Chapter 4 Volume 3-1

Before we speak of the various forms of government, let us ascertain the strict sense of the word government, which has not yet been well explained. Chapter 1 General Introduction to Government I would like to draw attention to the readers: this chapter must be read carefully, for those who do not pay attention, I cannot explain clearly. All free actions are produced by the combination of two causes: a spiritual cause, that is, the will that determines the action, and a physical cause, that is, the power that executes the action.When I move toward a goal, it must first be that I want to go there; second, it must be that my steps will carry me there.A paralyzed person wants to run, an agile person does not want to run, and both will stay where they are.The body politic has the same dynamics, and here we likewise distinguish between force and will; the latter is called legislative power, the former executive power.Without the combination of the two, nothing can or should be done.

We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and only to the people.Conversely, it is easy to see, from the principles previously established, that the executive power cannot be so universal as the legislator or the sovereign; Therefore it is not a power of the sovereign, since all acts of the sovereign can only be laws. The public power, therefore, must have a proper agent to hold it together and make it act according to the directions of the general will; he may act as the link between the State and the Sovereign; Much like the union of soul and body does to a person.This is the reason why there is a government in the state; the government and the sovereign are often confused, but the government is only the executor of the sovereign.

What, then, is government?The government is an intermediary established between the subjects and the sovereign so that the two can fit together, it is responsible for enforcing the laws and maintaining social and political liberties. The members of this intermediate body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say, rulers; and the whole intermediate body is called prince.It is therefore quite reasonable to think that the conduct by which the people obey their chiefs is by no means a contract.That is entirely a kind of entrustment, a kind of appointment; there, they are only officials of the sovereign, exercising the power entrusted to them by the sovereign in the name of the sovereign, and as long as the sovereign is happy, he can Limit, change and withdraw this power.The alienation of such a right, since it is incompatible with the nature of the social community, is also contrary to the purpose of the union.

I call, therefore, the lawful exercise of the executive power the government, or supreme administration, and the person or body responsible for this administration the prince or magistrate. It is in government that intermediate forces are to be found; and the ratio of these intermediate forces constitutes the ratio of the whole to the whole, that is, the ratio of the sovereign to the state.We may express the ratio of the Sovereign to the State by the ratio of the first and last terms of a continuous ratio, the middle term of which is the government.The government receives from the Sovereign all its orders to the people; and, in order that the state may be well balanced, it is necessary—after all calculations—that the product or power of the government multiplied by itself and on the one hand be The sovereign is equal to the product or power of the citizens who are, on the other hand, subjects.

Moreover, as long as we change any of these three items, it will not destroy this ratio immediately.If the Sovereign desires to rule; or if the magistrate desires to make laws; or if the subjects refuse to obey; then chaos takes the place of rule, force and will are no longer in harmony, and the state dissolves into Despotism or anarchy.Finally, just as there is only one median ratio between each ratio, so there can only be one possible good government in a country.But as a thousand events may vary these proportions of a people, not only may different peoples have different good governments, but the same people may have different good governments at different times.

In trying to account for the various ratios which may govern the two preceding terms, I may take as an example the easiest to explain, namely, the size of the population. Suppose a country is made up of 10,000 citizens.The sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a community; but each individual, in the capacity of a subject, can be considered an individual.So the sovereign is equal to the subject ten thousand to one, that is to say, each member of the country has only one ten-thousandth of the sovereign authority for his own part, although he must obey the sovereign completely.Suppose the number of the people is a hundred thousand, and the condition of the subjects remains the same, and all are equally responsible for all the laws; but his voting power is reduced to one part in a hundred thousand, so that when laws are made, his The impact is reduced to one-tenth of the original.Then the subjects are always one, but the ratio of the sovereign increases with the number of citizens.Hence, the greater the state, the less liberty.

By increasing the ratio, I mean that it is farther and farther away from equality.Thus, the greater the ratio in the geometrical sense, the smaller the ratio in the ordinary sense: in the former sense ratios are considered quantitatively and measured by quotients; In this sense, ratios are considered in terms of equality and are calculated as similar values. Therefore, the smaller the ratio of individual will to general will, that is to say, fashion to law, the greater the force of sanctions should be.Therefore, if the government is to be a good government, it should be relatively strengthened with the increase of the number of people.

On the other hand, since the enlargement of the state gives the trustees of public authority more temptations and means of abusing their power; the more power the government should have to restrain the people, the more power the sovereign should have on his part. government.I am not speaking here of absolute power, but of the relative power of the different parts of the state. From this double ratio it can be seen that the even proportion of the Sovereign, the Prince, and the People is by no means an invented idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic.It can also be seen that one of the first and last two terms, the people as subjects, is fixedly equal to "one"; therefore, every time this double ratio increases or decreases, the single ratio also increases in the same way. Or shrink, so that the middle term also changes accordingly.From this it can also be seen that there is no single absolute system of government, but that there can be as many governments of different natures as the size of the country varies.

If anyone scoffs at this system and says that, in order to find the median of this proportion and form a governmental community, it is only necessary, according to my method, to take the square root of the figure of population; As an example, the ratios I speak of cannot be measured only in terms of numbers, but generally in terms of the combined effects of a large number of factors; Temporarily borrowing the term from geometry, I do not, of course, overlook the utter uselessness of geometrical precision for mental quantities. Government is a miniaturization of the larger political community that includes the government itself.Government is a moral personality endowed with certain powers, active like the Sovereign, and passive like the State; we can subdivide it into other similar ratios, from which new ratios arise , of which there may be further proportions according to the degree of power; and so on, up to an indivisible middle term, that is to say, up to a single chief or supreme magistrate, who may be considered representative of the whole sequence The "one" between the fractional series and the integer series.

We need not dwell on these long-winded terms; it is enough to regard the government as a new community within the state, distinct from the people and the sovereign, and intermediate between the two. There is an essential difference between these two communities, that the state exists by itself, but the government exists only by virtue of the sovereign. So the prince's will to govern is, or ought to be, the general will or the law; his power is nothing but the public power concentrated in him; will start to slack.Finally, if the prince should have a particular will which is more active than that of the Sovereign, and he should subject the public forces at his disposal to this particular will, so that there are, so to speak, two Sovereigns, one One in right, the other in fact; then the social union is at once annihilated, and the body politic dissolved at once.

But in order that the government community may have a real existence, a real life distinct from the national community, in order that all its members may co-operate and be fit for the purpose for which the government was created; it must have A single "I" has a feeling common to all its members, a power, an inherent will to self-preservation.This solitary existence entails assemblies, councils, powers of deliberation and decision, rights and titles, and privileges proper to the sovereign, and makes the position of the magistrate proportionate to its greater difficulty. more honorable.The difficulty consists in arranging this subsidiary whole within the whole in such a way that, in determining its own constitution, it never alters the general constitution, so that it is always able to distinguish between the individual forces for its own preservation and the The public power for the preservation of the state; thus, in a word, always prepared to sacrifice the government to the people, not the people to the government. However, although the artificial community of the government is the product of another artificial community, and in a certain way has only a false and subsidiary life; this does not prevent the government from being able to act with sex, and, so to speak, enjoy more or less vigorous health.Finally, government, though not directly deviating from the end for which it was created, may, in accordance with the manner in which it is itself organized, divert more or less from that end. From all these differences, the proportions which the government can have to the national community vary according to the accidental and particular proportions by which the country itself changes.For there is often a government which is the best in itself, but if its ratios are changed according to the defects of the body politic to which it belongs, it will become the worst government. Chapter II Of the Institutional Principles of the Different Forms of Government In order to reveal the general cause of these differences, it is here necessary to distinguish between prince and government, as I have above distinguished state and sovereign. The community of magistrates may consist of a greater or lesser number of members.We have already said that the greater the number of the people, the greater is the ratio of the Sovereign to the subjects; and by obvious analogy we may say that the same is true of the government to the magistrate.But since the whole power of the government has always been the power of the state, it will not change in the slightest.It follows, therefore, that the more the government expends this power upon its own members, the less power it has left to exercise upon the people as a whole. The greater the number of magistrates, therefore, the weaker the government.Since this is a fundamental principle, let us clarify it. In the individual magistrate we may distinguish three essentially different wills: first, the inherent will of the individual, which is inclined only to his particular interest; second, the common will of all magistrates, which alone concerns the sovereign Interest, which we may call the will of the body, which is public in relation to the government, and individual in relation to the state, of which the government forms a part. The third is the will of the people, or the will of the sovereign, which is the general will both for the state considered as a whole, and for the government considered as a part of the whole. Under a perfect legislation, the individual or personal will should have no place, the corporate will of the government itself should be extremely secondary, so that the general or sovereign will should always be dominant and be the dominant force of all others. The sole norm of the will. On the contrary, according to the order of nature, the more concentrated these different wills are, the more active they become.The general will, then, is always the weakest, the corporate will the second, and the individual will the first of all.Every member of the government, therefore, is first himself, then a magistrate, and then a citizen; and this gradation is directly contrary to that required by the social order. When this is established, assuming that the whole government is in the hands of a single man, the individual and the corporate will are here fully united, so that the corporate will has the highest intensity it can have.But since the exercise of power depends on the degree of will, and since the absolute power of government is invariable, it follows that the most active government is that of a single man. Suppose, on the other hand, we unite the government with the legislative authority, suppose we make the Sovereign a prince, and all the citizens a magistrate; activity, while the individual will retains all its power.Thus the government, which is always of the same absolute power, will be at the lowest degree of its relative power, or activity. These ratios are irrefutable, and are confirmed by other considerations.We may see, for example, that each magistrate in his community is more active than each citizen in his community, and that therefore the individual will is more active in the action of the government than in the sovereign. has much greater influence in the actions of the government; for each magistrate almost always has some function of government, whereas each citizen, individually, has no function of sovereignty.Moreover, the greater the state, the greater its real power, though not in proportion to the size of its domain; but if the state remains the same, the number of magistrates may be increased at will. , but the government will not gain greater actual power because actual power is the power of the country, and the scales of the two are always equal.Thus, the relative power or activity of the government would be reduced without its absolute or actual power being increased. It is also certain that the more persons in charge, the slower is the business done; that due to over-prudence people do not pay enough attention to their occasions, and that they miss their chances; I have just demonstrated that, as the magistrates are multiplied, the government will be relaxed; and I have argued before, that the greater the number of the people, the greater the force of the sanction.From this it follows that the ratio of the magistrate to the government should be inversely proportional to the ratio of the subjects to the sovereign; that is to say, the larger the state, the more contracted the government, so that the number of chiefs may increase as the people increase. decrease proportionally. Also, I'm talking here about the relative power of government, not about its legitimacy.For, conversely, the greater the number of magistrates, the nearer will the corporate will be to the general will; It is just an individual will.Thus, what men lose in the one hand, they gain in the other, and it is the art of the legislator to know how to ascertain this: to combine the power of the government with the will of the government, always in inverse proportion to each other. become a ratio most favorable to the country. Chapter III Classification of Governments In the preceding chapter we have considered why the various kinds or forms of government are to be distinguished by the number of their members; and in this chapter we shall examine how this classification is to be made. First, the Sovereign can delegate government to the whole people, or to a great majority of them, so that there are more citizens who are magistrates than individual citizens.This form of government we call democracy. Furthermore, the government may be confined to a few hands, so that the mere citizens outnumber the magistrates; this form is called aristocracy. Finally, it is possible to centralize the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate, from whom all the rest derive their power.This third form is the most common and is called monarchy or royal government. We should remark that all these forms of government, or at least the first two, are more or less variable, even by considerable margins.Because democracy can include the whole people, and can also be reduced to half of the people; while aristocracy can be reduced from half of the people to a very small number without limit.Even the throne can accept certain divisions.According to its constitution, Sparta often had two kings; and we also saw that the Roman Empire even had eight emperors at the same time, but we cannot say that the Roman Empire was divided.Every form of government, therefore, overlaps to some extent with another; and we see, under these but three names, the various forms which government can actually contain, There are as many of them as there are possible citizens of the state. Furthermore, as the same government may in certain respects be subdivided into several parts, one to govern in one way and another in another; mixed forms of each of which can be reproduced from these simple forms. There have been many disputes in all ages as to what is the best form of government, without taking into account that each of them may be best in certain circumstances, but in another. This situation can be the worst. If, in different countries, the number of supreme magistrates should be in inverse proportion to the number of citizens; then, generally speaking, democratic government is suitable for small countries, aristocratic government for medium-sized ones, and kingly government for large ones.This law follows immediately from the principle.However, how to account for the many situations that may constitute exceptions? Chapter 4 On Democracy Whoever makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be enforced and interpreted.It seems, therefore, that the best system a man can have is that which unites executive and legislative powers.But it is precisely this which makes this government so inadequate in certain respects, because what should be distinguished is not distinguished; Say, a government without a government. It is not good that laws be enforced by those who make them; nor is it good for a community of people to divert their attention from general points of view to individual objects.Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interest upon public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by government is far less harmful than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable consequence of individual opinions.At this time, since the essence of the country has changed, all reforms become impossible.A people that never abuses the power of government will never abuse its independence; a people that has always governed well will not need to be governed. There has never been a true democracy, in the strict sense of the term, and there never will be.It is against the natural order for the many to rule and the few to be ruled.We cannot imagine endless assemblies of the people to discuss public affairs; and we can easily see that the establishment of institutions by the people for this reason cannot fail to bring about a change in the form of administration. In fact, I believe it may be advanced as a principle, that whenever the functions of government are divided among many governing persons, a few will sooner or later wield the greatest authority; will be in power. Besides, how many uncombinable conditions are required for such a government!First, there must be a small state in which the people can easily assemble and each citizen can easily get to know all the other citizens.Next, there must be the utmost simplicity of manners, lest there be any drama and difficult disputes.Then, there must be a high degree of equality in status and property, otherwise equality in rights and authority cannot be maintained for a long time.Finally, there is little or no luxury, for luxury is either the result of wealth or makes it necessary; and it corrupts both the rich and the poor, the former by possessiveness, the The latter is corrupted by greed; it will sell the country to weakness, to vanity; slave. This is why a famous writer has made virtue the principle of the republic; for all these conditions cannot be maintained without virtue.But, since this excellent genius failed to make the necessary distinctions, he was often inaccurate and sometimes indistinct; nor did he see that, since the sovereign authority is everywhere the same, all well-constituted states are All should be of the same principle—depending, of course, more or less on the form of government. It should be added that no other government is so prone to civil wars and civil strife as democratic or popular government; for no other government is so strongly and so constantly inclined to change its form. No government, nor any other, needs greater vigilance and courage to maintain its form.It is under this system that the citizen should especially arm himself with strength and perseverance, and every day of his life should recite in his heart what a virtuous Marquis said in the Polish Parliament Words: "Malopericulosamlibertatemquamquietemservitium" (“I would be free and in danger, but in peace and slavery”). If there were a godly people, they could be governed by democracy.But such a perfect government is not fit for mankind. Chapter V: Of Aristocracy We have here two distinct moral persons, the Government and the Sovereign; and thus two general wills, the one for all citizens, the other for the members of the executive only. .Therefore, although the government may formulate its own internal policy as it pleases, it can never order the people except in the name of the sovereign, that is, except in the name of the people themselves; and this must never be forgotten. The first societies were governed by aristocracy.The heads of the various families discussed public affairs among themselves.Young people submit to the authority of experience without compulsion.Hence the names of elders, elders, elders, elders.The savages of North America still govern themselves in this way to this day, and they govern very well. But as the inequalities created by institutions override natural inequalities, wealth or power is valued more than age, and aristocracy becomes elective.Finally, as power passed from father to son with property, several families were formed, making government hereditary; and the people saw senators of twenty. There are thus three aristocracy: natural, elective, and hereditary.The first is suitable only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments. The second is the best; it is strictly aristocratic. The second aristocracy has, besides this advantage of distinguishing the two powers, the advantage of choosing its own members; Restricted to a few, who became magistrates only by election.In this way, rectitude, prudence, experience, and every other reason for being valued and respected, become just new guarantees of political enlightenment. Again, assemblies are more conveniently held, business is better discussed, and its execution more orderly and expeditious; respectable senators are better able to maintain the state than unknown or despised masses. External prestige. In short, the best and most natural order is that the wisest men govern the masses, if they can be sure that they govern them for the good of the multitude, and not for their own.There should never be a vain increase in establishments, nor should twenty thousand men be employed doing things which could be done better by picking out a hundred.But it must also be remarked that here too the interest of the community begins to direct the public forces less in accordance with the dictates of the general will; while at the same time another inevitable tendency takes away from the law a part of the force of execution. In view of its special convenience, a state must not be so small, nor a people so simple and straightforward, that the execution of the laws is directly determined by the general will, as in a good democracy. .At the same time, a nation must not be too large, so that the leaders who have been dispersed due to governance can separate their sovereignty in their respective jurisdictions, starting from independence and finally becoming masters. But if aristocracy requires less of some virtues than popular government, it requires more others which are peculiar to itself, such as wealth, moderation, peace, and contentment; for perfect equality seems to be here Out of season, that was not seen even in Sparta. Moreover, if there is a certain degree of wealth inequality in this form, it is generally only so that the administration of public affairs can be entrusted to those who can best give their full time, not like Aristotle. The idea is that the rich may often have the upper hand, as suggested by Deutsche.On the contrary, and more importantly, the opposite choice sometimes teaches people that human merit is more reason to be valued than wealth. Chapter 6: On the Monarchy So far we have considered the prince as a moral and collective personality united by the force of the law, and as the trustee of the executive power in the state.Let us now consider that this power is concentrated in the hands of a natural person, that is, a real person; this alone has the right to exercise it by law.This is what people call a monarch or king. In all other administrations an individual is represented by a collective personality; this alone is the exact opposite, in which an individual represents a collective personality; The unity of the law is at the same time a physical one; those powers which, under other systems, would require great effort to combine, are here naturally united. Thus the will of the people, the will of the sovereign, the public powers of the state, and the individual powers of the government, all respond to the same motive force, all the power of the machine is in the same hands, and all move towards the same goal; There can never be any opposing movements here to cancel each other out, and it is impossible to imagine any other system which can produce a greater effect with less effort.Archimedes, sitting peacefully on the bank, effortlessly steering a large boat floating on the water, in my opinion, is a good symbol of a skilled monarch sitting in his cabinet and governing his kingdom. A vast country; he was moving everything, and he seemed quite immobile. But if there is no other government with more vigor, there is also no government in which individual wills are more powerful, and more easily govern other wills.It is true that all tend toward the same end; but this end is by no means the common good.Moreover, even the administrative power itself is constantly being transformed into a kind of damage to the country. Kings always want to make themselves absolute, and people appeal to them from afar: the best way to be an absolute king is to make yourself loved by the people.This maxim is very beautiful, and in some ways even very true.Unfortunately, this maxim was ridiculed at court.The power that comes from the love of the people is undoubtedly the greatest power; but it is unstable and conditional, and princes can never be satisfied with it.Even the best king wants to be able to do as he pleases without preventing himself from being master.A political preacher might well say to the king that the power of the people is the power of the king, and that it is in the best interest of the king that the people be prosperous, rich, and powerful.But the King knew very well that these were not the truth.It is the king's private interest above all that the people are weak, poor, and never able to resist the king.I admit that if the subjects are always completely obedient, it is still in the prince's interest to make the people strong and powerful, so that since this power belongs to him, he can also make himself powerful. But as this interest is only secondary and subordinate, and the two assumptions are incompatible; it is quite natural that princes prefer that maxim which is most immediately advantageous to them.This is what Samuel emphasized to the Hebrews; and this is what Machiavelli proves conclusively to us. Machiavelli claimed to be giving lectures to the king, but in fact he was giving lectures to the people. Machiavelli's "The Prince" is a textbook for Republicans. We have found, on the basis of general ratios, that monarchy is only suitable for great states;The greater the number of public administrations, the smaller and nearer is the ratio of prince to subject; and thus in democracy it is equal to one, or perfectly equal.But as the government shrinks, the ratio increases; and it reaches its maximum when the government is in the hands of a single person.At this time, it can be found that the distance between the monarch and the people is too large, and the country lacks connection.In order to establish relations, there must then be many intermediate ranks; princes, ministers, and nobles must fill these intermediate ranks.However, all of this is completely inappropriate for a small country, and the level of all this will destroy a small country. But if it is difficult to govern a great state well, it is much more difficult to govern it well by a single person; and everyone knows what happens when a king appoints a deputy. result. There is one most fundamental and inescapable defect which always makes monarchical government inferior to republican government, namely, that in the latter almost only the wise and capable are the ones whom public opinion elevates to the first positions, while They, too, will perform their duties with honor; whereas, under a monarchy, the fortunate are often but base slanderers, base liars, and base schemers; Be smart, once they climbed up, they can only expose their incompetence to the public.The people are less likely to err than the prince in this choice; and it is almost as rare that a man of real ability should be a minister as a fool should be at the head of a republic.Therefore, if, by some lucky chance, a man born to rule should manage in a monarchy almost shattered by a group of affected rulers, people will be amazed at the talents he will display. ; and this will usher in a new era for that country. 要使一个国君制国家能够治理得好，则它的大小或者说它的面积，就必须视统治者的能力而定。征服一个国家要比治理一个国家容易得多。有一根足够长的杠杆，人们只消用一个手指头便能够摇动全世界；可是要担负起全世界来，却非得有赫居里士的肩膀不可了。一个国家无论是多么地小，但对它来说君主几乎总还是太渺小的。反之，如果当真出现了这种极其罕见的情形，国家对于它的首领来说竟然是太小了的话，那时国家也还是治理不好的；因为首领总是追求自己的雄图远略，于是就忘记了人民的利益；而且由于他滥用他那过多的才干而给人民造成的不幸，也并不亚于一个能力有限的君主由于自己缺乏才干而给人民所造成的不幸。可以这样说，一个王国的每一朝每一代都必须根据君主的能力来加以扩张或者收缩；反之，一个元老院的才干则有着比较稳定的尺度，国家于是就可以有经常不变的疆界，而国家的行政也就不会太坏。 个人专制的政府，其最显著的不便就是缺乏那种连续不断的继承性，而那在其他两种制度之下却构成一种永不间断的联系。一个国王逝世，就需要有另一个国王；选举造成了一种危险的间断期，那是狂风暴雨式的。而且除非公民们能够大公无私、团结一致，——这是那种政府简直不能指望的事，——否则阴谋与舞弊必将插手进来。把国家收买到手的人到头来而不出卖国家，而不从弱者的身上捞回自己以前被强者所敲去的那笔钱，那是难得有的事。在这样的一种行政机构里，迟早一切都会变成为金钱交易，而且人们在国王治下所享受的和平比起空位时期的混乱来还更要坏得多。 人们都曾经做过些什么事来防止这些弊病呢？人们曾经使王位固定由某些家族来世袭，并且还规定了继承的顺序，以预防国王逝世时的一切纠纷。这就是说，人们既然是以临朝当政的种种不便来代替选举的不便，所以也就是宁愿要表面的太平而不愿意要贤明的行政；他们宁愿冒着由婴儿、怪人或傻瓜来当首领的危险，但不愿意为了选择好国王而发生纠纷。他们却不曾考虑到，在冒着这种两者择一的危险的时候，他们几乎是使一切的机会都不利于自己了。小但尼斯的父亲谴责小但尼斯一桩可耻的行为时说：“我给你做过这种榜样吗？”儿子回答说：“啊，但是你的父亲可不是国王啊。”小但尼斯的这句话是很有道理的。 一个人上升到可以号令别人的时候，一切就都来竞相剥夺他的正义感和理性了。据说人们曾煞费苦心地要把统治的艺术教给年轻的君主们；但是看来这种教育并没有使他们受益。人们最好还是先着手教给他们以服从的艺术吧！历史上那些出名的最伟大的国王们所受的教养，决不是为了进行统治的。统治乃是那样的一种科学：人们学得太多之后，掌握得就最少，但在只知服从而不知号令的时候，就会收获最多。 “Ｎａｍｕｔｉｌｉｓｓｉｍｕｓｉｄｅｍａｃｂｒｅｖｉｓｓｉｍｕｓｂｏｎａｒｕｍｍａｌａｒｕｍｑｕｅｒｅｒｕｍｄｅｌｅｃｔｕｓ，ｃｏｇｉｔａｒｅｑｕｉｄａｕｔｎｏｌｕｅｒｉｓｓｕｂａｌｉｏｐｒｉｎｃｉｐｅ，（“因为辩别好坏最有效的也是最简捷的方法，就是想一想自己愿意要什么，不愿意要什么，假如作国王的不是自己而是另一个人的话。”）这种缺乏连贯性的后果之一，便是皇室政府的变化无常；皇室政府时而规定这种计划，时而规定那种计划，全视统治者的君主或其统治的代理人的性格而定；因此便不能长期有一个固定的目标，也不能有一贯的行动。这种变化多端永远会使得国家动荡不定，从一种准则转到另一种准则，从一种政策转到另一种政策；而在其他的政府之下，则由于君主永远是同一的，这种变化也就不会发生。于是我们便可以看出：一般说来，如果说宫廷中有着更多的阴谋诡计的话，那末在元老院中就有着更多的智慧，而共和国则以更稳定的并且遵循得更好的观点朝着自己的目标前进，绝不会是内阁的一次革命便引起国家中的一次革命；因为一切大臣而且差不多一切国王所共有的准则，就是在一切事情上都采取与他们前任相反的措施。 根据这种不连贯性，我们还可以解决王权派的政论家们所常有的一种诡辩；那就是，他们不仅以国家政治来比附家政，以君主比附家长，——这种谬误已经是被我们驳斥过了的，——而且还任意地赋予这位行政官以种种他所必需具备的德行，并总是假定君主真的就是他所应当是的那种样子。 靠着这种假定，皇室政府就显然要比其他一切政府更为可取，因为它无可辩驳地乃是最强而有力的政府；而且要不是由于缺少一个更能符合公意的团体意志的话，它还会是最好的政府。但是，如果按照柏拉图的说法，天性上的国王本来就是极其罕见的人物；最末天性与幸运两者能汇合在一起而把王冠加在他的头上，那就更该是多么地罕见。而且，如果皇室的教育必然会腐蚀接受这种教育的人的话；那么对于那一系列培养出来就是为了治国的人们，我们还能期望什么呢？因此，把皇室政府与一个好国王的政府混为一谈的，就只好是自欺欺人罢了。为了能看清楚这种政府的本身究竟如何，就必须要考虑到昏庸无道的君主治下的政府；因为这些君主们即位时就是昏庸无道的，否则就是王位使得他们昏庸无道的。 上述的难点并没有逃过我们的作家们的眼睛，可是他们竟丝毫不感到为难。他们说，补救的方法就只有毫无怨言地服从。据说上帝震怒时便派遣坏国王降世，所以就必须忍受，看作是上天的惩罚。这种言论无疑是有启发性的；但是我怀疑把它放在一本政治著作里，是不是还不如放在神坛上要来得更合适一些。一个医生许下了奇迹，而他的全部本领只不过是劝病人忍耐；我们将会说他什么呢？我们很明白，当我们有了一个坏政府的时候，我们必须忍受它；但问题应该是，怎样才能找到一个好政府。 第七章论混合政府 确切说来，根本就没有单一的政府。一个独一无二的首领也必须有下级的行政官；一个人民政府也必须有一个首领。 因此，在行政权力的划分上，总会有着由数目较多到数目较少的级差；不同之点就在于，有时候是多数依附于少数，有时候是少数依附于多数。 有时候，这一划分是相等的；无论其各个组成部分是互相依附的，像英国的政府那样，还是各个部分的权威都是独立的但又是不完备的，像波兰那样。后一种形式是一种坏形式，因为它使政府根本不能有统一性，并使国家缺乏联系。 哪一种政府更好？是单一的政府呢，还是混合的政府呢？ 这是政论家们所激烈争论的问题；而对于这个问题，也必须做出像我上面在论各种不同的政府形式时所已经得出的同样的答案。 单一政府的本身是最好的，就只因为它是单一的。但是当行政权力并不是充分依附于立法权力的时候，也就是说当君主对主权者的比率大于人民对君主的比率时；就必须对政府进行划分以弥补这种比例上的失调了。因为这样一来，政府的各个部分对臣民的权威并没有减少，而它们的划分又使得它们全体都合在一起也不如主权者强而有力。 人们还可以设立各种居间的行政官以防止这种不便，这些居间的行政官并不妨害政府的完整，而仅仅能起平衡上述两种权力的作用并能维护他们相应的权利。这时候的政府并不是混合的，而是有节制的。 人们还可以用一些类似的方法来补救与此相反的不便；当政府过于松弛的时候，就可以设立一些委员会使之集中化，这正是一切民主制国家所实行的。在前一种情形下，人们划分政府是为了削弱政府；而在后一种情形下，则是为了加强政府。因为强力的极限与软弱的极限同样地都出现在单一的政府之下，反之，混合的形式则产生适中的力量。 第八章论没有一种政府形式适宜于一切国家 自由并不是任何气候之下的产物，所以也不是任何民族都力所能及的。我们越是思索孟德斯鸠所确立的这条原则，就越会感到其中的真理；人们越是反驳它，就越有机会得到新的证据来肯定它。 在全世界的一切政府中，公家都是只消费而不生产的。那末，他们所消费的资料从何而来？那就来自其成员的劳动。正是个人的剩余，才提供了公家的所需。由此可见，唯有当人类劳动的收获超过了他们自身的需要时，政治状态才能够存在。然而，这种过剩在全世界的各个国家里并不是都一样的。 在某些国家里，它是相当大的，但在另一些国家里却微不足道，另有些国家里根本就没有，再有些国家则是负数。这一比率要取决于气候的好坏，土地所需要的劳动种类、物产的性质、居民的力量和他们所必需的消费量的多少，以及这一比率所由以构成的许多其他的类似比率。 另一方面，各种政府的性质也不一样，它们的胃口也有大有小；而且这些不同还要基于另一条原则，即公共赋税距离它们的来源愈远，则负担就愈重。衡量这种担负，决不能只根据税收的数量，而是要根据税收转回到原纳税人的手里时所必须经历的路程。如果这一流转过程既简捷而又规定得好，那末无论人民纳税是多少，都是无关紧要的；人民总会是富足的，财政状况总会是良好的。反之，无论人民所缴纳的是多么地少；但是，如果连这一点点也永不再回到人民手里的话，那末由于不断的缴纳，人民不久就会枯竭；于是国家就永远不会富足，人民就永远都是贫困的。 由此可见，人民与政府的距离越扩大，则贡赋也就越沉重；因此，在民主制之下人民负担最轻，在贵族制之下负担较大，在国君制之下就承担着最大的重担了。所以，国君制只适宜于富饶的国家；贵族制只适宜于财富和版图都适中的国家；民主制则适宜于小而贫困的国家。 事实上，我们越是加以思索，就越会在这里面发现自由国家与国君制国家之间的不同。在前者之中，一切都是用于共同的利益；而在后者之中，则公共力量与个别力量二者是互为倒数的，一个的扩大乃是由于另一个的削弱。归根到底，专制制度之统治臣民并不是为了要使他们幸福，而是要使他们贫愁困苦，以便统治他们。 在每种气候之下，都有许多自然因素；我们可以根据这些自然因素指出政府的形式，因为政府的形式是受气候的力量所制约的；我们甚至于可以说出它应该具有哪种样子的居民。凡是贫瘠不毛的地方，产品的价值抵不上劳动的，就应该任其荒废，或者只由生番来居住。人们劳动的所得刚刚能维持需要的地方，应该是由一些野蛮民族来居住；在那里，一切典章制度都还是不可能的。劳动生产剩余不多的地方，适宜于自由的民族；土地富饶肥沃，劳动少而出产多的地方，则需要以国君制来统治，以便君主的奢侈能消耗掉臣民过多的剩余；因为这种过剩被政府所吸收要比被个人浪费掉好得多。 我知道，这里有例外；但是这些例外的本身就证实了这条规律，那就是，它们迟早会产生革命，使得事物又回到自然的秩序。 永远应该把一般规律与特殊原因区别开来，特殊原因只能影响到一般规律的效果。纵使整个南方布满了共和国而整个北方布满了专制国，然而由于气候的作用，专制之宜于炎热的国土、野蛮之宜于寒冷的国土、美好的典章制度之宜于温带地区，仍然并不因此而减少其为真理。我也看到人们虽然同意这个原则，但应用起来还是有争论的：人们会说寒冷的国土也有非常肥沃的，南方的国土也有非常贫瘠的。但是这个难题，只有对于那些不从全面的比率来考察事物的人，才真是难题。因为，正如我已经说过的，还必须要计算劳动、力量、消费量等等的比率。 假设有两块相等的土地，其中一块的产量为五，另一块为十。如果前者的居民消耗量为四，而后者的居民消耗量为九；那么，前者产量的过剩是五分之一，而后者的过剩则为十分之一。两者过剩的比率既然与生产量的比率成为反比，所以生产只等于五的那块土地，其剩余就要比生产等于十的那块土地的剩余多出一倍。 然而这并不是个产量加倍的问题，并且我也不相信，有任何人竟然把寒冷国土的丰饶程度一般地等同于炎热国土的丰饶程度。可是，姑且让我们假设有这样的相等；如果我们愿意的话，让我们衡量一下英国之于西西里以及波兰之于埃及吧；再往南就是非洲和印度群岛，再往北就什么也没有了。 为了使它们的产量相等，在耕作方面就应该有多大的悬殊啊！ 在西西里，只须松松土罢了；而在英国却须付出多么大的精工细作啊！因此，在必须用更多的人手才能得到同等产量的地方，它的剩余量也就必然会更少。 除此之外，还应该考虑到同等数量的人在炎热的国土上，其消耗却要少得多。气候要求这里的人们必须节制食欲才能保持健康；欧洲人在这里如果要像在自己家乡里那样生活，一定会死于痢疾和消化不良的。沙尔丹说：“比起亚洲人来，我们简直是食肉兽，是豺狼。有人把波斯人吃得少，归咎于他们对土地耕种不足；而我则相反，我相信他们的国家之所以不那么富于粮食，正是因为居民需要得少。”他接着又说：“如果他们的节食是土地歉收的结果，那就应该只有穷人才吃得少，而不应该所有的人普遍都吃得少；并且在各个省份里，人们也就应该按照土地的丰饶程度而吃得有多有少，却不应该是全王国的人都同样吃得少。波斯人对自己的生活方式非常自豪，他们说只要瞧瞧他们的皮色就可以看出，他们的生活方式比基督教徒的生活方式要优越得多了。的确，波斯人的面色都是匀净的；他们的皮肤是美丽的，又细润、又光泽；反之，他们的属民，那些按照欧洲人的方式而生活的阿美尼亚人的面容，则粗糙而多面刺，并且他们的身裁也是既肥蠢而又笨拙。” 越是接近赤道，人民生活的所需就越少。他们几乎不吃什么肉类；大米、玉米、高粱、小米和卡萨麸便是他们的日常食品。印度群岛有好几百万人，他们每天的食品还值不上一苏钱。就是在欧洲，我们也看到北方民族与南方民族之间，食欲有显著的差异。一个德国人的一顿晚餐，一个西班牙人可以吃上一星期。在人们比较贪吃的那些国家里，奢侈也就转到食品上面来。在英国，奢侈表现为筵席上的肉食罗列；而在意大利，人们设宴则只是用糖果和鲜花而已。 衣着的奢侈也可以表明类似的差异。在季节变化急速而剧烈的气候之下，人们穿着得就更好也更简单；但在人们的穿着只是为了装饰的那种气候之下，人们便力求衣服华丽而不求适用了，衣服本身在这里也就是一种奢侈品。在那不勒斯，你天天都可以看到有许多人在鲍昔里普山上闲逛，只穿着光彩夺目的外衣而没有内衣。就房屋来说，情形也是一样：当人们完全用不着耽心气候会伤害人的时候，他们就一味讲求富丽堂皇。在巴黎、在伦敦，人们要求住得温暖而舒适。但在马德里，人们虽有着精致的客厅，但却没有可以关得上的窗子；而且他们就在老鼠洞般的屋子里睡觉。 在炎热的国度里，食物更丰满而多汁，——这是第三种差异，而这种差异是不可能不对第二种差异发生影响的。为什么在意大利，人们要吃那么多的蔬菜？就因为意大利的蔬菜好，营养高，滋味美。在法国，蔬菜都是用水浇灌的，所以毫无营养，因而筵席上也就几乎完全没有把蔬菜当一回事。 可是它们并不少占土地，并且至少也得费同样的气力去栽培。 这是一条已经确定的经验了，巴巴里的小麦尽管次于法国的小麦，可是能出更多的面粉；而法国的小麦却又比北方的小麦出粉更多。由此可以推论：在从赤道到北极的这个方向上，一般地都可以观察到类似的级差现象。从同等数量的产品之中，所得到的粮食却较少，这岂不是一个显而易见的不利条件吗？ 在所有这些不同的考虑而外，我还要补充另一条考虑，它是从其中引申出来的，并且还可以加强它们。那就是：炎热的国度比寒冷的国度所需要的居民更少，而所能养活的居民却更多；这就产生一种永远有利于专制制度的双重剩余。同样数目的居民所占的地面越广阔，则反叛也就越困难；因为他们无法敏捷地而又秘密地配合一致，而且政府总会很容易揭露反叛的图谋，并切断一切交通的。但是为数众多的人民越是聚集在一起，政府也就越发无法篡夺主权者。首领们在他们的密室之中策划，也正像君主在他的内阁会议中是一样地安全；而且群众集合在广场上，也会像军队集合在营房里一样地迅速。因此一个暴君政府的便利之点，就在于它能在远距离上行动。借助于它所建立的各个支点，它的力量就能像杠杆的力量一样随着长度而增大。相反地，人民的力量则只有集中起来才能行动；如果分散开来，它就会消灭，正如洒在地面上的火药的作用，只能是星星点点地燃烧罢了。这样，人口最少的国家就最适于暴君制；凶猛的野兽是只能在荒野中称王的。