Chapter 9 Volume 7 (2)

Chapter Eleven Another question may naturally be posed, which kind of parts belong to forms, and which kinds do not belong to forms but to synthetic substances.If this problem is not cleared first, it is difficult to define things; because definitions belong to form and are universal.If one does not understand which parts belong to matter and which parts do not belong to matter, the definition of things cannot be understood.A circle can exist in copper or stone or wood. All things expressed by various materials, such as copper, wood and stone, are not part of the circle, because the circle can be separated from a certain material. performance on another material.If the circles that people see are all made of copper, copper is actually not part of the form; however, it is not easy for people to eliminate copper from the concept of circles.For example, the human form is often expressed in flesh and blood and the like; are these parts of the human formula and form?No, those are all substances; yet we never find man from other substances, so it is difficult for us to separate them for true abstraction.

Because abstraction is considered possible but often not very clear, some people propose that circles and triangles cannot be defined by lines and continuations, just as people cannot be defined by flesh and blood, and statues cannot be defined by copper or marble; They reduced everything to numbers, and the formula referring to the line is the formula of "two".And among those who put forward the idea of ​​"Italian formula", some think that the second is the "line book", and some think that the second is the "formula of the line"; because they say that "the general formula is the same as what the general formula expresses", such as "Two" and "the form of two" should be the same; but they don't say much on this issue.

Then there will be the conclusion that many things of different forms belong to one general formula (which the Pythagoreans also had to face), and it is also possible to establish an absolute general formula to generalize and deny other The formulas are not yet the true formulas; yet in this way all things will be brought together. We have pointed out that there are some difficulties in defining the problem, and the reasons for these difficulties.It is useless work to reduce all things to general formulas and eliminate matter; some things are indeed a particular form in a particular substance, or particular things in particular states.The example of "animals" often cited by the younger Socrates is unsound; because it leads people away from the truth and leads them to believe that, just as the circle can exist without copper, so can man exist without its parts (flesh and flesh) .But the two things are not alike; the animal is sentient, and cannot be defined without activity, and therefore cannot but be connected to his parts in a certain state.A hand in any state or in a certain state cannot be counted as a part of a person, only a living and working hand is a part of a person; if it is a dead hand, it is not a part of a person. a part of .

Regarding mathematical objects, why can't some formulas become part of the whole formula; for example, the semicircle formula is not included in the circle formula?It cannot be said "because these parts are sensual things"; they are not sensual.But these may be irrelevant; for some invisible things still have matter, and in fact every thing, which is not only an independent being and form, but is a body, must have some matter.Therefore, although the semicircle is not a part of the general circle, it should be, as mentioned above, a part of a particular circle; for there are two kinds of matter, the one perceptible and the other intelligible.

It is clear that the soul is the primordial being, the body is matter, and man or animal is a combination of both and is taken as a universal term.Even if the soul of Socrates could be called Socrates, Socrates or Corris could have two meanings, (some use this term for soul, others for composite entity;) but" If "Socrates" or "Corrisco" simply refers to an individual soul or an individual body, the synthetic individual is similar to the universal union. Whether there is only one degree of matter besides these substances, and whether we can find another degree of substance besides these substances, such as numbers and the like, will be studied later.The study of sensible substances in a certain sense is the work of physiology, that is, the second philosophy, and for this we must also try to determine the nature of sensible substances; the naturalist should not only explain matter, but also Understand the ontology expressed by the formula, and pay more attention to the formula.As to how the elements of a formula become parts of a definition, and how it is defined as a formula, (for it is obvious that things are one, but how does this have parts, and how can it be one?) This question must be studied later. .

What is what is and why how is can exist independently, and it has been made into a general rule and explained generally.Also, why do the formulas of how some things are contain part of their definition and others not?We have said that the physical parts do not exist in the formula of Being (for they are parts of the synthetic substance, not of the formula of the Being; But here, the formula may or may not exist. From the material theory, the matter has no fixed form, so there is no formula. From the original ontology, there is a noumenon formula—for example, human beings have a soul as a formula—because noumenon is sent by the form, and the form and The two of matter are combined into a composite entity.For example, "concave" is one of such forms, concavity combined with nose becomes a "concave", see its "concave"); the material part exists only in composite entities, such as a concavity or a gallia Then there is substance in it.We have said that things are sometimes the same as what they are; and this is certainly the case in primitive beings, as in primitive curves, where the curvature is what the curve is. (By "primitive" entities I mean those that no longer contain matter as an underlying layer.)

But things that are of a material nature, or that contain matter in their entirety, are not identical with themselves; accidental synthesis such as "Socrates" and "civilized" are not identical with themselves. Nor are they the same; for these only happen to meet in the same thing. Chapter Twelve Let us now discuss matters of definition that were not discussed in "Resolution"; the issues listed therein will be useful when we study ontologies.I refer to this question: for example, people say that "two-legged animal" is their formula and "man is a two-legged animal" is their definition. Where do these get their combination? Why are "animal" and "two-legged" combined into one and not many?In the example of "person" and "white", when one word does not belong to the other, the two words are treated as "many"; when they are combined, the subject person has a certain attribute; This is combined into one, and we have the "white man".On the other hand, as in the case of "man and two feet," one term is not mutually acceptable to another; families and genera are not considered to have participated in differences (because the differences by which families are distinguished have the opposite Nature, genus participating in difference will be the same thing participating in oppositions).And even if this family and genus participate in the differences, the same argument has to be applied, because man has many differences in animal families and genera, for example, "has feet", "two feet", "feathers".Why do these not become many but return to one.It is not that these all appear in one thing;

According to this principle, a thing will be one by the unification of all its attributes.These many properties must be united in definition; and as definition is a single formula, and is the formula of substance, it must be the formula of some particular thing; for substance, according to our claim, is One and is " this". We must examine the definitions that result from taxonomy.Nothing else is needed in the definition but the basic genera and their differences.The other families and genera are just the differences of the basic family and genera, which are added in order and continue to be distinguished. For example, it is first "animal", then "two-legged animal", and then "featherless two-legged animal"; and so on, it can include more items.Generally speaking, it doesn't make a difference whether there are many or few items,--it doesn't make any difference if there are two items or only two items; Foot animal", "animal" is the family and genus, and "two feet" is the difference.

If the family and genus can never exist independently from the "species within the genus", or it can only exist as a substance (for example, the rhyme is a family and a genus, which is a substance, and the difference is a variety, which is a phonetic note), the definition is Apparently a formula that incorporates the difference. However, it is necessary to distinguish the differences among the differences; for example, "having feet" is a difference of the animal family and genus, while "legged animals" must be regarded as a family and genus, and then the difference is sought.If we were to be true, we could not say that one part of the footed species has feathers and another part has no feathers (it would be an obvious lack of intelligence if we did so); The difference is the difference in foot style.This classification process continues until no further classification is possible.There are thus as many species of feet as there are differences, and the number of classes of footed animals is equal to the number of such differences.If this is the case, the final difference should be the substance of the thing and its definition; when we explain a thing in the definition, the words we use must never be repeated, and when we reach the final difference, there is nothing to add.Duplication is actually common;

When we say "animals have feet, but are bipeds", that is to say "animals that have feet and have two feet", so that as the classification proceeds, our explanation is repeated again and again-how many degrees of difference are there, and the repetition is also the same. How many times does it have to be. If, then, the difference among differences is sought step by step, the last degree of difference is reached, which is form and substance; but if we make a distinction by accidental qualities, such as distinguishing legs from white to black, then , the differences would be as numerous as such accidental distinctions.The definition is therefore the formula containing the differences, or, in the true classification, the last difference.If we reverse the order of the definitions obtained by this taxonomy step by step, we can understand what redundant repetition is. "It becomes superfluous.But in the ontology, this is not the order, what is the difference between one element and another?As regards the definition made by the taxonomy, we stop here at the first statement of its nature.

Chapter Thirteen Let us return to the ontology problem we were originally studying.Just as the composite entity of the bottom layer and how is and both are originally called noumenon, universal things are also called noumenon.We have already talked about the two of them, how and the bottom layer; the reason why the bottom layer is the noumenon has two meanings: either (1) the individual, such as the bottom layer on which the attributes of animals depend, or (2) matter , the bottom layer upon which the full implementation depends.Some think that the full meaning of universal things is cause and principle; let us therefore discuss this also.It seems that any "universal noun" cannot be called an ontology.The first meaning of the noumenon of each thing lies in its individuality—what belongs to a particular thing does not belong to other things; while the universal is common, and the so-called universal is unique to more than one thing.Then the universality will, among the things it has in common, single out that individual thing as its substance, or all the things in common will be taken as the substance of the universality, or none of them will be counted; The body of things.If it is the substance of some particular thing, the other thing will also be taken as substance; for the substance of things and what they are are one, and they themselves must be one. Also, noumenon is not a predicate of a subject, but universal quality is often used as a predicate of certain subjects. However, although universality cannot become ontology like how it is, perhaps we can try to think of it this way: for example, "animal" can be manifested in "human" and "horse".So the commonality between people and horses is obviously a formula of how to be.And this formula is a formula, if not all that is contained in the substance; just as "man" is the substance manifested in the individual, so the universal must always be the substance of something; Universality should be all that is suitable to manifest this animality as its noumenon. Again, this is absurd and impossible; for example, an individual or substance can be composed of several parts, but it cannot be composed of several substances, or several individuals, but can only be composed of some qualities; But it will therefore be prior to the individual, that is, to the noumenon.That is impossible; for the endowment of things cannot be prior to the substance, whether in formula, or in time, or in deterioration; if it is prior to the substance, they can all be separated from the substance.Again, Socrates will contain the noumenon of a noumenon, so this will be the noumenon of two things.Generally speaking, if man and such universal things are substances, and the elements in their formulas are not substances of any thing, this cannot be independent of particular species or any other thing; No "animal" can exist without a certain kind of animal, nor can any other element of the animal formula exist independently. Therefore, assuming that we look at the problem from this standpoint, it is clear that there is no universal quality that can be called noumenon; Can indicate a "so" (universal). Otherwise, many difficulties will follow, especially the "third person". The following considerations also make the conclusion clear.A being cannot be composed of several fully realized beings; "two real beings" can never become "one real being", although "potential two beings" can become "one being" (e.g. "double" is potentially two When it is fully realized, each half will act as a "one" and synthesize an independent "double").Therefore if substance is one, it cannot be composed of several substances; Democritus is right in saying that one thing cannot be made of two things, nor can two things be made of one; The partition "<atom> is the same. This makes it clear that if it is true, as some say, that number is a synthesis of ones, then the same holds true for numbers; for "two" is neither "one," nor is each unit fully realized "one." ". However, our conclusion involves a difficulty, since a universality can only indicate a "such" and not a "this", we assume that noumenon cannot be composed of universal things, and we assume that noumenon cannot be composed of each complete If realized ontologies are composed of them, none of the ontologies will be composed, so that the ontologies will not be able to have any formulas.We have said before that only noumena can be simply defined, and this is well known; but according to the present view even noumena can have a definition.Then nothing can be defined; Or according to a certain way of speaking, there can be a definition, but in the way of speaking here, the definition cannot be established.I can speak more clearly about these later. Chapter Fourteen From these facts it is also clear what consequences must be met with those who maintain that Italian forms are self-subsisting entities, while at the same time taking general forms to consist of families and their differences.Because, if the general formula exists, there are "animals" in both "man" and "horse", and these two "animals" are either one animal, or their number is not one.As far as formulas are concerned, they are obviously the same formula; for what you apply to one animal applies to the other.Therefore, if there is a human being (absolute man), it is an independent "this", and its constituent parts such as "animal" and "two feet" must also be several "this" that can exist independently, and each of them becomes a "this". ontology.Then animals are the same as people (there must be an "absolute animal" too). Now (1) if the "animal" in "horse" and "man" is the same animal, as if you and yourself are the same, then (a) how can this animal exist separately among many animal species, this" How can the animal" (formula) avoid itself being cut? And (b) if it is said that this is the general formula of animals participating in the category of "two-legged" and "many-legged", then an impossible conclusion will follow; the general formula is originally one and "this", but here it It must contain relative or even opposite endowments (such as "two feet" and "many feet">).If you don't participate in it, what will be the relationship between the so-called "legs" or "two feet" of animals?Maybe the two things were "set together" or "touched" or "blended"?All of these claims, however, are fallacious. However, (2) try to assume that "the general formula of each species is different".Thus, there will actually be an infinite number of things whose bodies are "animals"; because "man" takes "animal" as one of his elements, not by chance.And "absolute animal" will become "many" (children). In each species, "animal" will become the body of this species; because this species is named after "animal"; otherwise, it is said that there are other The element is its noumenon, and "man" will come out of this other element, that is, another genus.And (ugly) all the elements that make up "person" will become the Italian formulas.For the form cannot be the form of one thing and the substance of another (which is impossible); then the "animal" present in each species of animal will be the "absolute animal".Also, where is the general formula of animals in each species derived from, and how can this "animal" be derived from "absolute animal"?What is this "animal" is its animality, and how can it exist outside of the "absolute animal"? Again, (3) In the case of sensible things such conclusions and still more absurd ones must follow.If these consequences are impossible, it is clear that the general formula of sensible things which some maintain should not stand alone. Chapter Fifteen There are two types of noumenon: "comprehensive entities" and "formulas" (I mean one is formulas including matter, only one is general formulas). The formula has neither a process of destruction nor a process of destruction, because there is also no process of becoming (only this individual house is created, the "general house" has no becoming).Whether the formula is established or not depends on the process of birth and death; because it has been said above that there is no formula for the birth of a person, and there is no formula for the creation of a thing.For this reason sensible individual substances can neither be defined nor proved, since they have a substance whose nature can either be or not be. For this reason, the individuals they achieve are all destructible.Therefore, if it is said that the proof and knowledge of the truth must be consistent knowledge (knowledge cannot sometimes be knowledge and sometimes ignorance, such inconsistent knowledge can only be regarded as opinions, and opinions can be considered as "this is the case" or "this is not the case" "; As for the proof, it cannot be changed at will), then the individual sensible substances should be neither defined nor proved.For perishing things, when they disappear from our senses, the pertinent cognition is blurred; although the formulas kept in the soul remain unchanged, definitions and proofs also disappear.Thus, when a definition-maker defines any individual, he will think that his definition must always be subverted; for it is impossible to define such a thing. It is also impossible to define any meaning.For, according to the Italians, the Italian is a body, which can exist independently; and the formula must be composed of some nouns; the person who makes the definition of a thing must not invent a new word (because such a word everyone do not know), but all recognized characters are class words representing a class of things; What these words can define is not just an individual, but something common to other individuals.For example, someone gives you a definition saying "you are a white or thin animal", or other similar words, which are actually definitions that other people can use in common. If it is said that all the attributes which in part should belong to many subjects, but collectively belong to this subject, our answer: First, they must also belong to the elements; for example, "two-legged animals" Belonging to "animal" also belongs to "two feet". (As for the permanent element, this is even more necessary, because the element is a part of the combination, and it is also prior to the combination; if "man" can survive independently, "animal" and "two feet" should also be able to survive independently. Or Both can, or both cannot. If both cannot, then the family and genus cannot exist without each species; if both can, then the differences will also exist independently.) Second, we have to answer again, "animal" and "Two-legged" is actually prior to "two-legged animal"; and what is prior to other things does not perish when other perishes. Also, if the Italian forms are composed of various Italian forms (because the combined elements must be simpler than the combined body), the combined elements of the Italian forms (such as "animal" and "two feet") should be able to become the predicates of many individuals.If not, how can they be known?In this way, an Italian can only represent one thing.However, this is also considered to be wrong - each ideology can participate in many individuals. Thus, as stated above, the inability of the individual to form a definition is often neglected in regard to eternal things, especially such substances as the sun and the moon.Because people often attach certain attributes to the sun (as defined by the sun), such as saying that the sun "circles around the earth", or that the sun "does not appear in the night" (as they say, "hanging in the sky and not moving", or " It is not the sun. In fact, the sun has its own existence), but they are wrong. If they cancel those attributes, the sun will still exist as the sun; and these people often mistake the Attributes are assigned to a certain thing. For example, if something has the above two attributes, they clearly refer to it as a sun; thus this formula becomes a general formula.Yet the sun is an individual like Creon or Socrates.Finally, why did none of the proponents of Italian make a definition for Italian?If they try to find a definition for Italian, they will understand that the verses mentioned here are indeed true. Chapter Sixteen Evidently, what is taken as noumenon is still mostly potential,—such as the parts (limbs) of animals (because if the parts of an animal are separated, each part cannot exist independently; after separation, all parts are only matter) , and <the components of the limbs> earth, water, and fire are all potentials; For before they become a whole, each is but a stack, and none of them is a whole by itself.It is often easy to imagine that the parts of a creature correspond to the parts of the soul, and each part can be regarded as potential or actual, because the joints of each part have their own energy of action; so if some animals are separated, the separated parts Parts can live independently.However, when they are combined into a naturally continuous whole, the existence of all its parts can only be regarded as potentiality,-not as an example for those beings who have been coerced or joined together, because such phenomena are unusual. Because the noun "yuanyi" is used similarly to the noun "actually", all beings that are one, their essence is Yuanyi; as for the essence of things whose number is one, they are only one in number.Obviously, the monad and reality are not the substance of things in themselves, just as what is the "element" or "principle" of things is not the substance of things; But we ask, by what principle we can reduce things to things that are easier to know.On these points of view, "reality" and "unity" are more relevant to noumenon than "principles", "elements" or "causes", but they are still not noumenon, because generally speaking, everything in common is not The substance; the substance belongs to itself alone, not to anything else, but to its owner, who is originally the substance. Moreover, all things that become one cannot exist in many places at the same time, but common things can exist in various places at the same time; therefore, the universality obviously cannot exist without the individual. If form is indeed noumenon, in this respect, those who maintain that "form" can exist independently are right; but they also say that form "unifies many with one", and in this respect, they are wrong.They do this because they cannot know what kind of beings are the independent and indestructible beings outside the sensible individual beings.They classify indestructible things and perishable things in the same category (the essence of perishable things, we know it)—"Italian man" and "Italian horse" are just sensible things with the word "Italian" That's all.But even if we had not seen the stars, we should suppose them to be a class of perpetual beings, distinct from the perishable things we know; Feel the body.Therefore, universal nouns are obviously not ontology, and no ontology is composed of many entities. Chapter Seventeen Let us begin from another point of view to state what kind of things substance is; and from this we may perhaps gain a definite idea of ​​a substance existing independently of sensible things.Since noumenon is related to principles and reasons, let us trace from this starting point.The so-called "how"?Take the form of asking—"Why does this belong to that?" How can this civilized man be called a civilized man?As we have said above, it is to ask - how is this man civilized, or not a civilized man but a different kind of man.Now it is a meaningless question to ask why a thing is called "itself"; for by asking a "how" the existence of the thing and its truth are clearly exposed-for example, "the moon is eclipsed", the truth It is already there.The truth of a thing is the thing itself; and the answer to questions like "Why is this man a man?" Says "Because the thing cannot be separated from itself, it becomes a this just because it is this".Such a routine is just a simple solution to this kind of problem.But we can ask "Why is man such an animal of such a nature?" It is clear that we are not asking "Why is man?" We are asking how something can be an explanation of something (an explanation of what is meant). It must be clear; if the presumption cannot explain something, it is considered to be an inquiry, which means that there is no inquiry).For example, "What is thunder?" This is the same as "What is sound in the cloud?".Such inquiry is the explanation of one thing for another. And, how come these things, the bricks and stones, become a house?Clearly, we are looking for why.Abstractly speaking, inquiring is to find out how it is. Some things, such as a house or a bed, are the purpose, while others are the prime mover; the prime mover is also a reason.In the case of birth and death, what is sought should be the driving cause; and in the case of the existence of things, the ultimate cause should be sought. Where one word cannot be clearly explained by another word, the object of the inquiry is often lost (for example, when we ask what a person is), because we have not analyzed certain elements in a certain whole with certainty.We must reveal our destiny before we ask; if we don't, inquiry is just groping on the frontier of what is and what is not.Because we must affirm the existence of a certain thing from certain known things, we ask a certain question, which should put forward some definite content; for example, "Why these materials become houses"; What is it. "Why does this body, or this body, take this form and become a man?" So what we are looking for is the cause, that is, the form (formal cause), because of the form, the matter can become certain things; and this is the substance of things.Clearly, then, all words are unquestionable and unanswerable; for such things we should find another way of asking. For what is united from certain things, the whole being one, should be like a complete syllable, not like a pile of letters—syllables are different from letters, beta alpha is not beta and alpha, muscle is not fire and earth , (for when they are separated, the whole such as muscles and syllables cease to exist, but letters exist, and so do fire and earth;) Then the syllable is not only the two letters of a vowel and the consonant but another thing, and the muscle is not only fire and earth, or heat and cold, but also another thing: if, then, this compounded other thing , itself must be an element or be composed of elements, (1) If it is itself an element, the same argument will still apply; the muscle will be composed of this other thing with fire and earth, and the argument will be continued. This process will Go on to infinity. (2) If this is a compound, it must obviously synthesize more than one thing (if it is one thing, the synthesis can only be a combination of one thing and itself), and these we have discussed again in the two examples of muscles and syllables. The same debate applies.But this "other thing" should be distinct from the original, not an "element" but a "cause," which makes "this" a muscle, and "that" a syllable; similarly in other cases.These are the beings of everything, for this is the fundamental cause by which things are what they are.Again, though some things are not substances, many substances are formed by natural processes and their nature, so that these substances are nearly of such a nature that it is not an element but a principle.An element exists as matter in a thing which, if analyzed, is resolved into elements; for example α and β are the elements of syllables.