Chapter 19 Book VII On the System of Moral Philosophy - Part I

Book VII of the System of Moral Philosophy (four parts in this volume) Part I of the problems which should be examined in the theory of moral emotions If we consider the various theories which explain the nature and origin of human moral emotions some of the most successful and eminent theories, we shall find that almost all of them agree in one way or another with the theory which I have been trying to explain; Now that the matter is sufficiently examined, we shall not be at a loss as to what is the point of view or opinion of nature which leads each author to form his particular system of theory.Every system of moral doctrine which has ever enjoyed a reputation in the world has perhaps at last been derived from some principle which I have been endeavoring to elucidate.As these moral doctrines are in this respect all based on the principles of nature, they are all true to a certain degree.But since much of the moral theories arise from a partial and incomplete view of nature, they are also wrong in some respects.

In the discussion of moral principles, there are two issues to be examined.First, where does virtue reside?Or, what character and what conduct constitute that fine and admirable quality which is the natural object of esteem, respect, and approbation?Second, what power and function of the mind makes us recognize this quality—whether it is worthy of respect, respect, or approval?In other words, the human mind prefers one disposition to action to another; says one disposition to action is right and another is wrong; One is an object of approval, respect, and reward, and the other an object of blame, reproach, and punishment. How and by what means is all this accomplished?

When we examine whether virtue consists in benevolence, as Dr. Hutcheson supposes; or whether virtue consists in the judicious and prudent pursuit of one's own true and certain happiness, with the eyes of others, we are examining the first question. When we examine this good quality, wherever it exists, whether it is self-love--which enables us to perceive it in ourselves or in others, which greatly contributes to our own self-interest- —persuading us to love; or when we examine whether it is by reason—which shows us the difference between one quality and another, as well as the difference between right and wrong—persuading when we like it; or when we examine whether it is governed by some peculiar perception called moral consciousness—that good quality pleases and delights it, as that evil quality conversely disgusts and delights it. or, finally, when we examine whether it is persuaded to our liking by some other faculty of human nature—such as some limitation of sympathy, etc.—we are examining second question.

I would like to examine the system that has been developed with respect to the former question before proceeding further to the system with respect to the latter.