Chapter 12 volume ten

Chapter One We have explained that "one" has a number of meanings in the interpretation of the collection of word categories; although the meaning of yuan one is very broad, all things that are directly due to their nature and are not united by attributes can be classified into four categories. (1) That which lasts, by which it is continued, either in general or specifically, refers to "that" which grows out of nature, which is not made one by touching or being bound; In this category, those whose activities are simpler and more consistent should be more strictly and more preferentially in line with the will of "one". (2) The one that becomes a whole and has a certain form is a higher-level "one". In this category, the reason for its continuation should be based on its own nature and not synthesized by glue or staples.The activities of such things are consistent and indistinguishable both in space and in time; therefore, it is obvious that a thing which has the basic pattern (that is, circular motion) of the basic motion (that is, spatial motion) is basically a space Measure body.Some things, then, are "one" by virtue of their continuation or wholeness, and others are "one" by virtue of their formula being one.Such things are one in thought and indistinguishable; indistinguishable means that the thing is indistinguishable in form or number. (3) Therefore, the individual is indistinguishable in number, and (4) indistinguishable in form, its comprehension and cognition, all of which are sufficient to make noumenon one, then it is the "one" in basic meaning .These are the four meanings of "Yuanyi" - things that continue naturally, the whole, the individual and the universal.All these, some in activity, some indistinguishable in thought or formula, all become "one".

However, "what kind of things are called one", "how to become one", "how is its definition", we should notice that these are all different issues. "Yuanyi" has these meanings, and everything that has one of the meanings of "Yuanyi" can be called one; but "becoming one" sometimes refers to things with the above meanings, and sometimes refers to other things , those things are closer to the general meaning of one, and things having the above-mentioned meanings are closer to the real purpose of one.This is also the case with "element" or "cause", which can be used to refer to things, and can also be used to represent the general meaning of this noun.Fire in one sense is an element (and "indeterminate things" or other similar things which are elements by their nature), but in another sense is not an element; being fire is not the same thing as being an element.When fire is only a special thing in the nature of fire, this fire is an element, and the word "element" refers to those things that have such properties: that is, the basic components that constitute real things. The same is true of "cause" and "one" and similar terms.

Also for this reason, "to be one" is to be indistinguishable, and the main thing is to be one "this", which can be separated in space or in form or thought; it may be said to be an indistinguishable "whole"; But it is especially important to become the basic measure of all kinds of things, and most strictly speaking, it becomes a measure in terms of quantity; it is extended from quantity, and then extends to other categories.Quantity must be determined by measurement; measurement is measured by "one" or a certain number, and all numbers must be known by the unit of "one".It is based on the fact that all quantities are known because of "one", and the first understanding of quantity must come from "one".In this way, "one" is the starting point of number being number.Things at other levels are also known for their "measurement" and are the first to be recognized by everyone; each level of measurement is a unit-in length, width, depth, and speed, each has its own unit. (Nouns such as weight and speed include opposite ends of weight, weight, and speed. Heavy weight refers to the smallness of a penny, and also refers to the gigantic size of a million weights. It must have speed, and although it is light in weight, it must have gravity.)

Therefore, in all of these, the measure and the starting point are always the indistinguishable one. In line theory, we say that a foot is long, which means that a foot is taken as an indistinguishable unit. Everywhere we look for some "indistinguishable oneness" as a measure of things of all degrees, whether pure in quality or pure in quantity.Every exact measurement neither adds nor subtracts a point, (thus numbers are exact as quantities; we make "units" indistinguishable in any respect;) In all other cases we Emulate this type of measurement.In a stand or a Tyron, or any other unit of greater quantity, we are more easily inadvertent in its slight increase or decrease than in a smaller unit; At this time, we must exhaust the power of vision, so that the measured number can never be increased or decreased; when people know the measurement or volume obtained by such measurement, they claim to know the quantity of things.Natural philosophers also use simple and short transfers as the measurement of motion in motion; these motion units are the motions that occupy the shortest time.In astronomy, such a "one" (moving unit) is also the starting point of research and measurement (they assume that the movement of celestial bodies is the fastest and uniform and regular, so it is used as a comparison of all movements).In music, it is a quarter interval (because this is the shortest interval), and in speech, it is a letter <phonetic note>.All of these units of measurement here mean "one"—

And this "one" is just the measurement of the things stated in the term, and does not generally refer to all the things that are called one. But the unit of measurement is not always limited to one—sometimes there can be several; for example, there are two in a quarter interval (this is difficult to distinguish but adjusted according to the rhythm); we also have more than one unit of measurement Letters; and the diagonals of squares are measured by two measures, as are all similar spatial measures.Because we distinguish the noumenon in terms of quantity or class, and thus know the elements of the noumenon, "one" is the measure of all things.Just because the basic composition of things at all levels is indistinguishable, "one" (unit) is also indistinguishable.But each "one", such as "one foot" is not the same as one as an indistinguishable thing, "one" is indistinguishable in all aspects, and "one foot" is only visually Let it be indistinguishable only—Every continuous thing can be distinguished, but when it becomes visually one without distinction, we let it be an indistinguishable unit.

Measurement and the thing to be measured are always of the same nature and connected; the measurement of space measurement must also be a space measurement; in other words, length is measured by a length, width is measured by width, weight is measured by weight, sound is measured by sound, multiple units Measured in one unit. (We must describe it in this way in the above situation, but we cannot say that the number of columns is measured by a number; in terms of numbers, quoting the above description is generally consistent, but not exact—— Because numbers are composed of many "ones", saying that the number of columns is measured by one number is equivalent to saying that many units are measured by many units. )

For the same reason we call knowledge and sight the measure of things, because by these we know things—indeed, rather than being measured by them, they measure them.However, we estimate things by knowledge or sight, just as when people measure us by bending elbows, we see the elbow and say how long we are.But Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things, which means that he who can know or see can measure things by his intellect and sense. These thinkers seem to have expressed the truth of the world, and these famous sayings are actually not surprising. Obviously, then, if we interpret Yuan Yi in the strictest sense of the word, it is a measure, mainly a measure of quantity, and secondarily a measure of quality.Some things are one quantitatively indistinguishable, others qualitatively indistinguishable;

Therefore, the indistinguishability of "one" should be divided into two categories, either absolutely one, or regarded as one. Chapter Two Concerning the noumenon and nature of the monad, we should ask in which of the two ways does it exist.This is exactly the question we raised when listing the problems; What is the "one" and how we must conceive of this "one"; should we take the monad as noumenon (as the Pythagoreans said first and later Plato); Do not seek its nature at the bottom, as natural philosophers have recognized, or take Yuanyi as "friendship (love)", or take Yuanyi as "Qi", or take Yuanyi as "undetermined".

Therefore, as we said when discussing Noumenon and Reality, if the universal (universal) cannot become the Noumenon, but the universal Reality itself, if it is meant to be "similar to all beings" and become a being, Nor can it become a noumenon (because it is still in common with "many"), but can only be used as a predicate, so "one" obviously cannot become a noumenon; "is" and "one" were originally the most common among all predicates Yun said. Therefore, on the one hand, families and genera cannot be separated from other things to become certain realities and noumenon;

Again, the nature of the monad must be similar in every category.Now, since "one" has as many meanings as "is"; in the sphere of quality, "one" is something definite in kind, and similarly in quantity it is something definite in quantity, We must also ask "what is one" in every category, as we ask what is what is;But among the colors, "one" is one color, such as white, so when we observe other colors, one by one is generated from white and black, and black is the absence of white (such as darkness without light).Therefore, if all existing things are colors, all existing things should each be a number, but what should be the number of things?Of course, it is the number of each color; and one should be a special color, that is, white.Similarly, if all existing things are musical tones, they should each be a number. The ontology of these intervals is not those numbers, but some numbers such as "quarter intervals", so the unit "one" here, There will be not those "ones", but those "quarter intervals".Similarly, if all existing things are words, they should each be the number of some letters (phonetic notes), and the "one" here should be a vowel.And similarly, if all existing things were rectilinear figures, they would have been numbers of some figures, and "one of the figures" would have been the triangle.The same argument applies to all genera (species).Therefore, when each category has its number and unit in passivity, quality, quantity, and motion, in all cases the number should be the number of certain things, and "one" is To be particular ones of certain things, these particular beings need not correspond exactly to the universal one;

This "one" (particularly one) is then a definite thing in all kinds of things, and it is evident that there is no instance in its nature which is exactly "one" (universal one); The original one is "one color", similar to this, in all noumenons, the "original one" we must seek should be "one noumenon".Since a decree of "one" corresponds to the being of each category in each category, Yuan-one then agrees with reality, but "one" does not enter into any category alone, ("one" does not enter into" "How things are" does not fall into the category of quality, but is related to reality and exists in various categories); there is almost no difference between saying "one person" and "person" in terms of meaning (just As in reality, nothing is different from noumenon or quality or quantity); to be "one" is just like to be "something". Chapter three "One and many" are opposites in several respects.One is the indistinguishable and distinguishable "single and many"; what has been differentiated or distinguishable is called multiple (diversity), and what is indistinguishable or undifferentiated is called single (unity).Now because there are four types of antithesis and one of the antithesis here, since the meaning is derived from lack, they are not antithesis (contradiction), nor are they related, but should be relative.The name of the indistinguishable single (one) comes from its antithesis, and the indistinguishable multitude (many) is explained by the mutual interpretation of the opposite, because the distinguishable multitude is easier to understand than the indistinguishable See, therefore, visually speaking, "many" precedes "one" in definition. We have listed "same", "similar" and "equal" in the system of "one" when they are respectively paired.In the system of "public", there are "different", "unlike" and "not equal". "Same" has a number meaning; (1) Sometimes it is "the same as the number"; (2) We call it the same when the formula and number of things are one, such as you and yourself "form and matter" are one; and (3) if the formula of its substance is one, such as the equal straight line and Both equal quadrilaterals and equiangular quadrilaterals are called "the same". Things are not absolutely the same, (1) Those who have no difference in their synthetic ontology are called "similar", and these are actually the same in form; for example, a large square is similar to a small square, and unequal straight lines are also similar to straight lines; They are similar rather than absolutely identical. (2) Things of the same form may have differences in degrees, but if the differences are not clearly seen, they are also called similarities. (3) Things that have the same quality, such as "white" - its whiteness is slightly stronger or weaker and its color is the same - it is also called similarity. (4) The qualities of various things—either general or important—there are more the same than the different, which is also called similarity. For example, tin is like silver in terms of white, and it is like gold, and it is like gold in yellow. In terms of red, it is like fire. Therefore, obviously, there are several meanings for difference and difference. The meaning of "different" is the opposite of the same (so things are different if they are different from other things, and they are the same if they are not different).Another meaning of other is that everything is different except that which is materially and formally united; if so, then you and your neighbor should be said to be different. The third meaning of "bie" is the above examples of mathematical objects.Therefore each thing may be said to be "the same" or "different" to every other thing—but here both things must be existing things to be the same as other things, because such "different" is not the same as "different" It is the same as "opposite" (contradiction); therefore, non-existing things are not called differently ("not the same" can be a predicate of non-existing things). "Different" is the predicate of all existing things; since each existing thing is one in nature, it also becomes different from each other. The opposite nature of "don't" and "same" is like this.But "different" is not the same as "don't".The so-called "different" and "something else" do not necessarily differ in some specific respects (because every existing thing is always either the same or different), but to say that things are "different" requires that one thing be different from another something There are some differences between them, so those who are different must find the reason for their differences in the same aspects they recognize.The so-called recognized similarity refers to the family, genus or variety; and the so-called difference refers to the difference between varieties in the same family and genus, and the individual differences in the same variety.All things that have no common substance and cannot create each other (that is, those that belong to different categories) are called "different families and genera".As in a family and genus, it is said that "varieties are different" (the meaning of "family and genus" refers to the main "similarity" between two different things (species)). Relative things are all different, and opposites are a type of "different".Induction can prove that our assumption is true.All things that are not only different from each other but also different from the family and genus, and things that are different but still belong to the same predicate series, that is, the same in the family and genus, can be shown to be different.We have explained elsewhere what kind of things are "the same" or "different". Chapter Four The difference between things can be large or small, and the biggest difference I call "opposition".The greatest difference is contradictory, which can be explained by induction.Things that are different from families and genera are difficult to approach each other, and the distance between them is too far to be compared; things that are different from species, the two poles from which their occurrence begins are the two ends of the pair, and the distance between the two poles is the greatest distance of difference. .But the end at which there is the greatest difference between things at each level is the end which becomes complete.There is nothing beyond it here, and what is not surpassed by other things is complete.The series of differences of various degrees reaches the end of the series by going back to its completeness (this is the same as that of others whose purpose is complete), and there is nothing but the ultimate; everything is contained between the extremes. , so the end is the whole, and since it is called "whole", it has nothing to rely on other things.In this way, it can be understood that antithesis is the greatest difference; the meaning of the so-called "relative" means that the difference is in the different distances of the complete difference achieved by these relatives, and the contrasts of different degrees become the corresponding "oppositions". become". If so, then it follows that each thing can only have one opposite of it (for there is no other extreme than the extreme, and there can be no more extremes at the same time), and in general, as In contrast to the theory of difference, difference and total difference must be the difference between two things. Also, other relative formulas that everyone admits must also be true. (1) The so-called complete difference (because we cannot find another difference for things that are "different from the genus" or "different from the species" outside the scope of this difference. (A) should not only be the greatest difference between things of the same species, but also (B) should be compared with the thing with the greatest difference between things in the same family and genus (the so-called complete difference here is the thing of the same family and genus). and (2) between things with the same material, that is, the same substance, the greatest difference is relative; and (3) things belonging to the same function (academic category), the greatest difference is relative (An academic deal with first-level things, the so-called complete difference here is the biggest difference between things with the same function). The basic pairing consists of "holding" <positive> and its "queuing" <negative> - However, Quesu has several different meanings, and not every Quesu can be matched with its positive state as a basic pair, only a complete Quesu can.Other pairs are to be compared with these elementary pairs, and some become antitheses by acquiring them, some by producing them or being bound to produce them, and others by possessing or losing these or other pairs.Now, if we use the four categories of "opposite" <contradiction>, "absence", "relative" and "correlation" to discuss anti-trans, among them, the opposite is the first, and the opposite does not allow any intermediates, while the relative allows. Intermediates, opposite and relative are obviously different.Deficiency is of this kind nearly the opposite; a thing which is deficient in general, or in certain decisive respects, cannot retain certain dispositions, or no longer retains dispositions which it should have had in nature.Here we also talk about several different meanings of Que Shi, which have been listed elsewhere.So absence is a decisive or corresponding contradiction or incapacity to the receiving material.On the contrary intermediates are not admitted and the absence sometimes admits intermediates; for this reason: everything may be "equal" or "not equal", but everything is not necessarily "equal or not", if so , then this can only be said within the scope of tolerating equality.If, then, matter which is capable of making a change begins with relatives, or proceeds with the acquisition or deprivation of the form, all oppositions must obviously imply a lack, and all lacks are not necessarily opposites ( For suffering loss, which can be done in several different ways); if the change is carried out from the two poles then there will be oppositions. This can also be explained by induction.Each pair contains a deficiency as one of its two terms, but the cases are not uniform; inequality is the deficiency of equality, dissimilarity is the deficiency of tangential similarity, and vice versa. It is the lack of virtue.How the various cases of deficiency differ has been described; one instance of deficiency is that it suffers from a deprivation, the other is that it is at a certain period, or a certain part (for example, a certain age or some main parts), or all of it. Deprived of part or all of it.So, in some cases there is a compromise (some people are neither good nor bad) and in other cases there is no compromise (a number must be odd or even).Also, some pairs have a clear theme, while others do not.So, it is clear that one end of the "antithesis" is always missing; this is true at least in the basic or genus correspondences, such as "one and many"; other antithesis can be reduced to these antithesis . Chapter five Since there is only one relative to a thing, we have to ask how "one and many" can be relative, and how "waiting" and "big and small" can be relative. The word "or" can only be used in an argument, such as "Is this thing white or "black" or "Is this thing white or not white" (we would not ask, "Is this thing a person or is it white?" "), as for asking "Is it really Creon or Socrates" because of pre-planning—— These two do not belong to any level of things that must be separated; but here they also become opposites that cannot appear at the same time; here we assume the non-existence of the two, so we ask "who is coming"; According to this assumption, if both come, the question becomes absurd; but if both do come, this can still be included in the discussion of "one or many", and the question is changed to "they are both come, or one of them comes": so that "or" must be a question about the opposite, but we ask "is this greater or smaller or equal", "etc" and the other two opposites what is it "equal" is relative to neither or neither; What is the reason for "waiting" to say that it should be relative to "bigger" or that it should be relative to "smaller"?Also, saying "waiting" and "not waiting" are opposites.So "etc" is relative to "larger" and "smaller", so that one thing is not only relative to one thing.If the meaning of "not equal" does not refer to the greater and the smaller, then "wait" should be opposite to both (this difficulty supports the claim that "not equal" is the "undetermined two"), But this leads to the conclusion that one thing is relative to two things, which is impossible.Also, "wait" is obviously in the middle of "big and small", but no one has seen that the opposite can be in the middle; in definition, the opposite cannot be in the middle; These things are in the middle, but the antithesis cannot be a perfect antithesis if it is in the middle. The remaining problem is "waiting", so the opposite of the above two is "negation", or "queuing".This cannot negate or deprive only one of the big and small; why can it negate or deprive "big" but not "small"?This must be both disproportionately denied.For this reason, "or" refers to two things and cannot single one of them (for example, "is this greater or equal" or "is this equal or less"); here, three "or"s must be commonly used.But this is not an inevitable omission; Because not every thing that is neither bigger nor smaller is necessarily equal, only certain things with comparable attributes can be compared using three "or". So "waiting" is neither big nor small, but it can be big or small naturally; This, as a dispossessive negation, is the opposite of both (so this is also the intermediate).As for those who are neither good (good) nor evil (bad), there is no name; such things often have different meanings for each, and the subject that bears this meaning is often not pure; but The color that is neither white nor black is more likely to be one color.Although in this way, the color that can be introduced by the so-called negation has entered a limited range, but even this color has not yet been determined as the name "color"; because it may be gray, or Yellow or other similar colors.Those who, therefore, use such phrases as they please, and because that which is neither good nor evil is intermediate, say that what is neither a shoe nor a hand is intermediate between a shoe and a hand—as in all cases. Both must have a body - and this creates inauthentic fragments.But this is not a necessary argument.Because the former sentence is indeed a comprehensive negation between two opposites, there is a natural paragraph, an intermediate between this kind of antithesis in "two antis"; in the latter sentence, there is no "between shoes and hands" "Differences" exist; the two things that this comprehensive negation opposes belong to different categories, and the bottom layer of the "contained material" is not uniform, "so it cannot be a pair, and it is impossible to find a body for the two." Chapter Six We can also ask similar questions about "one and many".If "many" is absolutely opposite to "one", this will lead to certain impossible conclusions. "One" will become "less" or "fewer" because "less" is the exact opposite of "many".Also, because "double" is a multiplier that derives its meaning from two, since double is more, "two" should also be "more"; then "one" must be "less". Who can compare with "two" as "less" when compared with "two"?There is no such thing as "less" than "two".And just as long and short come from the same length, if "more and less" is taken as the same from "many", the so-called "many" is also the same as "many" (only in the unbounded continuation body) There are some differences between the two characters), here "less" or "less" will become the majority.Therefore, if two are considered as many, "one" just becomes less; and if "one" is regarded as "less", it can also be transformed into "many".It's just that when "many" and "many" mean the same thing, you have to pay attention to a little difference; for example, water can only be "many" and not "many". "Many" is applied to things that can be distinguished; the meaning of "many" is many, which is absolutely or relatively surpassed (as for "less" is similarly "many", it is insufficient The other meaning of "many" is number, and only in this specific title, "many" is opposite to "one".For we say "one and many" just as we say "one and many ones" or "one white thing and many white things", which is also the same as measuring several things by one measure.The so-called multiplier is exactly the meaning of this fate.Since each number is composed of several ones, it can also be measured by one, so they are all called "many"; so "many" is opposite to "one", not opposite to "less".In terms of meaning relative to one, although "two" is enough to mean "many" - but "two" is called "many" in an absolute or comparative sense. "Just a minimum "public". But the "two" in the full name is just "less"; because this is a super-large "many" with some shortcomings, (for this reason, Anaxagoras's discussion on this topic "all things are mixed", its meaning It is a mistake to be numerous and to be small (there is no limit, but the phrase "to be small" should be like "to be few"; and few are not endless,) according to some people's views, one does not do little, and two do It has the least number compared with it. The relationship between "one" as "measurement" and "many" as "measurable things" becomes the antithesis within the scope of numbers, which is transformed by related terms.Elsewhere we have enumerated the ambiguity of "relevant": (1) as antithesis, (2) as pertinent knowledge of things that are knowable, and one is said to be related to another because the other is related to it. .Nothing prevents "one" from being less than something, such as "two"; but "less" is not necessarily "less". "Multiple" comes from the level of things to which "number" belongs; number is "many" that can be measured by one, and the reason why "one" and "number" are opposites is not because of "relative" And because of "correlation"; the opposite of the two related items means that one item is measurable and the other item is measurable.So not everything that is one can be called a number; the fact that everything is indistinguishable does not mean that it has become a number.But though knowledge is similarly related to knowables, this relation is not made in exactly the same way as measurement; if we take the knowable as the measured and measure it with knowledge, in fact all knowledge knows things, And not all knowable things become knowledge, another meaning of knowledge is to use knowable things as measurement. "Multiple" is not opposite to "less" ("more" and "less" are indeed opposite, more is the excess of the multitude, and less is the deficiency of the multitude), nor is it opposite to "one"; But in one meaning, as mentioned before, these are antitheses, because the many are distinguishable, but one (single) is indistinguishable; Only correlates, as knowledge correlates with knowables. Chapter seven Because relatives allow intermediates, and in some cases intermediates do exist, intermediates should be composed of relatives. (i) All intermediates belong to the same family and genus as the pairs between which they are interposed.When things change, they must first change into the intermediate body. For example, if we want to go through various scales from the high-pitched string to the low-pitched string, we must first touch the middle note, which we call the intermediate body; To go from white to black, we must first point to gray or dark red; it is an analogy.But it is impossible to change from one genus (category) to another (category) such as from color to figure, except by chance.Thus the intermediates must belong to the same family and genus as their corresponding pairs. But (2) All intermediates stand between certain opposites; only a change of nature can take place between these opposites.There can be no intermediate between non-relative things; For when such things change, they cannot pass from one extreme to the other.Among the antithesis, the opposite (contradiction) does not allow a middle term; (this is really a contradiction—this kind of antithesis, the two extremes of its meaning must be determined, and there is no intermediate.) Other antithesis , some are correlated, some are absent, and others are relative.The related items that have not been transformed into relatives are also inseparable; the reason is this: the related items that are not relative should not be of the same family and genus.What is the intermediate between knowledge and the knowable?There is only one between "big and small". (3) As mentioned above, if the intermediates belong to the same family and genus, they must stand between pairs and must be combined by pairs.The pairs are either (A) included in a family or genus, or (B) not included in the same family and genus. (a) If there were such a family which preceded the pair of genera, the difference which makes up the pair of breeds in the family and genus would also precede the breed; for the breed is combined by the family and the genera with this difference. (For example, assuming that white and black are in pairs, one of which means penetrating color, and the other is pressure-resistant—the differences between "penetration" and "pressure resistance" are prior,—in this way, in terms of pairs It is also prior to.) However, the two varieties with opposite differences are really paired varieties, and other intermediate varieties must be composed of families, genus and their respective differences. (For example, all colors between white and black should be said to be genus, that is, colors and their color differences. But these differences will not become fundamentally relative; otherwise, all colors will become relative or white or black. Therefore, these differences Unlike basic pairs; they are between basic pairs; the basic difference is "penetration" and "pressure resistance".) Then, (b) we must inquire what the relatives not in a genus consist of. (Because things in the same genus must either be composed of genus elements and various differences, or compound without differences.) In pairs, those that do not contain each other but are compounded by differences can become the first. principle; as for the intermediates, they should all be complexes or none of them should be complexes.Now, when things change from pairs, they pass first to certain complexes, (which are more or less in the nature of two pairs), and then lead to the opposite end; these complexes are in the two pairs. In between, two pairs grow and decline in this body.Then all the so-called intermediates should be these complexes (one thing has more or less different qualities of two things in the process of ebb and flow, it should be said that some two things are compounded to a certain extent).And since there is nothing else in harmony with the intermediate before the pairs, the intermediate must be compounded by the pairs.Therefore, all secondary relatives and their intermediates should also be compounded by basic relatives. Clearly, then, intermediates are (1) all included in the same genus, and (2) stand between pairs, and (3) they are all compounded by pairs. Chapter eight "Different from species" means that "a thing" is "in something" different from "something", which should be the thing that the two different things belong to; for example, the "different from species" of animals "All are animals.Hence things distinct from breeds must belong to the same genus.The meaning of the word "family and genus" I mentioned, in terms of material or other aspects, is the common name of the two species, and it also contains the important differences that are not accidental.Within this family and genus, not only all things have a common nature, for example, both must be animals, but each must have its own specific species, for example, it means that one is horse-like, and the other is human-like; this common nature, in each What is shown in animals is beyond the difference of species. Then a certain animal can become a certain animal from that nature, such as a horse, and another can become another kind of animal, such as a human being.So this difference must be "sex" within the family and genus.I added another "gender" to the term "different from the family and genus", so that the family and genus themselves become different from each other.This would then be an "antithesis" (this can also be explained by induction).All things are separated by opposites, and pairs have been proved to belong to the same genus, because pairs have been shown to be complete differences.And all differences in species are differences "in something" to something; and this something is common to both of them, and this is their genus. (From this point of view, all relatives that are the same in genus but different in species are in the same series of predicates; and the highest degree of "different" from each other - this difference is a complete difference - cannot be at the same time coexist.) So this difference is one of opposites. Thus "different from species" would be that which is indistinguishable within the same family and genus but has an opposite (indistinguishables without an opposite would be "identical to species"); we therefore note The reason why "indistinguishable things" are specified is because in the process of differentiation, when the indistinguishable things are not achieved at the intermediate stage, objections can also be elicited.Therefore, as far as the so-called "family and genus" are concerned, none of the "varieties within a family and genus" can be the same or different from the family and genus. （这样的比喻可以适用；物质〈在综合实体上〉因否定〈取消形式〉而得以显明，科属作为事物本性的一个要素也就是它的物质底层，〈品种则类于综合物体的形式；〉但这里若以赫拉克利特氏族为一科属名词，则其命意含义便与此喻不符）。于不在同科属内的事物而言，这既于科属有异，便也不论品种之别：这里，所论为科属之别。而在同科属中的事物则论品种之别。别于品种之事物，其命意差异必须是一个"对反"；这只有同科属事物才能有这样的差异。 Chapter Nine 或问雌性与雄性相对，其间差异为一对成，何以女人与男人于品种无别；雌雄各有本性之异，其命意不同于白黑之例，何以雌雄动物于品种无别；雌雄作为动物同属一品种。这问题与下一问题略同，何以一类对反使品种有异，而另一类则不引起品种之异，如"有脚"与"有翼"成为动物种别之征，而"白脸"与"黑脸"却不成种别之征。也许前一类变异，于科属而论，颇为特殊，后一类则在科属上未为特殊。因为前一类的差别要素为定义之异而后一类只是物质之异，在定义上的对反才能造成品种之异，仅于物质上有所差殊不能造成异种。所以肌肤或白或黑不为种异，白人或黑人虽各系以异称，而实非异种。这里只在物质方面考虑着问题，物质不创造差异；因为这人与那人各有其骨肉，但这并不使两人成为各别的品种。综合实体各自为"别"，但不"别于品种"，因为这在定义上，并无对反。这里不含对反之"别"，而是最后不可更区分的个体之"别"。加里亚是公式综合于物质；于是白人也如此，因为这就是那个别的加里亚其肤色是白而已；人之为白，出于偶然属性，于定义上无所增益。一铜圈或一木圈也不是于种有异；若谓铜三角与木圈异于品种，则其为异不在物质，而是因为它们在定义上已成为一个对反。然而物质能在某一方式上使事物为别，却不能使事物于品种上成为别么？或也能在另一意义上使事物为品种之"别"？虽则于它们的个体定义中包括了它们的物质，何以这匹马与这个人于种有别？无疑的，因为这在定义上有一个对反在。白人与黑马之间也有一对反，而且这是品种上的对反，这对反不在于其一之白色与另一之黑色，即使两皆为白，白人与白马仍还是"于种有别"。但雌雄〈男女〉为动物之特有秉赋，其为分别不由其怎是而由于物质，即身体。为此之故，同一种籽只为所受某项作用就或成为雌，或成为雄。这里我们已说明了何谓"品种有别"以及何以有些事物异于品种而另一些则于品种无异。 Chapter ten 因为对反是"别"于形式，而可灭坏事物与不灭坏事物是相对（因为阙失是一个决定性的无能），两者必然不同级类。 我们现在说到一般通用名词时无需认为一切不灭坏事物应在形式上异于可灭坏事物，正象每一白色物并不一定于形式上异于每一个黑色物一样。假如这是一个普遍〈共相〉，同一事物可能成为两者，甚至于在同时可能成为两者（例如人类既有白人又有黑人）；假如这是一个个别〈殊分〉，这还是可能成为两者，只是不能同时成为两者；同一人可以一时为白，又一时为黑。可是，白与黑相对。 但，某些相对因偶然属性而附隶于某些事物（例如现在所述及的以及其它许多事物），另一些相对则不然，其中就有可灭坏与不可灭坏事物这一相对。一切事物之成为可以灭坏均非偶然。凡属偶然就可有时而不然，但可灭坏性当其见于一切事物就成为一个必然秉赋；如其不然，同一事物将可能灭坏而又不灭坏。于是，可灭坏性必然就是每个可灭坏事物的怎是，或存在于其怎是之内。同样的论点于不灭坏性亦可适用；两者都应是必然秉赋。于是，那引致一事物成为可灭坏，另一事物成为不灭坏的特性应是两个相反，所以它们必需异于级类。 于是，显然，某些人所主张的意式〈通式〉是不能有的，按照意式论，这将同时存在有一个可灭坏人与另一不灭坏人。而所谓意式，据说，与各个个体不但名称相同，形式亦复相同；但诸事物〈如可灭坏与不灭坏事物〉之异于级类者，其为差异较之形式之异，还更属重大。