Chapter 16 Part I The World as Representation §16

After we have made this whole consideration of reason, as a peculiar faculty of cognition peculiar to man, and the achievements and phenomena brought about by reason, peculiar to human nature, there remains [a question] about reason It's what I want to talk about.This is the problem with reason guiding human behavior.In this respect, reason may also be called practical.But most of what needs to be said here has already been discussed elsewhere, that is, in the appendix of this book, and there is also a place to refute Kant's so-called practical reason.Kant (admittedly conveniently) takes practical reason as the immediate source of all virtue, and speaks of it as the [throne] seat of an absolute (i.e., descended from heaven) of the due.Later, I refuted Kant's moral principle in detail and thoroughly in "The Fundamental Problems of Ethics".I shall, therefore, have little to say here about the influence of reason on conduct, in the true sense of reason.When we began to examine reason, we showed in a general way how human behavior differs from that of animals, and that this difference can only be regarded as a consequence of the presence or absence of abstract concepts in consciousness.The effect of these abstractions on our whole existence is so profound and important that our [human] relation to animals may be compared to that of sighted animals to those without eyes (certain larvae, worms, phytozoa) .Animals without eyes know by touch what is directly in contact with them in space, while animals with sight know, on the contrary, a large circle of close and distant.In the same way, the lack of reason restricts animals to intuitive representations that are immediately present in time, that is, to real objects; we humans, on the contrary, rely on cognition in the abstract, in the narrow and real present. Moreover, the entire past and future, and the vast realm of possibility, can be mastered.We can look at life from all sides, far beyond the present and reality.Therefore, within this certain limit, what the eyes do to perceptual cognition in space, so does rationality do to inner cognition in time.Just as the visibility of an object has value and meaning only in that it declares the object's intangibility, so the entire value of abstract cognition is always only in its correspondence with intuitive cognition.Therefore, an ordinary person always thinks that directly and intuitively known [things] are more valuable than abstract concepts, than mere imagined [things].He believes that empirical knowledge is better than logical knowledge.Others 133 think the opposite, and these people say more and do less in their lives, and what they experience comes from newspapers and books more than from the real world; at best, they can degenerate into pedants and Some people who stick to words.Only from here can one understand how Leibniz and Wolff and all their successors could go so far as to be so superstitious that they would repeat the mistakes of Genus Scotus and declare that intuitive knowledge is only vague abstract knowledge. !To Spinoza's credit I must mention that his clearer mind finally reversed; and declared that all common concepts arise out of the disorder of what is intuitively known. ("Ethics" Volume II Question 40, Attachment 1) The [consequence] arising from the above inversion of thinking is that people discard the inherent evidence in mathematics in order to allow only logical evidence. effective; there are people who put all non-abstract cognition under the broad name of "sense" and depreciate its value; finally, Kant's ethics declares that pure Goodwill, which leads to acts of justice and benevolence, is worthless and fruitless as mere sentiments and agitations, and only the actions produced by abstract norms are willing to admit that they have moral value.

[where] man excels the animals in his rationality, that he has a comprehensive overview of the whole of life.This overview may be likened to a sketch of his life's course, as abstract, uncolored, and reduced as geometry.In this way, the difference between man and animal is like the difference between a navigator and an ignorant sailor.The former can accurately know the voyage and the current location each time by means of maritime maps, compasses, and quadrants; the latter can only see the waves and the sky.Therefore, it is noteworthy and surprising that besides living one life in the concrete, man often lives a second life in the abstract.In the first life, man, like the animals, must struggle, suffer, and die, at the mercy of the torrents of reality and the forces of the moment.Man's life in the abstract [is different], when it precedes his rational reflections, is a silent reflection of the first life, of the world in which he lives, and of the above-mentioned A scaled down sketch.In this quiet reflection, in this field of quiet reflection, all that excited [everything] that had occupied his whole soul in the first life seemed calm and faded; for the present moment, It also looks strange.Here, 134 people are just a bystander, just an observer.In thus withdrawing into reflective thought, he is like an actor who, after an act, finds a seat in the audience before it is his turn, and watches the performance indifferently, no matter what the action is, even if it is arranged He is also indifferent to the measures that lead to his death (arrangements in the plot); and then he appears on the stage again, either doing something or suffering for something, and still performing one by one according to the requirements of the plot.Obviously different from the thoughtlessness of animals is the indifference and tranquility of human beings, which comes from the double life of human beings.Therefore, a man, according to his own considerations, according to the decisions made, or to see the necessity clearly, can calmly endure or carry out the most important and sometimes most terrible things in his life, such as suicide, execution, duel, All kinds of life-threatening adventures and everything that the whole animal instinct of man resists and avoids.From here, we can see how human reason is the master of animal instincts, and we can say loudly to strong people: "It is true that you have a heart of steel!" It can really be said that reason is manifested in practice.So wherever reason guides action, whenever the motive is determined by abstract ideas, and not by intuitive, individual representations, or present impressions which guide the behavior of animals, that is the presence of practical reason.As for the emergence of practical reason, it is completely different from the ethical value of behavior; rational behavior and virtuous behavior are completely different things. One side, the other does great work; reason is equally prepared and equally useful for the methodical and consistent execution of a lofty or base design, of a wise or meaningless maxim; And this is precisely due to the female nature of reason, which only accepts preservation and does not produce itself;-all this I have made a detailed analysis in the appendix and illustrated it with examples.What was said there should have been put here, [but] because it was a refutation of Kant's so-called practical reason, it had to be moved there.So I just pointed out that please go there for reference.

Practical reason, in the true sense of the word, its most perfect development, the highest peak to which man can reach only by using his reason--the highest peak at which the difference between man and beast is most striking--is in Stowe. What is expressed in the Kapai wise man as an ideal.It turns out that the ethics of the Stoics were not at all a doctrine of morality in origin and in essence, but a guide to a rational life; [their] aim and object was happiness through peace of mind.Virtuous conduct seems to have been incorporated into the rational life only incidentally as a means rather than an end.Stoic ethics, therefore, in its entirety and point of view, is fundamentally different from those systems of ethics directed directly at the practice of virtue, such as those of the Vedas, Plato, Christianity, and Kant.The purpose of Stoicism is happiness: "The whole purpose of virtue is to have happiness", this is what Stopaus said when he expounded the philosophy of Stoicism. ("Greek Classical Classification" Volume II, Chapter VII, pages 114 and 138) However, the ethics of the Stoics pointed out that happiness can only be truly obtained in inner peace and tranquility of mind, and this peace Tranquility, again, can only be attained through virtue; this is the meaning of the saying "Virtue is the highest good."However, if one gradually forgets the end in the means and exalts virtue in such a way that virtue itself reveals another purpose completely different from one's own happiness, and the two purposes have obvious contradictions; then , which is an inconsistency.Because of this inconsistency, in each system, the immediately recognized truth, which is called the "felt" truth, is brought back on the right track and overwhelms logical inference.This can be clearly seen, for example, in Spinoza's Ethics, which uses obvious sophistry to derive a pure moral doctrine from the "pursuit of one's own self-interest" of self-interest.As I understand the spirit of Stoic ethics, the origin of this ethics lies in the idea that man's great privilege, his reason, is already indirectly due to well-planned actions and the consequences of actions. Having thus lightened the burden of life and made life easy, can it be said that directly, that is, simply by knowing, one can be completely or almost completely freed from the pains and torments that fill life?It is believed that a rational creature can grasp through reason and survey an infinite number of things and situations, but still because of the moments and accidents that the finite years of this short, fleeting, and impermanent life can contain, And to fall into such severe pain, such heavy worries and sufferings, produced by the violent impulses of "greed" and "avoidance", is not commensurate with the superiority of reason; and it is believed that the proper use of reason should make people detached All of this made it impossible for him to be hurt by all of this.Therefore, Andistonius said: "Either obtain reason for yourself, or arrange a noose for hanging yourself." Since there are so many sufferings and troubles, people can only get rid of troubles by correcting their thoughts, otherwise they have to leave this world.People have seen clearly that suffering and sorrow do not directly and necessarily come from "not having anything", but are produced because of "desire to have something" and still "do not have it"; ” is the only necessary condition for suffering to produce pain. "It is not poverty that causes suffering, but greed." (Epicidet: Fragment, Art. 25) Moreover, it is known from experience that only hope, only the right to claim arises and nourishes [man's] desire; What is difficult and uncomfortable is neither the evils that are common to all people and cannot be avoided, nor the good things that cannot be obtained, but only a slight more or less between what can be avoided and what can be obtained.Yes, it doesn't have to be absolute, as long as it's relatively unattainable or inevitable it won't bother us at all.We are, therefore, indifferent to either the evils which once affixed to my personality [which can never be thrown away], or the goodnesses which are necessarily out of my character.Due to this characteristic of human beings, if there is no "hope" to provide nourishment, any wish will soon be disillusioned by itself, and pain will no longer be produced.From all this it follows that all happiness is founded in the proportion between what we may want and what we actually get.As for whether the two items before and after in this relationship are large or small, there is no difference [constituting happiness], and whether the former item is reduced or the latter item is enlarged, this relationship is equally constituted.Moreover, all pain is caused by the disproportion between what we ask and expect and what we actually get, and this disproportionate relationship can only be found in human cognition, so there is a higher Enlightenment can cancel it.Therefore, Chrysippus said: "People can only live according to the experience revealed by nature." (Stopias: "Selected Collection of Ancient Greek Texts" Volume II Chapter VII Page 134) This means that people should live properly. Know the origins and consequences of things in the world clearly, because whenever a person is at a loss for some reason, or when he is stunned by misfortune, or when he is furious, or hesitates, he just uses this It shows that he found that things did not come as he expected, and thus that he was a captive of error, did not know life and the world, did not know how inorganic nature is born of accidental coincidence, and how organic nature is born of opposite intentions. , with bad intentions, but every step of the way is blocking everyone's will.Therefore, either this person does not use his reason to understand the true nature of life in general, or he lacks judgment. Although he knows the general, he cannot use it in the particular, so specific things often come unexpectedly. And made him bewildered.Therefore any sentimental pleasure is false and delusional; for no fulfilment of desire can ever be satisfied and enduring, because any fortune, any happiness, comes only by chance, for an indeterminate period, perhaps Then it will be taken back again.Any suffering arises from the disillusionment of this delusion.Suffering and delusions are rooted in false perceptions.Therefore, neither pleasure nor pain can approach the wise man, and nothing can disturb the "peace" of the wise man.

According to this spirit of the Stoics, this purpose, Epictetus believes that people must always consider and distinguish what is and what is not dependent on us, so that they have no intention at all of those things that do not depend on us. , which is safe from pain, suffering, and fear.Epictetus starts from here, and often returns to this argument, as if it were the core of his wisdom.But only the will depends on us.From here, we gradually transition to the theory of virtue, because what is discussed here is that the external world, independent of us, determines happiness and misfortune, and the inner satisfaction or dissatisfaction for ourselves comes from the will of.After the note, people asked whether they should use the words good and evil to call luck and misfortune or satisfaction and dissatisfaction respectively?In fact, this kind of statement is arbitrary, following people's preferences, and has nothing to do with the grand purpose.On this point, however, the Stoics, the Aristotelians, and the Epicureans went on arguing. These are two quantities that have no common basis at all. The resulting, contrary, paradoxical arguments amuse themselves and condemn each other with them.Cicero has collected these arguments on the Stoic side in the Contradiction, and has left us with an interesting [material].

Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, seems to have taken another course.His starting point is this: in order for man to attain the highest good, which is happiness and peace of mind, he must live in harmony with himself. "To be consistent in life is to live according to certain principles and to be in harmony with oneself." (Stopias's "Classification of Ancient Greek Texts: Ethics" Volume II, Chapter VII, p. 132.) He also said : "Virtue consists in the whole life, [is] the harmony of the mind with itself" (ibid., p. 104.) But to do this, one can only do so rationally, according to concepts, not to the changing impressions and moods. to decide for yourself.Since all we can grasp are the norms of behavior, not the consequences of behavior, not external factors; then, if a person wants to be consistent and consistent, he can only take the former and not the latter as his goal. , which introduces the theory of virtue again.

But Zeno's immediate heirs had felt that Zeno's moral principle—living in harmony with oneself—was too formal, too empty.They give concrete content to this principle by the addition, "Life must be in accordance with nature."Stoppaas reports in his book that the first to add this addition was Cleantes; but the question is drawn out because of the wide-ranging meaning of the concept and the uncertainty of its semantics.Cleantes refers to the general term of nature in general, but Chrysippus refers to the nature of man specifically.Later, people believed that only the virtues are commensurate with human nature, just as only the satisfaction of animal impulses is commensurate with the nature of animals.In this way, the problem is introduced reluctantly into the theory of virtue again, and no matter how devious, it is always trying to base ethics on physics.This is because the Stoics everywhere aim at the unity of principle, just as God and the world are absolutely different from their point of view.

On the whole, Stoic ethics is in fact a very valuable and admirable attempt to "See how you plan to make your life nearly moderate: Let not greed, fear, and petty desires excite and vex you -- the one who has nothing forever. " To make use of man's specialty, his reason, for an important and happy purpose, that is, to free man from the pains and troubles destined for life; and to enable him to enjoy to the fullest extent his dignity.This is the dignity that man, as a rational creature, is different from animals.But the so-called dignity here is only speaking in this sense, and cannot involve other meanings. —Because I have such a view on Stoic ethics, when I explain what reason is and what reason can do, I must mention this ethics, which is brought about by my view. .Although that end [of the Stoics] may be attained within certain limits by the use of reason or merely by a sound ethics, although experience also points out that those who are purely rational - what is generally called The figure of the practical philosopher is also justified in this name, because the original, that is, theoretical philosophers bring life to concepts, but these practical philosophers bring concepts to life—that is, The happiest people, however, are far from being able to attain any perfection in this way, if the right use of reason can really free us from all the burdens and all the pains of life and lead to bliss. up.It should be said that to live without suffering is a complete contradiction; therefore, the usual "happy life" also contains this contradiction.Whoever has grasped my following explanation down to the last word will understand this truth with certainty.In fact, this kind of contradiction has already been exposed in the purely rational ethics itself, that is to say, [human] physical pain cannot be explained in philosophical conversation with some propositions, theorems and logical deduction. talked about it.The Stoics, when pain predominates and is irremediable, that is, when happiness, the only purpose of man, cannot be attained, when there is no escape from pain except death, must compelled to mix with their dogmas of the happy life (which their ethics always directed) the exhortations of suicide (as if there were a precious vial among the luxurious ornaments and utensils of the despotic kings of the East). like poison), so death is like other medicines, which can be swallowed indifferently.Here, then, there is a striking contrast: on the one hand, this ethics of the Stoics; on the other, all the other ethics mentioned above, which take virtue directly as an end in itself, regardless of the severity of the pain, and do not want people End your own life to get rid of the pain.But among these people, none of them can say the real reason against suicide, they just painstakingly collected some various, specious, superficial reasons.The real reasons against suicide will appear as our examination progresses in Part IV of this book.Stoic ethics is essentially a special theory of happiness, and it often coincides with the conclusions of those theories whose direct purpose is virtue, and has a similar relationship in appearance. However, the contrast just pointed out It exposed and confirmed that there is an essential and fundamental difference between the two parties.As for the inner contradiction mentioned above, even the contradiction attached to the Stoic ethics in its basic idea, it has its expression in another way, that is, the ideal of this ethics, the Stoic wise man , even in [their own] such rational statements can never attain life or inner, poetic truth.The wise man is still a wooden, rigid, jerky dummy; people don't know what to do with it, and he himself doesn't know where to go with his wisdom.His complete tranquility, self-sufficiency, and bliss just contradict the essence of life, and we cannot have any intuitive appearance of it.Compared with such wise men, those detached from the world, those voluntary penitents, are quite different.These are the ones whom the wisdom of India has pointed out to us, and which have actually been produced.As for the Christian Saviour, that is a far more sublime figure.He, full of this profound image of life, of the highest, poetic truth, of the greatest [life] meaning, stands before us in perfect virtue, sanctity, sublime, and in the incomparable condition of suffering before.