Chapter 34 A. Subjective concept (DerSubjektiveBegri ee) Ⅱ. Judgment

(Das Urteil) §166 Judgment is the concept in its particularity.Judgment is to distinguish the various links of the concept and connect them through the distinction.In the judgment the moments of the concept are posited as independent moments which are at the same time identical with themselves and not with other moments. [Explanation] Usually when we mention judgment, we first think of the two extremes in the judgment, the independence of the subject and the predicate. We think that the subject is a real thing or an independent stipulation, and we also think that the predicate is a universal stipulation. Outside, it seems to be inside our heads.So we connect the subject and the predicate to make a judgment.Since the linking word "is" says that the predicate belongs to the subject, the external subjective association is again sublated, and the judgment is recognized as the self-determination of the object. — Judgment (Urteil) has a deeper etymological meaning in German.Judgment shows that the unity of the concept is original, while the difference or specificity of the concept divides the original.This is indeed enough to show the truth of the judgment.

Abstract judgments can be expressed by the proposition: "The individual is the universal." The individual and the universal represent the two determinations in which the subject and the predicate are originally opposed to each other, since the moments of the concept are recognized as immediate determinations or primary abstractions. (Again, propositions such as "the individual is the particular" and "the particular is the universal" belong to a further definition of judgment.) The most surprising lack of observation is that in many logic books there is no The fact is not pointed out that in every judgment such a proposition as "the individual is the universal" is stated, or rather:

"The subject is the predicate" (e.g. God is the Absolute Spirit).No doubt there is also a distinction between determinations of individuality and universality, subject and predicate, etc., but this does not affect the very general fact that every judgment expresses them as identical. The conjunction "is" is derived from the nature of the concept, because the concept has a nature identical to itself in its externalization.Individuality and universality, as the link of concept, are two kinds of determinations that cannot be isolated from each other.The stipulations of reflection discussed above are also related to each other in their relationship, but their relationship is only a relationship of "being", not a relationship of "being". That is to say, it is not a relationship clearly established. identity or universality.

Therefore, the judgment is the real particularity of the concept, because the judgment is the difference or prescriptive expression of the concept, but this difference can still maintain its universality. Note: Judgments are often thought of as connections of concepts, or even of concepts of different kinds.This theory of judgment is certainly correct insofar as it recognizes concepts as preconditions that constitute judgments and in judgments that appear in the form of differences.However, it would be wrong to say that there are different types of concepts, because although a concept is concrete, it is still a concept in essence as a concept, and the various links contained in a concept cannot be regarded as types. different.It is equally wrong to speak of connecting the two sides of the judgment.For when it comes to joining, it is misleading to think that the two being joined exist independently of the joining.This extrinsic view of the nature of judgments is made clearer when one says that judgments arise by adding a predicate to a subject.In this view, the subject is something external and self-existent, and the predicate is considered to be only something we find in our heads.

But this view of the relationship between the subject and the predicate contradicts the linking word "is".When we say, "This rose is red" or "This painting is beautiful", what we are expressing here does not mean that we add red to this rose and beauty to this rose from outside. A painting, but only say that red beauty, etc. are the specific determinations of these objects themselves.The usual view of judgment in formal logic also has the disadvantage that, according to this logic, judgment generally appears to be a mere accident, and the progression from concept to judgment is not proved.But it must be understood that the concept itself is not self-sustaining and undeveloped, as the understanding supposes, but rather is an infinite form, absolutely dynamic, as if it were the source of all life (Punctum saliens), and thus differentiates itself. .This differentiation, brought about by the self-activity of the concept, which distinguishes itself into its moments, is judgment.The meaning of judgment must therefore be understood as a specialization of concepts.

Undoubtedly, concepts are already latent particularities.But within the concept itself, the specificity has not yet come into play so clearly, but there is still a clear unity with the universal.For example, as mentioned above (Note 161), it is true that the seeds of plants already contain special parts such as roots, branches, leaves, etc., but these special components are only potential at first, and they are not realized until the seed unfolds itself.This kind of self-development can also be regarded as the judgment of plants.This example can also be used to show why neither concepts nor judgments are simply found in our minds, nor are they simply made by us.A concept is something immanent in a thing itself; a thing is a thing because it contains a concept, and to grasp an object is to be conscious of the concept of the object.When we judge or judge an object, it is not according to our subjective activity to attach this predicate or that predicate to the object.Rather, we are observing the determinations brought into play by the concept of the object itself.

§167 Judgment is generally considered to be a conscious activity and form in a subjective sense, which occurs only in self-conscious thinking.But in logical principles no such distinction is made.For judgments are held to be extremely general, according to logical principles: "everything is a judgment," that is to say, everything is individual, and the individual thing has a universality or immanent nature in itself; or Say yes, the universality of individuation.In this individuated universality, the universal is distinct from the individual, but at the same time identical. (Explanation) According to the purely subjective interpretation of the judgment, it seems that I add a predicate to a subject, but this is exactly in contradiction with the objective expression of the judgment: in "roses are red", "gold is metal", etc. In judging, it is not that I first attach something to them from the outside. —Judgments are distinguished from propositions; propositions determine the subject, and this determination has no general relation to the subject, but expresses only a particular state, an individual action, and the like.For example, Caesar was born in Rome in a certain year, fought a ten-year war in Gaul, crossed the Rubicon River, etc. can only be regarded as propositions, not judgments.Or saying, "I slept well last night," or, "Give up the gun!" can be transformed into a form of judgment, which is also meaningless.Only such a proposition as "a carriage passed by" may be counted as a judgment, but at most it is only a subjective judgment. If we doubt whether the passing thing is a carriage, or if we doubt whether the object is moving , or the observer is moving.In short, we can only be said to be judging when our aim is to determine a representation which has not yet been properly determined.

§168 The point of view expressed by a judgment is a limited point of view.From the point of view of judgments, things are finite, because things are a judgment, because their particular being and their universal nature (their bodies and their souls) are united, (otherwise things would be nothing), but these moments of them are still distinct and, in general, separable. §169 In the abstract judgment of "the individual is a community", the subject is something that is negatively related to itself, and is directly concrete; on the contrary, the predicate is something that is abstract, non-determined, and universal.But these two elements are linked together by the word "is", so the universal predicate must also contain the stipulation of the subject, so it is particular.The specificity is the identity established between the subject and the predicate.Particularity is content insofar as it is independent of the difference in the form of the subject and the predicate.

[Explanation] The subject must first be regulated by the predicate before it has its definite stipulation and content, so the isolated subject itself is just a simple appearance or an empty noun. In judgments such as "God is the truest" or "the Absolute is self-identical," God and the Absolute are mere nouns; the content of the subject is expressed only by means of the predicate.What is otherwise the content of the subject as a concrete thing is not involved in this judgment (cf. § 31). Note: It would be trivial to say that the subject is something that is said about it, and the predicate is that which is said.Because this statement does not really mention the difference between the two.According to its thinking, the subject is the individual, and the predicate is the community.In the further development of judgments, the subject is not simply an immediate individual, and the predicate is not simply an abstract community.The subject thus acquires both a particular and a universal meaning.Predicates also acquire specific and individual meanings.Therefore, although the two aspects of judgment have the names of subject and predicate, their meanings have changed in the process of development.

§170 We now discuss the properties of subjects and predicates further.The subject, as a negative self-relation (cf. the explanation of §163 and §166), is the firm basis of the predicate.The predicate persists in the subject, and is ideally contained in the subject.It can also be said that the predicate is implicit in the subject.Furthermore, since the subject is generally directly concrete, a certain special content of the predicate only expresses one of the many determinations of the subject, so the subject is richer and more extensive than the predicate. On the contrary, as a community, the predicate exists independently and has nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of the subject.The predicate transcends the subject, makes the subject subordinate to it, and is therefore, in its respect, larger than the subject.Only the specific content of the predicate (§169) constitutes the identity of the two.

§171 In the judgment formed by the relationship between the subject, the predicate and the specific content or the identity of the subject and the object, it is still initially set as different, or mutually exclusive.But in essence, that is, from the conceptual point of view, they are the same.Since the subject is a concrete whole, that is to say, the subject is not any indeterminate multiplicity, but only individuality, that is, particularity and universality in identity. —The same is true of the predicate (§170).Furthermore, the linking word that presupposes the identity of the subject and the predicate is only expressed by an abstract word "is" at first.According to this identity, the subject must also be assumed to have the characteristics of the predicate, so that the predicate also acquires the characteristics of the subject, and the linking word "is" can fully exert its effectiveness.This is the process by which judgments progress to inferences by means of connected words of full content.The progress of judgment initially only defines the whole, class, species, etc. of the abstract perceptual universality, and further develops into the conceptual universality. [Explanation] With the knowledge of the further determination of judgments, we can find a meaning and connection among the kinds of judgments usually enumerated.We can also see that the usual enumeration of the kinds of judgments is not only very accidental and superficial, but also that some of the distinctions proposed are somewhat haphazard.For example, different judgments of the affirmative judgment cannot be regarded as listed on the same level and have the same value. Rather, they must be regarded as forming a staged sequence, and the distinction between various judgments is based on the logical meaning of the predicate. Up.As for the distinction in which judgments have value, it is always to be found even in ordinary consciousness.For example, we do not hesitate to say that a person who often likes to make judgments such as "this wall is green" and "this stove is hot" has extremely weak judgment.Conversely, if a person's judgments mostly involve issues such as whether a certain artwork is beautiful, whether a certain action is good, etc., then we will say that he really knows how to make judgments.For the first kind of judgment just mentioned, its content forms only an abstract quality, and to determine whether it has this quality, it is only necessary to have direct perception.Conversely, to say whether a work of art is beautiful, or an action good, one must compare the objects in question with what they should be, that is, with their conception. (1) Qualitatives Urteil §172 Immediate judgments are judgments about being.The subject of the immediate judgment is posited in a universality as its predicate, which is an immediate quality, and therefore a sensuous quality.A qualitative judgment can be (a) an affirmative judgment: the individual is particular.But the individual is not special, or to be precise, this individual quality does not correspond to the concrete nature of the subject.Such a judgment is (2) a negative judgment. [Explanation] It is the most important logical prejudice to think that the rose is red or not. This kind of qualitative judgment contains truth.At most it can be said that such judgments are rich.That is to say, within the confines of perception, within the limited representations and limitations of thought, the words are true.Whether it is wrong or right depends on its content, which is also limited and untrue in itself.But truth depends entirely on its form, that is, on the concept it establishes and the reality corresponding to it.But such truths are not to be found in qualitative judgments. Note: In everyday life, "truth" and "true" are often used as synonymous nouns.So we often say that a statement is the truth when we mean to say that it is true.Generally speaking, "good" only means that our representation has a formal conformity with its content, regardless of other conditions of this content.Truth, on the contrary, is based on the correspondence of the object to itself, that is, to its concept. Saying someone is sick, or someone steals something, for example, may be true, but the content is not true.Because a sick body is inconsistent with the concept of the body.Likewise, the act of stealing is inconsistent with the concept of human behavior.From these examples it can be seen that an immediate judgment expressing some abstract quality of some particular thing, however good the judgment may be, cannot contain truth, because the subject and the predicate in such a judgment are mutually exclusive. relationship, not that of reality and concept. We may also say that immediate judgments are not true because their form and content do not correspond to each other.When we say, "This rose is red," it implies that the subject and the predicate agree with each other because of the intermediary of the conjunction "is."But a rose is a concrete thing, it is not only red, but also has a fragrance, a specific shape and other characteristics, which are not included in the predicate "red".In addition, the predicate, as an abstract community, is not only suitable for this subject alone.Besides, there are many other flowers and other things in general, which are also red.So in immediate judgments the subject and the predicate seem to touch each other only at one point, they do not agree with each other.The case of judgments of concepts is different.When we say that an action is good, we make a conceptual judgment.We can see at once that here the relation between subject and predicate is not loose and external, as in immediate judgment.For in immediate judgments the predicate is an abstract quality, which may or may not belong to the subject.On the contrary, in the judgment of concepts, the predicate seems to be the soul of the subject, and the subject, as the body of this soul, is completely determined by the soul (predicate). §173 In this qualitative negation, that is, as the first negation, the connection between the subject and the predicate is still maintained.The predicate is thus a relative universality, only one of its properties is negated. (To say that a rose is not red, that is, to contain it, still has a color, but it has another color. But this only shows that it is an affirmative judgment.) But individual things are not a universal thing.Thus (iii) the judgment itself splits into two forms: (a) as an empty relation of identity, saying: the individual is the individual—this is the judgment of identity; Coherent judgments, this is what is called an infinite judgment. [Explanation] Examples of infinite judgments include "spirit is not an image", "a lion is not a table" and so on.Propositions like this are good, but just as meaningless as propositions of identity, such as: "A lion is a lion," "a spirit is a spirit."Although these propositions are the truth of direct or so-called qualitative judgments, generally speaking, they are not judgments, but only appear in subjective thinking that insists on any abstract idea that is not true. —From an objective point of view, these judgments express the nature of what is or is sensible, and, as I have just said, they are divided into, on the one hand, an empty identity, and on the other, a relation that fills everything, but this relation It is the qualitative difference between the two parties involved, completely irrelevant to each other. Note: This negative infinite judgment, in which the subject has no connection with the predicate, is often cited as a mere meaningless thing in ordinary formal logic.In fact, however, this infinite judgment is not only an accidental form of subjective thinking, but it also leads to the result of the latest dialectical development of the preceding immediate judgments (positive and simple negative immediate judgments), in which the immediate Finiteness and unreality are clearly revealed.The case of crime may be taken as an objective instance of negative infinite judgment.When a person commits a crime, such as stealing, he not only denies another person a special right to particular property, as in a dispute of civil rights, but also denies that person a general right.Therefore, he was not only ordered to return the person's original property, but also to be punished.This is because he has violated the dignity of the law itself, the law in general.Conversely, disputes over legal rights in civil litigation are just an example of simple negative judgments.For the one who breaks the law only denies a particular clause of the law, but he still recognizes the law in general.The meaning of a simple negative judgment is quite similar to this case: the flower is not red—what is being denied here is only this particular color of the flower, not the general color of the flower.Because the flower may still be blue, yellow or another color.Likewise, death is also a negative infinite judgment, which is distinguished from illness as a purely negative judgment.In disease, it is simply that one or another function in one's life is hindered or denied.In death, on the other hand, the body and the soul are separated, as we often say, that is to say, the subject and the predicate are completely cut off. (2) Reflective judgment (Das Reelexions-Urteil) §174 The individual who is posited as (returning to himself) in the judgment has a predicate, and the subject opposed to this predicate, as it relates itself to itself, is at the same time the opposite of the predicate. —In existence, the subject is no longer an immediate qualitative thing, but has a mutual relationship and connection with an other (other) or the external world.In this way, the universality of the predicate acquires this relative meaning. (e.g. useful or dangerous; weight or acidity; Another example is instinct, etc., which can be used as examples of relative predicates. ) Note: Reflective judgments differ from qualitative judgments generally in that the predicate of reflective judgments is no longer a direct abstract quality, but in such a way that the subject shows itself to be related to something else through the predicate.For example, when we say that the rose is red, we only look at the direct individuality of the subject, without noticing its connection with other things.Conversely, if we judge like this: "This plant is curable", through the predicate, the performance of the curable disease is connected with another thing (using this plant to cure disease).Similarly, judgments such as "this object is stretchable", "this tool is useful", "this punishment has the effect of frightening people", etc., are also reflective judgments.Because the predicates in these judgments are generally reflective provisions.Through such a reflective determination, the predicate certainly goes beyond the immediate individuality of the subject, but the concept of the subject is still not hinted at.Usually abstract rational thinking likes to use this kind of judgment the most.The more concrete the object under consideration, the more points of view this object can provide for reflective thinking.But thinking through reflection can never exhaust the inherent nature or concept of an object. §175 First, the subject, the individual as an individual (in a single judgment), is a community.Second, in this relation the subject transcends its singularity.This enlargement of the subject is an external subjective reflection, initially an indeterminate particularity. (In the particular judgment of the direct judgment, which is both negative and positive; the individual divides itself in two, on the one hand it is related to itself, on the other hand it is related to something else.) Third, there is something universal, so Particularity is expanded into universality; or universality is determined by the individuality of the subject to become totality (community, the usual universality of reflection). Note: When the subject is recognized as having universality in a single judgment, it thus transcends its mere individuality.When we say, "This plant is curative," we do not mean only that this single plant is curative, but that some or several of these plants have this effect.We then proceed to special judgments (some plants are curable, some people are inventive, etc.).The immediate individuality loses its independence through particularity, and thus becomes connected with other things.As a person, a person is no longer just this other person, but stands with other people, thus becoming a member of the crowd.In this way he belongs again to his universality, and thus he rises. ——Specific judgments are both affirmative and negative.If only some bodies are stretchable, it is evident that many others are not. In this way, it proceeds to the third form of reflective judgment, which is the universal judgment (all men are mortal; all metals conduct electricity).Totality is a universality to which reflective thought is first accustomed to think.Taking individual things as the basis of reflection, our subjective thinking activities sum up those things and call them "whole".Here universality appears only as an external connection, which brings together independent and independent individual things.But really speaking, universality is the basis and basis, root and substance of individual things.For example, if we take Caius, Titus, Sempronius, and other inhabitants of a city or district, they are all men, not only because they have something in common, but It is because they belong to the same category (GatA tung) or have commonality.If these individual beings had no kind or commonality, they would all lose their existence.Conversely, the superficially so-called universality is quite different from the kind or generality mentioned here; in fact, this superficial universality is only what all individual things are classified together and what they have in common.Someone once said that the reason why human beings are different from animals is that they all have earlobes.However, if this or that person has no earlobes, it is obvious that this in no way affects other aspects of his being, his character and talents, etc.On the other hand, it would be absurd to say that Caius had courage, learning, etc., assuming that he was not human at all.The individual man is specifically a man because, prior to everything, he is himself a man, a man with the universality of man.This universality is not merely something outside or alongside other abstract qualities of man, nor is it a mere reflective quality, but rather runs through and includes all particularities in something in it. §176 Since the subject is likewise determined to be universal, the identity of subject and predicate is established, and the division of judgment forms becomes irrelevant.This unity of content between the subject and the predicate (the content is the universality of the self-returning identity of the negation of the subject) makes the connection of judgments an inevitable connection. Note: The progression from reflective universal judgments to necessary judgments has also been seen in our ordinary consciousness: for example, when we say that whatever belongs to the whole belongs to the genus, and is therefore necessary.When we say: all plants, all men, etc. is exactly the same as saying man, plants, etc. (3) Necessary judgment (Urteil der Notwendigkeit) §177 The necessary judgment, as a judgment of identity in the difference of content, has three forms: (1) in the predicate, on the one hand, the essence or nature of the subject, the concrete universal (community) or kind (die Gattung); On the one hand, since the community also contains the negative determination within itself, this predicate expresses the exclusive essential determination, that is, the species (die Art).This is blunt judgment. (2) According to the substance of the subject and the predicate, both of them acquire the form of independent reality, while their identity is only internal.The reality of the one is therefore not at the same time its own reality, but the existence of its other.This is hypothetical judgment. (3) In this process of externalization of the concept, its internal identity is also established.Therefore, the generality is the "category", and the "category" is self-identical in its individuality that excludes other things.This judgment, both its subject and its predicate, is a commonality, which sometimes is a commonality, and sometimes it is the circle of the process of specialization which excludes itself.In this circle, "either this or that" and "both this and that" all represent categories, and such judgments are disjunctive judgments.The universal goes round first as a class and then as its two species.Such universality is determined and posited as totality. Note: A straightforward judgment (such as "gold is a metal", "a rose is a plant") is a direct necessary judgment, roughly equivalent to the relationship between substance and accident within the scope of essence.All things are categorical judgments, that is, all things have a firm and unchanging foundation or substantial nature that constitutes them.Only the judgments we make when we observe things from the point of view of the species and recognize that things are necessarily determined by the species are real judgments.If someone puts two judgments like "gold is expensive" and "gold is a metal" at the same stage, it shows that he lacks logical training. "Gold is expensive," refers only to its external relation to our inclinations and needs, and to the expense of obtaining it, and other circumstances.Gold can still remain gold, even if that relationship changes or cancels.On the contrary, metallicity constitutes the substantial nature of gold. Without metallicity, gold and all the qualities belonging to gold, or all words that can describe gold, cannot exist by themselves.The same is true when we say, "Caius is a man."What we are trying to say is this: whatever else happens to him, they have meaning and value as long as they correspond to his substantial nature as a man. But categorical judgments are flawed even within certain limits, in which the aspect of particularity does not get its due place.For example, gold is certainly a metal, but silver, copper, iron, etc. are also metals.Metallicity, as a class of metals, is indiscriminate in the specific things it contains.In order to overcome this shortcoming, this makes the categorical judgment progress to the hypothetical judgment. Hypothetical judgments can be expressed in this formula: if there is A, then there is B.This process of progressing from categorical judgment to hypothetical judgment is the same as the process of progressing from the relationship between substance and accident to causal relationship discussed in the scope of essence above, and the progress of contradiction is the same.In the hypothetical judgment, the stipulation of the content appears to be mediated and dependent on the other party.This is exactly the relationship between cause and effect.Generally speaking, the significance of a hypothetical judgment is that through a hypothetical judgment, universality is established in the process of its specialization.This leads to the transition to the third form of necessary judgments, that is, disjunctive judgments.If A is not B, it must be C or D; if a poetic work is not an epic, it must be a lyric or a drama; if the color is not yellow, it must be blue or red, etc.The two aspects of discourse judgment are identical.The species is the whole of the species, and the whole of the species is the species. This unity of the universal and the particular is the concept.So the concept now constitutes the content of the judgment. (4) Judgment of concepts (Das Urteildes Begriees) §178 The judgment of the concept has the concept, the whole in its simple form, as its content, that is, the universal and all its determinations.The subject in conceptual judgments, (1) is at first an individual thing, and the predicate returns to its universality in particular.In other words, whether the universality and the particularity are consistent is the predicate, such as goodness, truth, righteousness, and so on.This is a positive judgment. [Explanation] Judgments like this, saying that a thing or behavior is good or bad, true, beautiful, etc., are called judgments even in ordinary life.We would never say that a person has judgment if he only knows how to make positive or negative judgments, such as: this rose is red, this painting is red, green, old, etc. Judgment of certainty, though society in general does not admit what independent reliability it professes, is nonetheless owing to the recent prevalence of principles which assert immediate knowledge and immediate belief. Even in philosophy it has been developed into a uniquely important form of doctrine.We can read a thousand assertions or convictions about reason, knowledge, thought, etc., in many so-called philosophical works that assert this principle, since external authority has not much effect at this time anyway, and these assertions are To try to win faith in the same principles by repeating them endlessly. §179 Certain judgments do not yet contain, in their first immediate subject, the particular and general connection which the predicate is required to express.Certain judgments are therefore only a subjective particularity, and are thus opposed by a contrary assertion with the same reason, or rather with no reason at all.It is therefore at once only (ii) a probabilistic judgment.But when the objective particularity is established in the subject, and the particularity of the subject becomes the property of its in-itself, then (3) the subject expresses both the objective particularity and its own nature, that is, its relation to The connection between "classes" thus expresses the concept of the content that constitutes the predicate (cf. §178).Such as: This (immediate individuality) house (genus or universality) has some properties (specificity), good or bad.This is an inevitable judgment. —— Everything is a species (that is, has its meaning and purpose), a species in an individual reality with specific properties.As for the reason why they are limited, it is because their specificity may or may not conform to the generality. §180 Thus the subject and the predicate are each the whole judgment in themselves.The immediate character of the subject initially reveals itself as the ground of mediation between the individuality of the real thing and its universality, that is, as the ground of judgment.In fact, what is established here is the unity of subject and predicate, the concept itself.The concept is the enrichment of the empty connection word "is".When the concept is simultaneously distinguished into both subject and predicate, it is established as a unity of both and mediates their connection—this is inference.