Chapter 13 volume eleven

Chapter One In the introduction of several chapters, we have stated that wisdom is the science of first principles, and also put forward our criticisms of the first principles referred to by various scholars.One may ask, is wisdom one science or several sciences?Pairs of things are abnormally united in one science, and first principles are not opposite. It would be inconsistent with the meaning to say that wisdom is only one science.If there is more than one science, which sciences can be called wisdom? Also, do empirical principles belong to one or more disciplines?If it belongs to one sect, why must it belong to this sect and not to another sect?If there are several, then which ones are empirical studies?

Also, does wisdom unify all noumenon?If it is not a unified study of all noumenon, it is difficult to say which noumenon should be studied exclusively; if it is said that one academic discipline can unify the research of all, then it should be questioned why the same academic discipline can cover a variety of subject materials. Also, does this only study ontology and its properties?This has nothing to do with ontology if one studies instances of verifiable properties.But if the two belong to two disciplines, which one should be wisdom?If the verifiable properties of attributes are regarded as wisdom, then why is the ontology that discusses basic issues known as wisdom?

Furthermore, the scholarship we are now pursuing should not be envisioned as the study of the causes discussed in "physical science".For (a) this does not involve ultimate cause. (Extreme cause originates from goodness, which belongs to the scope of action and change; while the ultimate goodness belongs to the prime mover,—— But when it comes to things that don't change, there is no such thing that makes them change in the first place. ) (b) It is also difficult to say whether the scholarship we are now striving for can be generalized to sensible things, or can only be devoted to non-sensible things.If it is a non-sense thing, it should be a general formula or a mathematical object.Now the (sub)general formula obviously doesn't exist. (If the existence of general formulas is admitted, it is difficult to say why mathematical objects should not exist in this world like other things with general formulas. These thinkers place mathematical objects between general formulas and sensible things as objects in this world. There is a third series beyond the two series of things and their general formulas; but there is no third person and third horse besides the ideal man and the individual man. On the other hand, if their ideas are not recognized, the What will science study? Then it must not be the things in this world; because such things are not the objects of mathematics.) Then (ugly) the science we are striving for is not for mathematical objects; because all mathematical objects are cannot exist independently.This, however, does not deal exclusively with sensible things; for they are perishable.

You will be asked questions about the mathematical material in that academic discussion. It does not belong to the science of physics, for the whole of physics is devoted to the study of things which have principles of movement and rest; nor does it belong to the science of positivism; for this science studies only that kind of knowledge which it posits.It is then left to the philosophy in question to deal with these questions. You may also discuss whether our science is based on theories of what are called elements; and it is supposed that there are elements in all composite things. However, it should also be considered that the scholarship we strive for should be universal in research;

Since every formula and every science is based on general principles and not on the lowest breeds, it follows that science should be devoted to the study of the highest genera.These will eventually be attributed to "reality and unity"; because these are the basis of each principle on the ontology, and they contain all things; if "one" and "is" disappear, then all things will also disappear with them ; because everything is claiming that it is "one" and "is".However, "One and Yes" should be referred to in terms of their differences, and the genus refers to the sameness of things, not their differences. According to this meaning, we seem to be unable to take "One and Yes" as a category. genus and principle.But if the simpler ones are more complex, it is closer to the principle, then the lowest species in the family and genera is simpler than the family and genera (because the species are indistinguishable, and the family and genera can be divided into many varieties), then instead of thinking that the family The genus is the principle, rather the species is the principle.If it is said that varieties create differences in the place where the genus is the same, and this difference destroys the genus of the genus, then the genus should be closer to the principle; for it is that which can contain the destructiveness of another thing. The principle of another thing.These and other such questions are bewildering.

Chapter Two Also, do we need to assume that there are certain things that are separate from individuals, and that it is these things that our science deals with?But individual things are infinite in number; things that are independent of individuals are either families or species, and our academics do not study these.Why it is impossible to study these questions has been explained above.Whether it is necessary to postulate a separable substance in addition to the sensible substance (that is, the substance in this world), or to regard the sensible substance as the real thing with which wisdom is concerned, it is generally difficult to say.For it seems that we are looking for another kind of substances, and this is our problem—whether there are independent beings outside the things themselves that do not belong to the sensible things—if there are such substances corresponding to the sensible things, but It is separated from them, then it has to ask what kinds of sensible substances can have these corresponding substances?Why do people assume that humans and horses should have such corresponding identities more than other animals or inanimate creatures in general?On the other hand, it seems unadmirable to make another series of eternal beings equal in number to sensible and perishable beings. ——However, if the principle we seek cannot be separated from the real thing, then which term is more praiseworthy than matter?But matter is only potential, not actualization.Compared with matter, it seems that form or shape is a more important principle; but form is perishable, so there is no eternal body that can be independent and free.Yet this is paradoxical; for such beings and principles should actually exist, and it is precisely these that most accomplished thinkers have actually and unanimously pursued; In fact, how did the universe establish order?

Also, if there is indeed a substance and principle of the nature we are looking for in the world, and this is the only principle that connects perishable and indestructible things, then the question must turn to why some things fall into the eternal principle and others Some fall into the principle of destruction?This is impossible.But if it be admitted that there are two principles in the world, one of which applies to perishable things and the other to eternal things, we are also in doubt, whether both principles are eternal?If the principle is eternal, why should not that which belongs to the perishable principle also be eternal?If the principle is not eternal, how can the other principle (i.e. the principle of indestructible things) be eternal; Endless.

If, on the other hand, we establish, as the most invariable principles, "Essence and Unity," (a) how can it be separated if each Essence and Unity is not designated as a separate thing or a substance? And independent?Yet it is this independence that we should hope for as a fundamental and eternal principle.But, (b) If they were each a "this" or substance, all existing things would be all in substance; The phrase "existing things are substances" is not true. (C) They say that "unity" is the first principle and the noumenon, and "number", which is produced by the unit and matter, should also be the noumenon. What is the meaning of these teachings?How can we imagine that "two" and other numbers are still called "one" (a number) after being combined by several "ones"?

On this point they say nothing, and it is difficult to explain. Let us try to assume "lines" and things that follow them (I mean ideal surfaces) as principles, then at least these are not separable entities, lines are just divisions of surfaces, surfaces are layers of volumes, (and points are just lines paragraphs;) They are also the delimitation of corresponding things; but these divisions, paragraphs and levels are each contained in another thing, and in fact none of them can be separated to become an independent existence.To further ask, how can we assume that there are such entities as "point" and "one" in the world?Every ontology becomes a reality by a gradual process, but a point has no gradual process of becoming; because a point is a paragraph.

Another difficulty arises from the fact that all knowledge is some "so" about the universal, but noumenon is not a universal but rather a particular "this"; How can we suppose that first principles are ontology? Also, are there independent things other than synthetic entities (I mean things in which matter and form are combined)?If we say that there is nothing else, but all things subsisting in matter are perishable, we cannot answer the question of indestructibility.If anything else, it should be the formula or shape.It is now difficult to discern which forms are independent in order to be separable, and which are not; there are some cases, such as a house, whose forms are clearly inseparable.

And, are the principles the same in kind or in number?If it is the same as number, then all things are the same. Chapter three Because philosophy only seeks the truth from the general reality, focusing on the general principles and a little bit of the deviation, and "truth is" has multiple meanings, and when it has different meanings, it cannot be studied by the same academic (the words are the same Items with different meanings should belong to different families); however, if this word has some common meanings after all, then "actually" should also be attributed to an academic discipline. Word categories such as "medical" and "healthy" each have multiple meanings (and each belongs to a discipline) as described above.The use of word categories must correspond to what they are related to, one of which is related to medical treatment, the other is related to health, and the others are related to other things related to each other, and each seeks its agreement.Or a knife is called medical equipment, or a course is called medical courses, the former is practical, the latter is academic, and the ones involved are both medical.The things called "health" are similar, one can be a sign of health, and the other can contribute to a person's health.It is like this. The reason why "is" is called "is" is similar to this; the "is" it calls is either the evolution of reality, or its normal state, or its transient state, or its motion, or other similar By.Every existing thing can be compared with a simple general meaning, and every antithesis can be compared with the basic antithesis and basic difference of reality, whether the basic difference is "many and single", or "similar and dissimilar". ", or others of that kind; these, which we have already discussed, will not go into detail here.There is no difference between the existing things and the analogy of "reality" or "Yuanyi".Because, even if the two are not the same, at least they are convertible; because everything that is "one" always has its "is", and everything that is "is" is also "one". However, since each antithesis belongs to the same academic discipline, and each pair of antithesis has two items, each is the lack of the other. (In cases where there are couplets such as righteousness and unrighteousness which have an intermediate between the two ends, one may ask, how does the lack relate to the two ends?) In all these cases one must assume that the lack is Not a deprivation of all definitions, but only the lowest kind of deprivation.For example, if a righteous person is interpreted as "a person who obeys the law completely due to his self-conscious nature", then the definition of an unjust person does not need to be a negation of the entire definition section by section, but only needs to be "not obedient to the law in some respects", In this respect he is called Queso; it is like this. Just like a mathematician who specializes in abstract things (before he starts to study, he strips off all sensible qualities, such as light and heavy, soft and hard, cold and warm, and other sensible pairs, leaving only quantity and continuity Quantity and continuity, sometimes of one dimension, sometimes of two, sometimes of three dimensions, and the properties of these things as measurement and continuity, are indifferent in any other respect; he considers the relative position of some of them and their properties, and the measurable and immeasurable properties of other things, and the proportions of other things, etc.; but all these are settled in the same science—geometry), and the same is true in the study of reality. "Reality", as far as "reality" is concerned, the attributes and the opposites contained in it are precisely the object of philosophy.People can respectively attribute the fact that things are not true, but only changeable to physical science; the thing that does not regard itself as true but regards "what its attributes are as true" is attributed to dialectics and sophistry. ; then it remains to the philosopher that the things we have shown are true.Therefore, everything that can be compared to what is real by some simple and common things, although the word has many meanings, such things can be classified into one science by the simple general meaning, and all pairs of (they can be contrasted with actual basic pairs and basic differences), so that the difficulty we raised at the beginning can be regarded as solved-I mean how things of many different families can be attributed to An academic question. Chapter Four Although mathematicians use general rules in seeking solutions to various topics, this has left philosophers to examine the principles of mathematics. The principle of "equals minus equals, and the rest is equal" applies to all measurements, but mathematicians only apply this principle to the part of things they strip out, such as lines, or angles, or numbers or other such The measure of things—mathematics does not care what those things actually are, but how they each continue in one or two or three dimensions.But philosophy does not study individual subjects having these or those accidental attributes. It still thinks about things to clarify the reasons for everything to become the reality of this thing. ——Physics and mathematics have the same status; physics studies the attributes of things, and clarifies their principles of motion regardless of what they are (as for the first science we call also involves attributes and principles of motion, this is nothing else, It is only because there is another substratum in terms of attributes and changes); therefore, physics and mathematics must be classified as branches of wisdom (parts of philosophy). Chapter five There is a principle which we must not gloss over, but on the contrary must permanently admit as true—that "the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be, or admit of other like opposite ends."There are individual demonstrations of such truths, but no complete universal demonstration.For the full confirmation of a principle must be subsumed by a more certain truth, of which we cannot find a more certain truth.Whoever wants to prove him wrong to a person holding the opposite view must first ask the other party to admit that this is exactly the same principle (not as it seems)-the principle is that "the same thing cannot be and is not at the same time" ; and only in this way can he make his argument corroborative to someone who actually holds an opposite opinion on the same subject.The two parties participating in the debate must have a tacit understanding of this intention; if they do not agree with this rule, how can their debate proceed?Every word must refer to something intelligible, and each word can only refer to one thing, never many things; if a word refers to several things, it should first explain which one it refers to. thing.Then whoever says "this is and is not" denies what he affirms, and whoever literally means "so" says it is "not so"; this is impossible.So although "this is" indicates something, it can no longer be used to represent the opposite (contradiction) of it. Also, if it is affirmed that the word signifies something, the word and the thing will form a necessary connection; what must be "yes" should not be "no".So it is impossible to affirm and deny the same theme exactly the opposite.If affirmation and negation are equally true, then whoever says "human" and whoever says "non-human" are equally true.It seems that saying "this person is not a horse" is neither more true nor less true than "this person is not a person", and that the same person who can say "not a horse" can also be said to be "a horse"; It had been postulated that the opposite narrative might be equally true.Then it follows: is this same person a man, a horse, or any other animal. For these general principles, although there is no complete and sufficient proof here, it is enough to refute those who make arbitrary assumptions separately.Perhaps by cross-examining Heraclitus himself in this way, he could be forced to admit that the same subject can never be equally true for two opposite interpretations.But he makes such an assertion without knowing what his assertion actually entails.If what he says is indeed true, not only will the same thing be and not be at the same time, but it has to go like this: try to break down such a statement that each individual affirmation and individual negation should be equally true-and then compound it into A synthetic narrative—such a synthetic affirmation would be as true as a synthetic negation.Again, if a theorem does not affirm anything with certainty—and all it affirms is that the positive need not be positive to be positive, and the opposite need not be negative—the theorem itself should be false.If there is truth and wrong in the world, it is bound to reject these dissents that completely destroy reasonable grammar. Chapter Six Protago also had words similar to the above idea: he said that "man is the measure of all things", which means that what everyone sees is true.If so, the same individual thing that is beautiful to one person may be ugly to another, and this is often the case with other things that are measured by humans. If this is the case, the same thing will be right or wrong, good or bad, and all Both statements to the contrary will be equally true.If we trace its origin here, we will be able to solve its confusion.Part of this idea is based on the teachings of natural philosophers, while other examples are based on common secular views. People in the world either like or hate the same thing, or find it pleasant or bitter, and each of them differs according to what they see. Think differently. "Everything must come from things, and nothing cannot become something." This general rule is generally recognized by almost all natural philosophers.However, if there is an all-white person first, white cannot be produced, and if non-white exists first, this will not hinder the production of white; therefore, the opponents can say that the first is not white, and now it is white, and white cannot be prevented. The white one comes; if it is, then it must first exist in this thing both white and non-white.However, this difficulty can be easily eliminated; we have explained in "Materials" that things come into being from nothing, and there are two different meanings from becoming from something. It would be naive to equate the opinions and impressions of the two sides of the debate; one of the two sides must be wrong.It is obvious that the problem arises from the senses; the same thing does not actually taste sweet to one person and bitter to another, and if it were any different, one of them would have impaired or altered sense of taste.If this is the case, we should use one of them as the standard for measuring things, and not the abnormal other.The same is true of good and evil, of beauty and ugliness, and the like.Those who hold to the opinion we object to, just as one finger presses the lower eyelid and sees two fingers, and then shows that there is only one finger, he maintains that two are the same as one (which is different from the other A finger looks like a finger to a person who interferes with his vision). In short, it is absurd to base our judgments of truth on the notion that all things in the world are in constant flux, and that nothing remains the same for a moment.The search for truth must begin with things that remain the same and do not change.These should be the most suitable for the various celestial bodies; they will be safe through the ages, and they will be the same yesterday and today. If they do not participate in changes, they will not be like this for a moment, and then the same for a moment. Moreover, if there is change, there must be something passive. "All things that are passive must come from something and enter something." A certain thing can also be another thing that enters later; in fact, this thing is first in a certain thing, comes out of a certain thing due to the progress of movement, enters a certain thing after being separated from a certain thing, and then exists in a certain thing middle; the first and the latter are never at the same time, so the contrary narratives can never be both true at the same time as they imagine. Even if things on this earth are in constant flux—not quite, but let’s assume that—why should it be assumed that things are not constant in quality?Our opponent seems to believe that because the same thing can be four cubits long or not four cubits long, he believes that the amount of things cannot be kept constant, and thus misunderstands the fallacy that contradictory statements can be true of both at the same time.But how things depend on quality rather than quantity, quality comes from the determinism of things, and quantity comes from the indeterminacy of things. Also, when a doctor tells people to take certain special foods, why do people obey the doctor's advice?How can it be made clear that "this is bread" is more true than "this is not bread"? If you act according to the nonsense, there is no difference between taking food and taboos.But in fact, people and doctors all know the general rules of speech, and know that eating is eating, and what you eat is definitely bread.If it were true that nature was always in flux, and that all sensible things were absolutely impermanent, they would not be able to feel at all. Also, if we are always changing and have no normal state, then why should everyone be surprised by the patient's visual illusion? (According to their argument, the visual and sensory objects of a person without disease are constantly changing; but in fact, although the same thing causes different impressions in two physiologically different people, it does not itself participate in the variation of the sick person's vision. If things, as said above, are in flux, they should also give the impression of variation to the unaffected.) If we remain normal and unchanging, things will also remain unchanging. Satisfactory answers are not easy to those who pose such doubts from a position of defense, unless they are willing to affirm something without asking for an explanation; Only in this way can all understanding and demonstration proceed and be completed; if nothing is approved, they destroy all understanding and discussion cannot proceed.There is no way to reason with such a person.As for those who are confused by traditional puzzles, it is easy to talk to them and dispel their confusion.This has been made clear in the verses mentioned above. After these analyses, it is clear that opposite (contradictory) narratives cannot be true on the same topic at the same time; the same cannot be true for relative narratives, because when one end of the opposite appears, it must be deprived by the other end.This can be seen if we reduce the formulas of the antithesis to their fundamentals. Similarly, if a subject is defined as an end of an antithesis, the intermediate between antithesis cannot belong to this subject. If the subject is white, we should not say that it is neither black nor white, because then , then it can be said that this is white and not white; The second item of the two items in the compound narrative ("not black and not white") actually contradicts white. If the intermediary becomes what the subject is, then "not white" will also be what the subject is of white. <This is impossible>. So, we cannot accept the idea of ​​Heraclitus or Anaxagoras.If those ideas are considered to be correct, then the opposite ends will be (simultaneously) the predicate of a theme; when Anaxagoras said: "Everything contains a differential of all things", that means Sweet things are not different from bitter things, nor are they different from other pairs, so that what is contained in each thing is not only its potentiality, but also its respective realization. Similarly, it cannot be said that all statements are false, nor can they be true, because if everything is false, even his principle should be false, and if it is true, then if I say "this is all false The "" cannot be false; other kinds of confusion can be explained from such a topic. Chapter seven Every science seeks out certain principles and causes for what is knowable within its sphere--for example, medicine and fitness and other manufacturing sciences or mathematics.Each school is limited to the kinds of things it studies, as if to seek the reason for the existence and actuality of all things,-but in fact it is not; the study of existence and actuality is another science, completely different from these academics.The above-mentioned academic disciplines have their own views on how various things come to be and their "hows", and they tend to specialize in trying to clarify other truths.However, the "how is" they obtained is either based on feelings or hypotheses; in short, no such science of induction has ever been able to be a witness of the ontology and how it is. There is a natural science which is distinct from both the practical science and the manufacturing science. As far as the production of knowledge is concerned, the source of change is in the producer, not in the product. The source of change is art or other functions.Similarly, as far as pragmatic science is concerned, the source of change lies in the person who does the work, not in the work.However, the types of things studied by natural philosophy all have their own principles of change, so natural learning is neither practical nor engaged in manufacturing, which becomes a theoretical learning (all learning must be one of the three).Every science must know some "how is" ("what is this?"), and take this how is as a principle, so we should pay attention to how natural philosophers define things and make their "how is" into formulas—and these are formulas such as "concave" or "concave". "Concave nose" includes matter, and "concavity" is independent of matter; concavity is derived from the nose, and we must not give up the nose to derive its formula. Concave nose is a nose with a concave shape.Obviously, then, the muscles, eyes, and other parts cannot be formulated without substance. Because the academic study of what is real is an independent academic, we must consider whether this academic is the same as physical science or different.Physics discusses things that have their own dynamic principles; mathematics is a theoretical study that discusses static things, but mathematical objects cannot exist independently of things.So different from these two academic disciplines, it must be the academic study of those things that exist independently and do not change. We will try to prove that this kind of noumenon actually exists in the world.If there is such a kind of reality in the world, this place should be the place of God and become the first most basic principle.So obviously, there are three theoretical academics—physics, mathematics, and theology; Theoretical learning is respected by all academics, especially theology; each academic has its own advantages and disadvantages according to the high and low of the research object, and the explorer of theology is the most noble existence in the world. Superior to all academics. One can ask whether the science of what is is universal or not.Each subject of mathematics studies a certain level of mathematical objects, but general mathematics is generalized to all subjects and applied to all mathematical objects.If the natural noumenon is the first of all existing things, then physical science must be the first of science; but if there is more independent and unchanging noumenon and reality in the world, then this knowledge must be prior to everything, and universal to all, and also It must be different from physical science but prior to physical science. Chapter eight Because one of the meanings of "actuality" is the attribute (accidental) being, we must take this aspect of actuality into consideration.Obviously, traditional scholarship does not care about the problem of accidental attributes.Architecture does not take into account those who are to live in the house (for example, whether their lives in the house will be good or bad, happy or sad), nor weaving, or shoemaking or clothing; every science considers only their own ends within their respective spheres.As for the topic of the debate, it is like "everything that exists is always something that has never existed before, so there is nothing to do." As long as one already knows music and can write, this kind of cici - except for sophists, the established academic disciplines will not deal with these issues; because these are attributes.So when Plato said that the Sophist made a career out of "what is not", he was not wrong. If we try to understand what the attribute (accidental) is, we can understand that the science of attributes should not exist.We say that everything is either common, or inevitable (necessary does not mean that it comes from violence, but that it can be known by appealing to evidence), or most of them are like this, this is one kind, and the other is not Not most of them are like this, and it is very true, and it is not inevitable, but only by chance (chance); encounter.Thus, the contingent attribute can be interpreted as an encounter, rather than a common, inevitable, or most possible encounter.Now that we have explained what attributes are, it will be clear to all that such a science cannot be established; for all science deals only with things which are often or mostly such, and accidental attributes are not of this kind. Obviously, the being of attributes does not have causes and principles like the being of nature; if it has causes and principles, this will become necessary.If there is B, there will be A, and if there is C, there will be B; if C is not accidental but must exist, then where C is the cause, B will also become necessary, and the successive causes will cause the successive effects. Until the final result (but the result is followed by the reason of the hypothesis). Therefore, everything will become inevitable, and the possibility that a thing may or may not happen, that is, "chance", is completely deleted from this series.If the first cause were not already present, the same effect would follow; the events would necessarily follow in succession.Tomorrow will see a lunar eclipse, if A is seen first; A will be seen, if B is seen first; B will be seen, if C is seen first; , we shall see the predestined beginning.If the previous causes were true, then the various consequences would be encountered, and everything would become an inevitable encounter. The reason why "truth is" and "attribute is" are "is" is that the former depends on the combination of thought (reason), which is also an evolution of thought (so the principle we are exploring is not the original meaning of reality but the original meaning of reality). is actually an external objective principle); The latter is neither certain (that is, accidental), nor necessary; and the causes of accidental things are neither certain nor systematic. If things come from nature or are caused by thought, it must be seen that they are suitable for the purpose.If such a thing happens suddenly, it is an opportunity (luck).For a thing ought to have a cause, either by nature or by accident. For certain things, which have always been of some effect, and for some purpose, happen suddenly, and the cause of such things cannot but be ascribed to chance, which is chance, and thus chance covers the same sphere as thought; for Those functions should have taken place by thought.The cause of the result of chance is indeterminate; therefore, "chance" is hidden and beyond the calculation of human intelligence. This kind of accidental cause can be regarded as a cause without a cause.If the result is good or evil, good or bad, it is said to be the path of good luck or bad luck; if the consequences encountered are large-scale, it is said to be prosperity or decline. As accidental things do not precede natural things, so accidental causes do not precede natural causes.If there are those who take "chance" or "spontaneity" as the cause of the material universe, then "reason" and "nature" should be the cause first. Chapter Nine Some things are only actual things, such as a certain substance, some are only potential things, such as having a certain quantity, and some are potential and actual things, such as other categories.There is no movement apart from things, and changes are always carried out according to the categories of reality, and the categories are not interchangeable.All things in each category must be made in one of two ways, for example, in the individual, its kind is "positive form" and the other is "absence"; in "quality", One is "white" and the other is "black"; in terms of "quantity", one is complete and the other is "incomplete"; in space movement, one is "upward" and the other is "downward", Or one thing is "light" and the other is "heavy"; in this way, there are as many types of changes as there are types. Between potentiality and full realization there is a level of things, and I call this realization of potentiality movement.From the facts listed below, we can see that what we say is correct. When bricks and stones are being used in construction, that is, during the construction process, we think that these bricks and stones are "buildable", and these buildable buildings are being realized as "buildable".Learning, healing, walking, jumping, growing, maturing, all alike.When the movement is over, that is, when it is fully realized, neither first nor later.The so-called change means that potential things (bricks and stones) are transformed into fully realized (houses) in their movable status (bricks and stones as building materials) instead of their original identity (bricks and stones not as bricks and stones).Here, η <as> I use to indicate the meaning: copper, potentially, is a statue; but the complete realization of the statue is not the movement of "copper as copper".For "copper as copper" is not the same as "as" some underlying thing.If this were exactly the same in definition, then the complete realization of copper as copper would have to be counted as a movement.But it's not the same. (This is evident in the case of opposites; being able to be healthy is not the same as being able to be sick - if "can be" is the same, then being alive will be the same as being sick, - the only thing that is really the same is health and the substratum of the disease, that substratum or blood or bodily fluids are exactly the same blood or bodily fluids.) As colors are different from visible things, things are not identical to latent things; accomplish.In this way, it should be clear that "changes are finally realized at the same time as they are fully realized, not first or later".For every thing, such as the buildable as buildable, may sometimes be realized and sometimes not realized; and the realization of a buildable as buildable is the act of building.Realization is either the construction project or the house.But when the house exists, the building is no longer the building; it has become the building.Therefore, the realization process must be an architectural activity, which is a dynamic change.同样的道理可应用于其它一切动变。 从别人关于动变的议论看来，可以明白我们所说不误，事实上也没有其它方法来界说动变。第一，这不能安排在其它级别中。这从人们的议论中可以见到。有些人称动变为"别异"，为"不等"为"不实"；可是这些都不是必然会动变的，变化或从这些发生与变向这些，却也一样可从它们的对反发生与变向。人们把动变安排在这些级别中的缘故，是因为这些被当作为"未定"，而"未定"之成为诸对反两行列中的一列则因为它们全都不是"这个"，也不是"如此"，也不是其它任何范畴，而是阙失。至于动变为何被看作"未定"，是因为这不能归入事物之潜在或其实现；因为可能成为某一量与实现为某一量都不是必然会动变的。动变可拟想为实现，但未完成；动变虽出于潜能之进行实现，却也不完全。所以这很难捉摸动变究竟是什么；我们必须把它归之于"阙失"，或"潜能"，或"实现"，可是明显地，均不适宜。所以剩下的唯一安排就得依照我们的意见，归入我们所叙述的实现活动——这是一级难于察见而可得存在的实现过程。 动变显然涵存于可动变物之中；因为被那动变原因所动变而成为完全实现的正是这可动变物。致使动变之活动不异于可动变者之活动。两者的活动结果就是完全实现。一事物称为主动者，是因为它具有致使动变的能力；但实行动变的还得是那可动变者，所以两者的实现是合一的，有如一个段落，可说是从一到二，也可说从二到一，有如一个山坡，可以说是上坡，也可以说下坡，段落还是那同一段落，山坡还是那同一山坡，只在活动上看来不相同；主动与被动的例与此相似。 Chapter ten 无限〈无尽〉，或（甲）是不能达到尽处的，因为它的本性就是不可尽（这于声音总是看不到的有所类似）或（乙）是容许无尽地进行的，或是（丙）很难进行到尽处，或是（丁）虽则自然地可到尽处，却从未到过这尽处。又，一事物可以在加法或减法上为无限，或是在两者均为无限。说无限是一个可分离的独立实是而又不可得见，这是不可能的。无限若既不是一个几何量度又不是一个算术众多，而自身并不因属性而成为无限，却正因其本性为无限而成为无限者，这便应是不可区分的了；因为量度或众多均可区分。若无限正是不可区分，那就只有声音看不到这样的命意可成为无限；然而人们所论述的无限并不指这样的命意，我们也不是在考察这一类无限，大家只研究那不可尽的无限。那么无限应是数或量度的一个属性，若量度或数不能独立自在，无限如何能独立自在？又，无限若为其它某些事物的一个偶然属性，这样的无限就不能是那些事物的怎是，这犹如"不可见性"不能成为言语一样，尽管"声音"是不可见的。明显地，无限不能实现地存在。因为这样在无限中取出任何部分均将是无限（因为无限若不是一个主题的云谓，而已成为一本体，则"成为无限"〈无限性〉与"这无限"就相同了）。所以无限或不可区分或可区分，若可分段，则各段均当为无限；但同一事物不能有许多无限（假如无限为一本体，亦为一原理，则无限的一部分仍还是无限，犹如气的部分仍为气）。所以，这必须是不可分配的，不可区划的。但因为在实现上，无限就得是某一个量，这就不能是不可区分的。所以无限性只能是某一主题的偶然属性。但若真象我们所说过的那样，无限就不能是一个原理，这只能是气或偶数的偶然属性。 这个研究是普遍性的；但由下一论点可得明白在可感觉事物中没有"无限"。一个实体的定义倘是"以面为其界"，则无论是可感觉或可理知实体均不能是无限；也不能有一个分离的无限数，因为数以及具有数的事物均是可点数的。从下一论点看来真理是确乎明显的。无限既不能是组合体，也不能是单体。（甲）因为要素之为众为多是有限的，这就不能组合成"无限"。诸对反必须相等衡，各不能是无限；对反两物体的能力倘有高低，则有限将被无限所灭坏。两物体又不能均为无限。物体在各个方向均具有延伸，而无限则是不尽地延伸着，这样，无限倘为一物体，此物将在每一方向均为无尽。（乙）无限物体既不能是任何单纯物体〈元素〉——也不能象有些人所认见的由以创生诸元素的某些超元素事物。（因为诸元素以外并无这样的事物；万物均可分析为它所组成的元素，但除了不可再分离的诸单体〈元素〉外，从没有分析出这样的事物。）无限也不是火，也不能是其它元素。 除了这些怎能成为"无限"这问题以外，宇宙万物即便它是"有限"也不能是这一元素可以变为任何另一元素；象赫拉克利特所说"一切在某时悉变成火"。同样论点也可应用于自然哲学家们在诸元素外所主张的"元一"。因为一切事物均由对反变向对反，例如由热变冷。 又，一个可感觉实体必有所居处，全体与部分各有其正常位置，例如整个大地〈地球〉与其部分。于是，（甲）假如一个无限实体是匀整的，这当是或不动弹，或常动。但这是不可能的；它在或动或静，或上或下，或这里或那里，将何所择呢？例如这无限实体苟有外壳，它这一部分，将在何处逞其动静？这个匀整的实体和它外壳已占尽了无限的空间。 又，外壳真能占尽了那空间么？怎样来占尽？（这是不可能的。） 其动与静又何如？这将是在任何处静止着就不能动弹；或是在任何处动着就不能静止。但（乙）假如这"全体"〈全宇宙〉具有各不相似的部分，则各个部分的正当位置也不相似，而且第一，这个"全体"只能是因接触而成一实体，第二，它各个部分，其为数应或是有限或是无限。它们不能是有限一类；因为全体既为无限，其中一些部分若为有限，则另一些部分就将是无限；例如火或水应将是无限，但这样的一个无限元素将毁灭对反诸元素。假如其各部分是类属无限的单体，那么它们的部位也各为无限，而全体中又得有无限数的元素；假如这是不可能的，各个部位是有限的，全宇宙也必是有限的。 一般说来，一切可感觉物既悉属或轻或重的实体，世上便不能有一个无限实体而仍让诸实体各保持其正常位置。因为这必须或向中，或向上运动，而"无限"——或是一整个或是半个——均不能作向中或向上的运动。你怎能区分这个实体？你将以那一部分为上或为下，又那一部分为中或为外？ 每一可感觉事物各有其空间位置，而位置则有六类，这些都不能存在于一个无限实体中。一般说来，假如没有无限空间，无限实体也不能有；（无限空间实际是不能有的，）在一空间就得在某处，这就得是在上或在下，或在其它任何方向之一，这些各都有一个定限。 至于表现在运动上，或在距离上，或在时间上的无限，其命意不同于单独事物，这些必皆后于某一先天事物，由于另一事物在先故此后天事物相关地称为"无限"，例如一事物在动变或扩张中由于所历的距离关系，其运动有称为"无限"者，而由于运动的历程，一时间亦有称为"无限"者。 Chapter Eleven 关于变化的事物，有些是在偶然属性上变，例如说"这有文化的"在散步；另有些说是在全称上变着，因为它某些内存的事物在变，或是它所包含的某部分在变；身体说是变成健康，因为病眼已治愈了。更有些事物由于本性而直接变化，这才主要的是在本性上为可变事物。致动者也有同样分别；致动者引致变化也可以是或出于偶然属性，或部分地出于本性或全出于本性。 动变，某些事物当是直接致动，某些事物当是出于被动； 又必有动变时间，以及始动所自与终动所止。但作为动变两限点的形式，情态，地位都不动变，例如知识与热度；热度不是一个动变，加热或减温过程才是动变。 并非一切事物均具有非属性之变，内在本性之变只能变于诸相对，诸间体与诸相反〈矛盾〉之间。我们可凭归纳以为证明。凡变，或正变入于正或负变入于负，或正变入于负或负变入于正。（正项命意，我现在用以指说一个肯定词。） 这里负与负两项既非相对亦非相反，"负入于负"既然不涵有对反就不能当作一变；故变必归于三式。负乃正的相反，"负入于正"为生成，全变即完全生成，局部之变即局部生成； "正入于负"为灭坏，全变为完全灭坏，局部之变为局部灭坏。 假如"非是"有数命意，而在结合与分离上为"非是"者，以及与全称实是为相反的潜在之是，均不容有运动（"非白的"或"非善的"当然可以作偶然的动变，因为那非白的或非善的可能是一个人；但如果全不是一个个体，这就没法运动），则凡属"非是"均当不能"运动"。（若然如此，则"非是"既出于生成，一切生成便不能是运动；即便这生成完全出于属性，"非是"仍是一般生成事物的云谓）。相似地，"静止"也与非是无涉。于是这些后果颇为古怪。还有，每一运动的事物必有一处所，"非是"原无所处；但它若有运动这便当有其处所。灭坏也不应是运动；因为运动的两个对反为动和静，但灭坏的对反却正是生成。因为每一个运动是一个变化，而变化有三类，前已列举，三类之中生灭一式为一事物在它的两相反间之变化，并非运动，这样就只有正项之变入于正项才是运动。正项可以是相对或是间体（阙失也可作为相对），均用肯定词为之命名，例如裸体〈无衣〉，或豁龈〈无齿〉，或黑〈无白〉。 Chapter Twelve 如范畴分为本体，质，处，作用或被作用，关系，量，则运动必归于三类——质，量，处。本体无运动（因为本体无与之相对者），关系亦然（因为相关系的两者之一变化时，另一相关词项虽全无变化，亦已失其原关系，——所以它们的运动是附属的）。作用与被作用者，或主动者与被动者亦然，因为这既没有"运动的运动"，也没有"生成的生成"，一般说来也就没有"变化的变化"。（一）运动的运动也许在两个涵义上存在；（甲）一个人从白变黑这行动是一个行动主体在行动——在这样行动着的这个人又可以加热，冷却，或挪移，或增大。但这不可能是变化的变化；因为这里的主体不是（乙）或是另一主体也许由变化而再变为另一式的存在（例如一个人由疾病变成健康），但这动变只可附于主体而发生，仍还不可能是变化的变化。因为每一动变是由某些事物变为某些事物，生灭亦然；只是生灭变化之入于对反与运动之入于对反者其道各异。于是，说一事物同时由健康变为疾病，又由这个变化本身变向另一事物。明白地，假如这已变于疾病，这当已变到可得进行任何再变的境界（这不能在静止中），每一变化原不是一些偶然的变化，再变也当是由某些确定的事物变向于另些确定事物；所以再变将必是相反的变化，亦即变为健康。然而所有这些变化都只能凭附在某一主体上进行；例如有一种变化是由回忆变向遗忘的过程，这种变化只是因为那变化过程所系属的事物在变着，一时变入有知状态，一时又变入无知状态。 （二）变化的变化与生成的生成倘是确有的，这过程将进至无限。后一生成倘出于前一生成，则前一生成又必更有前一生成。假如简单的现生成物若先已是一度生成，则那些生成物又应先已一度是某些生成物；那么这些简单生成物尚未存在，那些曾已生成物业经先已存在。而那个业已生成物，在那时候则尚未成为生成物。但因为在一切无限系列中找不到第一项，在这样的生成系列中也不会有第一项，那么后续各项也不能跟着存在。于是生成或运动或变化也都不能有。 （三）凡能运动的也是能作相对的运动与静止的，凡生成者亦消失。故生成者当于一经生成的生成之顷即便消失，因为这不能在生成之中消失，亦不能在以后消失；那么，凡是正在消失的事物，必须是此刻正在生成的事物。 （四）生成与变化必须具有一物质为之底层。于是这底层物质将是什么，人在改换中，是身体抑灵魂在进行这改换，是什么成为运动或变化？这动变的终局又是什么？因为这必须是某些事物从某些事物动变为某些事物。于是这个条件怎能达成？不能有学习的学习，所以也没有变化的变化。 因为本体或关系，或作用与被作用均无运动，运动就只与质、量和处相涉；因为这些各都具有对成。至于质，我不是指本体中的质（因为差异也是一种质），我只指承受的质，由于这种质，一事物得以被作用或由此得以不被作用。全不被动变者或是在长时期间很难动变，或是动变开始很慢的，或是本性上能被动变且应被动变，而在该动变之时与该动变之处并不动变者，这些谓之不动变物。在诸不动变物中，只有这最后一个我称为在静止中；因为静止是相对于运动的，所以这必须是能受运动者的一个阙失。 事物之所在相紧接者称为"共处"，事物之各在一处者称为"分离"〈独立〉。（在一直线上相隔最近者称为"对处"。） 事物之极外端相共在一起者为"接触"；变化中的事物，若照它的本性继续变化，在尚未自然地到达到变化终极之前谓之"间在"。因为一切变化皆在对反之间，对反则或是相对或是相反，而相反者便无中项，所以这明显地，只相对之间才有"间在"。跟着起点顺次而下者为"串联"（其序列决定于位置或形式或其它），相串联的两者不得有同级而非顺次者杂入其间，例如线与线，单位与单位，一房屋与一房屋之间。（非同级事物之杂入其间，这可不管。）串联者，联于某事物而为某事物之后；"一"之于"二"不为串联，月份中初一亦不串联于初二。串联而相接触者谓之"贴切"。延续为贴切的一个品种。两事物之外限相共处以至于合一者，我称为"延续"，所以诸事物由于相贴切而成为一个整体者，才可见其为延续。 明显地，在这些观念中，串联当为先得，（因为串联者不必为接触，而接触者可为串联；事物之延续者自必相接触，而接触者不必延续；诸事物之不相接触者必非一有机体）；所以一个点不同于一个单位；因为各点可接触，而各单位〈数〉不可接触，诸单位只能串联；点之间可有某些事物，但单位之(此处缺)