Chapter 5 Part I The World as Representation §5

One still has to guard against a major misunderstanding. Just because intuition is established through the cognition of causality, one should not think that there is also a relationship of cause and effect between the object and the subject.In fact, it is more correct that this relation always exists only between direct and indirect objects, that is, between objects.It is on account of that false premise that there are foolish arguments about the reality of the external world.Dogmatism and skepticism confront each other in controversy; the former appears now as realism, now as idealism.Realism takes the object as the cause and places the effect of the cause in the subject.Fichte's idealism [conversely] regards the object as the subject's consequence, but there is no relation between subject and object that depends on the principle of sufficient reason, and this is not enough; therefore, the above two Neither of these claims can be proven, and skepticism is able to launch an offensive in favor of both.Just as the law of causality, when it is the condition of intuition and experience, precedes intuition and experience, so it cannot be learned from them (as Hume sees); , likewise already precedes all cognition, and therefore at all precedes the principle of sufficient reason; for the principle of sufficient reason is only the form of all objects, the consistent manner in which objects appear; but the mention of objects presupposes the subject, so There cannot be a relationship of grounds and consequences between the two.My essay on the "Law of Reason" was just to accomplish this task, to show that the content of this law is only the form of the essence of all objects, that is, the general way in which an object is an object is an addition to the object. So something that is an object.As such an object, it always presupposes the subject and has the subject as its necessary counterpart; this counterpart is therefore always outside the valid sphere of the principle of sufficient reason.The controversy concerning the reality of the external world is based precisely on the erroneous extension of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason to the subject; proceeding from this misunderstanding, the controversy can never understand itself.On the one hand, it is the dogmatism of the realists. When viewing the appearance as the effect of the object, it is necessary to separate the appearance and the object, which are two and one, and assume a cause completely different from the appearance, assuming an object in itself. , independent of the subject: that is something completely unthinkable; for [the object] already presupposes the subject when it is an object, and is therefore always a representation of the subject.Skepticism, on the other hand, opposes dogmatism on the same erroneous premise: one always sees only effects in appearances, never a cause, that is, never being, but always only the function of the object, which and its There may be no resemblance at all, or even a complete recognition of the object, because the law of causality must be extracted from experience, and the reality of experience must be based on the law of causality.Here we should teach both sides of the dispute, first, that the object and representation are the same thing, and second, that the existence of the object is its function, and the reality of things is in its function; To demand the actual existence of the object, to demand that the real thing has an existence other than its function, is utterly meaningless and contradictory.Therefore, as long as the object of intuition is an object, i.e., a representation, then to know the mode of operation of an object of intuition is to know the object without any residue; This is something that is known and preserved.In this respect, the world of perception in space and time, since it expresses itself purely in causality, is also entirely real, it is what it appears for, and it is also wholly and unreservedly As a representation, the earth is connected according to the law of causality, and manifests itself.Such is its empirical reality.But on the other hand, all causality exists only in the understanding, only for the understanding; therefore the whole real world, the world of action, is always conditioned by the understanding; It's nothing.But not only for this reason, but because imagining an object without a subject cannot be a contradiction at all, and we cannot but deny outright the kind of reality that dogmatism asserts, a reality independent of the subject.The whole world of objects is appearance, and what is immovable is appearance, so it is always conditioned by the subject; that is to say, it has a transcendental ideality.But it does not therefore lie to us, nor is it an illusion.It is what it is, that is, as a representation; and it is a series of representations, of which the principle of sufficient reason is a common ligament.Such a world is intelligible even in the innermost sense of the world to a full understanding, and it speaks a perfectly clear language to the understanding.Only a mind made eccentric by reason's misguided efforts would think of arguing for its reality.And the controversy always arises from the misapplication of the law of sufficient reason, which, while it is true that all appearances, whatever they may be, are related to each other, but not to the subject, nor to that which is both. It is not the object and the subject, but only the object is connected according to that kind of thing.The latter is an unspeakable concept, because only the object can be the ground, and it is always the ground of [another] object.If one traces more closely the source of the problem of the reality of the external world, one finds that, to the misapplication of the law of sufficient reason to things which are not within its sphere of validity, there is added a peculiar confusion between the forms of the law. ; that is to say, the form of the law, which existed only in concepts or abstract representations, is transferred to intuitive representations, real objects; it requires a basis for cognition from the object, but in fact the object is There cannot be any other grounds other than the grounds for change.The principle of sufficient reason governs abstract representations and concepts connected into judgments in such a way that every judgment has its value, its validity, and its entire existence, which is what is called truth here. It can only come from the relationship of the judgment to something other than itself, to its ground of knowledge, so it must always be reduced to this ground of knowledge.On the other hand, ground, when it governs real objects or intuitive representations, is effective not as a law of reason of knowledge but as a law of reason of change, as a law of causality: every object, by virtue of its becoming, is As an effect produced by a cause, it has done its duty to the law [satisfied the requirements of the law].It is therefore useless and senseless to demand a ground of knowledge here; it can only be demanded of objects of a quite another kind.Therefore, as long as it speaks in terms of intuition, it arouses neither thought nor doubt in the mind of the observer; things within the scope.Here the world is self-presenting to the senses and the understanding; what it is, it manifests itself in naive truth as intuitive representations; and the intuitive representations develop regularly on the ligament of causality.

The question of the reality of the external world, which we have considered so far, always arises from a misunderstanding of reason, down to a misunderstanding of reason itself; To answer this question by elucidating its content, this question is necessarily automatically removed after the whole nature of the principle of sufficient reason, the relation between object and subject, and the proper nature of sensible intuitions has been explored; Doesn't make any sense anymore.But there is another source of this question, quite different from the purely speculative one suggested heretofore.This other source, though also proposed from a speculative point of view, is an empirical one.On this interpretation the question takes on a more intelligible sense than on the preceding one.This means: We all dream, isn't our whole life also a dream? —or rather: Is there a reliable criterion of distinction between dream and reality, between phantom and real object?The suggestion that dreams are less vivid and clear than real intuitions is not at all worth considering, since no one has yet compared the two side by side.Only the dream memory and current reality can be compared.Kant solves the problem in this way: "The relation of representations to each other according to the law of causality distinguishes human life from dreams." However, all the individual events in dreams are also related to each other in the various forms of the principle of reason. It follows that the link is broken only between life and dreams, or between individual dreams and each other.Kant's answer, then, can only be this: in the great dream (life) there is a coherent connection obeying the principle of sufficient reason, but not in the short dreams; although in each individual dream the same But the bridge is broken between the long dream and the short dream, and this is how people distinguish the two kinds of dreams.However, it is still very difficult and often impossible to examine what is a dream and what is a real experience according to such a standard.Because it is impossible for us to pursue the causal connection between each experienced event and the present moment, section by section, but we do not therefore claim that these events are dreams.In real life, therefore, this method of investigation is not used to distinguish dream from reality.The only reliable criterion by which to distinguish dream from reality is in fact nothing other than the purely empirical criterion of waking [time].Because of this criterion, then the interruption of the causal link between the experience in the dream and the experience in waking life is only clear and perceivable.In the second chapter of Hobbes's Leviathan, a footnote written by the author is an excellent illustration of what we are talking about here.What he meant was that when we sleep unknowingly with our clothes on, it is easy to take the dream for reality upon waking; The dream continues to do what it was intended to do when waking up. In this case, waking is as unnoticed as falling asleep. The dream communicates with reality, and the real is indistinguishable.This leaves only the application of Kant's criterion.However, if a causal connection between dream and reality simply cannot be discovered afterwards, as is often the case, then the question of whether an experience was dreamed or actually occurred can only be left in perpetuity. It's not decided. ——Here, the question of the close kinship between life and dreams is very delicate; in fact, after many great figures have recognized this relationship and declared it in this way, we do not have to admit it. ashamed.In the Vedic and Puranna scriptures, there is no better metaphor than dreams for all that people know about the real world (which they call the "Vertain of Maya") , and no metaphor is used more often than this one.Plato also often said that people only live in dreams, and only philosophers struggle to wake up.Bindar says: "Life is a dream [made] by a shadow" (Bidian Hymn, No. 5, line 135), and Sophocles says:

"I see our living people, nothing but, Shapes and erratic shadows. " Besides Sophocles there is the most venerable Shakespeare, who says: "We are such material, Like the stuff that makes up dreams; And our tiny lives, A good night's sleep is enough. " Finally, there is Calderon who was so fascinated by this view that he attempted to express it in a play that could be called metaphysical, "Life is a Dream". After quoting the famous lines of these many poets, please allow me to use a metaphor to talk about my own views. [I think] life and dreams are pages of the same book, and reading them sequentially is called real life.If at the end of each reading hour (day) and the time for rest has come, we often inadvertently turn a page here and a page there, without order or coherence; I've read it, and often I haven't, but it's always the same book.Such a page that has been read separately is of course out of the coherence of sequential reading, after all, it is not much worse than sequential reading.One thinks [and knows] that a whole well-ordered reading is no more than an equally impromptu chapter, beginning with a book and ending with a book; so that a book can be regarded as merely a single larger page. .

Although individual dreams are distinguished from real life by the fact that they do not enter into the experiential connections that permeate life at all times, and the waking state is the mark of this distinction; yet as a form of real life It is this connection of experience that belongs only to real life; and there is a connection equally to be inferred in dreams.If, therefore, one judges from a standpoint detached from both sides, there being no definite difference in the nature of the two sides, one will be compelled to agree with the poets that life is one great dream. Now we return from this source of the problem of the reality of the external world, the exclusively empirical source, to its speculative source; It is between the subject and the object; secondly, it confuses some forms of this law, and transfers the law of reason of cognition to the field where [only] the law of reason of change is [only] valid.Nevertheless, it would be difficult for the question to haunt philosophers for so long if it had had no real content at all, some right thought and meaning at the heart of the question as its real source.Based on this, people can only assume that when this correct thought first enters into reflective thinking to seek an expression, it has already entered some forms and problems that put the cart before the horse and that they do not understand.And so it is, at least, in my opinion.Moreover, people do not know how to obtain a concise expression of the innermost meaning of this question, so I define it as a question: what is this intuitive world, except that it is my representation?Is this world, which I am only aware of once and as a representation, the same as my body, with which I have a dual consciousness of representation on the one hand and will on the other?A clearer explanation and affirmation of this problem will be the content of the second part of this book, and the conclusions derived from it will occupy the rest of the book.