Chapter 35 A. Subjective concept (DerSubjektiveBegri ee) Ⅲ. Inference

(Der Schluss) §181 Inference is the unity of concept and judgment.The corollary is that formal distinctions of judgments have returned to the notion of simple identity.The inference is a judgment because at the same time it is posited in reality, that is, in the difference of its determinations.Inferences are rational, and everything is rational. (Explanation) People are usually accustomed to regard inference (i.e. syllogism) as a form of rational thinking, but only as a subjective form. Inference form and other rational content, such as rational principles, rational behavior, No connection can be pointed out between ideas, etc.We often hear people talking about reason and appealing to reason many times, but few people explain what reason is and what the rules of reason are, especially few people think of the connection between reason and inference.In fact, formal inferences represent reason in such an unreasonable way that the inference has nothing to do with the content of reason.But since such a rational content can be rational only through the determination by which thinking becomes rational, so it can only be rational through that inferential (or syllogic) form. .But inferences are nothing but (as in the previous section) the realization or explicit development (initially only formally) of concepts.Inference is therefore the ground of the essence of all truth.The definition of the Absolute at this stage should be: the Absolute is an inference, or to express this principle in the form of a proposition: everything is an inference.Everything is a concept.The specific existence of the concept is the differentiation of its moments, so the universal nature of the concept gives itself external reality through particularity, and therefore the concept, as the negative self-returning, makes itself individual. —or, conversely, actual things are individual things which, through particularity, raise themselves to universality and identify themselves with themselves. —The actual thing is one, but at the same time its elements of the concept are many, and the inference represents the circular course of the intermediary process of its elements, by which the concept of the actual thing achieves its unity.

Note: Inferences, like concepts and judgments, are often conceived simply as a form of our subjective thinking.Inference is therefore often called the process of justifying a judgment. Judgment does, no doubt, proceed to inference.But the step from judgment to inference does not occur simply through our subjective activity, but because the judgment itself establishes itself as inference, and in the inference returns to the unity of the concept.In detail, the necessary judgment constitutes the transition from judgment to inference.In a necessary judgment we have an individual thing which, by its particularity, is related to its universality, the concept.Here, particularity appears as a mediating term between individuality and universality.This is the basic form of inference.The further development of this inference, in terms of form, is that individuality and universality can also take on this intermediary position, thus forming a transition from subjectivity to objectivity.

§182 In direct inference, the determinations of the concept, as abstractions, are only externally related to one another.Then the two extremes, individuality and universality, and the concept which is the middle term containing both, are likewise only abstract particularities.In this way the two extremes are posited equally indifferently and independently in relation to each other and to their conceptions of the middle.Such inferences are formal intellectual inferences, which may be said to be rational, but without concepts.In this inference, the subject is connected to another determinateness, or, through this mediation, the universal includes a subject external to it.On the contrary, in rational inference the subject unites itself with itself through a process of mediation.In this way it becomes the (true) subject, or the subject itself becomes rational inference.

[Explanation] In the following investigations, rational inferences are expressed subjectively in the usual sense.That is, to express it in the subjective way we adopt when we make abstract intellectual inferences.In fact, this is just a subjective inference.But this inference also has its objective meaning: it is only sufficient to express the finitude of things, but only in accordance with the particular way in which the form of thought has attained it here.Just as in finite things their subjectivity, as mere thingness (Dingheit), is separable from their quality, their particularity, so is their subjectivity separable from their universality, as long as This universality is also separable when it is not only the mere quality of a thing, and the external union of this thing with other things, but also its genus and concept.

Note: From the above-mentioned view of reasoning as a form of reason, one then defines reason itself as the faculty of reasoning, and at the same time the understanding as the faculty of forming concepts.Apart from the fact that this statement is based on a superficial notion of the mind as merely the sum total of many forces or faculties that stand side by side, there is nothing wrong with this alignment of intellect with concept, of reason with reason. We must also note that just as concepts must never be regarded as mere determinations of the understanding, so inferences must never be taken unreservedly as rational.Because, on the one hand, what formal logic often discusses in the theory of inference is in fact nothing other than a purely intellectual inference.This kind of inference is really not enough to enjoy the "good name of rational form", let alone the honor of "representing all reason". On the other hand, the real concept is not simply a form of understanding.It can even be said that the reason why the concept is reduced to the form of the understanding is the function of the abstract intellect.Therefore, some people are often used to distinguish the simple concept of understanding from the concept of reason, but this should not be understood as two different concepts, but rather must be realized that this is only a sign of our (cognitive) activities or only stays in the concept. In negative and abstract form, or in accordance with the concept's true nature, the concept is understood at the same time as positive and concrete.For example, if we regard freedom as the abstract opposite of necessity, then this is the concept of mere freedom.On the contrary, the true rational concept of freedom contains within itself the sublated necessity.Similarly, the definition of God put forward by so-called deism is only the intellectual concept of God. On the contrary, Christianity, which regards God as the Trinity, includes the rational concept of God.

(1) Qualitativer Schluss §183 The first type of inference, as pointed out in the previous section, is the definite inference or qualitative inference.Its form (1) is E—B—A. [E stands for individuality (Einzelnheit), B stands for particularity (Besonderheit), A stands for universality (Allgemeinheit)].That is to say, the subject as an individual is combined with a universal determination through a quality [particularity]. [Explanation] Needless to say, the subject (minor term) has other characteristics besides individuality, and similarly, the other extreme (the predicate or major term in the conclusion) also has other characteristics besides simple universality, here are not examined, but only those forms in which they are drawn.

Note: The deduction of fixed existence is a purely intellectual inference, at least in the case of the inference of fixed existence, in which individuality, particularity, and universality are in abstract opposition, it is indeed an abstract intellectual inference.So this kind of inference can be said to be a high degree of externalization of concepts.Here we have an immediate individual thing as subject; and from this subject we pick out any particular aspect, a quality, and by this individual quality we prove that the individual thing is a universal.For example, when we say: This rose is red; red is a color, so this rose has color.It is these forms of inference that are usually discussed in logic books.It was formerly regarded as the absolute rule of all knowledge, and that all scientific assertions were only reliable if they were proved by such inferences.On the contrary, the present forms of syllogism are hardly to be found except in textbooks of logic, and knowledge of this form of inference has been regarded as empty academic wisdom, of no more use to practical life nor to scientific investigation. .In this regard, we must first point out that it would be superfluous and pedantic if we had to show off this whole set of inferences on every occasion of our acquaintance.But the various forms of inference are constantly at work in our cognitive activities.For example, when a man hears carriages rolling in the street early in the winter, it leads him to infer that the previous night's frost may have been severe.Here he can also be regarded as having completed a deduction activity.This activity is repeated countless times in our daily multifaceted and complex lives.A thinking man, in his daily conduct, strives to be aware that such forms of reasoning are certainly of interest, as we study the various functions of our organic life, such as digestion, nutrition, respiration, etc., or even The study of the events and structures of the natural world which surrounds us is also admittedly of great interest.But we must admit without a doubt that we do not need to study anatomy and physiology before we can digest and breathe properly; nor do we need to study logic before we can draw correct inferences.

Aristotle was the first to observe and describe the subjective meaning of the various forms of the syllogism (the so-called modes of inference).He did it so closely and so correctly that no one ever made any further additions to his research in essence.Although we speak highly of Aristotle's achievement, we must not forget that the way of thinking that he applied in his own philosophical research is not the forms of rational reasoning, nor the general limited thinking. form (see §189 for clarification). §184 First, The terms in this inference are entirely accidental.For the middle term, which is an abstract particularity, is only any property of the subject.But the subject of immediacy, that is, of empirical concreteness, has many other properties.It can therefore be related to many other universals as well.Likewise, a single particularity may have many different properties, so that the subject may be related to other different generalities through the same middle term.

(Explanation) The reason why formal inferences lose their effectiveness is because there are many people who are popular, because few people see their mistakes, and because people have no intention of using arguments to justify formal inferences, so they are useless.This verse and the next one are intended to show that such inferences are useless for the search for truth. From what has been said above, it can be seen that by means of inferences of this kind it is possible to "prove" (as is commonly called "proving") many very different conclusions.You only need to pick a middle term at random, and you can transition to (or infer) the desired conclusion based on it.But if we start from another middle term, we can also "prove" another thing based on it, even something contrary to the previous one.The more concrete an object is, the more aspects it has, that is, the more things that belong to it and can be used as a middle term.The determination of which of these aspects is more important than the other has to be based on an inference which insists on a particular character and which is equally easy for the same A characteristic finds out a certain aspect or a certain reason, and thereby proves that it can indeed be regarded as necessary and important.

Note: Though intellectual reasoning seldom occurs to us in our daily intercourse, yet it is constantly at work in practical life.For example, in civil litigation, the duty of defense lawyers is to emphasize the legal provisions that are beneficial to the parties to make them effective.From a logical point of view, this legal provision is only a middle term.The same is true in diplomatic relations, for example, when various powerful states claim the same piece of land. In such disputes, the right of inheritance, the geographical location of the land, the ancestry and language of the inhabitants, or any other reason, may be raised. Emphasize it as the middle term.

§185 Second, not only the terms in this inference are contingent, as stated in the previous section, but also the formal inference is also contingent because of its form in the connection of the terms.According to the concept of inference, truth consists in connecting two different things through the middle term, which is the unity of the two.But using the middle term to connect the two extremes (the so-called major premise and minor premise) is rather a direct connection in the inference. In other words, there is no real middle term among them that can serve as a connection. [Explanation] This contradiction of inferences is again expressed by a [new] infinite progress in the requirement that each of the two premises equally requires a new inference to be proved, however, due to the latter An inference also has two immediate premises, so it again requires two inferences to prove it.So the immediate premise repeats itself, and there is always the need for a double inference, to infinity. §186 The shortcomings of inferences (forms that are generally regarded as absolutely good) that are pointed out here in order to show the importance of experience must themselves be superseded in the further determination of inferences.Since we have now come into the sphere of concepts, as in judgments, when the opposite character is not simply latent but explicitly established, to analyze the gradual progress of inferences we have only to accept or admit the inferences in them. Each stage of the process builds itself by itself. Through direct inference, (1) E—B—A, individuality, (through particularity) is combined with universality, and a universal conclusion is established.The individual subject, therefore, is itself a universal, and thus becomes the unifier or mediator of the two extremes.This leads to the inference of the second formula, (2) A—E—B. This inference of the second type expresses the truth of the first type: that the mediation process occurs only in individuality and is therefore contingent. §187 The second formula combines universality and particularity.This universality is in the conclusion of the first formula, and through the regulation of individuality, it transitions to the second formula, and thus acquires the status of the direct subject.The universal is thus established by this conclusion as the particular, and thus becomes the mediator of the two extremes whose place is now occupied by the other two, the particular and the individual.This is the third formula of inference: (3) Particular-universal-individual (B-A-E). (Explanation) The so-called formulas of inference (Aristotle correctly cited only three formulas; the fourth formula is superfluous, and can even be said to be a boring addition of modern people), in the usual research method, it is only sequential. Listed out, few people think of pointing out their inevitability, and even fewer people think of pointing out their significance and value.No wonder, then, that these formulas were later treated only as empty formalisms.But they have a very important significance, which is based on the necessity that each moment, as a conceptual determination, itself has the necessity of becoming the whole and the ground of its mediation. ——As for which form of proposition we want to find out (such as whether it is a general proposition or a negative proposition, etc.), it will enable us to deduce correct conclusions from various inferences, which is a mechanical research , due to the mechanical nature of this kind of research and its lack of intrinsic meaning, it should be forgotten by people.Those to whom such studies, and the study of intellectual reasoning, were of the utmost importance, would hardly have attracted the attention of Aristotle, though he had described these forms of reasoning, and countless other spiritual and natural ones, and had The properties of the various forms of expression have been examined.But in his metaphysical concepts K and his conceptions of spirit and nature, he is so far removed from having as a basis or standard the methods of intellectual reasoning that, we may say, if he accepts the If he is restrained, none of his concepts will be produced, or will be preserved.As for Aristotle, although he has made many unique contributions to classification description and abstract analysis, the leading principle of his philosophy is always speculative concepts. Never let it intrude into the realm of this speculative concept. Note: The objective meaning of the three forms of inference generally lies in showing that all rational things are three-fold inferences.Moreover, every link in the inference can take the position of an extreme as well as the position of a middle term playing a mediating role.This is just like the three departments in philosophy: that is, logical ideas, nature and spirit. Here, first of all, it is naturally the middle term, which connects the other two links.Naturally, the totality immediately [present before us] unfolds itself between the extremes of the logical idea and the spirit.But spirit is spirit only insofar as it is mediated by nature.Therefore, secondly, the spirit, that is, the individual and active spirit as we know it, also becomes the middle term, while the natural and logical ideas become the two extremes.It is the spirit that recognizes in nature the ideas of logic, and thus elevates nature back to its essence.Thirdly, likewise, the logical idea itself can be the middle term.It is the absolute substance of spirit and nature, the universal and all-pervading thing.These three are the links in the absolute inference. §188 Since each link can successively assume the status of the middle term and the extremes, their specific differences from each other are discarded.This inference of the indiscriminate form between the various moments takes, first of all, the identity or equivalence of the external intellect as its connection.This is quantitative or mathematical inference.Two things are equal if they are equal to a third. Note: The inferences of quantities mentioned here are well known, and are called axioms in mathematics, and like other axioms, their content is said to be unprovable, but since it is immediately self-evident, it does not require almost proved.In fact, these mathematical axioms are nothing but logical propositions. As long as these propositions can express specific and definite thoughts, they can be deduced from general and self-determined thinking.The process of deducing these propositions can also be seen as a proof of them.This is the case with the inferences of quantities proposed in mathematics as axioms.Quantitative inferences are in fact the nearest consequence of qualitative or direct inferences. —In short, quantitative inferences are completely formless inferences, because in quantitative inferences the distinction between the moments determined by concepts is superseded.Which propositions should be used as premises in quantitative inferences depends on the external environment.When we apply this inference, therefore, we presuppose what has been established and proved elsewhere. §189 In this way, first of all, two results are produced in terms of form: first, each link has generally acquired the characteristics and status of the middle term, and thus the characteristics and status of the whole, so it freely loses its abstract one-sidedness. (§182 and §184).Second, the mediation process has already been completed (§185), and it is also completed in a free manner, in other words, it is only a circle-like mediation process that presupposes each other.In the inference individual-particular-universal in the first formula, the two premises of "the individual is particular" and "the particular is universal" have not yet been mediated. The former premise must be in the third formula, and the latter premise must be in the second formula to be mediated.But each of these two formulas, in order for its premises to be mediated, must also presuppose the other two. In this light, the mediated unity of the concept is no longer posited as an abstract particularity, but as the developed unity of individuality and universality, and even, above all, as the two The unity of defined reflection, that is, individuality can simultaneously be defined as universal.This middle term develops reflective inferences. (2) Reflective inferences (Reelexions-Schluss) §190 If the middle term is first of all not only an abstract and particular determination of the subject, but at the same time as all individual concrete subjects, which likewise share that determination with the others, then we obtain (a ) full name inference.But the major premise of this kind of inference uses particularity, middle term, or totality as the main terms, but the conclusion has already been assumed first. In fact, the conclusion should have assumed the major premise first.Therefore, the inference of (2) universal name is based on induction.In this inductive reasoning, the middle term is the complete enumeration of all individuals, A, B, C, D, etc.However, since there is always a gap between the individuality and universality of direct experience, a complete enumeration of all individuals can never be satisfied.So the inductive inference is built on (3) analogy.The middle term of the analogy is an individual, but this individual is understood as the universality of its essence, its class, or the determination of its essence. —In order to be mediated, the first kind of universal inference leads to the second kind of inductive inference, and the inductive inference leads to the third kind of inference, namely analogy.But when the two forms of external relations of individuality and universality have experienced various forms in reflection and inference, analogy still needs a self-defined universality, or individuality as a class. [Explanation] With universal inferences, the shortcomings of the basic form of intellectual inferences pointed out in § 184 above can be improved, but this introduces a new one.The shortcoming is that the major premise presupposes what the conclusion should have, and even thus presupposes the conclusion as a direct proposition.All men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal, and all metals conduct electricity, so copper, for example, conducts electricity.In order to be able to explain these major premises (the "everything" mentioned in these major premises refers to the immediate individual, and should be an empirical proposition in essence), it must first be confirmed that the propositions about Caius' individual and about individual things are correct. ——It’s no wonder that everyone’s inferences about “all men are mortal, and Caius is a man, therefore Caius is mortal” not only make people feel pedantic, but even make people feel a kind of meaningless formalism . Note: The inference of the universal name leads to the inductive inference, in which the individual forms the middle term of the connection.When we say, "All metals conduct electricity," it is an empirical proposition, a conclusion arrived at by experiments with all the individual metals.We then get an inductive inference of the form: Special B individual EEE... Generally, gold is a metal, silver is a metal, and copper, lead, etc. are all metals.This is the major premise.Then the minor premise follows: All these objects conduct electricity.This leads to a conclusion: all metals conduct electricity.So it is the individuality as totality that has the connecting function here.But this inference immediately leads to another inference.This inference takes all individuals as its middle term.This presupposes that, to some extent, observation and experience are complete.But here we are dealing with individual things, and we are again caught in an infinite progression (E, E, E...).Because in the process of induction we cannot exhaust all individual things.When we say: By all metals, all plants, we simply mean: all metals, all plants that we have known so far.Every induction is therefore always incomplete.Although we have made many observations of this and that, we cannot observe all cases, all individuals, and this defect of inductive inferences leads to analogies.In an analogical inference, we infer from the fact that things of a certain kind have a certain quality, that other things of the same kind will have the same quality.For example, this is an analogical inference: when we say: up to now, the planets we have discovered all move according to the laws of motion.So a newly discovered planet might move according to the same laws.The method of analogy occupies a very high place in empirical science, and scientists have obtained very important results in this way of inference.Analogy is, so to speak, an instinct of reason.This rational instinct makes people feel that this or that determination discovered by experience is based on the internal nature or kind of an object, and the rational instinct makes further inferences based on this determination.Furthermore, analogies can be superficial or profound.For example, when we say: Caius is a scholar, and Titus is also a man, so Titus is probably also a scholar. —This is undoubtedly a very bad analogy.This is because a person's knowledge is not unconditionally based on the class to which he belongs.But superficial analogies like this can often be encountered. Therefore, people often infer that, for example, the earth is a planet and is inhabited; the moon is also a planet, so there are probably people living on the moon.This analogy is no better than the one mentioned above.Because the earth is inhabited, it is not just based on it being a planet, but on other conditions, such as being surrounded by an atmosphere, and in connection with this, there are water, space, etc.And these conditions, as we now know, are exactly what the Moon does not have.Much of what we have lately called natural philosophy is a idle game of empty and superficial analogies.Such analogical tricks still boast of being profound and mysterious, and the result is enough to make the philosophical study of nature be contemptuous. (3) Necessary inference (Schlussder Notwendigkeit) §191 Necessary inferences, in their purely abstract character, have universality as their middle term, just as reflective inferences have individuality as their middle term—the latter belonging to the second form of inference, the former to the first. Three formulas (§187).Here generally it is clear that presuppositions are intrinsically specific. (1) First, in so far as the particular is understood as a definite genus or species, then the particular is the determination of the mediation between the two extremes [middle item]. —That’s what blunt inference is. (2) As far as the individual refers to the direct existence, the individual is not only the mediating middle item, but also the mediated extreme. —That is the case with hypothetical inferences. (3) Setting the intermediary universal as the totality of its particular links, and setting it as individual particular things or exclusive individuality. — That's the case with selective inference.The terms in the disjunctive inference, therefore, signify only different forms of the same universal. §192 An inference is said to be consistent with the differences it entails.The general result of the development of these differences is that they themselves supersede themselves and supersede the existence of the concept outside itself.And we see, (i) that each moment presents itself as the whole of the moments, and thus as the corollary of the whole.They (moments) are therefore in themselves identical with each other. (2) The negation of the differences between the moments, and of their mediation, constitutes their being-for-itself, so that which exists in the form of these differences and which establishes their identity, It is also the same universal or concept.In this ideality of each link, the activity of inference can be said to keep the stipulation that negates the stipulation established in the process of inference in essence. In other words, the activity of inference can also be said to be a process of sublating intermediary. ——It can also be regarded as the process of combining the subject not with other things, but with the sublated other things, that is, with itself. Note: In textbooks of ordinary logic, the doctrine of inference is often regarded as the end of the first part or the so-called preliminary theory (the theory of elements).The second part follows the so-called methodology.What methodology is meant to indicate is how the thought form of the preliminary theoretical investigation can be applied to the current object in order to generate the whole scientific knowledge.But where do these present objects come from?What is the relation of the object in general to the objectivity of thought?Intellectual logic cannot give any further answers to these questions. K In intellectual logic, thinking is regarded as a purely subjective and formal activity, while objective things, contrary to thinking, are regarded as fixed and independent.But this kind of dualism is not the truth, and arbitrarily accepting the two provisions of subjectivity and objectivity without further questioning the source is a non-ideological approach.Whether subjectivity or objectivity, both are undoubtedly thought, even definite thought.These thoughts must show themselves to be based on that universal and self-determining thought.As far as subjectivity is concerned, this is initially accomplished here.We have seen that subjective concepts (including concepts themselves, judgments, and inferences) are the result of the dialectical development of the first two main stages of logical ideas, namely, being and essence.It is true to a certain extent to say that concepts are subjective or only subjective, since concepts are in any case always subjectivity itself.As for judgments and inferences, they are of course no less subjective than concepts.Judgments and inferences, as well as the so-called laws of thought (the law of identity, difference, and the law of sufficient reason) constitute the content of the so-called elementary theory in ordinary logic, which is also subjective.But what we need to point out further is that the so-called subjectivity here and its content such as regulations, concepts, judgments, inferences, etc. should not be regarded as a set of empty frameworks. Objects are filled.On the contrary, we should say that since subjectivity itself develops dialectically, it will break through its limitation and unfold itself into objectivity through deduction. §193 In this realization of the concept, the community is the whole that returns to itself, the different moments of which are still the same whole, and which is determined as an immediate unity by sublation of mediation. . —This realization of the concept is the object. [Explanation] This transition from the subject, from the general concept, or rather from the inference to the object, may seem strange at first glance, especially when we only see inferences of the intellect and regard them as mere When a kind of consciousness is active, we will feel more strange.But we do not speak of this transition from subject to object in such a way that the usual appearances seem plausible because of this sense of strangeness.We need only consider whether our usual representations of so-called objects roughly correspond to objects as we understand them here.However, the object generally understood by ordinary people is not simply an abstract existence, or an existing thing, or any general reality, but a concrete independent thing that is complete in itself, and this completeness is the whole of the concept. sex.As for the object being an object opposed to us and something external to others, it will be explained in more detail later when we talk about the opposition between the object and the subject.At present, as far as the concept transitions to the object due to its intermediary process, the object is only a direct and simple object. Similarly, the concept can only have the determination of the subject after it is opposed to the object. Furthermore, generally speaking, the object is a whole not yet determined in itself, the whole objective world, God, the absolute object.But there is also differentiation within the object itself, and it also splits into innumerable indeterminate multiplicity (as the objective world).And each of its individuated parts is still an object, a concrete, complete and independent existence in itself. Just as objectivity was compared with being, existence, and actuality, so the transition to existence and actuality (not speaking of the transition to being, since being is the first, most abstract, and entirely immediate thing) , can also be compared with the transition to objectivity.The ground from which existence emerges, a reflective relation that sublates itself and passes over to actuality, is nothing but a concept that has not yet been fully realized.In other words, they are only abstract aspects of the concept,--in terms of only the essential unity of the concept, the relation is only a connection that should only return to the real aspect of itself.The concept is the unity of the two, while the object is not only the essential, but the universal unity in itself, containing not only real differences, but these differences within themselves as a whole. Moreover, it is clear that in all these transitions the aim is not merely to point out the inseparability of thinking and being or concept and being in general.It has often been said that being is nothing but a simple relation to itself, and this poor category is of course included in concepts, or in thought as well.The meaning of these transitions is not just to accept the various provisions or categories contained in it (such as the ontological proof about the existence of God, that existence is only one of many realities), and then forget it.这些过渡的意义乃在于理解概念作为概念本身所应有的规定性（那远为抽象的存在，或者甚至客观性，与这种概念还并不相干），并且单就概念本身所应有的规定性来看这规定性能否并如何过渡到一种不同于属于概念并表现在概念中的规定性的形式。 如果我们将这种过渡的产物，客体与概念（这概念，按照它特有的形式来说是消失在客体中的）建立在关系之中，那么，对于所得结果我们可以很正确地这样表述：概念（或者也可说是主观性）与客体潜在地是同一的。但是同样，我们也可以很正确地说，概念与客体是不同的。既然这两种说法都同样正确，也同样都不正确。因此，这类的说法是不能表达真实关系的。这里所说的“潜在”乃是一种抽象，比起概念自身来还更为片面，而这种片面性，当概念扬弃其自身而发展为客体、为正相反对的片面性时，一般说来，它就在这过程中被扬弃了，因此这种潜在性，也必须通过否定其自身，而被规定为实在性。无论何处，思辩的同一，决不是刚才所说的那种肤浅的主体与客体的潜在的同一。——这个意思我们已经重说过多少遍，但如果想要根本消除对于这种肤浅思辩同一性陈腐的完全恶意的误解，无论重说多少遍也不能说是太多，——因为要想消除这种误解，是很难有合理的希望的。 如果完全一般地去了解概念与客体的统一，不管统一的潜在存在的那种片面形式，那末，这种统一，如众所熟知，即是上帝存在的本体论证明的前提，甚且被认作最完善的统一性。就首先提出本体论证明这一非常值得注意的思想的人安瑟尔谟（Anselm）看来，无疑地他原来的意思仅论及某种内容是否在我们思维里的问题。他的话简略地说是这样的：“确定无疑的，那个对于它不能设想一个比它更伟大的东西，不可能仅仅存在于理智中。因为如果它仅仅存在于理智中，我们就可以设想一个能够在事实中存在的比它更伟大的东西。 所以如果那个不能设想一个比它更伟大的东西，仅仅存在于理智中，那末它就会是这样一种东西，对于它可以设想一个比它更伟大的东西。但确定无疑的，这是不可能的。〔因此，那个对于它不能设想一个更伟大的东西，必定既在理智中，又在实在中。〕”——按照这里所提出的说法，有限的事物的客观性与它的思想，这就是说，与它的普遍本性，它的类和它的目的是不一致的。笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎等人曾经很客观地说出了概念与客体的统一。但那些坚持直接确定性或信仰的原则的人，却较多地按照安瑟尔谟原来的主观方式去了解这种统一，即认为上帝的观念与上帝的存在在我们的意识里有不可分离的联系。持信仰说者甚至认为外界的有限事物的存在与它们的被意识或被知觉也有不可分离的联系，因为在直观里，事物与实存这一规定是联系着的。这种说法当然是不错的。但是如果以为有限事物的存在与我们对于有限事物的观念在我们意识里联系着，其联系的情形与上帝的存在和上帝的观念，在我们意识里联系着的情形是同样的，那就会太缺乏思想性了。因为这样一来，就会忘记了有限事物乃是变化无常飘忽即逝的。这就是说，实存与有限事物的联系仅是暂时的，即不是永恒的，而是可分离的。总之，按照我们在这里所用的范畴或术语说来，说一物有限，即是说它的客观存在与它的思想、它的普遍使命、它的类和它的目的是不相协调的。所以安瑟尔谟不管出现在有限事物中那样的统一，而仅宣称惟有最完善者才不仅有主观方式的存在，而且同时也有客观方式的存在，这确有其相当的理由。表面上人们无论如何高叫反对所谓本体论的证明，并反对安瑟尔谟对最完善的存在的规定，其实仍无济于事。因为本体论的证明仍然原样地潜存于每一素朴的心灵中，并且不断返回到每一哲学中，甚至为它自身所不知道，并违反它的意愿，正如在直接信仰的原则里那样。 安瑟尔谟论证的真正缺点，也是笛卡尔和斯宾诺莎以及直接知识的原则所共有的缺点，就在于他们所宣称为最完善者或主观地当作真知识的统一体只是预先假定的，这就是说，只被认作潜在的。思维与存在的这种抽象的同一，立刻就可由于两个规定的不同而对立起来，即如老早以前所提出的对于安瑟尔谟的批评，正是如此。这就是说，事实上把有限事物的观念和存在与无限的东西对立起来了。因为正如前面所指出那样，有限的事物具有这样一种客观性，这客观性与它的目的、本质和概念并不同时相符合，而是有了差异的。换言之，它是那样一种观念或一种主观的东西，其本身并不包含存在。这种分歧和对立只有这样才能解除，即指出有限事物为不真，并指出这些规定，在自为存在〔分离〕中乃是片面的虚妄的，因而就表明了它们的同一就是它们自身所要过渡到的，并且在其中可得到和解的一种同一。