Chapter 3 volume two

Chapter 1 On the Inalienability of Sovereignty The first and most important consequence of the principles thus established is that only the general will can direct the powers of the state in accordance with the end in which it was created, namely, the public happiness; for if the antagonism of individual interests makes If the establishment of society becomes necessary, then it is the unity of these individual interests that makes the establishment of society possible.It is the commonality of these different interests that forms the bond of society; and no society could exist if all these interests had not some point of agreement with one another.The government of society, therefore, should be entirely based on this common interest.

Therefore I say: Sovereignty, since it is nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be transferred; But it cannot be diverted from the fact that, if it were not impossible for the individual will and the general will to agree in certain points, yet at least such agreement would be impossible if it were constant and lasting; for the individual will, by its very nature, is The general will always tends to favoritism, while the general will always tends to equality.It is still less likely that one would secure this agreement, even if it should have existed at all; it would not be the result of man's hand, but only of chance.The sovereign can well say, "My intentions are indeed so-and-so's intentions, or at least what he says he intends"; but the sovereign cannot say, "What this man will intend tomorrow will still be my intentions." ’, because it is inherently absurd for the will to bind itself to the future, and because no other will can promise anything contrary to the intention’s own happiness.If, therefore, the people simply obey obediently, the people themselves are dissolved by this act, and lose their character as a people; This is by no means to say that the orders of the chiefs are not general wills when the Sovereign is at liberty to oppose them and does not do so.In such cases, general silence may be considered the consent of the people.This point will be explained in detail below.

Chapter II On the Indivisibility of Sovereignty As sovereignty is inalienable, for the same reason, sovereignty is also indivisible.Because the will is either the general will or it is not; it is either the will of the people's community, or it is only the will of a part of the people.In the former case, the declaration of this will becomes an act of sovereignty and constitutes law.In the second case it is only an individual will or an administrative act, or at best a command. However, our political commentators cannot distinguish sovereignty in principle, so they distinguish sovereignty in object: they divide sovereignty into force and will, into legislative power and executive power, into taxation power, judicial power and war power. , Divided into internal power and foreign power.Sometimes they lump these parts together, sometimes they take them apart.They make the Sovereign a monstrosity put together; as if they made a man out of the parts of several men, one with eyes, another with arms, another with feet, and none of them. Another part.It is said that Japanese illusionists can dismember a child in public, throw his limbs into the sky one by one, and then drop a whole and living child.

It's a bit like the game of our political commentators, who use a kind of quackery to dismember a social community and then somehow manage to put the pieces back together again. This error arises from not being able to form a correct concept of sovereign authority, from mistaking what is only derived from sovereign authority as a constituent part of sovereign authority.Thus, for example, the acts of declaring war and making peace are regarded as acts of sovereignty; they are not, since they are not laws but their application, an individual act which determines the legal situation.This is evident when we establish the idea attached to the word law.

On examining the other divisions likewise, we shall find that men err whenever they think they see that sovereignty is divided; To presuppose a supreme will, those rights are nothing but the execution of the supreme will. We cannot tell how clouded this lack of certainty casts upon the assertions of the writers of political rights, when they attempt to judge the corresponding rights of kings and peoples from principles which they have established.Everyone can see how, in the first book, third and fourth chapters of Grotius' work, the learned scholar and translator of that book, Barberac, is entangled and lost in his own of sophistry; they are afraid of saying too much or too little of their opinion, and of offending the interests with which they seek to reconcile.Grotius was dissatisfied with his homeland and fled to France; he intended to please Louis XIII, to whom his book was dedicated, so he spared no effort to deprive the people of all their rights, and tried every means to They are dedicated to the king.This must have also appealed to Barberac, who dedicated his translation to King George the First.Unfortunately, however, the expulsion of James the Second - his abdication as he called it - obliged him to be careful, to avoid the point, to be vague, so as not to make William a usurper.If these two writers had adopted true principles, all difficulties would have been solved, and they would have been consistent.They should have spoken the truth out of pain, and they should have only sought to curry favor with the people.However, the truth will not make them lucky after all, and the people will not give them ambassadors or professors or high salaries.

Chapter Three: Whether the General Will Can Be Wrong From the above, it can be seen that the general will is always just and always based on the public interest; but it cannot be deduced from this that the people's considerations are always equally correct.People always want to be happy for themselves, but people don't always see happiness clearly.The people are never corrupted, but they are often deceived, and only then do they seem to want bad things. There is always a great difference between the public will and the general will; the general will is only concerned with the public interest, while the general will is concerned with the private interest, and the general will is only the sum of individual wills.However, except for the positive and negative offsetting parts of these individual wills, the remaining sum is still the general will.

If, when the people are well informed and deliberated, there is no collusion among the citizens; there will always be a general will out of a great number of small differences, and the result of the discussion will always be good.But when factions are formed, when small groups are formed at the expense of the larger body, the will of each such group becomes the general will for its members, and the individual will for the state; At this point we can say that the number of voters is no longer equal to the number of people, but only equal to the number of groups.The differences were reduced in number, and the results were less general.Finally, when one of these groups is so large that it surpasses all the others, then you no longer end up with the sum of many small differences, but only one single difference; There is a general will, and the prevailing opinion is nothing but an individual opinion.

Therefore, in order to express the general will well, the most important thing is that there should be no factions in the country, and each citizen can only express his own opinion.Such was the unique and ingenious system of the great Lygergus.But if factions exist, they must be multiplied and their inequality prevented, as Solon, Numa, and Servius did.This precaution is the only good way in which the general will may always be carried forward, and the people never err. CHAPTER IV ON THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGN POWER If the state, or the city, is nothing but a moral personality whose life consists in the union of its members, and if its chief concern is to preserve itself; then it must have a universal coercive power , in order to drive and arrange the parts in the manner most beneficial to the whole.Just as nature has endowed each individual with absolute power over his parts, so the social compact has endowed the body politic with absolute power over its members.It is this power, when it is directed by the general will, which, as has been said, acquires the name sovereign.

However, in addition to this public personality, we have to consider those private persons who make up the public personality, whose life and liberty are naturally independent of the public personality.It is therefore a matter of distinguishing well the rights corresponding to citizens from those corresponding to the Sovereign, and between the duties of the former as subjects and the natural rights which they have as persons. We admit that all his powers, wealth, and liberties, which each man alienates by the social pact, are only that part of the whole, the use of which matters to the community; but it must also be admitted that only the sovereign is such. referee of importance.

Whatever service a citizen may render to the state, it must be done as soon as the Sovereign demands it; but the Sovereign, on his part, can never impose upon his subjects any kind of restraint which is useless to the community; he even There must be no such intention, for under the laws of reason, as under the laws of nature, nothing can be without reason. The agreements which bind us to the body of society are duties only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that, in fulfilling them, one cannot do service to others without also being Do yourself a favor.How could the general will always be just, and how could all men always Want each of them to be happy?This proves that equality of rights and the notion of justice it produces arise from each individual's partiality for himself, and thus from human nature.This also proves that if the general will is to be truly general, it must be as general in its purpose as it is in its essence.This proves that the general will must start from the whole before it can be applied to the whole; and when it tends to some individual and specific goal, it will lose its natural justice, because at this time our judgment It is something alien to us, so that we cannot be guided by any principle of real fairness.

In fact, as soon as there is any point in an individual fact or right which is not regulated by a prior convention, the matter is in dispute.In such a dispute, the individuals concerned are one party, and the public another; yet I see here neither a law to be followed nor a judge who can decide .Then it would be absurd to try to appeal to the vote of the general will; the general will here can only be the conclusion of one creation, and therefore only an external, individual will for the other. , which in this case would be unfair and fallible.Therefore, just as the individual will cannot represent the general will, when the general will has individual goals, it is its turn to change its nature, and it can no longer be used as the general will to make a judgment on a certain person or something. For example, when the people of Athens appoint or depose their chiefs, honor one man or condemn another, and carry out the whole act of government by a mass of individual decrees without distinction, the people no longer have any The general will is worthy of the name; their action is no longer that of the sovereign, but that of the magistrate.This may seem to be the exact opposite of common belief, but allow me time to explain my reasons. From this we should understand that it is not so much the number of votes that make the will general, but rather the common interest that binds men together; other people's conditions. This admirable correspondence between interest and justice gives impartiality to public discourse; but in discussing any particular case, no common interest can separate the judge's maxim from the parties' and unify the principles of society, so this impartiality will disappear. Wherever this principle is stated, we always arrive at the same conclusion; namely, that the social compact establishes such an equality among citizens that they are all subject to the same conditions, and are all deserving of the same rights.Thus, due to the nature of the convention, all acts of the sovereign—that is to say, all acts of the general will—restrain or care for all citizens equally; No distinction is made between any individual constituting the State.But what exactly is an act of sovereignty?It is not an agreement between superiors and subordinates, but an agreement between the community and its individual members.It is a legal agreement, because it is based on a social contract; it is a just agreement, because it is common to all; any other end; it is a firm convention, for it is secured by the power and supremacy of the public.So long as the subjects obey such an agreement, they are obeying no one but only their own will.To ask how far the relative rights of the sovereign and the citizen go, is to ask how far the citizen can define himself--each to the whole, and the whole to each individual. It can be seen from this that although sovereign power is completely absolute, completely sacred, and completely inviolable, it cannot and cannot exceed the limits of public agreement; and everyone can dispose of the wealth left to him by this agreement at will. and freedom. The Sovereign, therefore, can never have the right to demand more from one subject than another; for then the matter becomes individual, and his power ceases to be effective. Once this distinction is admitted, it is untrue to say that any real sacrifice is made on the part of the individual in the social contract.As a result of the compact, their situation was indeed much more attainable than it had been before; what they made was not a cession but a favorable transaction, that is, with a better and more stable life Instead of an unsure and insecure way of life, liberty for natural independence, one's own security for one's power to injure others, one's own right which is guaranteed invincible by social union, Power that can be overcome by others.The individual lives which they give to the State are constantly being protected by it; and when they risk their lives in defense of the State, what they do then is not to restore what they have received from the State. to the country?Isn't what they are doing now that they are in their natural state, when living in the inevitable struggle and having to risk their lives to defend the needs of their existence, they have to do it all the more frequently and more dangerously? Something to do?It is true that every one will fight for his country if necessary; but then no one will fight for himself any more.Is it not a gain that, in order to secure our security, we need only run some of the dangers we ourselves would have to run if that security were lost? CHAPTER V ON THE RIGHT OF LIFE AND DEATH It is asked: Since the individual has absolutely no right to dispose of his own life, how can he transfer this right which he does not have to the sovereign?This question appears difficult to answer only because it is framed incorrectly.Everyone has the right to risk his own life in order to preserve his own.Can anyone say that a person who jumps off a building to escape a fire commits suicide?Will anyone hold that a man who is drowned in a storm has committed reckless recklessness in embarking on a ship? The purpose of social treaties is to preserve the parties.Anyone who wants to achieve an end must have the means, and the means are inseparable from certain risks and even certain sacrifices.Whoever depends on others to preserve his own life should, if necessary, give his life for others.Nor should the citizen judge for himself what dangers the law requires him to run; he should die when the prince says to him, "For the sake of the state, you are required to die"; for it is on this condition that he He has always enjoyed safety, and his life is no longer simply a gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the country. The imposition of the death penalty on criminals may be viewed in much the same light: it is in order not to be the victim of a murderer that people agree that, if they become a murderer, they themselves must die.In this social pact men thought only of securing their own lives, far less of killing them; and it could never be imagined that any one of the parties to the treaty conceived in the first place that he should be hanged. Moreover, a man who does evil, since he attacks the rights of society, is by his crime a traitor to his country; he breaks the laws of his country, so he is no longer a member of Nations go to war.At this time, preserving the country is incompatible with preserving himself, and one of the two must be destroyed.To impose the death penalty on a criminal is to treat him not so much as a citizen as as an enemy.The prosecution and judgment are the proof and declaration that he has broken the social pact, and that he is therefore no longer a member of the state.And since he at least considered himself a member of the state by virtue of his residence, he should be exiled as a violator of the treaty, or put to death as a public enemy.For such an enemy is not a moral man, but only a man; and only then can the right of war be to kill the conquered. Yet it may be said that punishing a criminal is an individual act. I grant this, but this punishment does not belong to the sovereign; it is a right which the sovereign can only delegate to others, and not enforce by himself.My whole idea is consistent, but I cannot explain it all at once. Moreover, the frequency of punishment is always a sign of a weak or incompetent government.There will never be a wicked person whom we cannot in any way make good.We have no right to put to death, even mere police action, except for those who cannot be preserved without danger. As for the right to pardon or commutation of the sentence of a criminal who has been punished by law and pronounced by a judge, that can only belong to a person who is above law and judge, that is to say, only to the sovereign; At this point, his rights are still not very clear, and the occasions where this right is used are very rare.In a well-governed state, punishments are rare, not because pardons are many, but because crimes are few.The impunity of criminals is guaranteed only by the emergence of a large number of crimes when the state is weak.Under the Roman Republic, neither the senate nor the consuls ever attempted to exercise pardons; nor did the people, though they sometimes revoked their own sentences.Frequent pardons mean that it won't be long before criminals don't need pardons, and you can see where that leads.But I feel myself full of grievances, which stall my pen; let the just men who have never erred and never need pardon discuss these matters. CHAPTER VI ON THE LAW By the social convention we have given existence and life to the body politic; it is now necessary to give it action and will by legislation.For the original act by which the body politic is formed and united does not determine what else it must do in order to preserve itself. What makes things beautiful and in conformity with order is the nature of things and has nothing to do with human conventions.All justice comes from God, and God alone is the source of justice; but if we could really accept justice from this height, we would need neither government nor laws.There is, no doubt, a universal justice which proceeds entirely from reason; but for this justice to be recognized by us it must be reciprocal.However, looking at things from the perspective of the world, there is no natural sanction, and the laws of justice are illusory in the world; It has only caused the happiness of the wicked and the misfortune of the righteous.Conventions and laws, therefore, are needed to bind rights and duties together, and to make justice fit its purpose.In a state of nature everything is public, and if I have not made any promise to a man, I have no obligation to him; and what I think belongs to others is only that which is of no use to me.But in a state of society, where all rights are fixed by law, this is not the case. What, then, is the law?As long as one is content with attaching metaphysical notions to the term, one remains baffled; Get a good idea of ​​what state law is. I have already said that there can never be a general will concerning an individual object. In fact, this individual object is either within the state or outside it. If it is outside the state, this external will can never be the general will in its relation to the state; if this particular object is within the state, it is part of the state: Then there is a contrast between the whole and its part in two separate existences, one of which is the part, and the other the whole minus the part.But the whole minus the part is by no means the whole; and so long as this relation lasts, there is no longer the whole but only two unequal parts; , it will never be more general will. But when the whole people decides for the whole people, they only think of themselves; The relationship between the objects as a whole without any division of the whole.Then what men prescribe is public, as the will that prescribes is the general will.It is this act that I call law. When I say that the object of the law is always universal, I mean that the law considers only the community of subjects and abstract actions, and never individual persons and individual actions.The law, therefore, may very well prescribe privileges, but it can never confer them on a single individual; it may divide citizens into classes, and even prescribe the qualifications for acquiring the rights of each class, but it cannot Nominates such-and-such a person in a certain order; it can establish a dynastic government and a hereditary succession, but it cannot elect a king, or appoint a royal family: in short, all matters concerning individual objects functions that do not belong in the slightest to the legislative power. From this notion we see at once that we need no longer ask who should make the laws, since laws are acts of the general will; we need not ask whether the prince is above the law, since the prince is also a member of the state; There is no need to ask whether the law can be unjust, because no one can be unjust to himself, and there is no need to ask why people are free and obey the law, because the law is only the record of our own will. We can also see that since the law unites the universality of the will with the universality of the object, a man, whoever he may be, can never be law if he commands himself; , can never be a law, but only a command; that is not an act of sovereignty, but only an act of administration. Wherefore, wherever the rule of law prevails—whatever its form of administration—I call a republic; for here alone the public interest rules, and public things count.All legitimate governments are republics; and I shall afterwards show what a government is. Laws are, strictly speaking, nothing more than the conditions of social union.The people who obey the law should be the creators of the law; the conditions of society can only be determined by those who make up society.But how are these people to define the conditions of society?Was it a mutual agreement by a sudden inspiration?Does the body politic have an institution through which it can express its will?Who has given the body politic the necessary foresight to conceive these acts in advance and to promulgate them?Or, how are these actions declared when necessary?How can the blind masses, often ignorant of what they want—for they know so little what is good for them—be able to enforce for themselves such a great and important task as the legislative system? What about difficult careers?The people always desire their own happiness, but the people themselves cannot always see what happiness is.The general will is always right, but the judgments that guide it are not always wise.It must therefore be enabled to see the object as it is, and sometimes the semblance as it should be; Know the time and place, and be able to balance the temptation of immediate immediate interests with distant hidden dangers.The individual sees happiness but does not want it; the public desires happiness but does not see it.Both need guidance equally.Therefore, it is necessary to enable the former to obey their own reason with their own will; and to enable the latter to learn to know the things they desire.At this time, the result of common wisdom is the combination of reason and will in the social body, from which there is the close cooperation of the various parts, and finally the greatest strength of the whole.It is for this reason that a legislator is necessary. Chapter VII Of the Legislator In order to discover the best rules of society which can be adapted to each people, a supreme intelligence is required which can penetrate all human sentiments without being dominated by any; its own happiness is not our concern, yet it is willing to care for our happiness; finally, in the passing of the ages, it takes care of the long-term glory, can work in this century, and in the next century enjoy.To make laws for men, it is almost necessary to have gods. What Caligula deduced from fact, Plato deduces from right, and with the same deduction in his Politics, defines the statesmen or princes he seeks.But if a great prince is a rare individual, what of a great legislator? The former is just following the model planned by the latter.One is the engineer who invents the machine, the other is no more than a craftsman who sets it up and runs it. Montesquieu said: "When society was born, the leader of the republic created the system, and after that it was the system that shaped the leader of the republic." He who dares to create for a people must - so to speak - feel himself capable of transforming human nature, of transforming each individual who is a complete and isolated whole into a part of a greater whole , the individual derives his life and being in a definite way from the whole; he can change and strengthen his human qualities; he can replace the physiological life which we all receive from nature with a moral life which is a part of the whole. independent life above.In short, it is necessary to take away the powers inherent in human beings, in order to give them powers which are external to themselves and cannot be used without the help of others.The more these natural forces are eliminated, the stronger and more durable the acquired forces will be, and the stronger and more perfect the system will be.Thus each citizen is nothing, and can accomplish nothing, but by all the rest; and if the whole acquires a force equal to or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the individuals, we may say that the legislation has attained its The highest degree of perfection possible. The legislator is in every respect a singular figure in the state.If he should be so by his genius, so should he be by his office.This office is by no means executive, nor is it sovereign.This office creates the republic, but is by no means within its organization; it is a peculiar and transcendent function, having nothing in common with the world of men; Still less should he who commands the laws; otherwise, his laws, governed by his passions, can only constantly carry out his own injustices, and his personal opinions impair the sanctity of his own cause. , it can only be forever inevitable.When Legacus made laws for his country, he abdicated before proceeding.It was the custom of most Greek city-states to entrust foreigners to make their own laws.The republics of modern Italy have frequently imitated this practice; the republic of Geneva has done the same, with good results.In Rome at its most glorious, the vices of tyranny were seen to have revived within it, and it was seen to be dying, because the legislative and sovereign powers were united in the same persons. Yet the Council of Ten themselves never claimed the right to pass any laws on their own authority alone.They said to the people: "Nothing we suggest to you can ever become law without your assent. Make yourselves, O Romans, laws that will benefit you!" He who makes laws, therefore, has no, and ought not to have, any legislative power, and the people themselves, if they will, can never deprive themselves of this inalienable right; for, according to the fundamental covenant, only the general will can bind Individuals, and we cannot be sure that individual wills are in line with the general will, unless a free vote of the people has been held.I have already said this, but it is not useless to repeat it. Thus one finds in legislation two things that seem at once incompatible: it is a superhuman enterprise, and, as far as its execution is concerned, it is an authority without substance. There is another notable difficulty here.If wise men try to speak to lay people in their own language instead of their own, they will not understand them.There are, however, thousands of ideas which cannot be translated into popular language.Ideas too general, as goals too remote, are alike beyond men's reach; every individual's favorite plans of government are those concerned with his own particular interest, and he hardly realizes How to benefit themselves from the constant sacrifices that good law requires of them.In order for a new nation to love sound political norms and follow the fundamental law of national interests, it is necessary to turn the effect into the cause, so that the social spirit that should be the product of the system is overriding the system itself, and people in the Before there was law, it could be what it should have been because of law.The legislator, therefore, could use neither force nor reason; and it was therefore necessary to demand another authority which restrains without force, and persuades without argument. 这就是在一切时代里迫使得各民族的父老们都去求助于上天的干预，并以他们固有的智慧来敬仰神明的缘故了，为的就是要使人民遵守国家法也像遵守自然法一样，并且在认识到人的形成和城邦的形成是由于同一个权力的时候，使人民能够自由地服从并能够驯顺地承担起公共福祉的羁轭。 这种超乎俗人们的能力之外的崇高的道理，也就是立法者所以要把自己的决定托之于神道设教的道理，为的是好让神圣的权威来约束那些为人类的深思熟虑所无法感动的人们。但是并不是人人都可以代神明立言，也不是当他自称是神明的代言人时，他便能为人们所相信。唯有立法者的伟大的灵魂，才是足以证明自己使命的真正奇迹。人人都可以刻石立碑，或者贿买神谕，或者假托通灵，或者训练一只小鸟向人耳边口吐神言，或者寻求其它的卑鄙手段来欺骗人民。只会搞这一套的人，甚至于也偶尔能纠集一群愚民；但是他却决不会建立起一个帝国，而他那种荒唐的把戏很快地也就会随他本人一起破灭的。虚假的威望只能形成一种过眼烟云的联系，唯有智慧才能够使之持久不磨。那些迄今存在着的犹太法律，那些十个世纪以来统治着半个世界的伊斯美子孙们的法律，直到今天还在显示着订立了那些法律的人们的伟大；而且当虚骄的哲学与盲目的宗派精神只把这些人看成是侥幸的骗子时，真正的政治学家则会赞美他们制度中在主导着持久的功业的那种伟大而有力的天才。 绝不可以从这一切里便做出跟华伯登一样的结论说，政治和宗教在人间有着共同的目的；而是应该说，在各个国家的起源时，宗教是用来作为政治的工具的。 第八章论人民 正如建筑家在建立一座大厦之前，先要检查和勘测土壤，看它是否能担负建筑物的重量一样；明智的创制者也并不从制订良好的法律本身着手，而是事先要考察一下，他要为之而立法的那些人民是否适宜于接受那些法律。正是因此，所以柏拉图才拒绝为阿加狄亚人和昔兰尼人制订法律，他知道这两个民族是富有的，不能够忍受平等。正是因此，我们才看到在克里特有好法律而有坏人民，因为米诺王所治理的乃是一个邪恶多端的民族。 有千百个从不能忍受良好法律的民族都曾在世上煊赫过；而且纵然那些能够忍受良好法律的民族，也只是在他们全部岁月里的一个极为短暂的时期内做到了这一点。大多数民族，犹如个人一样，只有在青春时代才是驯顺的；他们年纪大了，就变成无法矫正的了。当风俗一旦确立，偏见一旦生根，再想加以改造就是一件危险而徒劳的事情了；人民甚至于不能容忍别人为了要消灭缺点而碰一碰自己的缺点，正像是愚蠢而胆小的病人一见到医生就要发抖一样。 正如某些疾病能振荡人们的神经并使他们失去对于过去的记忆那样，在国家的经历上，有时候也并不是不能出现某些激荡的时期；这时，革命给人民造成了某些重症给个人所造成的同样情形，这时是对过去的恐惧症代替了遗忘症；这时，被内战所燃烧着的国家——可以这样说——又从死灰中复活，并且脱离了死亡的怀抱而重新获得青春的活力。莱格古士时代的斯巴达便是如此；塔尔干王朝以后的罗马便是如此；我们当代驱逐了暴君之后的荷兰和瑞士也曾经是如此。 然而这种事情是非常罕见的，它们只是例外；而其成为例外的缘故，又总是可以从这种例外国家的特殊体制里找到的。这种例外在同一个民族甚至不会出现两次；因为只有在一个民族是野蛮的时候，它才能使自己自由，可是当政治精力衰竭时，它就不再能如此了。那时候，忧患可以毁灭它，而革命却不能恢复它；而且一旦它的枷锁被打碎之后，它就会分崩离析而不复存在。自此而后，它就只需要一个主人而不是需要一个解放者了。自由的人民啊，请你们记住这条定理：“人们可以争取自由，但却永远不能恢复自由。” 青春不是幼年。每个民族正像个人一样，是有着一个青春时期的，或者也可以说是有着一个成熟时期的，必须等到这个时期才能使他们服从法律；然而一个民族的成熟往往不容易识别，而且人们若是提早这个时期的话，这项工作就要失败的。有些民族生来就是能受纪律约束的，另有些民族等上一千年之久也还是不能。俄罗斯人永远也不会真正开化的，因为他们开化得太早了。彼得有模仿的天才；但他并没有真正的天才，没有那种创造性的、白手起家的天才。他做的事有些是好的，但大部分却是不合时宜的。他看到了他的人民是野蛮的，但他一点也没有看到他们还没有成熟到可以开化的地步；他想要使他们文明，而当时所需要的却只是锻炼他们。彼得首先是想造就出来德国人或者英国人，而当时却应该是先着手造就俄国人；由于说服他的臣民们相信他们自己乃是他们本来并不是的那种样子，从而彼得也就永远妨碍了他的臣民们变成为他们可能变成的那种样子。有一位法国教师也是这个样子培养他的学生，要使学生在幼年时候就显姓扬名，然而到后来却始终一事无成。俄罗斯帝国想要征服全欧洲，但是被征服的却将是它自己。它的附庸而兼邻居的鞑靼人将会成为它的主人以及我们的主人的；在我看来，这场革命是无可避免的。全欧洲所有的国王们都在努力配合加速着它的到来。 第九章论人民（续） 正如大自然对于一个发育良好的人的身躯给定了一个限度，过了这个限度就只能造成巨人或者侏儒那样；同样地，一个体制最良好的国家所能具有的幅员也有一个界限，为的是使它既不太大以致不能很好地加以治理，也不太小以致不能维持自己。每个政治体都有一个它所不能逾越的力量极限，并且常常是随着它的扩大而离开这个极限也就愈加遥远。社会的纽带愈伸张，就愈松弛；而一般说来，小国在比例上要比大国更坚强得多。 有千百种理由证明这条准则。首先，距离愈远，行政也就愈发困难，正好象一个杠杆愈长则其顶端的分量也就会愈重。随着层次的繁多，行政负担也就越来越重：因为首先每个城市都有它自己的行政，这是人民所要负担的；每个州又有它自己的行政，又是人民所要负担的；再则是每个省，然后是大区政府、巡抚府、总督府；总是愈往上则所必须负担的也就愈大，并且总是由不幸的人民来负担的；最后还有那压垮了一切的最高行政。如此大量的超额负担，都在不断地消耗着臣民；这种种不同的等级，远没有能治理得更好，而且比起在他们之上若是只有一个行政的话，反而会治理得更坏。同时，他们简直没有余力来应付非常的情况；而当有必要告急的时候，国家往往已经是濒于灭亡的前夕了。 还不仅如此；不只是政府会缺少勇气与果断来执行法律，来防止骚动，来矫正渎职滥权的行为，来预防遥远地方所可能发生的叛乱；而且人民对于自己所永远见不到面的首领、对于看来有如茫茫世界的祖国以及对于大部分都是自己所陌生的同胞公民们，也就会更缺少感情。同一个法律并不能适用于那么多不同的地区，因为它们各有不同的风尚，生活在迥然相反的气候之下，并且也不可能接受同样的政府形式。而不同的法律又只能在人民中间造成纠纷与混乱；因为他们生活在同样的首领之下，处于不断的交往之中，他们互相往来或者通婚，并顺从了别人的种种习俗，所以永远也不知道他们世袭的遗风究竟还是不是他们自己的了。在这样一种彼此互不相识而全靠着一个至高无上的行政宝座才把他们聚集在一起的人群里，才智就会被埋没，德行就会没有人重视，罪恶也不会受到惩罚。事务繁多的首领们根本就不亲自视事，而是由僚属们在治理国家。最后，为了要维持公共权威——而这正是那些遥远的官吏们要规避的，或者要窃据的——所必须采取的种种措施，会耗尽全部的公共精力；这样，他们就再也没有余力关心人民的幸福了，在必要的关头，他们也几乎毫无余力来保卫人民；就是这样，一个体制过于庞大的共同体，就会在其自身的重压之下而削弱和破灭。 另一方面，国家应该被赋予一个可靠的基础，使之能够具有坚固性，并能够经受住它少不了要遭到的种种震荡以及为了自存所不得不作的种种努力；因为所有的民族都有一种离心力，使他们彼此不断地互相作用着，并且倾向于要损害邻人来扩张自己，就好像是笛卡儿的漩涡体那种样子。这样，弱者就随时有被并吞的危险，而且除非是大家能处于一种平衡状态，使得压力在各方面都接近于相等，否则就谁也难以自保。 由此可见，既有需要扩张的理由，又有需要收缩的理由；能在这两者之间求得一种对于国家的生存最为有利的比例，那就是很不小的政治才能了。我们可以一般地说，前者既然只是外在的、相对的，就应该服从于后者；后者乃是内在的、绝对的。一个健全有力的体制乃是人们所必须追求的第一件事；我们应该更加重视一个良好的政府所产生的活力，而不只是看到一个广阔的领土所提供的富源。 此外，我们也曾见过有这样体制的国家，其体制的本身就包含着征服的必要性；这些国家为了能维持下去，便不得不进行无休止的扩张。也许它们会深自庆幸这种幸运的必要性；然而随着它们的鼎盛之极，那也就向它们显示了无可避免的衰亡时刻。 第十章论人民（续） 我们可以用两种方式来衡量一个政治体，即用领土的面积和用人口的数目；这两种衡量彼此之间存在着一个适当的比率，可以使一个国家真正伟大。构成国家的是人，而养活人的则是土地；因此，这一比率就在于使土地足以供养其居民，而居民又恰好是土地所能够养活的那么多。正是在这一比例之中，才可以发现一定数目的人民的最大限度的力量；因为如果土地过多，防卫就会艰难，开发就会不足，物产就会过剩，而这就是形成防御性战争的近因；如果土地不敷，国家就要考虑向它的四邻寻找补充，而这就是形成攻击性战争的近因。一个民族所处的地位，若是只能抉择商业或者战争，它本身必然是脆弱的；它要依赖四邻，它要依赖局势，能有一个短促不安的生命。它或者是征服别人而改变处境，或者是被别人所征服而归于乌有。它只有靠着渺小或者伟大，才能够保全自己的自由。 使土地的广袤与人口的数目这两者得以互相满足的确切比率，我们是无从加以计算的；这既因为土地的质量、它的肥沃程度、物产的性质、气候的影响有着种种差异；同时，也因为我们察觉到的各种居民的体质也有着种种的差异：有的人居住在肥沃的地方而消耗甚少，另外也有人居住在贫瘠的土壤上却消耗很大。还必须顾及妇女生育力的大小、国土对于人口有利与否的情况、立法者的各种制度可望起作用的程度，等等；从而立法者便不应该依据自己所见到的，而是应该依据自己所能预见到的来做判断；也不应该只站在人口的实际状况上，而应该站在人口自然会达到的状况上。最后，各地方特殊的偶然事件还有千百种情况，迫使人们或允许人们拥有多于必要的土地。因而，山地的人们就要扩展他们的土地；山地的自然物产，即森林、饲草，只需较少的劳动，而经验也告诉我们这里的妇女比平原上的妇女生育力更强，并且大片倾斜的山地上也只有小块的平地才能指望耕种。反之，在海滨，人们便可以紧缩土地，哪怕在几乎是荒凉不毛的岩石和沙滩上；因为渔业可以弥补一大部分土地上的出产，因为居民更需要聚集在一起以便抵御海盗，也因为人们在这里更容易以殖民的办法来减轻国土上负担过多的人口。 要为一个民族创制，除了这些条件而外，还须再加上另外的一条；这一条虽然不能代替其他任何一条，但是没有这一条则其他条件便会全归无效：那就是人们必须享有富足与和平。因为一个国家在建立时，就像一支军队在组编时一样，也就正是这个共同体最缺乏抵抗力而最易于被摧毁的时刻。 人们即使在绝对无秩序时，也要比在酝酿时刻更有抵抗力；因为酝酿时，人人都只顾自己的地位而不顾危险。假如一场战争、饥馑或者叛乱在这个关键的时刻临头的话，国家就必定会倾覆。 在这些风暴期间，也并不是不曾建立过许多政府；然而这时候，正是这些政府本身把国家摧毁了。篡国者总是要制造或者选择多难的时刻，利用公众的恐惧心来通过人民在冷静时所决不会采纳的种种毁灭性的法律的。创制时机的选择，正是人们可以据之以区别立法者的创作与暴君的创作的最确切的特征之一。 然则，是什么样的人民才适宜于立法呢？那就是那种虽然自己已经由于某种起源、利益或约定的结合而联系在一起，但还完全不曾负荷过法律的真正羁轭的人民；就是那种没有根深蒂固的传统与迷信的人民；就是那种不怕被突然的侵略所摧毁的人民；就是那种自身既不参与四邻的争端，而又能独力抵抗任何邻人或者是能借助于其中的一个以抵御另一个的人民；就是那种其中的每一个成员都能被全体所认识，而他们又绝不以一个人所不能胜任的过重负担强加给某一个人的人民；就是那种不需要其他民族便可以过活，而所有其他的民族不需要他们也可以过活的人民；就是那种既不富有也不贫穷而能自给自足的人民；最后，还得是那种能结合古代民族的坚定性与新生民族的驯顺性的人民。立法工作之所以艰难，倒不在于那些必须建立的东西，反而更在于那些必须破坏的东西；而其成功之所以如此罕见，就正在于不可能发现自然的单纯性与社会的种种需要相结合在一起。的确，这一切条件是很难于汇合在一起的；于是我们也就很少能见到体制良好的国家了。 欧洲却还有一个很可以立法的国家，那就是科西嘉岛。 这个勇敢的民族在恢复与保卫他们的自由时所具有的豪迈与坚决，的确是值得有一位智者来教导他们怎样保全自由。我有一种预感，总有一天那个小岛会震惊全欧洲的。 第十一章论各种不同的立法体系 如果我们探讨，应该成为一切立法体系最终目的的全体最大的幸福究竟是什么，我们便会发现它可以归结为两大主要的目标：即自由与平等。自由，是因为一切个人的依附都要削弱国家共同体中同样大的一部分力量；平等，是因为没有它，自由便不能存在。 我已经谈过什么是社会的自由。至于平等，这个名词绝不是指权力与财富的程度应当绝对相等；而是说，就权力而言，则它应该不能成为任何暴力并且只有其职位与法律才能加以行使；就财富而言，则没有一个公民可以富得足以购买另一人，也没有一个公民穷得不得不出卖自身。这就要求大人物这一方必须节制财富与权势，而小人物这一方必须节制贪得与婪求。 有人说，这种平等是实践中所绝不可能存在的一种思辩虚构。但是，如果滥用权力是不可避免的，是不是因此就应该一点也不去纠正它了呢？恰恰因为事物的力量总是倾向于摧毁平等的，所以立法的力量就应该总是倾向于维持平等。 然而一切良好制度的这种普遍目的，在各个国度都应该按照当地的形势以及居民的性格这两者所产生的种种对比关系而加以修改；应该正是根据这种种对比关系来给每个民族都确定一种特殊的制度体系，这种制度体系尽管其本身或许并不是最好的，然而对于推行它的国家来说则应该是最好的。 例如，土壤是荒瘠不毛的吗，或者国土对于居民来说是过于狭隘了吗？那末，你就转向工业和工艺方面去吧，你可以用它们的产起来交换你所缺乏的食粮。反之，你占有的是富庶的平原和肥沃的山坡吗，你是有美好的土地而缺少居民吗？那末，你就专心致力于能够繁殖人口的农业，并驱除一切工艺吧；工艺把一国仅有的少量人口都集中在几个地点上，结果只能造成国家人口的减少。你占有的是广阔而便利的海岸吗？那末，你就把海上布满了船舶吧，经营商业与航运吧，你将会获得一个光辉而短暂的生命。海洋在你的沿岸上是在冲洗着几乎无法攀越的岩石吗？那末，你就安心作个野蛮的渔人吧，你会因此生活得更恬静，或许会更美好，而且无疑地还会更幸福。总之，除了一切人所共同的准则而外，每个民族的自身都包含有某些原因，使它必须以特殊的方式来规划自己的秩序，并使它的立法只能适合于自己。正因为如此，所以古代的希伯来人和近代的阿拉伯人便以宗教为主要目标，雅典人便以文艺，迦太基与梯尔以商业，罗德岛以航海，斯巴达以战争，而罗马则以道德。《论法的精神》一书的作者已经用大量的例证指明了，立法者是以怎样的艺术在把制度引向每一个这样的目标的。 使一个国家的体制真正得以巩固而持久的，就在于人们能够这样来因事制宜，以至于自然关系与法律在每一点上总是协调一致，并且可以这样说，法律只不过是在保障着、伴随着和矫正着自然关系而已。但是，如果立法者在目标上犯了错误，他所采取的原则不同于由事物的本性所产生的原则，以至于一个趋向于奴役而另一个则趋向于自由，一个趋向于财富而另一个则趋向于人口，一个趋向于和平而另一个则趋向于征服；那末，我们便可以看到法律会不知不觉地削弱，体制便会改变，而国家便会不断地动荡，终于不是毁灭便是变质；于是不可战胜的自然便又恢复了它的统治。 第十二章法律的分类 为了规划全体的秩序，或者说为了赋予公共事物以最好的可能形式，就需要考虑各种不同的关系。首先是整个共同体对于其自身所起的作用，也就是说全体对全体的比率，或者说主权者对国家的比率；而这个比率，我们下面就可以看到，是由比例中项的那个比率所构成的。 规定这种比率的法律就叫做政治法；并且如果这种法律是明智的话，我们也不无理由地称之为根本法。因为，如果每个国家只能有一种规划秩序的好方法，那末人民发现它以后，就应该坚持它；但是，已经确立的秩序如果很坏，那末人们为什么要采用这种足以妨碍他们美好生活的法律来作为根本法呢？何况，无论在什么情况下，人民永远是可以作主改变自己的法律的，哪怕是最好的法律；因为，人民若是喜欢自己损害自己的话，谁又有权禁止他们这样做呢？ 第二种关系是成员之间的关系，以及成员对整个共同体的关系。这一比率，就前者而言应该是尽可能地小，而就后者而言又应该是尽可能地大；以便使每个公民对于其他一切公民都处于完全独立的地位，而对于城邦则处于极其依附的地位。这永远是由同一种办法来实现的，因为唯有国家的强力才能使得它的成员自由。从这第二种比率里，就产生了民法。我们可以考虑到个人与法律之间有第三种关系，即不服从与惩罚的关系。这一关系就形成了刑法的确立；刑法在根本上与其说是一种特别的法律，还不如说是对其他一切法律的制裁。 在这三种法律之外，还要加上一个第四种，而且是一切之中最重要的一种；这种法律既不是铭刻在大理石上，也不是铭刻在铜表上，而是铭刻在公民们的内心里；它形成了国家的真正宪法；它每天都在获得新的力量；当其他的法律衰老或消亡的时候，它可以复活那些法律或代替那些法律，它可以保持一个民族的创制精神，而且可以不知不觉地以习惯的力量代替权威的力量。我说的就是风尚、习俗，而尤其是舆论；这个方面是我们的政论家所不认识的，但是其他一切方面的成功全都有系于此。这就正是伟大的立法家秘密地在专心致力着的方面了；尽管他好象把自己局限于制定个别的规章，其实这些规章都只不过是穹窿顶上的拱梁，而唯有慢慢诞生的风尚才最后构成那个穹窿顶上的不可动摇的拱心石。在这些不同的种类之中，只有构成为政府形式的政治法才与我的主题有关。