Chapter 8 Volume 7 (1)

Chapter One In the previous collection and interpretation of nouns, we have pointed out that there are several meanings for things that are called "is". The meaning of "is" is "what" a thing is, "this"; the other meaning is one of quality or quantity or other predicates.Among the meanings of "is", "what" should obviously be the basic meaning of "is", and "what" indicates the essence of things.For, when we cite the quality of a thing, we cite it as good or evil, not as three cubits long or as a man; but when we say "what" it is, we do not say "white" or "Hot" does not mean "three cubits long", but "human" or "god".The other so-called "is" is because it is the quantity or quality of this "basic being", or its variation, or other meanings that determine this thing.

In this way, one can ask whether "walking", "sitting", "healthy" and other similar words also exist separately?None of these can exist independently of the body.If something exists, then what actually exists is the thing (person) that is walking, sitting, or healthy.These appear to be relatively real precisely because underlying them there is a definite thing (i.e., noumenon or individual) as the subject, and they predicate it; if there is no "this", we cannot use "good " or "sitting".Obviously, this is because this category is "is", and then other categories can also be "is".Therefore, cancel all additional meanings, and then see the pure original name, then the noumenon is the "original reality".

There are several meanings for things to be called first (primitive)—(1) beginning with definition, (2) beginning with the order of cognition, and (3) beginning with time. —The essence begins with all three.All other categories cannot exist independently, so noumenon must be prior to time.The formula of each thing must contain the formula of noumenon; so noumenon also precedes definition.As far as cognition is concerned, our full understanding of everything must start from the ontology, for example, what is a human being?What is fire?Then proceeding to its quality, quantity or location, we must first understand how it is, and then we can understand the reason why each cloud, such as quality or quantity, is what it is.

Therefore, from ancient times to the present, the subject that people often question and question is "what is reality", that is, "what is noumenon".That is the problem, some people think that the noumenon is only one, others say that there is more than one, some people think that its number has a limit, and some people say that its number has no limit.Therefore, we must basically and broadly explore the true nature of the noumenon. Chapter Two Most obviously, most people often regard objects as bodies; therefore, we not only refer to animals, plants and their parts as bodies, but also to natural objects such as fire, water, and earth, and all the objects composed of them (whole or their parts), for example, The sky and its parts, the stars, the moon and the sun are also called the ontology.However, are these only the noumenon, or are there others?

Or all of these, and only some of them are substances, or the other part; or are all these not substances, and something else is substance?These must be considered. Some people think that the outer limit of objects, that is, planes, lines, points, and units, are noumenon, and these should be noumenon more than objects or solids. Still others think that there are no substances but sensible things, but others think that eternal substances are both more numerous and more real than sensible things; Plato, for example, sets forth two classes of substances— General formulas and mathematical objects—coexist with the noumenon of the third class of sensible objects.However, Sipanxuepu produced more kinds of noumenon, starting with Yuanyi, and assumed many principles for each kind of noumenon, one is the principle of number, another is the principle of space measurement, and the other is the principle of soul; it develops in this way , he increased the type of ontology.Others say that formulas are of the same nature as numbers, from which other things are derived—such as lines and planes, etc.—to the universe itself and sensible things.

Of these we must inquire which of these is true, and which of these is false, and what are substances, whether there are substances besides sensible things, and how sensible things exist, whether there are substances which exist independently of sensible things, or Absolutely nothing or possible (if possible, why and how).We must begin with a brief description of the nature of ontology. Chapter three The word "ontology", if not added to its meaning, can be applied to at least four main objects; "bottom".What I mean by "substratum" (theme) here is something for which everything else is predicated, but which itself is not predicated for other things.As the original bottom of things, this is considered to be the truest noumenon, so we should first determine the nature of the bottom.One idea is based on matter, another on shape, and a third on a combination of both. (To illustrate my point with an example: matter is bronze, form is the model, and the combination of the two is the statue, the complete whole.) If form is considered to be more tangible than matter, it will be prior to both for the same reason. combination.

We have now outlined the properties of an ontology, showing that it can be substantively predicated and everything else predicated by it.But the problem is not yet understood; it is insufficiently stated and somewhat vague.According to this statement matter will become substance.If we don't say it like this, it's hard for us not to say it.When everything is stripped away, all that remains is matter.For the rest are both evolutions, products, and potentialities of things; and length, breadth, and depth are measures rather than essences; these are rather basic evolutions of essences.However, after the length, width, and depth as the outer limit of the entity are taken away, the shape cannot exist; <Measurement is not the essence, so the shape mainly based on measurement is also not the essence. 〉It seems that only matter is the noumenon when studying this problem in this way.Here I refer to matter, which itself is neither an individual thing nor a certain quantity, nor does it belong to other categories that explain reality.Each of these categories has its own meaning, and what it means is also different.For all other things are used to describe the substance, and here the substance is denoted; so the ultimate substratum itself is neither a particular thing, nor a certain quantity, nor a thing with other positive characteristics; nor is it the opposite of these, because Negative properties also only occasionally accompanies substances.

Then, if we accept this point of view, matter should be substance.But this is impossible; for noumenon is primarily independent and individual.The so-called ontology, rather than thinking of it as matter, is rather a combination of general formula and general formula and matter.However, the combination of general formula and substance can be put on hold temporarily, and its nature is clearly behind the general formula.Matter is also clearly "after" in this sense.We must examine the third noumenon (general form), because this is the most confusing. There are sensible things which are generally taken as noumenal, and which we must first attend to.

Chapter Four The procedure of public study should be like this—going through the easy-to-understand subsections of individual sensory experiences to the general principles that are difficult to understand in nature.Just as our actions should start with the individual small good, and then proceed to the absolute great good that all individuals call good, our research should also start with what each of us knows, and then advance to the depth of nature.Here are some of the basic truths that people know and think are often difficult for the world to fully understand, and they are often quite impractical.But we must start with our little knowledge among these ignorant knowledge, and then try to find the meaning of the universe that is absolutely not easy.

At the beginning we explained the various items that determine the ontology, one of which is the so-called "how is", which we must now study.Let's start with some verbal interpretation.How each thing is belongs to "you". "Because of what" becomes "you"?It's not because you're civilized.The nature of civilization does not make you who you are. So "what" are you?This is you by yourself, this is what you are.But this is not completely clear about "how to be"; it is different from being "white" because of the "face". Saying "because this is white flour" is not what the noodles are, because saying "noodles" in terms of "noodles" cannot explain the original thing.Explain that a noun should not use the original noun, but other words should be used to express its meaning; the same is true for the formula of how is.Therefore, the interpretation of "white flour" means that it is a "smooth surface", and smoothness is used to explain whiteness, and whiteness and smoothness are the same.

But since there are compound words that describe other categories (each category such as quality, quantity, time, place, and action has a substratum), we must investigate whether each category has its own formula, such as "white people" Compound nouns There are also reasons why.Let X stand for compound nouns.What is X's how?However, it can be said that this is still not an explanation of "Yuji": as a subject, there are two cases of Youjiyun predicate that are not qualified, one is the addition of a decisive noun, and the other is the lack of a decisive noun.The former category of examples is like explaining what is "white", but it states the formula of the white "person", which adds a decisive term.In the latter category, for example, if X stands for "white man" and X is interpreted as "white", another decisive noun in the subject is deleted; it is true that a white man is white, but what makes him white is not what makes him white. However, what is called X is really a what?no.How should be exactly what a thing is; when another attribute is attached to a subject, the compound no longer is exactly the original "this is" (individual), for example, "white man" cannot be exactly as The "this is", for these "this" (individualities) can only belong to the exact substance.Then only those things whose explanation can become a definition can have what they are.However, this does not count as a definition if every word is the same as its description (if so, any group of words will become a definition; just like Iriel, it can also be said to be the definition of a certain thing).This must explain something fundamentally.No elementary thing can explain one thing by another.Whoever is not one of the species in the genus does not have the "genus" of the genus - only the varieties can have this, for these not only acquire the contingent properties of the genus (of the genus) by participating in the genus Or Bingfu, <but how is it that has the family and genus>.As for all other thick things, if they have a name, they must each have a formula that lives up to their name—that is, "a certain subject has such properties"— Or use a more precise formula instead of this simple formula, but these are not definitions, nor are they what they are. Or, if something is, how many meanings can its definition have?What something is, one of its meanings is noumenon and "this", and the other meanings are quantity, quality and other predicates.Everything has its own "is", but its being is different, either for its basic "is", or for its secondary being; what is something?Its original meaning refers to the ontology, and its narrow sense refers to other categories.As we often ask its quality?So quality is also a "what is" - but this "is" is not a simple original meaning, but like an example of "nothing". The pure nature is only used to be what it is like "nothing"; the same is true for quality. Undoubtedly, we must study how to make every aspect of the problem clear, without going beyond the reality of the problem.Now it should be clear that no matter what words we use, "how is" is like "what is something?", its primary original meaning must always belong to noumenon, and its secondary meaning belongs to other categories, such as a quality or a quantity. When we say that these are "all", it must be a pun (same meaning), or there may be some gains or losses in the meaning of "all" (for example, we say that everything that is not known is also known),——the fact should be It is so; our use of the word "is" should be neither ambiguous nor double-entended, but as we use the word "medical", its meaning is related to the same kind of things, and the things referred to are not the same, However, it is unambiguous; because a patient, an operation, and a medical instrument are both called "medical" and they do not represent the same thing, but they are unambiguously related to a common purpose. Of the two narrative modes, you are not limited which one you use; it is obvious that both definition and how are fundamentally subordinated to noumenon in a pure sense.They may also belong to other categories, but the meaning there is not fundamental.But having said that, the definition of each word is not necessarily the same as any of its formulas; it can only be the same as a particular formula; In order to meet the necessary conditions to become the definition of monad, a pile of words like "Iriel", or a bundle of sticks tied together, does not satisfy the essence of monad.What is now called "is" means "this" in its original meaning, and its other meanings refer to quantity and quality.Even "white" (such a compound word) can have a formula or definition, but its meaning is quite different from the definition of "white" or the definition of "noumenon". Chapter five If someone denies that a formula with a determinant added can be a definition, then the question arises, how can a noun that is combined but not simple be defined?Because if we want to explain compound words, we have to add a decisive word.For example, nose and concavity and concavity, nose and concavity combine to form a concavity, concavity becomes the nature of the nose, not an accidental attribute of concavity; it is not like the white face of Gallia or the white face of man Out of whiteness (only Gallia is human and happens to be white), but it seems that "masculinity" belongs to animals and "equality" belongs to quantity, and all these "attributes by themselves" have become themes. same as endowment.Such a gift is contained in the formula or name of that subject, without which we cannot explain that subject; for example, white can be explained without man, and we cannot explain female without animal.Therefore, there may be no how is and definition for these things; if there is, these can be derived from the different meanings of how is mentioned earlier. But about these, there is a second question.If we say that concave nose is flat nose, then "concave" will be the same as "collapse"; but concave and collapse are not the same (because "flat nose" is an attribute of oneself, it cannot exist independently of things, it is actually " Concavity lies in the nose"), so if you don't talk about flat nose, if you want to talk about flat nose, the explanation for flat nose should be a concave nose, so you have to say twice.It is absurd to try to get the most out of such things; if one wants to ask what is a snub-nosed nose, one more "nose" must be added to the explanation, so that there will be endless repetition. Clearly, then, only ontology can be defined.If other categories can also be defined, this must include a decisive word, such as quality must be defined in this way; odd (number) cannot be defined without number; female (animal) cannot be defined without animal. Define it.In the above cases (when I say "to add a determinative noun" is actually Da language), if so, dichotomous nouns such as "odd number" cannot be defined (because our noun <formula> is just not true It’s just that everyone doesn’t pay attention to it), if these are also definable, then there must be another definition method, or as we have said before, the definition and how have original meanings and other meanings instead of more than one meaning .Therefore, on the one hand, apart from the ontology, there can be no definition and how to be. On the other hand, other things can also have definitions and how to be.Clearly, then, the definition is the formula of the how-is, and the how-is belongs to noumenon, either exclusively or mainly and fundamentally and simply. Chapter Six We must study the similarities and differences between each thing and how it is.It is beneficial to study the noumenon; because it is generally believed that everything is not different from the noumenon, and how is the noumenon of each thing.Now, in attribute complex words, things are generally considered to be different from how they are, for example, white people are different from how white people are.If they are said to be the same, what is human and what is white must be the same; since people say that people are white, then what is white and what is white should be the same.However, the how of attribute compound words may not necessarily be the same as the how of words.It is not so that the outer term becomes the same as the middle term.Perhaps, another attribute extra-term should be able to become the same, such as what is white and what is civilized; but in fact this is not the case. But is a thing necessarily the same as how it is in the noun of nature, "things by oneself"? For example, what about substances for which there is no other substance or is actually prior to them (some people think that form is the substance that precedes all)? ——If how the good is different from the good itself, how the animal is different from the animal itself, and how the real is different from the real itself, then firstly, between the affirmed noumenon and real being and idea In addition, there will be noumena, reality and meaning. Second, if these are also regarded as real objects, they will be prior to noumenon.If the first noumenon and the back noumenon are separated from each other, then (a) the sub noumenon will not be able to get its cognition (idea or object origin), and (b) the back noumenon will have no reality. (The meaning of separation, I refer to the original goodness If it is separated from what is, what is good will not have the essence of being good.) Because (a) We can know everything only if we know how it is. (b) If it is said that what is good is no longer good, the situation of other things will be the same as good, what is true is no longer what is, and what is unitary is no longer unitary.Everything is so; then if it does not become true, nothing else can be true.Also, whatever does not contain goodness is not good.What is good must be one with what is good, and what is beautiful is what is what is beautiful; all things that are self-sufficient, basically self-sufficient, and not dependent on other things, should be like this.If so, it would suffice if they were not general formulas; perhaps it would suffice that they were all general formulas. (At the same time, it is also clear that the meanings that some people say, if they exist, the bottom will not be the essence; because the meaning must be the essence and it does not contain the bottom; if the meaning contains the bottom, they will because of Participates in individual things and exists in individual things.) Then, each thing itself and its how are not coincidentally the same, but actually united. This is clear from both the analysis in the previous section and the theory that "to know a thing, one must know how it is".After these examples, it should be clear that the two must indeed be one. (However, for an attribute noun such as "civilization" or "white", since this has two meanings, it cannot be said that itself is exactly the same as how it is; since both the attribute and its affiliation are white, in this sense The attribute is the same as how it is, and the other meaning is different; the reason why white is white (how is) is the same as the attribute of whiteness, but it is not the same as that person or white person.) If different names are given to each how is, the fallacy of separation can also be seen, because in this way, in addition to the original how is, there must be another how is, for example, for the horse how is, there must be a second how is.Because how is is the ontology, shouldn't some of them be identified from the beginning?But in fact, not only a thing and its being should be one, but also their formulas are the same as mentioned before;Moreover, if they are not the same, the process of "seeking truth" will go to infinity; because we regard (1) "how is the unitary" and (2) "unity" as different words, then in In the successive questions about words, the series of how is Yuan Yi has to develop accordingly.It is then clear that every fundamental and selfish thing is indeed one with what it is.The Sophists' various expressions on this topic and the question "Is Socrates the same as he who became Socrates" can be answered with the same interpretation. It seems that there is no difference. Here we have shown in what sense each thing is the same as how it is, and in what sense it is not the same as it. Chapter seven Regarding the things created, some are made by nature, some are made by technology, and some are made spontaneously.The creation of every thing must have a creator, it must have a source, and it must be accomplished. The things I mean by creation can be seen in any category; this can be a "this" or Some quantity, or some quality, or some place. Natural things are created by nature; their origin is matter; their achievements are all things existing in nature.Either for a person or for a plant or a tree, or for something like that, all those created by nature and achieved something, we call it the ontology—everything created by nature or artificial (technology) has matter; these Everything has the potential to be or not to be, and this potential is the substance in everything.Generally speaking, nature is the source of all things, and the model from which all things are produced is also nature, and what is produced by it is like a plant, a tree, or an animal, all of which have natural nature.Therefore, the natural nature on which all things are created is the same as the general formula, and the natural individuals are generated successively. Although the materials are different, the natural forms are all the same; human beings pass on to human beings. Natural products are produced in this way, and other products are called "articles".All products come from technology, function, or thought.Some things arise spontaneously, or by chance, just as natural produce; and the same things sometimes arise from seeds, and sometimes without seeds.We will talk about these later.A product created from technology, its form comes from the soul of the artist. (In the meaning of form, I mean the how of each thing and its original substance.) Even in a certain sense, the form of paired things is the same; a missing substance is an opposite substance; for example, health is a disease. Essence (for sickness is the loss of health); and health is a formula or certain knowledge in the soul.The theme of health arises from the following thought process: health is this: if the owner wants to be healthy, he must have this, such as the whole body physiologically well-balanced; A certain "this" of him becomes something he can make.Then the health obtained by inverting from this is called a "product".So the conclusion is this, health is due to health <general formula>, and housing is due to housing <general formula>; material things are due to immaterial things; (because the technology that creates health and housing is the general formula of health and housing.) When I give Out of no substance, I mean "how is". Regarding the manufacturing process, one part is called "thought" and the other part is called "production"-the starting point and form are carried out by thinking, and the work carried out from the last step of thinking is called making.Each intermediate preparation is also produced in this way.For example, if the owner wants to be healthy, his physiology should be well-balanced.How can the physiology be evened out?Either by this method or by that method.This needs to keep him warm.How can I get warm?There must be something else.All these things in the process of making health are latent in health, and all are derived from the ability of the physician. The effective principle and its starting point for health, then, should arise, if technical, from a general formula in the physician's soul, or, if spontaneous, from any point where this accident arises.The starting point of his technique leading to health may be warmth, which this practitioner uses massage to generate.The warmth in the body is a part of health, or through it, directly or indirectly, gradually leads to various parts of a person's health, which becomes the personal thing of health--so is a house (stones are the personal thing of the house), The same goes for the other cases. So the old saying is true, nothing can come into being if there was nothing before. It is evident that everything that exists must come out of things that were before; matter is the part that was before; matter was seen in the process of creation, and something was created out of it.However, can matter be counted as an element in the formula?What is a copper ball?Of course, we describe it from two aspects: we say that its substance is copper, and that its form is such and such a pattern; and the pattern is the immediate family to which it belongs.In this way, the formula of the copper ball contains substances. As for things made of a certain substance (that), after they are made, they no longer say "something" (that) but "made of a certain thing (that)"; for example, a statue is not "stone" but "made of stone". of".A healthy person is not called by what he comes from.The reason is that a sick person who loses his health regains his health, and at the same time the sick person is also a person, and the healthy person is still produced from the substratum of human beings; but the origin of health is not so much from the substratum of humans as It is said that it is due to "deficiency", that is, "disabled people" (patients), so the theme of health is not "patients" but still "people", which means that "people" have now become healthy.As for the form or order of things such as copper or wood and bricks, which are originally obscure and nameless, when they are made into copper balls and houses, people can't see what original form they have been deprived of, so they don't focus on "queen" like the theme of health. Lost" (healthy people are often regarded as recovered people), and copper balls are called copper products, and houses are bricks and wood products.Here, in terms of language, everything made of matter is not called the original substance, but the ending is changed. For example, statues are not made of stone but made of stone, and houses are not made of brick and wood but of brick and wood. (Although we carefully examine these conditions, we can see that stone is to statues, and bricks and wood are to houses. What is changed in the manufacturing process is not the permanent substance but the original order or form of stones, bricks, and wood.) This is Our reason for using such words. Chapter eight Because any regular thing must have a creator (this I call the starting point of manufacturing), and it must have a source (this I will take the material and not take the missing, and its purpose has been explained in the previous section), and it must also have a source. (either a brass ball or a brass ring or something else); and since what is made is a brass ball, we are not making brass, although the form of the brass ball corresponds to a ball, we are in It's not ball control here either.To make "this" is to make a single entity entirely out of the underlying matter. (I mean this, to make copper into a circle is not to make a circle or a ball, but to make the shape into some matter. For, as prefigured above, to make a form must presuppose certain preexisting things. For example, we make a copper ball, which is a copper ball made of copper.) If we had to make the bottom of things too, the process of making it would go back to infinity.It is evident, then, that we do not invent formulas (or any other name for shapes embodied in sensibles) either.This is neither the product of the formula nor the how of the formula; for "this" is accomplished by something else, made by technology or by nature or by function.Here is "a brass ball" and this is what we made.We make "this" out of copper material and spherical form; we give form to this particular substance, and the result is a copper ball.If it is said that what is to be made is a general spherical shape, then what is the spherical shape made of?An artifact must have something as its predecessor.Every product will be in two distinguishable parts, one of which must necessarily be matter.The other must be the general formula. If a sphere is such a figure that "the distance between every point and its center is the same", with this general formula as the intermediary, one can realize it as a sphere, and the other can form it into a sphere in certain substances, and its synthesis is a copper ball.From the above explanations, it can be understood that what is created is not a general formula or how is, but a composite entity named copper ball from this. In every created thing, matter is always included. One part of this composite entity is matter, and the other part is formula. So, is there a spherical formula other than individual spheres, and a general formula other than bricks and wood?If so, "this" would never come into being, and the meaning of the general formula is "so", not "this"—not a definite thing; But the artist makes a such from this, or the father begets a such from this; it is a such after birth. "This" whole, Gallia or Socrates, is equivalent to "this brass ball", and man and animals are equivalent to "general brass ball".Thus, the obvious reasons for supporting the general formula (the general formula is something that exists outside the individual, according to some people) is empty, at least not sufficient in the problem of creation and noumenon, the general formula need not be self-existing ontology.In some cases of natural productions, as father and son are always of the same breed, (they are of the same form, but not the same body), but there are sometimes cases contrary to nature, as when a horse produces a mule (even though Even with these exceptions, things are still similar, for the common nature of horses and donkeys can establish a family and genus between horses and donkeys, although there is no such name at present, but if there is such a name, it is of course the genus mule).Obviously, therefore, there is no need to set up a general formula as a model (if we want to find a general formula, we can find it in these examples; because the living being is the most proper substance); the father can make products, just as in the material cause of form.Such and such a form is embodied in these muscles and bones, and when we have this composite substance, this is Gallia or Socrates; they are also each one "this" because of their different substances, but their form are the same; their forms are indistinguishable. Chapter Nine Questions can be asked how some things, like health, can be made by technology or spontaneously; others, like houses, are not.The reason is this, that some of the substances from which any manufacture, or part of a manufacture, is made, are endowed with automatic powers, and some are not; and of those which possess automatic powers, some are capable of developing automatically in a definite way, and some are not; for example Everyone can dance spontaneously, but not everyone can dance a certain style of dance.Matter, such as stones, does not automatically arrange itself towards the special form of a house; it must be moved by something else; like fire, it will burn automatically.So some things would not happen if no one had made them, and others would not depend on others; actions could happen automatically, or be triggered by other untechnical things or by some pre-existing part of things. conduct. From what has been said above, it is clear that every technical article is always produced either from the thing of the same name (as the production of natural products), or from a part of itself (as a house from the thing of the same name). Manufactured means the idea that makes the house; for the idea is the technique (that is, the form), or made out of something that contains parts of it—except things that happen by chance.Whatever causes a thing to produce a thing directly from itself becomes a part of that product.The masseur's hand heats the patient's body, and that is health, or part of health, or it leads to health, or part of health.Heat is thus the cause of health, and the effect of this cause is health.Therefore, in the method of synthesis, "how is" is the starting point of all things (the starting point of the method of synthesis, "what is this?").We also find the starting point of creation here. The same goes for things made by nature and artifacts of technology.The production function of the seed is just like the technical work; because this subsistence has a form, and the source of the seed and the thing produced have the same name-only we can't expect the father and the son to be exactly the same, as we say "man" To be born must be a "person", because a "man" sometimes gives birth to a "woman".Natural reproduction sometimes produces deformed offspring, so the names are different, so the parents of mules are not mules. (Like the man-made things mentioned above,) there are some natural things that can be spontaneous, and most of their substances contain automatic properties like seeds; Substances that do not have this automatic property cannot be produced for themselves except when produced by their parents. Our theory not only proves that form does not generate form on ontology, but also applies to all basic classes, namely other categories such as quantity and quality.As far as copper balls are concerned, what is produced is neither copper nor balls.As far as copper is concerned, before it becomes a copper ball, the copper block must also be a composite entity, because both matter and form must first exist.This is true in the ontology, and it is also true in quality, quantity, and other categories; quality cannot be separated from materials to become quality, and quantity cannot be measured without a piece of wood or an animal.The difference is that the characteristic of the noumenon is that there must be another noumenon that has been fully realized as its parent. For example, the production of an animal must first have another animal; enough. Chapter ten Because a "definition" is a "formula" and each formula has several parts; if a formula is to a thing, so is a part of the formula to a part of the thing; In the formula of the whole?Some general formulas have partial formulas, while others do not.The circle formula does not include the broken arc formula, but the syllable formula includes the letter <phonetic note> formula; however, the circle can be divided into several arcs, and the syllable can be divided into several letters.Also, if the part precedes the whole text, and the acute angle is a right angle part, referring to <toe> as the part of an animal, then the acute angle should precede the right angle and the finger should precede the human.But the latter is considered to be prior to the former; because in the formula, the part is to be understood from the whole; and from the point of view that each can exist independently, the whole should precede the part. Perhaps, we should say "part" is referenced in several different senses. 其中的一义是用部分来作别一事物的计量，这一命意暂予搁置。让我们先研究组成本体的各部分。假如物质为一事，另一为形式，而两者之综合又作为另一本体，那么物质就可说是这一事物的部分；在另一情况，物质就不是其中的部分，这里只有形式公式所由组成的诸要素。例如，肌肉，对于凹不是其部分，而于凹鼻则肌肉为其一部分（因为肌肉是产生凹鼻的物质）；铜是整个铜象的一部分，但不是那象的一个部分。 （事物常凭其形式取名，而不凭其物质原料取名。）这样，圆公式不包括弧公式，但音节公式包括字母公式；因为字母是形式公式的一个部分，不是物质公式的一个部分，而弧则在物质的含义上作为圆的一个部分，其形式则由这些物质导成，可是弧与铜相比拟，弧之成圆型与铜之为铜球相比拟，则弧较为接近形式。但在某一意义上讲，也不是各种字母均存在音节公式之中，例如，特殊的腊字母或空中所画字母；因为这些在作为音节的一个部分，我们只取它的可感觉物质。因为即便是线分割为两半，人破坏为骨与肉，这还不能说线由半线组成，人由骨肉组成而得有半线与骨肉的怎是，线与人所得于这些部分的还只是其物质；这些确是综合体的各个部分，而不是公式所似的形式之各个部分；因此它们并不存在于公式之中。有些部分公式并不依照那综合整体公式而拟定，有一类定义就必然包括这样的部分公式，有一类则必不包括。 因此，有些事物坏死〈消失〉时拆为它们原来组成的各个部分，有些则不然。那些以物质与形式相结合而成的事物，例如凹鼻或铜球，坏消时还为这些原料，而其中的一部分就是物质。（那些不包括物质的事物，或非物质事物，其公式只是形式公式，不会坏消，——或是全不坏消，至少不以如此方式坏消。）所以这些原料是综合实体的部分与原理，不是形式的部分与原理。泥象消失于泥，铜球消失于铜，加里亚消失于骨肉，还有圆消失于断弧。（这里圆是作为具有物质的事物看的。"圆"字双关，可用以指一个净圆，亦可以指某个个别圆，因为对于个别圆物体，我们就称之为一个"圆"。） 真相已陈述了，但再做一番讨论，问题可以更明白。公式可以区分为若干部分公式，这些部分都可以先于全公式，也可以其中一部分先于全公式。可是直角的公式不包括锐角的公式，而锐角的公式依其于直角；因为人们用直角来界说锐角，说"锐角是一个小于直角的角"。圆与半圆的关系亦然，因为半圆用圆来界说；照样，指也用全身来解释，说：指是人身上如此如此的一个部分。所以，凡事物的各个部分之属于物质者后于全体，全体消失时就分解为这些物质。但那公式与依公式为本体的各个部分则先于全体，或其中某些部分先于全体。动物之灵魂（即有灵生物的本体）依公式就是某科属躯体的形式与其怎是（至少我们若要明白地解释动物，就不能不照顾到各部分的机能，这些如不提到感觉〈与灵魂〉就说不明白了），所以灵魂必是全部或其中某些部分先于动物这综合实体，于每一个别动物也如此。躯体与其部分后于灵魂这主要本体；综合实体分解于物质的各个部分，这个本体不分解为物质，在这意义上它是先于全体。在另一意义上灵魂就不先于全体，因为它不能离整个动物而存在；因为在一个活动物身上时是一个指，但一只死指就只名称是"指"，而实际已无复"指"的真义了。灵魂也相似。有些部分对全体而论既不先于，也不后于，这些是个体的主要部分与公式（亦即其本体的怎是）紧接地出现于个体之中，例如心或脑；（究竟是心是脑为动物主体则无关要旨。）至于人与马以及此类以普遍性应用于个别事物的名词则并非本体，这些只是这个个别公式与这个个别物质所组成的个别事物被当作普遍性事物来处理或讲述而已。作为个体，苏格拉底已经将切身的个别物质包括在他躯体之中。其它的例也相似。 一个部分，可以是形式（怎是），或是形式与物质的结合体，或是物质的部分。但只有形式的各个部分才能是公式的各个部分，公式是具有普遍性的；因为一个圆与其"所以为之圆"，即怎是相同，灵魂也与其"所以为灵魂"者一样。然而当我们接触到那综合实体，例如"这圆"，一个个别的圆，无论是可感觉或可理知的，（我所说理知的圆即数理上的圆，所说可感觉的圆即铜或木材所制的圆，）关于这些个别事物，定义是没有的；它们只凭思想或感觉来认识；当它们从完全的现实消失以后就不知其或存或亡；但"圆"却总是由普遍公式来为之说明并得以认识。至于物质本身是无由自知的。有些物质是可感觉的，有些可理知的。可感觉物质，例如铜与木材与一切可变化的物质都是的；可理知物质为存在于可感觉物质之中的不可感觉事物，例如数理对象。 于此我们已讲明了关于全体与部分以及它们"先于"与"后于"的问题。然而当有人询问究属直角、圆、动物是"先于"抑或那些组成它们的与可以由它们分解出来的各个部分是"先于"呢？我们不能简单地答复这问题。如果以灵魂为动物或一切生物之本，每个个别灵魂即为个别生物之本，所以为圆即圆，所以为直角即直角，而直角的怎是即直角，那么全体就得被认为后于部分，即其公式内所包括的各部分与个别直角的各部分（因为铜所制的物质直角与线所成的直角两皆后于其部分）；同时则那非物质直角是后于公式所包括的直角之部分，而先于任何个别实例所包括的部分。所以问题不能作成简单的答复。可是，灵魂与动物若不是合一而是相异的事物，那么如前所曾述及各个部分中将有些称为先于，有些不称为先于动物。