Chapter 17 Book II The World as a Preliminary Treatise on the Will §17

objectification of will The abode of the spirit is us, not the underworld, not the stars: both are made by the spirit that lives in us. In the first part we only considered representations as representations, and therefore examined them only in general form.As for the abstract representation, that is, the concept, it has all content and meaning only because it has a corresponding relationship with the intuitive representation, otherwise it has no value and no content; recognize it. [However] since we have to rely entirely on intuitive representations, we now also need to know the content of intuitive representations, its detailed regulations and the image it performs before us.And what we are particularly concerned with is gaining an understanding of what it really means, what is otherwise only "felt".It is by means of this true meaning that these landscapes [appear before us] do not pass by us completely strangely, indifferently, -- without the aid of this meaning, as it must be -- — but greets us directly, comprehends us, and engages us in it with an interest sufficient to attract our whole being.We turn our attention to mathematics, natural science, and philosophy, each of which allows us to hope that it will provide in part the understanding we seek. —But we first discover that philosophy is a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a different language.Not all of them differ, of course, on the point we have here raised concerning the meaning of intuitive representations, for, except for the skeptics and the idealists, the rest are quite consistent in the main respects.Objects, they say, are the basis of representations, which, while different from them in their total being and essence, are at the same time so similar in all their parts, as eggs are similar to eggs.Notwithstanding their unanimity, it is of no help to us, since we do not know [how] to distinguish objects from representations, but only to find each other to be one and the same, two as one.Since all objects always and always presuppose the subject146, and therefore are always representations and cannot be changed; likewise, we have seen that "being an object" is the most general form of representations, and this form It is the separation of object and subject.Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason on which people speak of objects appears to us only as a form of representation, that is, as a regular connection between one representation and another, rather than as a complete and exhaustive or the connection between an infinite series of representations and a something that is not a representation, a thing that must not be a representation.As for the claims of the skeptics and idealists, we have already discussed them above when we talked about the controversy over the reality of the external world.

As for the intuitive representations which we have known only generally and only in form, if we now seek the further knowledge we seek in mathematics, we can only speak of those representations which fill time and space, that is, We can only speak in terms of appearance as quantity.Mathematics certainly has the most precise answer to how much or how big, but how much or how big is always relative, that is, a comparison between one appearance and another, and it only takes into account the comparison of quantities one-sidedly; therefore, this will not is the answer we seek in the main. Finally, if we look again at the broad, divided field of the natural sciences, we can first of all distinguish them into two main divisions.Natural science is either the description of form or the explanation of change, which I call morphology and etiology, respectively.The former examines the unchanging form, while the latter examines the changing matter according to the law of form transformation.The former, though inappropriate, is in its whole extent what one would call natural history [the science]; and especially as botany and zoology, it teaches us to recognize various, individual [though] endlessly interchangeable (Without prejudice to] those forms which are unchanging, organic, and thus rigidly determined. These forms constitute a large part of the content of intuitive representations, and morphology classifies, differentiates, and unifies them, according to natural and artificial Arranged systematically, placed under concepts so as to make it possible to survey and know all forms. Morphology also points out, in the whole or part of the field, a resemblance throughout all [forms], with infinitely finer differences (unity of design), and by this resemblance, these forms are like complex transpositions around an unrecorded theme. How matter enters into those forms, that is, individual occurrence [problem] not us The main part to be studied. This is because each individual is born from an identical individual by a process of reproduction. This process of reproduction, everywhere the same mystery, has hitherto eluded clear recognition ; and one or two points known to man belong to the sphere of physiology, and physiology belongs to the natural science of etiology. Mineralogy, which is basically morphological, especially when mineralogy becomes geology, also tends [to be] The natural science of etiology. Originally, etiology is the branch of all natural sciences whose subject is everywhere the knowledge of cause and effect. The knowledge of cause and effect shows how, after a state of matter, it follows a law that has never been corrupted and must Another definite state follows, and indicates how a definite change necessarily constrains and brings about another definite change: this is called explanation. The [science] belonging to etiology is mainly mechanics, physics , chemistry, physiology.

But if we put our trust in the teachings of these sciences, we shall soon find that etiology, like morphology, cannot answer the main questions we pursue.Morphology spreads out before us innumerable, infinitely varied forms, but all alike by an unmistakable resemblance of kind; If we only examine them in this way, these forms are like hieroglyphs spread out before us with different "understandings". On the contrary, etiology teaches us that this definite state of matter leads out according to the law of cause and effect. That state, this explains the state, even if it has fulfilled the responsibility of its etiology. In fact, what etiology does is simply to point out the regular order observed by the state of matter in time and space, It is only affirming for all occasions which phenomenon must appear at this time and place, and it is only determining the position of those states in time and space according to a law. The definite content of this law has been taught to us by experience. As for its general form and necessity are conscious of us without experience. But we are not in the least enlightened about the inner nature of any one of those phenomena, which is called natural force and depends on the cause The explanation of etiology, which is outside the scope of the explanation of science, whenever it has those conditions which it knows is required for the expression of natural forces, calls the regularity of the same force at the beginning of the expression. Natural law. However, This law of nature, these conditions, this beginning to manifest itself, at a given place and at a given time, is all that is and can be known by the etiological explanation. And the natural force itself, which manifests itself, according to those The inner nature of the phenomenon that occurs according to the law is always a secret to etiology, no matter whether the phenomenon is the simplest or the most complex, it is always a completely strange and unknown thing. Because etiology has until now, although it has most satisfactorily in terms of physiology, and least satisfactorily in terms of physiology, yet the force by which a stone falls to the ground or an object knocks another object away is, in its inner nature, foreign to us. It is no less mysterious than the force that promotes animal movement and growth. Mechanics assumes that matter, gravity, impenetrability, transmissibility of motion caused by impact, shape fixity, etc. are inexhaustible, called It is called the force of nature; and the regular expression of natural force under certain conditions is also called the law of nature, and then the explanation [work] of mechanics begins. The so-called explanation is to point out each kind of force faithfully and with mathematical precision. When, where, and how forces are manifested; each phenomenon discovered by mechanics is reduced to one of these forces. Physics, chemistry, and physiology are also concocted in the same way in their fields, but their assumptions are more and the results are different. Much less. Accordingly, even the most complete etiological account of the whole of nature is in essence no more than a list of inexplicable [natural] forces, except that these forces are represented in time and space, and their phenomena follow each other. The rules are properly indicated when they give way to each other; but the forces thus appearing, because their inner nature is beyond the reach of the laws to which etiology is subject, so etiology has to be left unexplained. in the phenomena and their order. In this sense, the etiological theoryIt can be compared with the cross-section of marble, because although this cross-section shows many [flat-headed] juxtaposed grains, it is impossible to understand how these grains reach this cross-section from the inside of the marble.If I may allow myself to give another joking example because it is too coincidental, then, after completing the etiological explanation of the whole of nature, it must be such a feeling to a philosophical student, just like a human being. I somehow broke into a social group that he knew nothing about, and the members here introduced one after another to him one by one, saying that someone was his friend, that someone was his middle cousin, and that was enough. The details; but every time he is introduced, although he always expresses that he is very happy to meet these new friends, but every time there is a question that comes to his mouth: "But what the hell, how on earth am I Who broke into this group?"

Etiology, then, cannot point us to those phenomena which we know as representations of ourselves, that understanding which we expect, which takes us beyond the phenomena.Because these phenomena, after all the explanations of etiology, are still just before us, completely unfamiliar appearances, and we do not understand their meaning.As for the causal connection, it only points out that these phenomena appear in the law and relative order of time and space, and does not teach us to further understand the [thing itself] that appears in this way.And the law of causality itself is valid only for appearances, for certain kinds of objects, and only makes sense after assuming these objects.Therefore, the law of causality, like the object itself, is always related to the subject and exists under conditions; therefore, the law of causality, as Kant taught us, can be understood from the subject, that is, a priori, or from the object. To set out means to know experientially.But what drives us to seek now is precisely that we cannot be complacent in knowing that we have appearances, that appearances are so-and-so, connected according to this and that law, and that the law of sufficient reason is the general form of these laws, and so on.We just cannot be satisfied with this, we want to know the meaning of those appearances, we want to ask whether the world is nothing but appearances;—if so, the world passing by before me must be the same as Insubstantial dreams are no more worthy of our attention than ghostly mirages—; we ask whether the world is anything but appearances, and if so, what.What is certain now is that what we are asking here must be something fundamentally and completely different from the appearance, and the forms and laws of the appearance must have nothing to do with it. These laws lead to this thing.The law is only to connect those objects and those appearances with each other, so the law is the form of the principle of sufficient reason.

Here we have seen that it is impossible to find the essence of things from without, and that no matter how much one searches, one gets nothing but metaphorical images and empty names.This is like a person who is walking around a palace and cannot find the entrance, so he only has to sketch the official walls as he walks.Yet this is the path taken by all philosophers before me.