cannot think.Please forgive me if I reply that I have not yet touched upon this subject, for I did not begin until the sixth meditation.I spoke of it in these few words: my being able to apprehend one thing clearly and distinctly without reference to another is sufficient to establish that this is different or different from that, etc., not far behind where it goes on: Although I have a body with which I am very closely united, on the one hand I have, on the one hand, a clear and distinct idea of ​​myself, that I am only a thinking thing without extension. , and on the other hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​the body, that it is only an extended being and cannot think, so it is this I, my spirit or my soul, which is my So the thing that is for me is completely, truly separate from my body, and it can exist without a body.To this one might well add: whatever is capable of thinking is spirit, or is called spirit.Since body and mind are actually distinct, no body is mind.So no object can think.Certainly, I see nothing in this that you can deny; for do you deny that our clear apprehension of the one without reference to the other is sufficient to know that they are actually different?Give us, then, some more reliable sign of real separation, if any can be given.Because what do you say?You say that those things are actually different, that any one of them can exist without the other?But I ask you again, where did you know that one thing can exist without the other?For, in order to be a sign of separation, it must be known.Perhaps you will say: the senses make you know, because you see one thing without another, or you touch it, etc.But faith in the senses is less trustworthy than in reason;

One and the same thing may appear to our senses in different ways in various forms, or in several places or in several ways, so that it is regarded as two.Finally, if you remember what I said about wax at the end of my second meditation, you will know that objects in themselves cannot really be known by the senses, but only by the intellect; A thing is nothing but the idea of ​​a thing, that is, the idea is not identical with the idea of ​​another thing.But this can only be known if the one is understood without reference to the other, and it cannot be known positively if one has no clear and distinct idea of ​​both.In this way, the mark of real distinction should be reduced to my mark to be reliable.

If anyone denies that they have clear ideas of minds and bodies, I can only ask them to consider what is contained in my second meditation sufficiently carefully to point out that they think that the parts of the brain contribute to the formation of minds. Our minds, there is no positive reason for this opinion, it is simply that they have never experienced disembodied, they are often encumbered by the flesh in their activities, which is the same as if someone has been on the ground since childhood Wearing iron shackles, he will think that the iron shackles are a part of his body, and it is the same to walk without them.

Secondly, you do not say anything contrary to my opinion when you say that we find no ground in ourselves for the idea of ​​God; For at the end of the third meditation I myself said in definite words: This idea is born with me, it does not come from anywhere else but from myself.I also admit that we can do it, though we do not know of a Supreme Being, not the fact that we could do it without a Supreme Being; for on the contrary, I have said, the whole force of my argument That is: if I have not been created by God, then the function of making this idea cannot be in my heart. Nor can what you say about flies, plants, etc. in no way prove that a degree of perfection can be in the effect that was not previously in its cause.For either there must be no perfection in the animals, for animals are as irrational as the inanimate, or, if it has any perfection, it comes to them from elsewhere, and the sun, the rain, and the earth do not The whole reason for these animals.

If anyone, merely because he does not know the causes which contribute to the birth of a fly, and which have as many degrees of perfection as there are in a fly, does not know with certainty that there are other perfections than those which he knows Some perfection, and it would be a very unreasonable thing for the man to find occasion here to doubt a thing which (as I shall shortly say at length) is evident by the light of nature. I will add: what you object to the flies here, since it is derived from considerations of material things, will not come to the minds of these people, who follow the order of my meditations Will turn their minds away from something perceptible in order to philosophize.

You say that the idea of ​​God in us is nothing but a rational being, and I do not think that there is anything against me.For it would be wrong if a rational being meant a non-existent; it would only be true if every intellectual activity was taken as rational, that is to say, as a being out of reason. correct.In this sense, the whole of the world may also be called a God-reasoning being, that is, a being created by a simple act of God's intellect.I have amply stated on several occasions that I am speaking only of the perfection or objective reality of this idea of ​​God, which likewise requires a cause which in fact contains in it all but objective reality. Contained in a way, or through representation, of the same objective or representational skill as is contained in the idea of ​​a very ingenious machine owned by some craftsman.

Certainly, if the readers had not, by paying more attention to what I have written, freed themselves from preconceptions which perhaps obscured their natural light, and were accustomed to trust the first concepts (awareness of which are so true and obvious that nothing can be more real and more obvious than these), and distrust vague, false, opinions that long habit has etched into our minds, I think Nothing can be added to make it clearer that the idea cannot be in us if a Supreme Being does not exist. For there is nothing in an effect that has not been in its cause in the same or better manner, and this is the first concept, which cannot be more obvious; There is this other general notion which itself includes the former, for if one agrees that there is something in the effect which was not in its cause, it must also be agreed that it arose out of nothing; and if it is evident that "Nothing" cannot be the cause of something, only because there is nothing identical in the cause as in the effect. It is also a first notion that all reality, or all perfection, which is merely objectively in ideas, must be formally or eminently in their causes; The whole insight into existence rests on this concept alone.For, if the idea of ​​these things comes from the senses and strikes our minds from this concept alone, how can we guess that they exist? But what conception of a supremely powerful and perfect being we have within us, and whose objective reality is neither formally nor preeminently within us, does not matter to those who contemplate it seriously, willingly, and ourselves. Those who contemplate it together are obvious; but I cannot force it into the minds of those who read my Meditations only as novels to amuse themselves without paying much attention.And yet from all of this it is quite obvious that God exists.Nevertheless, for the sake of those whose natural light is so meager to see that objectively all perfection in an idea must really be a primary idea in one of these causes, I have used a The more comprehensible way proves again, pointing out that the mind with this idea cannot exist by itself; so I see that you can hope for nothing more in order to surrender, as you once promised. You say that the idea of ​​representing God to me may be from my previous thoughts, from book education, from discussions with my friends, etc., rather than from my spirit alone, I don't see what you can do against me.For if I say to those people (from whom they say I have received the idea of ​​God), I ask them whether they have it from themselves or from others, instead of asking it to myself, my The arguments would still have the same force; and at the same time I would still conclude that the man was God from whom the idea was drawn in the first place. As for what you go on there to say that it can be made by consideration of bodily things, I don't think it's any better than if you say we don't have any sense of hearing, but we can get it by sight alone for color. Sound awareness is more real.For one may say that there is a greater resemblance or relation between color and sound than between corporeal things and God.When you ask me to add something to raise us to the awareness of immaterial or spiritual beings, I'd better refer you to my second meditation, so that you can at least realize It is not entirely useless; for what can I do here with a paragraph or two if I have not been able to make any progress with a long speech prepared just for this question?I don't think I've put more effort into that speech than any other work I've published. Although in this meditation I speak only of the human intellect, it is not therefore any less useful for recognizing the difference between the nature of God and the nature of material things.For, here, I am willing to confess frankly that the ideas we have, for example, differ from the idea of ​​a binary or ternary number like an infinite number, the intellectual idea of ​​God seems to me It is no different from our own intellectual ideas that we have; it is like all the attributes of God, of which we recognize but a trace in our minds. But besides this we perceive in God an immensity, simplicity, or absolute unity which encompasses all his other attributes, and to which immensity, simplicity, or absolute unity, whether We find no instance, in our minds, or elsewhere; but, as I have said before, it is like the stamp that the artisan stamps on his work.It is in this way, too, that we realize that none of those particular attributes which we ascribe piecemeal to God, through the weakness of our reason, belong (as we experience them in our hearts) to God and to us, according to the in the specific sense referred to. We also recognize that in the infinite number of concrete things of which we have ideas, as in infinite cognition, in unlimited power, in unlimited number, in unlimited length, etc. etc., and various unlimited things, some of which are formally contained in our idea of ​​God, as knowledge and power, and others are only eminently contained in our conception of God, as number and power. Length; if the idea had been but a figment in my mind, things would certainly not be so. Nor is it so accurately perceived by all in the same way; For, very remarkably, all metaphysicians agree in their descriptions of the attributes of God (at least those attributes known only to human reason), and therefore there is no physical, measurable Perceived things, nothing of which we have so particular and accessible an idea, are no greater differences of opinion among philosophers about the nature of that idea than about the idea of ​​God. If men are only willing to pay attention to the supreme and perfect beings they have, they must not fail to have a real knowledge of this nature of God.But those who mix this idea with other ideas, and in this way make up a fictitious God, in the nature of which there are contradictory things, if they deny that It is not surprising that a false conception presented them with the existence of God.Therefore, when you here speak of a very perfect being of a body, if you absolutize the term very perfect, and understand a body as a being in which there is all perfection, then you are speaking of each other. Contradictory words.For the nature of objects contains many imperfections.Bodies, for example, may be divided into parts, each of which is not the other, and so on; for there is greater perfection in being indivisible than in being divisible, etc., is self-evident; If you understand something very perfect only in terms of objects, it is not really God. You go on to speak of the idea of ​​an angel, which is more perfect than ours, that is, there is no need for this idea to be placed in our hearts by an angel.I quite agree with you, because I said it myself in the third meditation that it can be made out of the combination of the ideas we have of God and of man.Nothing against me on this. As for those who deny that they have the idea of ​​God in their hearts, and make some idol in its stead, I say, those who deny the name and admit the fact.Of course, I do not think that this idea is of the same nature as the image of a material thing drawn arbitrarily; Action, or the idea that a third action makes us know, I think, only because some perfection above me becomes the object of my intellect, no matter in what way this perfection is presented to the intellect, e. From my finding that I can never count a number greater than all numbers, and thereby recognizing that there is something beyond my power in numbers, I must be able to draw conclusions, not of course an infinite number. The existence of numbers does not mean that the existence of infinite numbers contains contradictions as you say, but that my ability to understand that there is always more to the greatest number that I can never comprehend is not Not to myself, but from something else more perfect than me. ① "Therefore it is the idea of...", the second French edition is "Therefore it is what we perceive by means of reason, or judge by it, or reason by it." It does not matter whether this concept of an infinite number is called an idea or not.However, in order to understand what this being that is more perfect than I is, if it is not the same thing as I cannot find its end, is actually existent and infinite in number, or if it is something else, then All other perfections must be considered, which, besides giving me the power of this idea, may be that which contains this power; so that this thing is seen to be God. Finally, when God is said to be incomprehensible, this is to be understood in terms of a complete and comprehensive concept which fully encompasses and encompasses all that is in him, and does not contain, does not include in our minds. Good, imperfect things, but enough to make us know that God exists.Nor can you prove anything against me by saying that the idea of ​​the unity of all perfections in God is formed in the same manner as the unity of the species and the unity of other universals.Nevertheless, it is quite different from them; for it expresses a special, positive perfection in God, whereas the unity of the species adds nothing real to each individual. Thirdly, when I say that we can know nothing with certainty if we do not first know that God exists, I say in that place that I am only speaking of knowledge of these conclusions, when we no longer think where we came from When these reasons are drawn, the memory of these conclusions can come back to our minds.For the knowledge of first principles or theorems has no habit of what the dialecticiens call knowledge.But when we find that we are thinking something, this is a first concept, which is not deduced from any syllogism.When someone says: I think, therefore I exist, he draws the conclusion of his existence from his thinking not from any syllogism, but as a self-evident thing; The inspiration to see where it comes from.It is evident from the fact that, if he deduces from a syllogism, he must know in advance the major premise: that everything that thinks exists.On the contrary, however, it is told to him by his own feeling that he cannot think if he does not exist.Because it is the nature of our spirit to make general propositions out of individual cognitions. I do not deny that an atheist can clearly know that the sum of the three triangles of a triangle is equal to two right angles; but I do not think that his knowledge is a kind of real knowledge, because no knowledge that can be doubted can be called knowledge; since it is assumed that he Being an atheist, I have pointed out before, that he cannot be sure that he is not mistaken in what he considers to be very obvious; though such doubts do not occur to him, he can still Doubt, and, if he does not recognize a God, he is never free from the danger of doubting. Maybe he thinks he has a set of arguments to prove that there is no God, and that doesn't matter, because these so-called arguments are all wrong, and one can always make him realize that those arguments are wrong, and then they will make him change his mind.In fact, it is not difficult, if, however many reasons he may have, it is enough for him to give those reasons which you have mentioned here, that the infinity which is perfect in all kinds excludes all other indeterminates. What is it, and so on. For, first of all, if one were to ask him where did he know that this exclusion of everything else belongs to the nature of the infinite, he would not be able to answer anything reasonable.For the name infinite is not used to be understood as excluding the existence of finite things, and nothing can be known about the nature of things that people think are nothing, and the result is that there is no nature, but what is contained in this thing. something in the single, ordinary sense of the name. Besides, if this imaginary infinity can create nothing, what is the use of its infinite power?From our experience of what thinking powers are in our own minds, we can easily appreciate that such a power can exist in something else, even greater than in our minds; but although we think that power increases To infinity, we are not thereby afraid of diminishing the capacity within us.The same is true of all other attributes of God, even the power to produce any effect other than itself, if we assume that there is no word in our hearts that is not subject to the will of God.We can therefore understand him as the existence of something that is completely infinite and does not interfere in the slightest with the created. Fourth, I think I agree with all theologians, past and future, when I say that God is neither a liar nor a liar.All the contrary opinions you have advanced are not more convincing than the fact that, after denying that God is angry or that he is governed by other passions of the soul, you object to some passages in my Bible, where It seems as though some of the passions of man were given to God. For everyone is well aware of the ways in which the Bible speaks of God in general (these ways are in accordance with the ability of ordinary people, and they contain a certain truth, but this truth only concerns people) and express a simpler way. , of a purer truth (which does not change in nature, though it does not concern people) (about which everyone uses them in philosophizing, and which I have written in my Meditations Also had to use these mostly, because in this place I haven't assumed that I know anyone, nor have I considered that I'm a combination of body and spirit, I've only considered that I'm a spirit) between the two difference. Hence, it is clear that here I am not speaking of the lie expressed in words, but only of the internal, formal falsification within the lie, despite the words of one of the prophets you bring up: forty more God, Nineveh is going to be destroyed is not a verbal lie, but a mere threat whose fulfillment depends on a condition; when it comes to God hardening Pharaoh's heart, or anything like that, don't think He did this positively, but only negatively, that is, by not giving Pharaoh an effective grace to convert him to God. Yet I would not blame those who say that God used his prophets to utter such verbal lies as doctors lie to their patients in order to heal them, that is, they Generally all the malice in deceit does not count; but, more than that, we sometimes see that we are really deceived by the natural instincts God has given us, as when a edema patient is thirsty; for then He was really prompted to drink water by an instinct which God had given him for the preservation of his body, though it deceived him, because drinking water was injurious to him; God's goodness and truth go hand in hand. But in things which cannot be so explained, that is, in our very clear and very exact judgments, which, if false, cannot be corrected by other clearer judgments, nor corrected by any other natural faculty. Correction, in these judgments I firmly believe that we cannot be deceived.Since God is the supreme being, he must also be the supreme good, the supreme truth, and thus he opposes what comes from him positively tending towards error.But since there can be nothing real in us that is not given to us by him (as already shown in the proof of his existence), and since we have in us an ability to know what is true and to distinguish it from what is false. If this function does not tend towards the truth, at least when we use it correctly ( That is, when we agree only to what we understand clearly and distinctly, since one cannot invent another good use for this function), then God who gave this function to us is regarded as a Liar, this is not without reason. Thus, if we wish to doubt things that we apprehend clearly and distinctly, we shall see that, after having recognized God's existence, it is necessary to imagine him to be a liar; is very real, very reliable. However, since I see here that you are still stuck in the doubts which I raised in the first meditation and which I think have been dismissed with sufficient accuracy in the following meditations, I here regard myself as a human The basis upon which all reliability rests is explained again. First, as soon as we think we clearly grasp something true, we naturally believe it.If this belief is so strong that we can never have any reason to doubt what we thus believe, then there is nothing further to be sought, and we have all the certainty we can reasonably hope for in the matter. sex. For what does it matter to us if it may be asserted that what we so strongly believe to be true is wrong in the eyes of God or in the eyes of angels, and is therefore absolutely wrong?Since we never believe in this absolute error, and we don't even have the slightest suspicion, what do we bother with it?Because we are firm to a belief to an unshakable degree first, then this belief turns out to be a very reliable belief.But one may well doubt whether one has any reliability of this nature, or any firm conviction. One cannot, of course, have any belief, not even a little vagueness, in what is vague; for vagueness, whatever it may be, is what makes us doubt these things.Nor can we have faith in what comes from the senses, for we often find that there may be errors in the senses, as when a edematous patient is thirsty or a man with jaundice sees snow as yellow because that man sees snow as yellow. Snow can see clearly and distinctly no worse than us, and we see snow as white.It remains, therefore, that, if one can have faith, it is only that which the mind comprehends clearly and clearly. Some of these things, however, are so clear, and at the same time so simple, that we cannot think of them without thinking that they are true.For example, I exist when I think; what is made cannot be unmade; and so on.We are obviously quite sure of these things. For if we do not think of those things, we cannot doubt them; but if we do not believe them to be true, we shall never think of them, as I have just said.So we cannot doubt them without also believing them to be true, that is, we never doubt them. Nor is it of much use to say that we often experience that some men are mistaken about things which they think are clearer than seeing the sun; for neither we nor anyone have ever seen such He who derives all clarity and distinctness from intellectual perception has only seen such things happen to those who derive all clarity and distinctness from the senses, or from some false prejudice.想要假装认为也许这样的事情在上帝或者天使看来是错误的，这也没有什么用处，因为我们的知觉的明显性决不允许我们去听那个想要假装认为是那样并且想要使我们相信的人的话。 还有，其他的一切东西，当我们密切注意对它们的认识所根据的那些理由时，我们的理智对它们领会得也十分清楚，因此我们不能怀疑它们；可是因为我们可能忘记那些理由，不过我们记得由那些理由得出的结论，人们问道，对于这些结论，在我们记得它们是从一些非常明显的原则推论出来的时候，是否能够有一个坚定不移的信念；因为这个记忆必须设定，以便这些结论能够被称之为结论。我回答说，那些认识上帝到如此程度以致他们知道由上帝给予他们的理解功能除了有真理做为对象不可能有其他东西的人，他们能够对于这些结论有一个坚定不移的信念；不过其他的人不能够有。关于这一点，我在第五个沉思的末尾已经讲得非常明白，我认为没有必要在这里多说什么了。 第五点，我奇怪你们会怀疑当意志按照理智的模糊不清的认识行事时，就有达不到目的的危险；因为，假如它所按照其行事的东西不是被清楚认识的，谁能使它是靠得住呢？有谁（不管是哲学家也好，神学家也好，或者仅仅是运用理性的人也好）不承认，在给予同意之前领会得越清楚的东西上，我们所面临的达不到目的的危险就越小，而那些对于原因还不认识就冒然下什么判断的人就失败？领会不能说成是模糊不清，除非是因为在它里边有什么还不认识的内容。 从而，你们关于人们应该接受的信仰所做的反驳，在反对我上，并没有比反对所有任何时候都从事培养人类理性的人具有更大的力量，而且，真正说来，它对任何人都没有力量。因为，虽然人们说信仰是对付模糊不清的东西的，可是我们之所以信仰那些东西的理由却不是模糊不清的，而是比任何自然的光明更清楚、分明的。不仅如此，还必须把我们信仰的材料或东西同推动我们的意志去信仰的那种形式的理由加以区别，因为就是在这种形式的理由中我们才意愿有清楚性和分明性。 至于材料，从来没有人否认它可以是模糊不清的，甚至它就是模糊不清性本身：因为当我判断必须从我们的思想里把模糊不清去掉，以便能够把我们的同意交给我们的思想而毫无达不到目的的危险时，给我用作材料以便做成一个清楚分明的判断的，正是模糊不清。 除此而外，必须注意我们的意志由之而能够被激发起来去相信的那种清楚性、分明性有两种：一种来自自然的光明，另外一种来自上帝的恩宠。 可是，虽然人们通常说信仰是一些模糊不清的东西，不过这仅仅是指它的材料说的，而并不是指形式的理由说的，我们是为了形式的理由去信仰的；因为，相反，这种形式的理由在于某一种内在的光明，用这个光明，上帝超自然地照亮了我们之后，我们就有了一种可靠的信念，相信要我们去信仰的东西是他所启示的，而他完全不可能撒谎欺骗我们，这就比其他一切自然的光明更可靠，经常由于恩宠的光明而甚至更明显。 当然，土耳其人和其他一些不信基督教的人，当他们不接受基督教时，并不是因为不愿信仰模糊不清的东西由于这些东西是模糊不清的原故而犯罪；他们犯罪是由于他们拒绝从内部告知他们的那种圣宠，或者由于他们在别的事情上犯了罪，不配享受这种恩宠。我敢说，一个不信基督教的人，他被排除于享受任何超自然的圣宠之外，并且完全不知道我们这些基督教徒所信仰的那些东西是上帝所启示的，可是，由于受到某些错误推理的引导，他也会信仰和我们所信仰的同样的那些东西，而那些东西对他来说是模糊不清的；虽然如此，这个不信基督教的人并不会因此就是基督教的信徒，而不如说他之所以犯罪是由于他没有很好地使用他的理性。 关于这一点，我想任何一个正统的神学家也决不会有别的意见；读过我的《沉思集》的人们也没有理由相信我没有认识这种超自然的光明，因为，在第四个沉思里，在那里我仔细地追求了错误的原因，我特别用下面的词句说过：它（超自然的光明）支配我们思想的内部去愿望，可是它并不减少自由。 再说，我在这里请你们回忆一下，关于意志所能包括的东西，我一向是在日常生活和真理的思考之间做非常严格的区别的。因为，在日常生活中，我决不认为应该只有按照我们认识得非常清楚、分明的事情才能做，相反，我主张甚至用不着总是等待很有可能的事物，而是有时必须在许多完全不认识和不可靠的事物中选择一个并且决定下来，在这以后，就如同是由于一些可靠的和非常明显的理由而选择出来的那样坚持下去（只要我们看不到相反的理由），就象我已经在《谈方法》一书第26页①中解释过的那样。不过在那里谈的仅仅是对真理的思考。有谁否认过，在模糊不清的、没有被清楚认识的事物上不应该去下判断？然而，我的《沉思集》一书的唯一目的只是思考真理，这不但是由这些沉思自身可以足够清楚地认出，而且我还在第一个沉思的末尾说得很明白： 我在这上面不能使用太多的不信任，因为我对待的不是日常生活，而仅仅是对真理的追求。 ①“第26页”，法文第二版缺。 第六点，在你们批评我谱之于形式〔逻辑〕的一个三段论式中得出的结论的地方，似乎是你们自己在这个形式〔逻辑〕上弄错了；因为，为了得出你们所要的结论，大前提应该是这样的：凡是我们清楚、分明地领会为属于什么东西的本性的东西，都能真正不错地被说成或者被肯定为是属于这个东西的本性。这样一来，这个大前提除了无用的、多余的重复以外，没有包含什么东西。可是我的论据的大前提是这样的：凡是我们清楚、分明地领会为属于什么东西的本性的东西，都能真正不错地被说成或者被肯定为是属于这个东西的。这就是说，如果“是动物”属于人的本质或属于人的本性，那么可以肯定人是动物；如果三角之和和等于二直角属于直角三角形的本性，那么就可以肯定直角三角形三角之和等于二直角；如果存在属于上帝的本性，那么就可以肯定上帝存在，等等。小前提是这样的：而存在是属于上帝的本性的。从这里显然必须得出象我所说的那样的结论，即：所以我们可以真正不错地肯定说上帝存在，而不是象你们所想的那样：所以我们可以真正不错地肯定说存在是属于上帝的本性的。 从而，为了使用你们接着提出的例外，你们本来应该否认大前提，说我们清楚、分明地领会为属于什么东西的本性，不能因此就被说成是或被肯定是属于这个东西，除非是它的本性是可能的，或者不矛盾。不过，我请你们看一看这个例外的缺点。因为，要么是你们用可能这个词，象一般人所做的那样，指的是凡是与人类思想不相矛盾的东西，在这种意义上，上帝的本性，按照我所描写的方式来说，显然是可能的，因为在上帝的本性身上，除了我们清楚、分明地领会为应该属于它的东西以外，我并没有假定什么东西，这样我就没有假定什么与思想或人类概念相矛盾的东西；要么是你们假想出什么其他的可能性，从对象本身那方面来说，这种可能性如果与前一种可能性相矛盾，就决不能被人类理智所认识，从而它就和否定人的认识中的其他一切东西一样，没有什么力量来迫使我们去否定上帝的本性或者上帝的存在。因为，如果把上帝的本性是可能的这件事加以否定，达虽然从概念或从思想方面来说没有什么不可能，可是相反，凡是包含在上帝本性的这个概念里的东西都是如此地互相衔接，以致如果说其中有某一个不属于上帝的本性，这对我们来说似乎是矛盾的；因此，如果上帝的本性是可能的这件事可以去否定，那么同样道理，也可以去否定一个三角形三角之和等于二直角是可能的，或者现实在思维的人存在是可能的；尤有甚者，人们甚至可以否定凡是我们由感觉知觉到的一切东西都是真的。那样一来，人类的一切知识都将既无丝毫理由，又无任何根据而被完全推翻。 至于你们用来和我的论据相比较的那个论据，即如果在上帝之存在上没有矛盾，那么上帝之存在就是肯定的，而在上帝之存在上没有矛盾，所以等等。实质上它是对的，可是形式上，它是一种诡辩。因为，在大前提里，有矛盾这一词是关于上帝之能够存在所根据的原因的概念的，而在小前提里，它是单独关于上帝的存在和本性的概念的，如果否定大前提，就似乎必须这样来证明它： 如果上帝还没有存在，那么他之存在是有矛盾的，因为不能指定充足理由律来产生他；可是他之存在没有矛盾，就象小前提中所认可的那样：所以，等等。如果否定小前提，就必须这样来证明： 这件事没有矛盾，在它的形式的概念里没有什么东西包含着矛盾；在上帝的存在或本性的形式的概念里，没有什么东西包含着矛盾：所以，等等。因此有矛盾这一词有两种不同的意义。 因为，有可能是这样的，即在事物本身里不会领会到什么东西阻碍它能够存在，然而在它的原因里会领会到什么东西阻碍它被产生。 可是，虽然我只是非常不完满地领会上帝，但这并不妨碍他的本性是可能的或者是没有矛盾的这件事是靠得住的； 也不妨碍我们可以真正不错地确认我们已经足够仔细地检查了并且清楚地认识了上帝的本性，也就是说，足以认识上帝的本性是可能的，以及必然的存在性是属于上帝的本性的。因为，一切不可能性，或者，如果我可以在这里用经院哲学的话来说，一切矛盾性仅仅在于我们的概念或思想里，因为它不能把互相矛盾着的观念结合到一起，而并不在于在理智之外的任何东西里，因为，就是由于它在理智之外，所以显然它是没有矛盾的，而是有可能的。 而存在于我们思想里的不可能性不过是来自思想的模糊不清，在清楚、分明的思想里不可能有任何不可能性；从而，为了我们得以确知我们足够认识上帝的本性以便知道上帝的本性之存在是没有矛盾的，只要我们清楚、分明地理解我们在上帝的本性里所看到的一切东西（尽管这些东西比起虽然也在上帝的本性里可是我们看不到的那些东西来数目是很小的），只要我们看出必然的存在性是我们在上帝里所看到的许多东西之中的一个，这就足够了。 第七点，我已经在我的《沉思集》的《内容提要》里说过关于灵魂不死我为什么在那里什么都没有说的理由。我在前面也表示了我已经充分证明了精神和一切种类物体之间的区别。 至于你们补充说，从灵魂与肉体之间的区别不能得出灵魂不死这个结论来，因为虽然有区别，可是人们可以说上帝把灵魂做成这样一种性质使它的延续时间和肉体的生命的延续时间同时完结，我承认我没有什么可答辩的，因为我没有那么大的胆量去企图用人类的推理力量来规定一个只取决于上帝的纯粹意志的东西。 自然的认识告诉我们精神是与物体有别的，精神是一种实体；同时，人的肉体，就其与其他物体有别而言，不过是由某一种外形的肢体以及诸如此类的偶性组合而成；最后，肉体的死亡仅仅取决于形状的某种分解或改变。然而我们没有任何论据也没有任何例证使我们相信象精神这样一个实体的死亡或毁灭应该随着一个形状的改变这样一个如此轻微的原因，而形状的改变不过是一个样态，更何况这个样态又不是精神的样态，而是与精神实际上有别的肉体的样态。我们甚至没有任何论据或例证可以使我们相信有些实体是可以被毁灭的。这就足以得出结论说，人的精神或灵魂，按其能够被自然哲学所认识的程度来说，是不死的。 可是如果有人问道，是否上帝用他的绝对能力，也许规定了人的灵魂和它与之联合的肉体的毁灭而同时停止存在？ 这只有由上帝自己来回答。既然他现在向我们启示这样的事不会发生，关于这件事我们不应该再有任何怀疑了。 此外，我十分感谢你们，由于你们肯于如此助人为乐地并且如此坦率地不仅把你们理应得到解释的一些事情，而且也把无神论者们，或者某些坏家伙能够向我提出的反驳也都告诉了我。 在你们向我提出的东西里，我看不出有什么是我以前在我的沉思里没有解释过的。比如说，你们所提到的关于由太阳产生的苍蝇、加拿大人、尼尼维人、土耳其人，以及诸如此类的事，那些按照我的沉思所指出的办法暂时抛弃一切从感官得来的东西以便注意最纯粹、最健康的理性所告诉我们的话的人是想不到的。这就是为什么我认为已经把所有这些东西都避而不谈的原故。尽管如此，我认为这些反驳对我的计划来说仍然是很有用处的，因为我并不希望有很多这样的读者，他们愿意对我所写的东西给予那么大的注意，以致看到末了他们还记得所看过的全部东西；而那些不这样做的读者们，他们很容易陷于困难，对于这些困难，他们以后将会看到在这个答辩里我会使他们得到满足，或者至少他们会由此得到更认真地检查真理的机会。 关于你们建议我把我的理由按照几何学家们的方法来处理，以便让读者们能一下子就明白，我在这里告诉你们我如何以前就按照这个方法做过，我如何今后还要这样做。 在几何学家们的写作方式中我把两件事区别开来：次序和证明方式。 次序仅仅在于：最先提出的东西应该是用不着后面的东西的帮助就能认识；后面的东西应该是这样地处理，即必须只能被前面的东西所证明。我在我的沉思里边就是尽可能试用这个次序的。这就是我所以我在第二个沉思里没有谈精神和物体的不同，而留待在第六个沉思里再谈的原故；而且我故意取消了很多东西不谈，因为那些东西要事先提出很多别的东西才能说得清楚。 证明方式是双重的：一个是由分析法或决定法做的，一个是由综合法或组合法做的。 分析法指出一条一件事物由之而被有条不紊地发现出来的真正道路，同时也指明结果如何取决于原因；这样，如果读者们愿意遵循这个方法并且仔细注视它所包含的一切东西，他们就会把这样证明了的东西理解得同样完满，就跟他们自己发现了它一样成为他们自己的东西。 不过这种证明不足以使顽固的、不用心的读者信服；因为，如果一不经心漏掉了它所提出的一点点小事情，它的结论的必然性就不会出现；人们没有习惯大量检查那些本身足够明确的东西，虽然那是最应该注意的东西。 综合法则相反，它走的是一条完全不同的道路，好象从结果里检查原因一样（虽然它所包含的证明经常也是由原因检查结果），它固然清楚地证明在结论里所包含的东西，并且使用了一长串的定义、要求、公理、定理、问题，以便如果否认它的什么结论的话，它就指出这些结论是怎样包含在前件里边的，这样它就会使读者们（不管他们是多么顽固不化）不得不同意，不过它不象另外那种方法那样，使那些希望学习的人感到完全满足，因为事物是用什么方法发现的，它不告诉你。 古时几何学家们习惯于在他们的著作里仅仅使用这种综合法，这不是因为他们对分析法完全无知，而是，我认为，因为他们过于重视它，把它留给他们自己，当做一个重要秘密。 至于我，我在我的沉思里仅仅采用分析法，因为我认为这种方法是最真实、最好的教学方法；不过，至于综合法，它无疑地是你们希望我采用的方法，虽然在几何学里所谈的东西上它仅次于分析法的地位，但是它对于形而上学的东西却不怎么合适。因为，有这么一种不同：被假定来证明几何学命题的第一概念适合于感官，从而很容易为每一个人所接受； 因此在这上面没有问题，问题只在很好地推出结论上，这对于各种人，甚至最不经心人来说，都不难做到，只要他们记得前面的东西就行；而且人们很容易迫使他们记起在提出的问题当中有多少东西要指出就分别出多少不同的命题，以便他们得以分别停留在每一个上面作为以后可以引证这些命题，让他们知道应该对这些命题加以思考。相反，在属于形而上学的问题上，主要的困难在于清楚、分明地领会第一概念。因为，虽然第一概念由于其本性的关系并不是不如几何学家们所对待的那些第一概念清楚，甚至时常是比那些第一概念更清楚，不过，由于它们似乎与我们通过感官接受来的许多成见不一致，而这些成见，我们自从儿童时期就已经司空见惯了，这些第一概念只有那些非常用心并且致力于尽可能把他们的精神从感官的交往中解脱出来的人才能完全懂得；因此，如果人们把它们单独提出来，它们就会很容易地被那些好持反对意见的人所否认。 就是为了这个原故，我宁愿写沉思而不愿象哲学家们那样写争论或问题，或者象几何学家们那样写定理或问题，以便由此来证明我写这些沉思仅仅是为那些肯和我一起认真沉思并且专心致志地来考虑事物的人。因为，谁要准备向真理进行攻击，就是因为这个原故他就越是不能懂得真理，因为他的精神与对于使他相信真理的那些理由的思考背道而驰，他是去追求摧毁真理的那些理由。 可是，虽然如此，为了证明我对你们的建议的尊重，我在这里试求效仿几何学家们的综合法，并把我用以论证上帝的存在和精神与人的肉体之间区别的主要理由做了一个概要：这对于安慰读者们的关怀也许不无小补。