Home Categories philosophy of religion The world as will and representation

Chapter 6 Part I The World as Representation §6

Now in the first part, we only regard everything as appearances, as objects for the subject.And, like all other real objects, we only see our own body from the side of the possibility of cognition, which is the starting point of everyone's intuition of the world.In this respect, our own body is only an appearance to us.To be sure, everyone's consciousness objected to this statement; people already resented when all other objects were said to be mere appearances, and even more so if [their] own bodies were also mere appearances. .People object because the "thing-in-itself" is directly known to everyone when it appears as one's own body, but indirectly when it is objectified in other objects of intuition.However, the process of our research makes it necessary to make such an abstraction, such a one-sided view, and such a forced separation of things that exist together in essence.Therefore, people have no choice but to temporarily suppress the antipathy mentioned here and settle down with an expectation that subsequent investigations will make up for this current one-sidedness and allow us to fully understand the nature of the world.

So far the body is for us the immediate object, that is to say, the representation which, since the representation itself, together with the changes it immediately recognizes, precedes the application of the law of causality, and thus affords the application of the law of causality the first Zhang Ben, it becomes the starting point for the subject to recognize.As said before, the whole essence of matter is in its action.The effect and cause of action are only for the understanding, and the understanding is also the cause.The subjective "correspondence" of the effect, and nothing else.But the understanding can never be applied without something else from which it starts.Such a thing is mere sensuality, the immediate awareness of bodily changes; through which the body also becomes an immediate object.Accordingly, we find that the possibility of knowing the intuitive world depends on two conditions: the first condition, if we express it in terms of objects, is the possibility of mutual interaction of objects, the possibility of mutual induction of changes; if there is no such condition common to all objects, properties, even with the sensibility of the animal body as the mediation, it is still impossible to have intuition.If we express this first condition in terms of the subject, we say: it is the understanding first of all that makes intuition possible, since the law of causality, the possibility of effects and causes, arises only from the understanding and is valid only for the understanding; therefore intuition The world also exists only because of the understanding, for the understanding.But the second condition is the sensibility of the animal body, that is, the property that certain objects are immediately objects of the subject.Those mere changes, those which are perceived by the sense organs through external influences specially adapted to the senses, insofar as they provoke neither pain nor pleasure, and have no immediate significance for the will, are nonetheless perceived. The theory of existence only for cognition is already called representation, and in this sense I also say that the body is a direct cognition and a direct object; however, the concept of object here is not realized in its original meaning. , because since this immediate knowledge of the body precedes the application of the understanding, and is a mere sensory perception, the body itself is not yet a real object, but only the objects that act on it are real objects.The reason here is that any knowledge of a real object, that is, of an intuitionable representation in space, is only due to the understanding, and therefore cannot precede the application of the understanding, but only in the thereafter.Therefore, the body, as a real object, as an intuitive representation in space, like all other objects, can only be known indirectly, when one part of the body acts on another part, such as seeing the body with the eyes, and seeing the body with the hands. When touching the body, apply the law of cause and effect to these effects and then recognize it.Therefore, the shape of our body is not known by the ordinary physical sensation, but only through cognition, only in the representation, that is, in the mind, our body appears as unfolded [in space], Well-defined, organic [body].A congenitally blind person can only acquire such an appearance gradually and gradually through the scripts provided by the sense of touch.A blind man without two hands will never be able to know his own figure, but at most he can only gradually deduce and form his own figure from other objects acting on him.Therefore, when we call the body the immediate object, it should be experienced within this limitation.

In other respects, as mentioned above, all animal bodies are immediate objects, that is, the subject, the starting point for the subject who knows everything and therefore never knows, when he perceives the world.This cognition, and the action which follows the motive as a condition of cognition, are the real characteristics of animal nature, just as the movement caused by stimuli is the characteristic of plants.But inorganic matter has no other motion than that which is caused by "causes" in the narrowest sense.All this I have expounded in detail in the treatise on the principle of reason (second edition, §20), in Chapter 3 of Lecture I of Ethics, and in §1 of Sight and Colour, please Readers refer to these places.

It follows from the foregoing that all animals, even the most imperfect ones, have understanding, because they all know objects, and this knowledge is the motive which determines their actions.The understanding, in all animals and in all men, is the same understanding, with the same simple form everywhere: the knowledge of causality, passing from effect to cause, and from cause to effect [knowledge]; and nothing more.But in the degree of sensitivity, in the breadth and narrowness of the scope of knowledge, the understanding is very different, and there are many kinds, and there are many levels; from the lowest level, only the causal relationship between the direct object and the indirect object is recognized. That is, just transitioning from the action of bodily sensations to the cause of this action, and using this cause as an object in space to be intuitive; until the highest level recognizes the causal relationship between the same indirect objects, so as to understand the various objects in nature. The most complex causal chain.

However, even the latter kind of high-level cognition still belongs to the comprehension, not to focus on reason.Abstract concepts belonging to rationality can only serve to receive, fix, and connect what is directly understood, and never directly produce "understanding" itself.Every force of nature, every law of nature, and every situation from which they arise, must first be directly known by the understanding, and intuitively grasped, before it can enter, in abstract, into the sphere of reflective thought for the sake of reason. consciousness.The law of gravitation discovered by Hooke, and the reduction of many important phenomena to this law, and then Newton proved these laws with calculations, these are all intuitive and direct cognitions through comprehension.It can be compared with this amount; there is also Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and its important role in nature; and Goethe's discovery of the production method of physical color.All these discoveries are nothing but a correct and immediate reduction from effect to cause; and with it comes the recognition of the identity of the forces of nature which manifest themselves in all causes of the same kind.All these insights are but degrees of the same faculty of the understanding.Owing to this function, an animal also perceives the causes acting on its body as objects in space.Hence all those great discoveries, just like intuitions, like every manifestation of the understanding, are direct knowings, and as direct knowings are the work of a moment, an appercu, a sudden realization; not in the abstract. The product of a long chain of reasoning.On the contrary, the function of the chain of inference is to fix the immediate knowledge of the understanding by virtue of its precipitation in abstract concepts, that is to say, to give the knowledge of the understanding [conceptual] clarity, that is to say, Enable yourself to point out and explain the meaning of this realization to others.- The sharpness of the understanding in grasping the causal relations between indirectly recognized objects has its utility not only in the natural sciences (on which all discoveries depend), but also in practical life.In practical life, this keenness is called shrewdness.Strictly speaking, shrewdness refers to the understanding that serves the will; but within the scope of natural science, it is better to call it "sharp discernment", "penetrating observation" and "wisdom".However, the boundaries of these concepts cannot always be strictly drawn, because they are always the same function of the understanding.This is the understanding that every animal already has when it perceives objects in space.Its function, often with the utmost acuity, sometimes rightly explores in natural phenomena from known effects to unknown causes, thereby furnishing reason with material for thinking rules more general than natural laws; They invent complex and ingenious machines in order to achieve predetermined effects; sometimes they are used in motives, either to see through and thwart elaborate intrigues, or to arrange motives for people according to their suitability, so that People follow my will and act according to my purpose.It was as if [I] turned the machine with levers and wheels.Lack of comprehension is called dementia in the original sense, that is, slowness in applying the law of cause and effect, inability to directly grasp the interlocking of cause and effect, and the interlocking of motivation and behavior.A demented person has no understanding of the connection between natural phenomena, whether they occur naturally or operate according to human will, and are used by machines; therefore, he likes to believe in magic and miracles.A demented person cannot see people who seem to be unrelated but are in fact colluding, so he can easily fall into doubts and conspiracies arranged by others.He does not see that there are hidden motives hidden in the advice others give him, the opinions they threaten, and so on.He always lacked only one thing: shrewdness, quickness, and quickness in the application of the law of causality, that is, lack of understanding. ——Among the cases of dementia that I have encountered in my life, there is one that is the most striking, and it is also the most instructive example for the problem we are investigating here: There was an idiot boy about eleven years old in the lunatic asylum. He has normal rationality, because he can speak and understand words; but he is not as good as some animals in terms of understanding.I used to go to the asylum, and always took off [over the bridge of my nose] my spectacles, which were fastened around my neck by a braid, and hung over my breast; the child looked at them every time, for the reflection of the room was reflected in them. The window and the treetops outside the window.For this phenomenon, he was particularly surprised and delighted every time, and he watched it with a surprised expression, never tired of it.This is because he did not understand the completely immediate causality of the lens reflection.

The sharpness of understanding differs greatly from man to man; it differs still more from animal to species.All animals, even those species which are nearest to plants, have such intelligence as to pass from effects on direct objects to causes caused by indirect objects, and so to attain intuition, and to know an object.And the knowledge of an object makes the animal an animal, capable of acting on motives, whereby it is possible to seek food, or at least to grab it;The plant can only wait for the immediate effect of these stimuli, or wither; it cannot pursue or catch them.Among the highest animals, such as dogs, elephants, and monkeys, their unique wit often amazes us; while the cleverness of foxes has already been described extensively by Piphon.In these most intelligent animals we can measure almost exactly how much the understanding can do without the assistance of reason, that is, without abstract cognition in concepts.This situation is not recognized by us humans, because in humans, understanding and reason are always supporting each other.Therefore, we often find that the performance of animals in understanding sometimes exceeds and sometimes falls short of our expectations.For example, on the one hand the wit of an elephant amazes us: there is an elephant who has crossed many board bridges during his travels in Europe.Once, although it saw a large group of people crossing the bridge, as in the past, it refused to walk on the bridge because it felt that the structure of the bridge was too weak to bear its weight.On the other hand, we are amazed that there are intelligent apes.They often keep warm with ready-made bonfires, but they don't know how to add wood to keep the fire alive.This proves that the action of adding fuel to the fire already requires thinking, and it cannot be done without abstract concepts.[The fact] that the knowledge of cause and effect, as the universal form of the understanding, is possessed a priori even by animals, is well established, since this knowledge is as much a part of the animal as it is of us [man]. An antecedent condition of all intuitive cognition of the external world [this fact is fully established]; but one might still want a special instance. [If so,] one can observe the example that even a very young dog, although he would like to jump off the table, dare not do so.This is because it [can] foresee the effects of its own weight without having to recognize this particular case empirically elsewhere.When we discern the understanding of animals, we should be careful not to mistake the manifestation of instinct for the expression of understanding.Instinct is completely different from comprehension and rationality, but it has very similar functions to the combined actions of comprehension and rationality.However, this is not the place to discuss these. When the second chapter examines the harmony or purpose of nature, its status will be discussed, and the twenty-seventh chapter of the supplementary chapter is a special chapter to discuss this issue.

Lack of understanding is called dementia; want of practical use of reason we hereafter call stupidity; want of judgment simple-minded.Finally, a partial or total lack of memory is called madness.Each of these items, however, will be dealt with separately in its proper place.What is rightly known by reason is truth, that is, an abstract judgment well grounded (Essay on the Law of Reason § 29 et seq.); The effect transitions correctly to its cause.False, as the deception of the reason, is opposed to the truth; False, as the deception of the understanding, is opposed to the reality.A detailed treatment of all this is found in the first chapter of my treatise on sight and colour.The illusion arises where the same effect may be induced by two quite different causes, one of which produces the common effect and the other the unusual.Since the effect is generally the same, and the understanding does not recognize which cause is the cause of action, it always assumes as the cause what is customary and common, and the action of the understanding is not reflective thinking, not conceptual deduction, but is immediate, present; then this false cause is presented to us as an object of intuition; this is the illusion.I have explained in the passage cited above how double vision, double touch [problem] can be produced in this case when the sense organs are in an abnormal position; Intuition exists only because of, and for, the understanding.In addition, examples of this kind of deception or false appearance of the understanding are the curved images of a straight stick immersed in water. When the figure in a spherical mirror appears on a convex surface, it seems to be a little behind the mirror. When the circular concave surface appears, it seems to be far away in front of the mirror.Among the examples here, there is also the fact that the Moon appears to be larger on the horizon than on the zenith. [Actually] it's not an optical problem, because micrometers have shown that the eye has a slightly wider field of view when looking at the Moon at the zenith than when looking at it at the horizon.This is still the function of understanding. Understanding thinks that the moon and all stars on the horizon are weaker because they are far away. They regard these stars and moon as the things on the ground and estimate them according to the law of air perspective. Think of the moon on the horizon as larger than the moon on the zenith; at the same time, think of the zenith on the horizon as more spread out and flattened.The same miscalculation according to the law of aerial perspective makes us feel that tall mountains, which are only visible in clear air, are closer than they really are, and at the same time feel that they are lower and taller. Distortion of the actual height, such as Montblanc seen from Salangis. —All these hallucinatory illusions are presented to us in immediate intuition, and cannot be destroyed by any reasoning of reason.Rational reasoning can only prevent fallacies, and fallacies are judgments without sufficient grounds. Rational inferences can prevent fallacies with a correct inference opposite to the fallacy, such as abstractly recognizing that the luminosity of the stars and the moon are weaker on the horizon The reason for this is not the greater distance, but the cloudier atmosphere on the horizon.However, all the above-mentioned illusions have to embarrass every abstract cognition, but they still remain the same and cannot be changed.This is because reason is the only faculty of cognition which is appended to man and which is exclusive to man; but there is a completely different and strict distinction between understanding and reason.As far as understanding is concerned, it is not yet rational, even in human beings.Reason can always know only, and intuition always belongs exclusively to the understanding, outside the influence of reason.

Press "Left Key ←" to return to the previous chapter; Press "Right Key →" to enter the next chapter; Press "Space Bar" to scroll down.
Chapters
Chapters
Setting
Setting
Add
Return
Book