Chapter 18 Volume VI Conclusion

Conclusion of Book VI Concern for our own happiness calls upon us the virtues of prudence; concern for the happiness of others calls upon us the virtues of justice and benevolence.The former virtue binds us against harm; the latter urges us to promote the happiness of others.The first of those three virtues is originally what our self-interest demands of us, without regard to the question of what the affections of others are, should be, or would be under certain conditions, The other two virtues are what our benevolent affections demand of us.Concern for the sentiments of others, however, compels and directs all these virtues; and if a man, throughout his whole life, or for a greater part of it, steadfastly and consistently emulates prudence, justice, or proper benevolence, This way of thinking, his conduct is guided chiefly by respect for the imaginary impartial spectator, the great inhabitant of his own mind, the great judge and arbiter of his conduct. Emotional respect.If in any part of the day we depart from some of the rules which he has laid down for us; Where the interest or happiness of our neighbor is injured; and if we neglect some obvious and proper occasion of promoting that interest and happiness, the great inhabitant of the heart calls us in the evening to pay attention to all these neglects. and violations, and his accusations often make us ashamed in our hearts of our follies and neglect of our own happiness, and perhaps of our greater indifference and indifference to the happiness of others. .

Though the virtues of prudence, justice, and benevolence may on different occasions be called upon us almost equally by two different principles, yet the virtue of self-control is in most cases chiefly and almost exclusively governed by one principle— —a sense of propriety, respect for the sentiments of the imaginary impartial spectator—claims upon us.Without the restraint which this principle imposes, every passion, if I may say so, would, in the vast majority of cases, have a hasty discharge and take pleasure in it.Anger is caused by the intensity of the passion itself; fear is born of the extreme anxiety of the passion itself.Consideration of time and place may lead to some restraint of vanity from being loud and inappropriately ostentatious; over.The importance given to the question of what the emotions of others are, should be, or are under given conditions is, in most cases, to overwhelm all those recalcitrant and tumultuous passions, and turn them into something that the impartial spectator can The sole principle of that mood and emotion is empathy and empathy.

Indeed, on some occasions these passions are restrained not so much by a sense of their impropriety as by a careful consideration of some of the evils which may attend to the indulgence of them.In such cases these passions, though restrained, have not been eradicated, and the rage inherent in them often lurks in the heart.People who suppress their angry feelings out of fear do not always eliminate their anger, but only postpone it until a safer time.But when a man tells some of his wounds, he immediately feels that his violent passions are appeased and restrained by the temperate sympathy of his companions, and he immediately adopts those Well tempered emotion, not looking upon the injury with that vehement, ferocious look with which he had earlier looked upon it, but began to look upon it with the mildness and integrity with which his companions must have looked upon it. ; he not only suppressed his anger, but overcame it to a certain extent.This passion had really become less intense than it had been before, and was less likely to motivate him to the violent and brutal vengeance which he might have been tempted to inflict earlier.

Those passions which are governed by the above-mentioned sense of propriety are all tempered and overcome in a certain degree by this sense of propriety.Rather, only those passions bound by a certain prudence.Often exacerbated by this restraint, and sometimes (long after he has received some stimulus, when no one thinks of it) absurdly and unexpectedly, with tenfold rage and rage burst out. Like every other passion, however, anger may, on many occasions, be very properly restrained by prudence.A certain effort of fortitude and self-control is even necessary to this restraint; and the impartial spectator may sometimes use that perfunctory homage--his respect for an act of prudence which he regards as commonplace. such an effort of fortitude and self-control; he would never have used such an emotional admiration--the admiration he aroused in observing the temperance of propriety and the overcoming of those same passions which he could truly empathize with-- — Let's look at the above behavior.In the former constraint, the spectator can often see some propriety, and, if you will, some virtue, but this is a condition greatly inferior to that of the latter. Less propriety and virtue, the latter restraint always has a sense of delight and admiration in the spectator.

The virtues of prudence, justice, and benevolence have no tendency to produce anything but the most pleasing consequences.Just as the first actor sees these consequences, so does the impartial spectator afterwards. In approving the prudent man, we feel with great contentment that he must enjoy a security--which he must enjoy when he lives in the world under the protection of the virtues of calm and deliberation.In our assent to the just man, we feel equally contented with a security that all those connected with him, whether neighbors, associates, or business associates, must be able to He walks with the security that comes from his desire not to hurt or offend anyone.In approving the merciful man, we experience the gratitude expressed by all those who have been in his favor, and share with them a deep understanding of his virtues.In our assent to all these virtues, whether to the person who practices them, or to some other being, our sense of their pleasant consequences and their effects will have the same meaning as ours. The sense of the propriety of these virtues combines, and always constitutes a noteworthy and often very important element of that assent.

But in the approbation of the virtue of self-control, the satisfaction with the consequences of this virtue sometimes constitutes no element of that approbation, often only a negligible element of it.These consequences may sometimes be pleasant, and sometimes unpleasant; and though our assent is no doubt stronger on the one occasion, it is by no means entirely absent on the latter.Uncommon valor may be employed in just as well as unjust causes; and though in the one case such valor will no doubt be more loved and admired, even in the latter It can also show a noble and respectable quality.In this heroism, as in all other virtues of self-control, the striking and striking quality always seems to be nobility and firmness in the effort made, and the intensity necessary to make and sustain it. sense of appropriateness.The consequences are often underestimated.