Chapter 6 Chapter 06 Deployment of Operation Crossing the River

Crossing the south of the Yangtze River is a strategic decision carefully planned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission for a long time.As early as July 1947 and January 1948, the Central Military Commission twice proposed a plan for the East China Field Army to cross the south of the Yangtze River to fight, but both failed to implement due to immature conditions. On October 11, 1948, the Central Military Commission pointed out to the leaders of the East China Field Army in a telegram about the operational policy of the Huaihai Campaign that in the Huaihai Campaign (the plan at the time was to annihilate the 7th Corps of the Kuomintang Army and the troops in Haizhou, Huai'an, and Huaiyin areas ) after the end, the East China Field Army "should still be divided into two corps, the East and the West. About five columns will form the East Corps, which will fight in northern and central Jiangsu, and the rest of the main force will be the Western Corps. , Kaifeng, Zhengzhou, Queshan, Xinyang, Nanyang, the Huaihe River Basin and the cities of the Dabie Mountains." He also instructed: "You should complete the Huaihai Campaign in November and December.

Rest in January next year.From March to July, we fought together with Liu and Deng, and beat the enemy to various points along the river.In autumn, your main force will probably be able to carry out operations across the river. "In December, the Liaoshen Campaign had already ended victoriously, the entire Northeast was liberated, the Huaihai Campaign had achieved a decisive victory, and the Pingjin Campaign had also begun. According to the above-mentioned war situation, the Central Military Commission sent a call to the General Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign on the 12th regarding future combat policies. It pointed out that after the Huaihai Campaign ended, the two major field armies in East China and Central Plains "rested for two months (divided into four periods, with one period every half month), and roughly prepared all the necessary items for crossing the river (raincoats, currency, shells, medical treatment, etc.) medicines, steamships, etc.), and the initial completion of political mobilization. ""Under the condition that the existing enemies in the Jianghuai area have not retreated to the south of the Yangtze River, the two armies will join forces to hold the Jianghuai campaign in one to two months, annihilate all the enemies in the Jianghuai area, and occupy the north of the Yangtze River, the south of the Huaihe River, and the east of Pinghan. , The towns west of the sea.Mainly the towns from Anqing to Nantong, controlling the north bank of the Yangtze River. "Then it will take a considerable amount of time to finally complete all the preparations for crossing the river, that is, to carry out the battle to cross the river."Its time is around May or June next year. The telegram requested the General Front Committee to convene a meeting to discuss the plan for crossing the river. In late December, when Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi went to the Central Committee to participate in the Politburo meeting, they reported the preliminary plan for the joint crossing of the two field armies.

On January 10, 1949, the Huaihai Campaign ended successfully, and the remaining Kuomintang troops retreated to the south of the Yangtze River one after another, and the area north of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River was basically liberated.Accordingly, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram on the 12th to Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Jichun, Su Yu, and Chen Shiju, leaders of the Central Plains and East China Field Army, stipulating that the two field armies should rest and reorganize in five phases from January 15 to March 31, and complete the crossing of the river. All preparations for combat are on standby. On February 3, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out in the "Instructions on the Military Situation and Cadres Preparing to Cross the Yangtze River": "The Kuomintang has two possibilities: to organize resistance on the Beijing-Shanghai line and to abandon the line and withdraw the main force to the Zhejiang Road area." , "We should prepare two countermeasures against these two possible situations." And pointed out: "If it is proved in the next period that the Kuomintang still adopts the policy of organizing (organizing) resolute resistance on the Beijing-Shanghai line, then we should still According to the original plan, Huaye and Zhongye will rest until the end of March, prepare to cross the river in April, and capture the cities of Ning, Zhen, Xi, Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Wu in May and June." In other words, it is to prepare for some resistance on the south bank of the Yangtze River, not to concentrate our forces to defend Nanjing and other cities, but to withdraw the main force to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line for defense, so we should make preparations for action one month in advance. Huaye and Zhongye should rest and reorganize to By the end of February, prepare to cross the river in March, and after occupying Zhenjiang and Wuhu, go to occupy Nanjing. Then gradually occupy Suzhou and Hangzhou according to our own work ability." "If we can occupy Nanjing in March or April ( This is the most important), then convene a meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the establishment of a democratic coalition government should be held after the occupation of Nanjing, so that it will have an excellent impact both internationally and domestically.” Stand by.

Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi, who presided over the overall situation at the General Front Committee, received the above-mentioned telegram from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and replied on the 4th that they decided to take action in early March and march south.He also believes that if the Northeast Field Army is dispatched after March 10, it will be more than one month away from the deployment of the Central Plains and East China Field Army.This will give the enemy the opportunity to transfer troops from Wuhan to Nanjing and Shanghai, which is not conducive to the cross-river operations of the Central Plains and East China Field Army.Therefore, it is suggested that a part of the Northeast Field Army be dispatched to the south in advance, and when the Central Plains and East China Field Army carry out cross-river operations, they should surround Wuhan in time and contain the Bai Chongxi Group so that they would not dare to reinforce them, so as to facilitate the Central Plains and East China Field Army to cross the river and seize Nanjing, Shanghai and other places.

On February 9, the General Front Committee of the Huaihai Campaign held a meeting to specifically discuss issues related to crossing the river, and telegraphed the results of the discussion to the Central Military Commission on the same day, suggesting that the time for crossing the river should "be dispatched in the middle of March and start at the end of March." It is best to fight across the river", because at that time the internal contradictions of the Kuomintang had not yet been resolved, and in terms of military deployment, they were still hovering between the two strategies of guarding the south bank of the river and the points in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, or withdrawing the main force to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Road. , it is more favorable to cross the river at this time.In terms of seasons, there is less rain in early April and the Yangtze River has less water, making it easier to fight.Although the preparations are hasty, as long as the front and rear work hard, it will be possible.If the dispatch is postponed to April and the river crossing is completed at the end of April and early May, although the preparations are relatively sufficient, the Kuomintang has more preparations politically and militarily, especially in terms of seasons. Difficulties increase.If it is dispatched in early March and crossing the river in mid-March, although it will be more favorable in terms of politics and seasons, many necessary preparations will be too late.

He also suggested that the Northeast Field Army, with about 200,000 people in three armies, move south quickly, and enter the vicinity of Wuhan at the end of March to contain the Bai Chongxi Group and guarantee the actions of Nakano and Huaye. On February 11, the Central Military Commission replied in a telegram stating: "I agree with your plan to dispatch in March and a half, and start crossing the river at the end of March. I hope you will prepare everything according to this time."In order to strengthen the organization and command of cross-river operations and take over Jiangnan, the Central Military Commission also decided: "Comrades Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Jichun, and Chen Geng will join the East China Bureau as members." Both the East China Bureau and the General Front Committee are directly under the Central Committee." On the 12th, the Central Military Commission also called Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Nie Rongzhen and told Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, the East China Bureau, the Central Plains Bureau, and the North China Bureau; In the middle of the month, the operation of crossing the river at the end of March decided that Lin Luo would send out two armies, about 120,000 people, to reach the area between Yancheng and Xinyang before March 20, and to capture Xinyang and Wushengguan at the end of March. , captured Huayuan and Xiaogan areas before April 15th, approached Hankou, and rested and waited for orders to restrain Bai Chongxi's troops from sending reinforcements to Nanjing so that Liu, Chen and Deng could capture Nanjing. In order to carry out the above tasks, the two armies should Complete preparations for departure before February 19, and set off from the Pingjin line on February 19." According to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the leaders of the Fourth Field Army decided that Xiao Jinguang, the commander and political commissar of the 12th Corps, would lead the 40th and 43rd Armies and the Artillery No. The 1st Regiment, the 2nd Division of the Logistics Department, and 2 Engineer Battalions, a total of 120,000 people, formed an advance corps and went south first to carry out the task of containing the Bai Chongxi Group. On March 20, the Central Military Commission further clarified the mission of the advance corps of the Fourth Field Army: it was to cooperate with the forces of the Tongbai, Jianghan, and Hubei-Henan military regions to contain Bai Chongxi's troops, so that the Bai troops could not send reinforcements to the east and hinder the progress of the second and third field armies. cross the river.For this reason, the advance corps was under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, and everything acted according to Liu Deng's will.

In mid-March, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to conduct peace negotiations with the Kuomintang government. On March 17 and 19, the Central Military Commission sent telegrams to the leaders of the Second, Third and Fourth Field Armies respectively: the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations decided to start on April 1, and the hope of the negotiations could be determined before April 5. , the Second and Third Field Armies can carry out operations to seize the Kuomintang army strongholds on the north bank of the river around April 6, "cross the river on April 10, and head towards the lines of Hukou, Wuhu, Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Shanghai and the south Sixty divisions of the Kuomintang army in the area launched an attack", forcing the other party to either sign a peace agreement that is beneficial to the people, or break the peace talks and take responsibility for continuing the war.It is also stipulated that the radio station of the General Front Committee must be in close contact day and night without any interruption.After receiving the above-mentioned telegram from the Central Military Commission, the leader of the Third Field Army called the Central Military Commission on March 19, thinking that if the attack on the strongholds in Jiangbei was launched on April 6, it would take 4 to 5 days to complete the task, and then another week. Open the port and tow the inland watercraft to the outlet of the Yangtze River.Therefore, it is suggested that the formal battle of crossing the river should be postponed until the 16th. At 2:00 on March 20, the Central Military Commission replied that the capture of the Kuomintang army's stronghold on the north bank of the river could be started on April 2 ahead of schedule and completed on April 5 or 6. For this task, it will take another week to open up the port, arrange ships, and start crossing the river on April 13 or 14, which will be beneficial to negotiations. On March 26, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, and Tan Zhenlin called the Central Military Commission, arguing that April 13 was the 16th day of the lunar calendar, and the moonlight lasted all night. Our army's crossing of the river could not be concealed, and the tactical surprise of the battle could not be obtained.Therefore, it is recommended to postpone the crossing of the river until the evening of April 15, because it was just before 9 pm on the 18th of the lunar calendar, and the dark night is beneficial for our army to cross the river. On March 27, the Central Military Commission replied and agreed to launch the crossing operation on April 15.

So far, the tasks and time for the implementation of the river crossing operation have been basically determined, that is, the second and third field armies will start at the dusk of April 15, 1949, and carry out the crossing operation from Hukou to Shanghai to eliminate the Tang Enbo Group.A part of the Fourth Field Army is located in front of Wuhan to contain the Bai Chongxi Group and ensure the safety of the flanks of the Second and Third Field Army crossing the river. On April 1, the delegations of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party started peace negotiations in Beiping. In order to reach an agreement beneficial to the people, the Central Military Commission contacted the General Front Committee on the issue of delaying the crossing time of the People's Liberation Army when the preparations for crossing the river had been completed. There were repeated consultations. At 1:00 on April 10, the Central Military Commission called the General Front Committee and the leaders of the Second and Third Field Armies, pointing out that the peace negotiations between the KMT and the Communist Party peace talks delegations have made progress, and a comprehensive peace agreement may be reached. The signing time is about April 10. Around the 15th of the month.If this agreement is successfully signed, the originally planned combat crossing of the river will be changed to a peaceful crossing of the river.Therefore, the time to cross the river is bound to be postponed for half a month or a month.As for the situation of the river and the disadvantages of delaying the crossing, I will let you know immediately so that you can make a decision. At 13:00 on April 10, the Front Committee of the General Assembly replied that the floods began in early May every year, and the water in May was greater than in July and August. The lakes on both sides of the bank were flooded, and the water surface of the Yangtze River was extremely wide. Great difficulty occurred.At the same time, our million-strong army is crowding the riverside, and food and firewood are extremely difficult. If the delay is too long, the troops must be withdrawn for food and firewood. Therefore, our opinion is that only under the condition that we can ensure a peaceful crossing of the river Postpone, otherwise it should be assumed that the enemy will turn his back and the river is not easy to overcome, so prepare to postpone crossing the river until after autumn.According to the current situation of the troops, it is quite possible to cross the Yangtze River immediately. It is more advantageous to fight the Yangtze River first, and then strive for a peaceful takeover.The heads of the second and third field armies also reported to the Central Military Commission the various unfavorable conditions for delaying the crossing of the river, and advocated launching the crossing operation on April 15 as originally planned.Based on the above situation and the progress of the negotiations, the Central Military Commission decided at 5 o'clock on April 11 that the operation to cross the river should be postponed for one week, that is, from the 15th to the 22nd. Benevolent to the utmost.If the other party repents, the song is on the other side, and I will be confident.

At 12 o'clock on April 11, the General Front Committee replied by telegram stating that it would resolutely follow the instructions of the Central Military Commission and prepare to start crossing the river on the 22nd.At the same time, it is suggested that it would be better if it can be two or three days earlier than the 22nd. On April 15, the delegations of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party signed the "Domestic Peace Agreement (Final Amendment)". On the 15th and 16th, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to the General Front Committee and the leaders of the Second and Third Field Armies: April 20 was the deadline for the peace talks, and whether the other party signed the agreement had to decide before that date. Xudu River, after you receive this telegram, please get ready immediately. On the 20th, you will definitely capture all the strongholds on the north bank except Anqing, Pukou, and Puzhen, and cross the river in a big way on the 22nd. On the 17th, the General Front Committee sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission, proposing that the capture of the enemy's bridgehead and Jiangxinzhou on the north bank must be closely integrated with the official crossing of the river.

The Central Group began to attack on the evening of the 20th, clearing the Yuxikou, Xiliangshan line and Jiangxinzhou Kuomintang army stronghold, and continued to develop southward on the 21st.The East and West groups launched a cross-river operation on the 21st. On the 18th, the Central Military Commission replied in a telegram agreeing that "the corps of the Second Field and the Third Field will start attacking on the 20th (Maoyang) and carry out a general offensive on the 22nd (Maoyang) to fight to the end in one go. Make a pause and take the second step. Please implement this general plan resolutely and thoroughly. This plan is not only necessary militaryly, but also politically necessary, and there must be no changes." The reply also returned He pointed out: "This time our army of one million crossed the south of the Yangtze River, the overall victory is very important. I hope that the soldiers of the second and third fields of our army will work together with one heart and one mind, and complete the great task under the leadership of the general front committee and the two front committees of the second field and the third field."

The final determination of the time for launching the cross-river operation fully demonstrated the Chinese Communist Party’s generosity and benevolence to the Kuomintang government, but the Kuomintang government finally refused to sign the peace agreement, which fully exposed the true face of the Kuomintang government’s fake peace and real war. The deployment of the General Front Committee How to carry out the crossing operation is an important issue carefully planned by the General Front Committee and the Second and Third Field Armies.According to the intention of the Central Military Commission and the deployment of the Kuomintang army's defense of the river, the General Front Committee of the Battle of Crossing the River comprehensively analyzed various difficulties and favorable conditions in the implementation of the operation of crossing the river. Most of the commanders and fighters are from the north, are not familiar with water, do not know much about the situation of the Yangtze River, and have various ideological concerns; commanders at all levels lack the experience of organizing and commanding large corps to forcefully cross the river; and there is no modern navigation equipment, so they can only The main means of transport is wooden sailboats.Under the above circumstances, it will be very difficult to break through the Yangtze River defense line composed of the Kuomintang army, army, navy and air force. However, the overall situation is very favorable to the People's Liberation Army. The Tang Enbo Group defending the lower reaches of the Yangtze River is not strong in combat effectiveness, lacks backbone forces, and has a long front, insufficient troops, and many defensive loopholes; The narrow river surface west of Nanjing and the weak defense of the Kuomintang army are more conducive to the organization of the People's Liberation Army to cross the river; the Wuhu and Jiangyin sections, the river body gradually protrudes northward, and the Shanghai-Nanjing and Ningwu railways are parallel to the river, which is conducive to the People's Liberation Army's implementation of the Kuomintang army on the south bank. The pincer assault quickly achieved the encirclement of the Kuomintang army in Nanjing and Zhenjiang, and immediately occupied and controlled the railway line after crossing the river, so that the Kuomintang army could not use the railway to maneuver. Based on the above analysis and judgment, the General Front Committee and the Second and Third Field Army Front Committees conducted detailed and careful research on the deployment of the crossing operation.At the meeting of the General Front Committee held on February 9, it was initially determined that the four corps of the Third Field Army and one corps of the Second Field Army would be the first echelon for crossing the river. The four corps of the Third Field Army were The Jiangyin-Yangzhou section, the east-west section of Nanjing, the east-west section of Wuhu, and the section from Tongling to Guichi were implemented; the second field army crossed the river in the east-west section of Anqing with 1 corps, and the remaining 2 corps divided by 1 army marched to Huangmei, Except for the feigned movement in the Susong and Wangjiang sections, the remaining five armies served as the general reserve team and followed the first echelon to cross the river.It is planned to focus on crossing the river from Wuhu to Anqing. In late March, the General Front Committee once again held an enlarged meeting in Sunjiaweizi in the southern suburbs of Bengbu to discuss and study the specific deployment of crossing the river. On the 31st, the General Front Committee formulated the "Outline for the Implementation of the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign" and reported it to the Central Military Commission on April 1. The "Outline" decided to use the second and third field armies to form three assault groups in the east, middle, and west, and launch a cross-river operation at 18:00 on April 15, annihilating all or most of the Tang Enbo group of the Kuomintang army, and "occupying the Soviet Union" South, southern Anhui, and the entire province of Zhejiang, seize Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, and completely destroy the political and economic center of the reactionary Kuomintang government." The "Outline" made the following judgments on the possible actions of the Tang Enbo Group after the second and third field armies successfully crossed the river: "(1) Shrink the troops to the Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou triangle areas and the Nanjing and Wuhu areas, control Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Wuhu, Zhenjiang, and Wuxi are all important points, and when our eastern and western armies are still far apart, we will gather troops to fight a decisive battle with our eastern corps that has advanced to the Beijing-Shanghai line, and retreat to the west of Wuhu to Zhejiang. Jiangxi line to protect its retreat. (2) Withdrawing backwards, deploying defense lines in Wuxi, Nanjing, Wuhu and the areas south of them, using the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway to quickly transfer troops to control along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, ensuring the two key points of Nanjing and Wuhu, and seeking to cut off our eastern and western armies Then, depending on the situation, either fight us decisively in the triangle area of ​​Nanjing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, or retreat to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line to fight us decisively, or make a strategic retreat along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line. (3) Voluntarily abandon the areas of Wujin, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Wuhu, and retreat southward along the entire line of the enemy along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line and the coastal areas of Wuxi, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, so as to use the railways and Haikou for stubborn resistance, or for an orderly campaign. retreat. (4) When the situation is not conducive to retreat, stick to the Ning, Shanghai, and Hangzhou points in order to resist stubbornly. " The "Outline" emphasized: "As long as our army successfully crosses the river, no matter what the enemy does, the development of the battle situation will change in our favor, and it may turn into a situation where the enemy is completely chaotic." According to this, the "Outline" It is stipulated that if the Tang Enbo Group implements the first plan, it should gather the main force of the four corps of the Third Field Army, and even devote all its efforts to the decisive battle on the Nanjing-Shanghai Line, and use one corps of the Second Field Army to advance to Quzhou and its north and west area, cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line.The main force of the Second Field Army should go eastward along the river to capture Wuhu and prepare for the capture of Nanjing.If the Tang Enbo Group implements the second plan, the main force of the Second Field Army can be changed to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, and the rest is the same as the first plan.If the Tang Enbo Group implements the third plan, the Second Field Army will take over the Nanjing garrison, and the main force will deal with the Kuomintang troops on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, and the Third Field Army will be fully responsible for dealing with the Kuomintang troops in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Wuxi.If the Tang Enbo Group implements the fourth plan, the Second Field Army will solve Nanjing, and the Third Field Army will solve Shanghai and Hangzhou.In terms of the entire combat process, it is more beneficial to put Shanghai at the end; if the Kuomintang army is completely confused, it should be dealt with according to the actual situation. The "Outline" emphasizes that the preparation for the battle should be based on being able to cope with the first and second situations mentioned above, and it is necessary to fully estimate that after the Eastern Front Group successfully crosses the river, it may encounter serious battles. Therefore, the Western Front Group Timely and powerful support should be given. "No matter what the enemy does or how the situation changes, the Seventh and Ninth Corps of the Three Fields on the Western Front should retain the necessary forces to coordinate with the Second Field to annihilate the enemy in front of them. The Twelfth Corps moved east and west, and strived to meet up quickly. The success of this work will not only prevent the Eastern Front Corps from being isolated, so that the main force on the Eastern Front will be sure to win, but also disrupt the enemy's combat system and achieve a split encirclement. The enemy's purpose. Therefore, it is really the key to the whole campaign." The "Outline" is scheduled to divide the campaign into three stages.In the first stage, the task of crossing the river is achieved, and the campaign is launched; in the second stage, the task of splitting and encircling the Kuomintang army is achieved, and a section of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line is indeed controlled, cutting off the retreat of the Kuomintang army; in the third stage, the surrounded Kuomintang army is annihilated. , complete the entire campaign. The "Outline" determined that the combat deployment for the first phase is: the 8th and 10th Corps of the Third Field Army, a total of 8 armies and 3 independent brigades with 350,000 people, will be led by Su Yu, the deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the field army, and Zhang Zhen, the chief of staff. Command and form the East Assault Group.Among them, the 34th and 35th armies under the command of the 8th Corps used active feints to attract and contain the Kuomintang troops in the Pukou and Puzhen areas, and waited for the opportunity to cross the river.The main six armies crossed the river from Sanjiangying, Kouan, Jingkou section and Zhanghuanggang to Longshaogang section.After success, annihilating the defenders in front of them with a force, the main force quickly advanced to the Nanjing-Shanghai Railway, controlling a section of the road, and strived to establish a firm foothold first, adjust the situation, consolidate the position, and consolidate the rear contact line.Then expand the results of the battle and launch an orderly attack on the Kuomintang army with a rear.If conditions permit, troops should be sent westward to cut off the Nanjing-Hangzhou Highway. If the Kuomintang troops attack, they should be wiped out one by one in field battles.If the strength is insufficient, continue to consolidate the position and wait for the Chinese assault group to annihilate it after it arrives. The 7th and 9th Corps of the 3rd Field Army consisted of 300,000 soldiers, forming the Central Breakthrough Group, commanded by Tan Zhenlin, the 1st Deputy Political Commissar of the Field Army, from Yuxikou to Yaogou, from Yaogou to Zongyang Town (not Including) section across the river.After success, with enough troops to annihilate the defenders in front of them and monitor the defenders in Wuhu, the main force quickly moved eastward, joined the East Group, cut off the Nanjing-Hangzhou Highway, and completed the division and encirclement of the Kuomintang troops in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou. Annihilate the Kuomintang troops in the Ning and Zhen areas. In order to achieve coordination in the actions of the Central and Eastern Groups, the defenders in the Ning and Zhen areas were quickly encircled, and the Central and Eastern Groups were under the unified command of Su Yu and Zhang Zhen. A total of 350,000 people from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps of the Second Field Army and 350,000 local troops formed the West Assault Group, commanded by Field Army Commander Liu Bocheng, Deputy Political Commissar Zhang Jichun, and Chief of Staff Li Da. (inclusive) to Wangjiang section to cross the river.After the success, in addition to annihilating the defenders in person, one corps quickly advanced to Quzhou on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line and the areas west and north of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, and indeed controlled the section of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi railway and the Tunxi North-South Highway, cutting off the Kuomintang army. retreat.The main force should quickly advance eastward to take over the tasks of the troops left behind by the Third Field Army, annihilate the defenders in the Wuhu area, and prepare to participate in the battle to capture Nanjing. The final requirement of the "Outline" is: After the troops have successfully crossed the river, they should send teams to guide the left and right friendly neighbors to cross the river. Each army should keep in touch with the friendly neighbors, exchange information, cooperate closely, and actively support the friendly neighbors in the battle. .In order to attract the attention of the Kuomintang army to the Wuhu area, which is conducive to the crossing of the East and West Groups, and it is estimated that the East Group may encounter serious battles after crossing the river, the General Front Committee then decided that the Central Group was more powerful than the East and West Groups. Cross the river one day in advance, so as to be able to support the East Group in operations as soon as possible. On April 1, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi, the secretaries of the General Front Committee, led the newly formed headquarters to Yaogang Village in the southeast of Hefei to coordinate the overall situation and command the entire cross-river operation. On April 3, the Central Military Commission replied and agreed to the "Outline for the Implementation of the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Campaign." On April 17, according to the road and food situation in southern Anhui, the General Front Committee made some adjustments to the deployment of the Second Field Army after crossing the river in order to facilitate the troops to deploy food and avoid overcrowding. On the Jiangxi line, a corps marched eastward along the river, first taking over the task of monitoring and encircling the Wuhu area by a part of the Third Field Army, and then preparing to participate in the battle to capture Nanjing. On the 18th, the Central Military Commission agreed to the above adjustments.According to the general deployment of the General Front Committee, the Second and Third Field Armies conducted serious research and formulated specific combat plans based on their own situation and the situation of the defending troops in front of them. Battle Plan of the Second Field Army The head of the Second Field Army believes that the section of the field army crossing the river is the junction of the Tang Enbo Group and the Bai Chongxi Group. The Liu Ruming Division of the 8th Corps of the defending army has only 3 armies and 7 divisions with more than 40,000 people, and its combat effectiveness is relatively weak. The Corps was lined up on the 100-kilometer-wide front between Guichi and Madang, and at the same time crossed the river, focusing on the east and west areas of Anqing, and reported to the Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee on April 8 and April 17. The specific arrangements for the implementation of the cross-river operation: Chen Xilian, commander of the 3rd Corps, and Xie Fuzhi, political commissar, commanded the 10th, 11th, and 12th armies.Except that the 10th Army surrounded the defenders of Anqing by means of a feint attack, and blocked Anqing and its east and west rivers to cover the main force crossing the river, the main 11th and 12th armies crossed the river from the east of Anqing to Zongyang Town.After landing, a force was used to consolidate the beachhead position. The 11th Army attacked and advanced to the Yinjiahui, Guankou, and Wutianpu areas, captured the area, and sent a part of the army through Tangtian Town to Zhangxi to meet the 5th Corps to cross the river; the 12th Army The army marched south of Guichi to take over the task of the 7th Corps to monitor and annihilate the defenders in the Guichi area.Afterwards, the 11th Army attacked Tunxi via Diaoyutai, Yixian, and Xiuning, split, surrounded, and waited for an opportunity to annihilate the defenders of Shexian and Tunxi.The 12th Army marched towards Shexian County via Qingyang, Shidai, and Taiping, and attacked Jixi County with part of it, cutting off the Huihang Highway. Chen Geng, commander and political commissar of the 4th Corps, commanded the 13th, 14th, and 15th armies to cross the river from Wangjiang to Madang.Among them, the 41st Division of the 14th Army attached to the 13th Army and the 15th Army are the first echelon, and the main force of the 14th Army is the second echelon.After landing, he marched eastward along the river to take over the mission of the 9th Corps to monitor the garrison in Wuhu, and prepared to participate in the battle to capture Nanjing. Yang Yong, commander of the 5th Corps, and Su Zhenhua, political commissar, commanded the 16th, 17th, and 18th armies to cross the river from the west of Anqing to the Wangjiang section.Among them, the 16th Army is the first echelon, and the 17th and 18th Army are the second echelon.After the surprise landing, a force controlled the beachhead, the main force surrounded and wiped out the defenders in Dongliu and Zhide, and the 4th Corps crossed the river.Then attack along the Fuliang, Wuyuan, and Jingdezhen lines to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line, control the Quxian, Jiangshan section of the railway and the Quxian, Shexian section of the road, and cut off the retreat of the defenders. The 40th and 43rd Advance Corps of the Fourth Field Army and the troops of the Jianghan, Tongbai, and Hubei-Henan Military Regions, with a total of 200,000 people, were under the unified command of Xiao Jinguang. The first advance troops entered Guangshui, Hekou, Huang'an, and Zhongguanyi The front line and the areas north of it gathered for standby; troops from the Jianghan, Tongbai, and Hubei-Henan military regions entered the Yingcheng area to gather for standby.In the second step, when the second and third field armies were crossing the river, they went to the east and north of Wuhan to actively carry out activities respectively to contain the Bai Chongxi Group and support the second field army to cross the river.