Chapter 3 Chapter 03 The CCP decided to "carry out the revolution to the end" and the People's Liberation Army reorganized the entire army

In response to the conspiracy activities of the Kuomintang government and the U.S. government, the Chinese Communist Party formulated the policy of "carrying out the revolution to the end." On December 30, 1948, Mao Zedong exposed the "peaceful" conspiracy of the U.S. government and the Kuomintang government and organized opposition groups within the revolutionary camp in his New Year's message to Xinhua News Agency. attempt to stop.It is clearly pointed out that the enemy will not be eliminated by itself, neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of American imperialism in China will withdraw from the stage of history on their own.

Only when the Chinese reactionaries are completely wiped out and the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism are driven out of China can China achieve independence and peace.The revolution must be carried through to the end, and all reactionary forces must be resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and completely eliminated. We must unswervingly insist on overthrowing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Establish a republic under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat with the alliance of workers and peasants as the main body. Mao Zedong also borrowed the story of the ancient Greek fable "The Farmer and the Snake" to solemnly declare: "The Chinese people will never pity snake-like villains." Just like the enemy's military offensive, smash the enemy's political conspiracy and carry the great People's Liberation War to the end." "In 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will march south of the Yangtze River and will win even greater victories than in 1948." "In 1949, a Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionaries will be convened to complete the tasks of the people's revolution, declare the founding of the People's Republic of China, and form the central government of the Republic."

From January 6th to 8th, 1949, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting to discuss and pass the inner-party directive of "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949" drafted by Mao Zedong.The instructions analyzed the war situation across the country and pointed out: After the battles of Pingjin, Huaihai, Taiyuan, and Datong, can it be said that the Kuomintang regime has been basically defeated by us?As far as the main military force has been wiped out, it can be said that the basic overthrow of the Kuomintang does not mean the complete overthrow of the Kuomintang. There are still many enemies in China to be eliminated and many areas to be occupied by us. and go to work.

The concept of underestimating the enemy should never exist, and we must never let victory go to our heads. "We must carry the revolution to the end and not allow it to stop halfway."It is required that "education must be carried out persuasively within the Party, within the People's Liberation Army, and among the masses, and explanations must be carried out among representatives of the democratic parties and people's organizations, so that everyone understands that the revolution must be carried through to the end, and No excuses for quitting. The Kuomintang's so-called peace negotiation conspiracy must continue to be exposed and attacked. "The instruction also pointed out: "We have always included the possibility that the United States will directly send troops to occupy several cities along the coast of China and fight against us in our combat plan.Don't give up this kind of calculation now, lest we be in a situation where we are at a loss when things happen.However, the stronger and more resolute the Chinese people's revolutionary forces are, the less likely it will be for direct military intervention by the United States, and the possibility of aiding the Kuomintang with finances and weapons will also be reduced.

This has been proved by the fluctuations and certain changes in the US government's attitude over the past year, especially in the past three months. "At the same time, we must increase our vigilance and resolutely defeat the conspiracy of "internal sabotage" against the US government." " In order to quickly win the national victory and lead the people of the whole country to build a new China after the victory, from March 5 to 13, 1949, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held the second plenary meeting of the Seventh Central Committee in Xibaipo, Pingshan County, Hebei Province.The plenary session heard and discussed Mao Zedong's report, approved the proposal initiated by the Communist Party of China on convening a new Political Consultative Conference and establishing a democratic coalition government, and adopted corresponding resolutions based on Mao Zedong's report.

In his report, Mao Zedong put forward various policies to promote the rapid victory of the revolution in the whole country and the victory of the organization. It explained that under the situation of national victory, the focus of the work of the Communist Party of China must be shifted from the countryside to the cities, and the urban work must be centered on production and construction. ; stipulated the basic policies that the Chinese Communist Party should adopt in terms of politics, economy, and diplomacy after the national victory, especially focused on analyzing the conditions of various economic components in China at that time and the correct policies that the party must adopt. The development direction of China's transformation into an industrial country and from new democracy to socialism.

The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held by the Communist Party of China at the historical juncture of the Chinese revolution is of great historical significance. Mao Zedong’s report and the resolutions made at the meeting played an important role not only in winning the national victory of the Chinese revolution, but also in building a new China. Great guide. For Chiang Kai-shek's fake peace conspiracy, Mao Zedong wrote a series of comments for Xinhua News Agency, giving a profound exposure. On January 14, 1949, Mao Zedong issued the "Statement on the Current Situation", which profoundly exposed that the Chiang Kai-shek ruling clique, with the help and support of the US government, launched a counter-revolutionary civil war and massacred Heinous crimes of the people.It clearly pointed out that when the Kuomintang government was about to perish, Chiang Kai-shek's peaceful proposal was "in order to maintain the remnants of the Kuomintang government, gain breathing time, and then make a comeback to destroy the revolutionary forces."

Because the conditions proposed by Chiang Kai-shek as the basis for peace negotiations in the proposal are hypocritical, "the conditions for continuing the war, not the conditions for peace." At the same time, the statement pointed out: Although the Chinese People's Liberation Army has sufficient strength and sufficient reasons, it does It is certain that within a short period of time, all the remaining military forces of the Kuomintang reactionary government will be completely wiped out; however, in order to quickly end the war, realize real peace and reduce the suffering of the people, the Chinese Communist Party is willing to cooperate with the Nanjing Kuomintang reactionary government and any other Kuomintang The local governments and military blocs shall conduct peace negotiations on the basis of the following conditions.These conditions are: punishment of war criminals; abolition of the pseudo-constitution; abolition of the pseudo-legal system; reorganization of all reactionary armies in accordance with democratic principles; confiscation of bureaucratic capital; reform of the land system; , to take over all the powers of the Nanjing Kuomintang reactionary government and its affiliated governments at all levels.

Mao Zedong also pointed out: "Only the peace established under the above-mentioned conditions is the real democratic peace. If the people in the reactionary government of the Nanjing Kuomintang are willing to realize the real democratic peace instead of the hypocritical reactionary peace , then they should abandon their reactionary conditions and accept the eight conditions put forward by the Chinese Communist Party as the basis for the two sides to engage in peaceful negotiations. Otherwise, it will prove that their so-called peace is nothing but a deception." Finally, Mao Zedong demanded that "all the people of the country, all democratic parties, and all people's organizations, stand up for a true democratic peace and oppose a hypocritical and reactionary peace." Before a truly democratic peace, one should never let up one's fighting efforts. "Any reactionaries who dare to resist must be resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly and completely wiped out."

After Li Zongren came to power and expressed his willingness to hold peace negotiations on the basis of the eight conditions proposed by the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party tried to win and help him in good faith. End wars and bring true peace. On January 27th and 28th, Ye Jianying successively met Huang Qihan and Liu Zhonghua, representatives sent by Li Zongren in Beiping, and expressed to them that he hoped that Li Zongren could recognize the situation, follow the trend, and move closer to the people at this historical turning point.In the telegram to Ye Jianying drafted by Zhou Enlai for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Ye Jianying asked Ye Jianying to tell Huang Qihan and Liu Zhonghua to tell Li Zongren that if he really had the sincerity to oppose Chiang and the United States and accept the eight conditions, he "should quickly split with Jiang" and "the middle way is Absolutely no way out."Only in this way, "can we gain a firm foothold and carry out peace talks"; otherwise, "the CCP will have no time to deal with it."

On February 22, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others met with Yan Huiqing, Shao Lizi, Zhang Shizhao, Jiang Yong and other members of the "Shanghai Peace Delegation" sent by Li Zongren in Xibaipo, and told them: It will be considered and a decision is expected around March 15.The two sides confirmed that the negotiation was carried out with the Chinese Communist Party and the Nanjing government each sending an equal number of representatives.The venue is Shijiazhuang or Beiping. The negotiations are based on the statement of the Chinese Communist Party on January 14. Once an agreement is established, it will be implemented immediately. On March 26, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to send Zhou Enlai, Lin Boqu, Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, and Li Weihan (later Nie Rongzhen) as representatives of the peace talks, and Zhou Enlai as the chief representative. Peace negotiations will be held in Peking on April 1. On April 1, the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party officially started. The representatives of the two parties conducted extensive discussions, mainly exchanging views on the issue of war criminals and the People’s Liberation Army’s crossing of the river. If the talks are successful, the People's Liberation Army will cross the river, and if the talks fail, they will also cross the river. The Yangtze River has never prevented the reunification of China in history. On April 4, Mao Zedong wrote a commentary for Xinhua News Agency, "Where is the Nanjing Government Going?", pointing out: "Two roads lay before the Nanjing Kuomintang government and its military and political personnel: One is to draw closer to the Chiang Kai-shek war criminal group and its master, American imperialism, which is to continue to be the enemy of the people and perish together with the Chiang Kai-shek war criminal group in the People's Liberation War; One is to get closer to the people, which is to break with the Chiang Kai-shek war criminal group and American imperialism, and to make meritorious service in the People's Liberation War to atone for crimes, in order to seek forgiveness and understanding from the people.There is no third way. " If the Nanjing government really has the sincerity to accept the eight conditions of the Chinese Communist Party as the basis for negotiations, "it should start with dealing with the Nanjing tragedy, arrest and severely punish the main culprits Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Enbo, and Zhang Yaoming, and arrest and severely punish the spies in Nanjing and Shanghai. Arrest and severely punish those counter-revolutionary chiefs who firmly oppose peace, actively sabotage the peace talks, and actively prepare to resist the People's Liberation Army's advance south of the Yangtze River." The commentary is telling the Nanjing government not to lose this opportunity, because no matter whether the Nanjing government signs an agreement to accept the eight conditions It doesn't matter if this agreement is not signed, the People's Liberation Army will always advance, and the People's Liberation Army will march to the south of the Yangtze River. After half a month of negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party peace talks delegations, on April 15th, after adopting as much as possible the opinions put forward by the Nanjing government delegation, the CCP delegation proposed the "Domestic Peace Agreement (Final Amendment)" with 8 articles and 24 clauses. , and announced April 20 as the final signing date.During this period, the Central Military Commission asked the People's Liberation Army to be vigilant and prepare for battle. Once the negotiations broke down, they would immediately carry out fighting across the river and march across the country. On April 20, the Nanjing Kuomintang government finally refused to sign the agreement. On April 21, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission, and Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, issued the "Order to March to the Nation", stating that: the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party and the The domestic peace agreement drawn up by the Kuomintang government delegation after long negotiations has been rejected by the Nanking Kuomintang government.The reason why the leaders of the Nanking Kuomintang government rejected this domestic peace agreement is that they are still obeying the orders of U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, trying to prevent the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people and the peaceful solution of domestic problems.In this case, we order the People's Liberation Army to: Go forward bravely, resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and completely wipe out all Kuomintang reactionaries who dare to resist, liberate the people of the whole country, and defend the independence and integrity of China's territorial sovereignty. Go forward and arrest all the most arduous war criminals.No matter where they fled, they must be brought to justice and punished according to law. Announce the final amendment to the domestic peace agreement to any KMT local governments and local military blocs.For those who are willing to stop the war and solve the problem by peaceful means, you can sign local agreements with them according to the general meaning of this final amendment. After the People's Liberation Army surrounded Nanjing, if the Nanjing Li Zongren government has not fled and is willing to sign the domestic peace agreement, we are willing to give the government another chance to sign. In accordance with the above orders, the People's Liberation Army began a great march to the vast areas of the south of the Yangtze River and the northwest.The attempt by the U.S. government and the Kuomintang to "rule across the river" to stop the advance of the Chinese revolution finally went bankrupt. According to the development of the war situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission stipulated the tasks of the People's Liberation Army in 1949.First of all, we must establish the idea of ​​​​always being a fighting team and liberate the whole of China.Mao Zedong pointed out: "The People's Liberation Army will always be a fighting team. Even after national victory, during the historical period when classes have not been eliminated at home and the imperialist system exists in the world, our army will still be a fighting team. There can be no doubts about this. misunderstanding and wavering.” The People’s Liberation Army was required to “after the battles of Pingjin, Huaihai, Taiyuan, and Datong, several large field armies must rest for at least two months to complete various preparations for crossing the south of the Yangtze River. Then, steadily and steadily march south." "In the summer, autumn and winter of 1949, we should strive to occupy most of the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shaanxi and Gansu, and some of them all. " Secondly, in the process of marching across the country, the People's Liberation Army must implement the tasks of the task force and build new areas.Mao Zedong pointed out: The People's Liberation Army "is not only a combat team, but mainly a work team." We have set the task in this way. If we do not set this task now and make up our minds to do it, we will make a huge mistake.” Therefore, all army cadres must learn to take over cities and manage them, and must learn to work in cities. To wage political, economic, and cultural struggles against imperialism, the Kuomintang, and the bourgeoisie, and to wage diplomatic struggles against the imperialists; to be good at leading workers and organizing trade unions; being good at mobilizing and organizing youth; Industry and commerce, good at managing schools, newspapers, news agencies and radio stations, good at handling foreign affairs. Good at dealing with the problems of various democratic parties and people's organizations, good at adjusting the relationship with the countryside, solving the problems of food, coal and other necessities, and good at dealing with financial and financial problems.In short, all urban problems that army cadres and soldiers were unfamiliar with in the past should all be borne by themselves in the future.We also have to learn a lot about rural work, because the rural areas in the south are completely new areas, and the work in the old areas in the north is fundamentally different. "We must regard the 2.1 million field army as a huge cadre school." Third, further strengthen the army building.The resolution of the Politburo meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on January 8 pointed out that in 1949 the field armies must be further regularized, mainly by strengthening the artillery and engineers, using modern means of transportation such as railways, roads, and waterways, and strengthening the organization of the army. Resolutely overcome certain indisciplines that still exist in the army to a considerable extent, and strengthen the work of the headquarters.It is necessary to strengthen the organization and efficiency of the People's Liberation Army's rear service work on the basis of possibility and necessity, adjust or establish the munitions industry and other munitions industries, establish an ordnance system, uniformly stipulate various supply standards, and uniformly distribute health and communication equipment , do a good job in the front and rear division of labor in transportation and warehouses, and determine the rear service organization and system in order to effectively support the People's Liberation Army's great march to the southern provinces.The political work of the People's Liberation Army must be conducted under the leadership of the Political Department of the Central Military Commission to sum up the experience of carrying out the new-style army-wide movement, the establishment and restoration of the party committee system, the revolutionary military committee, and the work of the party branch of the company, and formulate corresponding regulations or regulations , became a system, popularized in the whole army. In 1949 and 1950, we should strive to form an air force that can be used and a navy that can defend the coast and the river. While giving the People's Liberation Army the task of 1949, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also pointed out the favorable and unfavorable conditions for fighting in the south.The favorable conditions are that the Kuomintang army has no main force, and we have a strong army; the Kuomintang has lost its prestige, while the Chinese Communist Party has great prestige; The area of ​​​​the Agrarian Revolution; now there are already many guerrillas and guerrillas.The disadvantage is that the most extensive area is under the rule of the Kuomintang, the organization of the Chinese Communist Party there is not yet strong, the masses there have not yet mobilized, and the army's supplies will encounter many difficulties for a period of time. It is much more difficult than the northern cities.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China requires that the above-mentioned favorable conditions and unfavorable conditions must be clearly explained to all cadres and soldiers who are going to the south, so that they are fully mentally prepared to make good use of the favorable conditions to overcome the unfavorable conditions and strive for national victory.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission also proposed the policies that the People's Liberation Army must adopt in the process of marching across the country.Mao Zedong pointed out in the report of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee: In the future, there will be more than 1 million Kuomintang army combat troops, no more than Tianjin, Beiping, and Suiyuan.However, "Using combat to deal with the enemy, such as dealing with the enemy in Tianjin, is still the first thing we must pay attention to and must prepare for. All commanders and combatants of the People's Liberation Army must never relax their will to fight. The thinking of the enemy and the thinking of underestimating the enemy are both wrong." At the same time.We should also pay attention to and learn to use the Peiping method and the Suiyuan method to deal with the enemy.The former is to force the enemy army to use peaceful methods to quickly and thoroughly reorganize it into the People's Liberation Army in accordance with the system of the People's Liberation Army, just like it did to Fu Zuoyi's troops in Beiping. The latter is to deliberately preserve a part of the Kuomintang army as it did to the Kuomintang army in Suiyuan, leaving it intact, or in general, in order to strive for this part of the army to stand on our side politically, or remain neutral for our benefit. Concentrate on the main part of the Kuomintang's remnant forces first, and then reorganize this part of the army into the People's Liberation Army according to the system of the People's Liberation Army after a long period of time.At the same time, according to the situation in the period when the focus of the Communist Party of China shifted from the countryside to the cities, and the cities began to lead the countryside, the People's Liberation Army was required to occupy the cities first and then the villages in the process of marching south. The Central Military Commission also stipulated the policies of the People's Liberation Army in the process of marching across the country. On April 25, Mao Zedong and Zhu De issued the "Chinese People's Liberation Army Announcement", which proposed eight chapters of the agreement: protecting the lives and property of all the people; industry; confiscation of bureaucratic capital; protection of all public and private schools, hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, sports venues, and all other public welfare undertakings; The People's Liberation Army and the People's Government will not capture, arrest or insult anyone who does not resist with guns or conspire to sabotage; for the purpose of ensuring public security in urban and rural areas and stabilizing social order, all stragglers should report to the local people The People's Liberation Army or the people's government surrendered and reported; preparedly and step by step abolished the feudal land ownership system in the countryside; protected the safety of the lives and properties of foreign nationals. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission formulated a deployment to march across the country.As early as the middle and late December of 1948, the Central Military Commission began to study this issue. On December 12, 1948, Mao Zedong proposed in a telegram to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin: After the end of the Huaihai Campaign, the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army will rest for 2 months (divided into four periods, with one period every half month) ), and roughly prepared all the items needed for crossing the river (raincoats, currency, shells, therapeutic medicine, steamboats) and initially completed political mobilization.Under the condition that the existing enemies between the Jianghuai and the Huaihe Rivers have not retreated to the south of the Yangtze River, the two armies joined forces to hold the Jianghuai Campaign in one to two months, annihilated all the enemies between the Jianghuai and Huaihe Rivers, and occupied the north of the Yangtze River, the south of the Huaihe River, and the Pinghan Road. The towns in the east and west of the sea, mainly the towns from Anqing to Nantong, control the north bank of the Yangtze River. Then it will take a considerable amount of time to finally complete the preparations for crossing the river, and the river crossing operation will be held in May or June next year.The East China and Central Plains field armies worked together to manage the southeast, including southern Anhui, southern Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces, and part of Jiangxi province, and captured Wuhu, Hangzhou, Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Fuzhou.After the Battle of Pingjin, the Northeast Field Army rested for 2 months, then went south along Pinghan Road in May, held the Jianghan Battle in June and July, and completed the preparations for crossing the river. Crossing the river in August, the first step was to operate southern Hubei, The entire Hunan Province and a part of Jiangxi Province will capture Wuhan, Yueyang, Changsha, Changde, Baoqing, Hengyang, Chenzhou, Jiujiang, Nanchang, Ji'an, and Ganzhou; the second step is to capture Guangdong and Guangxi. After the Battle of Pingjin, the three corps of the North China Military Region worked together to capture Taiyuan, and then used the 2nd and 3rd corps to capture Suiyuan and Ningxia, and join up with the Northwest Field Army; the 1st Corps joined up with the Northwest Field Army as soon as possible, and cleared the Lanzhou and Tongguan lines first The Kuomintang troops from above and to the south and north captured the cities of Tongguan, Xi'an, Tianshui, and Hanzhong, and then entered Sichuan.Mao Zedong pointed out: The above-mentioned plan is based on many military, political and economic considerations, and adopts a steady and steady approach. On the 24th, Mao Zedong sent the above-mentioned telegram to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, and clearly pointed out: After the Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns, the whole army will rest for 2 to 3 months, and then the Central Plains and East China Field Army will go out to the south of the Yangtze River, and the Northeast Field Army will go out from Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi. The Northwest Field Army and the three corps of the North China Military Region went out of Shaanxi, Gansu and Sichuan.It may be considered to use all three corps of the North China Military Region to go out of Shaanxi, Gansu and Sichuan, or to go out of Shaanxi, Gansu and Sichuan with two corps, and to go out of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi with the Northeast Field Army in the first step with one corps, and to go out of Guangdong and Guangxi in the second step. After the Huaihai Campaign ended, the Central Military Commission sent a telegram to Su Yu, Chen Tuju, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Jichun on January 12, pointing out that the Huaye and Nakano rest periods are currently scheduled for two and a half months, starting from January 15 and ending on March 31. Half a month is one phase, and there are five phases in total. I hope to rest according to this deployment, and complete all preparations for the cross-river operation, and be on standby for dispatch." On January 31, the Pingjin Campaign ended. On February 12 and 15, the Central Military Commission called Peng Dehuai, He Long, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, Yang Chengwu, and Li Jingquan: The three corps of the North China Military Region should strive to solve the Taiyuan and Datong issues in mid-March, and then rest for one month to one month. In half a month, 3 corps or 2 corps were dispatched to Xi'an, and together with the Northwest Field Army, the Hu Zongnan, Ma Bufang, and Ma Hongkui groups were completely eliminated. On March 17, the Central Military Commission issued another instruction that the East China and Central Plains field armies decided to launch the Battle of Crossing the River on April 10 in Hukou, Wuhu, Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Shanghai and the areas south of it; The tasks of the Kuomintang Army in Wuhan and the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi have been determined." The first two armies of the field army should start before February 25, and the main force should complete preparations for departure before April 1. Within a month, the whole army has set off, and strives to reach the line of Nanyang, Xinyang, Gushi and the areas south of it on May 31 to complete the deployment of troops. On May 23, according to the development of the Battle of Crossing the River, the Central Military Commission determined the specific deployment of the march across the country: the First Field Army (formerly the Northwest Field Army) marched to the northwest, responsible for annihilating Ma Bufang, Ma Hongkui, etc. and a part of the Hu Zongnan Group, liberating and Manage Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, and strive to occupy Lanzhou, Ningxia, and Qinghai before the end of the year. At the end of the year or early next year, prepare to divide into two groups. One will be led by Peng Dehuai in the northwest, and will start operating Xinjiang in the next spring. The other will be led by He Long Entering Sichuan in order to cooperate with the Second Field Army to solve the three provinces of Guizhou, Sichuan, and Xikang; the main force of the Second Field Army (formerly the Central Plains Field Army) was concentrated in southern Anhui, eastern Jiangxi, and western Zhejiang. After the possibility of imperialist armed intervention was reduced, it marched southwest. Annihilate the main force of the Hu Zongnan Group and the Southwest local warlord forces that retreated from the Qinling Mountains to Sichuan, liberate and manage the 3 provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Xikang (later adding 4 provinces of Yunnan), and strive to occupy Guiyang, Chongqing, and the upper reaches of the Yangtze River by the end of the year or before the end of the year The area; the Third Field Army (formerly the East China Field Army) marched towards Fujian and Zhejiang, and was responsible for managing Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces, and was preparing to liberate Taiwan; the Fourth Field Army (formerly the Northeast Field Army) marched towards the Central South to annihilate the Bai Chongxi Group Work with the Yu Hanmou Group to liberate and manage Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi and other provinces, and strive to occupy Guangdong and Guangxi before the end of November or December. On April 25, the Central Military Commission decided that the 18th and 19th Corps (formerly the 1st and 2nd Corps of the North China Military Region) would be transferred to the First Field Army to participate in the battle to liberate the Northwest. In order to prevent possible imperialist armed intervention, the Central Military Commission issued an instruction on May 28: Recently, various imperialist countries have some signs of joint intervention in the revolution. Therefore, "we should prepare countermeasures in order to be prepared." "The main aspect of the countermeasure is that our various field armies advance according to the predetermined plan, annihilate the remnants of the Kuomintang, and make the imperialists of various countries completely lose their lackeys on the Chinese mainland. The second aspect is to strive for economic self-sufficiency and prepare for the sea. When we are blocked, we still have a way. In this respect, it is extremely important to unite the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals on our side. The third aspect is to deploy sufficient troops in North China and East China to prevent the U.S. Navy from cooperating with the Kuomintang navy and army. Attacks and disturbances in our rear." For this reason, the Second Field Army rested along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Road, and prepared to cooperate with the Third Field Army to deal with the imperialist armed forces that might invade Nanjing and Shanghai; Army Corps) and the main artillery force of the Fourth Field Army deployed defenses in Qinhuangdao and Tanggu. The 19th Corps joined the 18th Corps and the main force of the First Field Army to wipe out the main forces of the Hu Zongnan and Ma Bufang Groups on the Shaanxi-Gansu border, and stayed in Baoji and Fengxiang for standby. Reinforce North China; the 3rd Field Army uses 1 corps attached to the necessary number of artillery to open near Qingdao, and is on standby to capture Qingdao, and then serves as the guard of Qingdao, and should strengthen the fort facilities in Wusong and Jiangyin areas; 4th Field Army is located in Henan with 1 corps. In charge of suppressing bandits, he reinforced North China if necessary. In the process of deploying and marching across the country, Mao Zedong also gave overall consideration to dealing with the issues of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Tibet.As early as December 9, 1946, when Mao Zedong answered questions from Western reporters about the CCP's attitude towards the Hong Kong issue, he pointed out: "We are not asking for immediate return" and "it can be resolved through negotiation in the future." February 1949 From the 1st to the 3rd, Mao Zedong pointed out in talks with Mikoyan, the representative of the former Soviet Communist Party and the state leader Stalin, that half of China's territory had not yet been liberated.Things on the mainland are easier to handle, just send the troops there, but things on the islands are more complicated, and you need to adopt another more flexible way to solve them, or use a peaceful transition method, which will take a lot of time . Under such circumstances, it is meaningless to rush to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues.On the contrary, I am afraid that it will be more beneficial for us to develop overseas relations and import and export trade by taking advantage of the original status of these two places, especially Hong Kong.In short, the final decision depends on the development of the situation.There are two more troublesome places: Taiwan and Tibet.In fact, the Tibet issue is not difficult to solve, but it should not be too reckless.It is indisputable that Taiwan is China's territory.Now it is estimated that all the remnants of the Kuomintang will probably withdraw there, and will face us across the sea in the future and will not communicate with each other.There is also an American problem, Taiwan is actually under the protection of American imperialism.The Taiwan issue is more complicated than the Tibet issue, and it will take more time to liberate it. According to the guidelines and deployments formulated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission, after the breakdown of the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army wiped out the remnants of the enemy with overwhelming momentum, and began an unprecedented march in Chinese history. According to the deployment and instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission, the troops of the People's Liberation Army began to make comprehensive preparations for marching across the country after the Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns ended. In order to meet the needs of the war situation, the Central Military Commission issued the "Regulations on Unifying the Organization and Unit Numbers of the Whole Army" on November 1, 1948.The regulations point out that in accordance with the requirements of the September meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on strategic tasks and the further transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission have formulated the following unified regulations on the organization and number of troops in the entire army: (1) The Chinese People's Liberation Army is divided into three categories: field troops, local troops and guerrilla troops. The field troops are formally organized, with unified titles. Columns are renamed army, divisions and brigades are unified as divisions, and are no longer called brigades; local troops take the garrison brigade and independent brigade as the highest units, and are no longer called divisions; guerrilla troops still retain columns and detachments. and other names.Field troops range from army, division, and regiment to battalion, company, platoon, and squad. Local troops are generally organized according to the three-three system from all levels below the brigade. It is divided into temporary establishments of large regiments and small regiments; the formation of guerrilla troops is determined according to the situation.Regardless of field troops, local troops, or guerrilla troops, the official names of troops above regiments and military divisions are all labeled with the words "Chinese People's Liberation Army". (2) Field troops There are two levels above the army: the field army and the corps. According to the needs of the situation, the corps and independent divisions are either divided into the corps or directly under the field army.The corps is generally subordinate to the field army, but it is also under the command of the Military Commission.When necessary, corps, corps or independent divisions may also be placed under the command of the military area.The number of armies and divisions under the jurisdiction of field armies and corps shall be determined as necessary and possible.The field armies are divided into 4, which are distinguished by region, namely, the Northwest Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Central Plains Field Army, the East China Field Army, and the Northeast Field Army. The corps increased from the existing 8 to 20, that is, the Northwest Field Army was the 1st to 2nd Corps; the Central Plains Field Army was the 3rd to the 6th Corps; the East China Field Army was the 7th to the 11th Corps; the Northeast Field Army was the 12th to the 1st Corps The 17th Corps; the field troops of the North China Military Region are the 18th to 20th Corps.The official name of each corps is designated as the XX Corps of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.The army has increased from the existing 55 (columns) and 168 divisions (brigades) to 70 armies and 210 divisions. According to the number of existing columns and divisions (brigades) of each field army, the Northwest Field Army is reorganized into the 1st to 7th armies, and the divisions are designated as the 1st to 21st divisions; the Central Plains Field Army is reorganized into the 10th to 17th armies, and the divisions The designations are from the 28th Division to the 51st Division; the East China Field Army is reorganized into the 20th to the 35th Army, and the designation of the division is the 58th Division to the 105th Division; the Northeast Field Army is reorganized into the 38th Army to the 56th Army. The 112th Division to the 168th Division; the field troops of the North China Military Region were reorganized into the 60th to the 70th Army, and the designations of the divisions were the 178th to the 210th Division.The remaining corps and division numbers will be reserved for new troops to be used in the future. Cavalry units in the special forces, except those directly under infantry divisions and infantry regiments, all strategic cavalry units are renamed cavalry divisions and cavalry regiments.Cavalry divisions or cavalry regiments are attached to corps, corps, or field armies as required, and may also be attached to military districts when necessary.Artillery units, units under the jurisdiction of the army are not assigned another number, field army, corps or units directly under the military region are renamed artillery divisions and artillery regiments, and are uniformly arranged according to the serial numbers stipulated by the Military Commission.In order to facilitate the centralized training of artillery units during rest, the field army or military region should set up an artillery headquarters; when conditions permit, the field army should organize special forces columns to command the directly subordinate artillery units, tank units and engineering units. (3) The organizational system of local troops belongs to the military region system. The military area is divided into 4 levels, which are at the same level as the Central Bureau and are led by its leader as a first-level military area. There are 5 military areas in total, namely, the Northwest Military Area, the Central Plains Military Area, the East China Military Area, the Northeast Military Area, and the North China Military Area; they are at the same level as the Central Bureau and are under its leadership. The second-level military region; the same level as the district (provincial) party committee and its leader is the third-level military region; the same level as the prefectural committee and its leader is the military division.The secondary and tertiary military regions and military subregions are named after the areas under their jurisdiction, such as "Henan, Anhui and Su Military Regions", "Southern Shandong Military Regions", "Trilateral Military Regions" and so on.The establishment of local troops is regulated by each first-level military region and submitted to the Military Commission for approval. The garrison brigades, independent brigades, and independent regiments do not have uniform numbers for the entire army, and are arranged by each first-level military region. (4) For guerrilla units, whether they are in the new areas or the border areas of the old areas, the local military command organizations should organize themselves according to the needs and possibilities of the situation, and then report to their superiors. 上述《规定》下发后，由于各野战军和各大军区部队正在与国民党军进行紧张的战略决战，没有时间进行整编，仅东北野战军于辽沈战役结束后在11月12日下达了整编命令，颁布各纵队、师的新番号，但由于紧接着进行平津战役，因此，实际上延至战役结束后才正式启用新番号。 1949年1月15日，中央军委又发出《关于各野战军番号改按序数排列的决定》，指出：根据战争的发展，去年11月1日关于各野战军冠以军区地名已不合适，决定改为按序数排列，西北野战军改称第一野战军，中原野战军改称第二野战军，华东野战军改称第三野战军，东北野战军改称第四野战军。 遵照中央军委1948年11月1日和1949年1月15日的指示，各野战军、各大军区于1949年2月开始相继进行整编。整编的具体情况是： 西北野战军改称第一野战军，司令员兼政治委员彭德怀，副司令员张宗逊、赵寿山，参谋长阎揆要，政治部主任甘泗淇，副参谋长王政柱、李夫克，政治部副主任张德生。下辖：骑兵第1、第2师；第1军(由第1纵队改称)，军长贺炳炎，政治委员廖汉生，辖第1、第2、第3师；第2军(由第2纵队改称)，军长兼政治委员王震，辖第4、第5、第6师；第3军(由第3纵队改称)，军长许光达，辖第7、第8、第9师；第4军(由第4纵队改称)，军长王世泰，政治委员张仲良，辖第10、第11、第12师；第6军(由第6纵队改称)，军长罗元发，政治委员徐立清，辖第16、第17师；第7军(由第7纵队改称)，军长彭绍辉，代政治委员孙志远，辖第19、第20师；第8军(由第8纵队改称)，军长姚蝗，辖第22、第23师，不久，该军拨归华北军区建制。5月，由晋绥军区部队和华北军区独立第5旅分别组成第18、第21师，分别拨归第6、第7军建制。6月，组建第1、第2兵团，第1兵团司令员兼政治委员王震，政治部主任孙志远，下辖第1、第2、第7军；第2兵团司令员许光达，政治委员王世泰，副政治委员兼政治部主任徐立清，参谋长张文舟，下辖第2、第3、第6军。兵团组成后，军的领导人相应作了部分调整。郭鹏任第2军军长，王恩茂任政治委员；黄新廷任第3军军长，朱明任政治委员；张达志任第4军军长；罗贵波任第7军政治委员。全野战军共15．5万人。 中原野战军改称第二野战军，司令员刘伯承，政治委员邓小平，副政治委员兼政治部主任张际春，参谋长李达。下辖：军政大学，校长兼政治委员刘伯承；特种兵纵队，司令员兼政治委员李达，副司令员孔从周；第3兵团，司令员陈锡联，政治委员谢富治，副司令员王近山、杜义德，政治部主任阎红彦，后勤部部长刘清，辖第10军(由第2纵队改称)，军长杜义德(兼)，政治委员王维纲，辖第28、第29师；第11军(由第3纵队改称)，军长曾绍山，政治委员鲍先志，辖第31、第32、第33师；第12军(由第6纵队改称)，军长兼政治委员王近山(兼)，辖第34、第35、第36师。第4兵团，司令员兼政治委员陈赓，副司令员郭天民，副政治委员兼政治部主任刘志坚，后勤部部长赵炳润，后勤部政治委员杨世荣，辖第13军(由第4纵队第10、第13旅及豫西军区部队组成)，军长周希汉，政治委员刘有光，辖第37、第38、第39师；第14军(由第4纵队第11、第22旅及淮海战役起义之廖运周师组成)，军长李成芳，政治委员雷荣天，辖第40、第41、第42师；第15军(由第9纵队改称)，军长秦基伟，政治委员谷景生，辖第43、第44、第45师。第5兵团，司令员杨勇，政治委员苏振华，副政治委员张霖芝，政治部主任甘渭汉，后勤部部长吴机章，辖第16军(由第1纵队第1、第2旅及豫皖苏军区部队一部组成)，军长尹先炳，政治委员王辉球，辖第46、第47、第48师；第17军(由第11纵队及冀鲁豫军区独立第1、第3旅等部组成)，军长王秉璋，政治委员赵健民，辖第49、第50、第51师；第18军(由第1纵队第20旅及豫皖苏军区部队组成)，军长张国华，政治委员谭冠三，辖第52、第53、第54师。全野战军共28万余人。6月，将皖北军区独立师改称第30师，拨归第10军建制。 华东野战军改称第三野战军，司令员兼政冶委员陈毅，副司令员兼第二副政治委员粟裕，第一副政治委员谭震林，参谋长张震，政治部主任唐亮，政治部副主任钟期光。下辖：教导师；军政干部学校，副政治委员张崇文；特种兵纵队，司令员陈锐霆，政治委员张凯，副政治委员刘述周，参谋长叶超，政治部主任喻新华。第7兵团，司令员王建安，政治委员谭启龙，副政治委员兼政治部主任姬鹏飞，参谋长李希迎，辖第21军(由第2纵队改称)，军长滕海清，政治委员康志强，辖第6l、第62、第63师；第22军(由第3纵队改称)，军长孙继先，政治委员丁秋生，辖第64、第65、第66师；第23军(由第4纵队改称)，军长陶勇，政治委员卢胜，辖第67、第68、第69师；第35军(由济南战役起义的吴化文部和鲁中南纵队合编组成)，军长吴化文，政治委员何克希，辖第103、第104、第105师。第8兵团，司令员陈士榘，政治委员袁仲贤，副政治委员兼政治部主任江渭清，参谋长何以祥，辖第24军(由第6纵队改称)，军长王必成，政治委员廖海光，辖第70、第71、第72师；第25军(由第7纵队改称)，军长成钧，政治委员黄火星，辖第73、第74、第75师；第26军(由第8纵队改称)，军长张仁初，政治委员王一平，辖第76、第77、第78师；第34军(由淮海战役起义的何基沣部和江淮军区第34旅、独立旅合编组成)，军长何基沣，政治委员赵启民，辖第100、第101、第102师。第9兵团，司令员宋时轮，政治委员郭化若，参谋长覃健，政治部主任谢有法，辖第20军(由第1纵队改称)，军长刘飞，政治委员陈时夫，辖第58、第59、第60师；第27军(由第9纵队改称)，军长聂凤智，政治委员刘浩天，辖第79、第80、第81师；第30军(由第12纵队改称)，军长谢振华，政治委员李干辉，辖第88、第89、第90师；第33军(由淮海战役起义的张克侠部和渤海纵队合编组成)，军长张克侠，政治委员韩念龙，辖第97、第98、第99师。第10兵团，司令员叶飞，政治委员韦国清，参谋长陈庆先，政治部主任刘培善，辖第28军(由第10纵队改称)，军长朱绍清，政治委员陈美藻，辖第82、第83、第84师；第29军(由第11纵队改称)，军长胡炳云，政治委员张藩，辖第85、第86、第87师；第31军(由第13纵队改称)，军长周志坚，政治委员陈华堂，辖第91、第92、第93师。两广纵队番号不变，司令员曾生，政治委员雷经天。全野战军共58．1万人。 东北野战军改称第四野战军，司令员林彪，政治委员罗荣桓，参谋长刘亚楼，政治部主任谭政，副参谋长曹祥仁，政治部副主任陶铸。下辖：特种兵司令部(由炮兵司令部改编)，司令员萧华，政治委员钟赤兵，副司令员苏进、贾陶、匡裕民，副政治委员邱创成，参谋长苏进(兼)，政治部主任唐凯，辖炮兵第1、第2师，战车师，高射炮指挥所，工兵指挥所。第12兵团，司令员兼政治委员萧劲光，副司令员陈伯钧，副政治委员兼政治部主任唐天际，参谋长解方。第13兵团，司令员程子华，政治委员黄克诚，副司令员彭明治，参谋长黄志勇，政治部主任刘道生。第38军(由第1纵队改称)，军长李天佑，政治委员梁必业，辖第112、第113、第114、第151师；第39军(由第2纵队改称)，军长刘震，政治委员吴法宪，辖第115、第116、第117、第152师；第40军(由第3纵队改称)，军长韩先楚，政治委罗舜初，辖第118、第119、第120、第153师；第41军(由第4纵队改称)，军长吴克华，政治委员莫文骅，辖第121、第122、第123、第154师；第42军(由第5纵队改称)，军长万毅，政治委员刘兴元，辖第124、第125、第126、第155师；第43军(由第6纵队改称)，军长洪学智，政治委员赖传珠，辖第127、第128、第129、第156师；第44军(由第7纵队改称)，军长邓华，政治委员吴富善，辖第130、第131、第132、第157师；第45军(由第8纵队改称)，军长黄永胜，政治委员邱会作，辖第133、第134、第135、第158师；第46军(由第9纵队改称)，军长詹才芳，政治委员李中权，辖第136、第137、第138、第159师；第47军(由第10纵队改称)，军长梁兴初，政治委员周赤萍，辖第139、第140、第141、第160师；第48军(由第11纵队改称)，军长贺晋年，政治委员陈仁麒，辖第142、第143、第144、第161师；第49军(由第12纵队改称)，军长钟伟，政治委员袁升平，辖第145、第146、第147、第162师。野战军另辖骑兵第5师、第165师、整训第5师。全野战军共90万余人。 4月28日，中央军委命令，萧克任第四野战军参谋长，聂鹤亭任副参谋长，同时成立了第13、第14兵团部。并对第12、第13兵团及各军的领导人作了适当调整。其序列是：第12兵团，司令员兼政治委员萧劲光，第一副司令员陈伯钧、第二副司令员韩先楚，副政治委员兼政治部主任唐天际，参谋长解方，辖第40军，军长罗舜初，政治委员卓雄；第45军，军长陈伯钧(兼)，政治委员邱会作；第46军，领导人不变。第13兵团，司令员程子华，政治委员萧华，第一副司令员李天佑，第二副司令员兼参谋长彭明治，政治部主任刘道生，辖第38军，军长梁兴初，政治委员梁必业；第47军，军长曹里怀，政治委员周赤萍；第49军，军长钟伟，政治委员徐斌洲。第14兵团，司令员刘亚楼，政治委员莫文骅，第一副司令员黄永胜，第二副司令员刘震，副政治委员兼政治部主任吴法宪，辖第39军，军长刘震(兼)，政治委员吴信泉；第41军，军长吴克华，政治委员欧阳文；第42军，军长吴瑞林，政治委员刘兴元。第15兵团，司令员邓华，政治委员赖传珠，第一副司令员兼参谋长洪学智，第二副司令员贺晋年，政治部主任萧向荣，辖第43军，军长李作鹏，政治委员张池明；第44军，军长方强，政治委员吴富善；第48军，领导人不变；两广纵队(由第三野战军拨归)，司令员曾生，政治委员雷经天，辖第1、第2师。特种兵司令部由万毅任司令员，其余领导人不变。 华北军区第1、第2、第3兵团分别改称第18、第19、第20兵团。第18兵团司令员兼政治委员徐向前，副司令员兼副政治委员周士第，参谋长陈漫远，政治部主任胡耀邦，辖俘训第1、第2旅；第60军(由第1兵团第8纵队改称)，军长兼政治委员王新亭，辖第178、第179、第180师；第61军(由第13纵队改称)，军长韦杰，政治委员徐子荣，辖第181、第182、第183师；第62军(由第15纵队改称)，军长刘忠，政治委员袁子钦，辖第184、第185、第186师。第19兵团，司令员杨得志，政治委员罗瑞卿，副司令员葛晏春，参谋长耿飚，政治部主任潘自力，辖俘训第1、第2旅；第63军(由第3纵队改称)，军长郑维山，政治委员王宗槐，辖第187、第188、第189师；第64军(由第4纵队改称)，军长曾思玉，政治委员王昭，辖第190、第191、第192师；第65军(由第2兵团第8纵队改称)，军长邱尉，政治委员王道邦，辖第193、第194、第195师。第20兵团，司令员杨成武，政治委员李井泉，副司令员兼参谋长唐延杰，副政治委员李天焕，政治部主任李志民，辖俘训旅；第66军(由第l纵队改称)，军长萧新槐，政治委员王紫峰，辖第196、第198师；第67军(由第2纵队改称)，军长韩伟，政治委员旷伏兆，辖第199、第200师；第68军(由第6纵队改称)，军长文年生，政治委员向仲华，辖第202、第203、第204师。3个兵团共23．8万余人。5月3日中央军委决定周士第接替徐向前任第18兵团司令员兼政治委员，王新亭任副司令员兼副政治委员，张祖谅任第60军军长。6月初，李志民接替罗瑞卿任第19兵团政治委员。 此外，中央军委将第四野战军铁道纵队拨归军委直辖，并改称铁道兵团，司令员滕代远，副司令员吕正操，副政委兼政治部主任何伟，参谋长李寿轩，下辖第1、第2、第3、第4支队。 1949年2月，陕甘宁晋绥联防军区改称西北军区，司令员贺龙，政治委员习仲勋，副司令员王维舟，参谋长张经武，政治部主任李卓然，后勤部部长陈希云，后勤部政治委员刘海滨。下辖：陇东、黄龙、西府、绥德、关中、三边、延属、榆林等军分区；晋绥军区，司令员贺龙(兼)，政治委员李井泉(兼)，辖五寨、离石、雁北、雁南等军分区。 中原军区，司令员刘伯承，政治委员邓小平，第一副司令员陈毅，第二副司令员李先念，第一副政治委员邓子恢，第二副政治委员兼政治部主任张际春，参谋长李达。下辖：第58军(由桐柏军区部队编成)军长孔庆德，政治委员方正平，辖第172、第173、第174师；鄂豫军区，司令员王树声，辖独立师(由独立第1、第3旅合编组成)，第l、第2、第3、第4、第5军分区；桐柏军区，司令员王宏坤，辖第1、第2、第3、第4军分区；江汉军区，司令员张才千，政治委员刘建勋，辖独立第1、第2旅，第1、第2、第3、第4军分区；陕南军区，司令员刘金轩，政治委员汪锋，辖第12旅、第17师，第2、第4军分区(5月，陕南军区划归西北军区建制，第12旅、第17师组成第19军，改称第55、第57师，归第一野战军指挥)；河南军区(3月由豫西军区及豫皖苏军区一部合并组成)，司令员陈再道，政治委员李雪峰，辖南阳、确山、许昌、潢川、淮阳、陈留、商丘、郑州、洛阳、陕州等军分区。 华东军区，司令员陈毅，政治委员饶漱石，副司令员张云逸，政治部主任舒同，副参谋长周骏鸣，政治部副主任唐亮。下辖：华东军政大学，校长张云逸(兼)，副校长余立金、刘清明；警备旅；后备兵团，司令员林维先，副司令员戴心宽、王彬，副政治委员龙潜，参谋长李学勤，政治部主任汪少川，辖第1、第2、第3、第4师。山东军区，司令员张云逸(兼)，政治委员康生，第一副司令员许世友、第二副司令员兼参谋长袁也烈，第一副政治委员傅秋涛，第二副政治委员向明，政治部主任王集成，辖第32军(由胶东军区部队组成)，军长谭希林，政治委员彭林，辖第94、第95师；昌潍特区，司令员刘德胜，政治委员王众音；济南警备区，司令员廖谷标，政治委员刘顺元；徐州警备区，司令员张光中，政治委员张北华； 胶东军区，司令员贾若瑜，政治委员赖可可，辖警备第4、第5旅，东海、西海、北海、南海、滨北等军分区；渤海军区，司令员覃士冕，政治委员张晔，辖沧南、泺北、清河、垦利等军分区；鲁中南军区，司令员钱钧，政治委员高克亭，辖泰山、沂蒙、沂山、尼山、台枣、滨海、泰西等军分区。苏北军区，司令员张震东，政治委员肖望东，辖警备第9旅，泰州、扬州、南通、盐城、淮阴等军分区。苏南军区，司令员管文蔚，政治委员陈丕显，辖警备第6、第7、第8旅。皖北军区，司令员兼政治委员曾希圣，辖警备第1、第2旅，滁县、宿县、巢湖、安庆、六安、阜阳等军分区。 东北军区，司令员兼政治委员林彪，第一副司令员兼副政治委员高岗，副司令员吕正操、周保中、萧劲光，第一副政治委员罗荣桓，副政治委员陈云、李富春，参谋长刘亚楼、伍修权、陈奇涵，政治部主任谭政，政治部副主任周桓。下辖：军政大学，副校长倪志亮，副政治委员吴溉之；航空学校，校长刘亚楼(兼)，政治委员吴溉之(兼)；工兵学校，校长冯志湘，政治委员李雪炎；朱瑞炮校，校长贾陶；第50军(由辽沈战役起义的曾泽生部改编)，军长曾泽生，政治委员徐文烈，辖第148、第149、第150、第167师；辽宁军区，司令员边章伍，政治委员张秀山；辽北军区，司令员彭嘉庆，政治委员郭峰；安东军区，司令员程世才，政治委员江华；热河军区，副司令员舒行；锦州军区，副司令员朱军；内蒙古军区，司令员兼政治委员云泽(乌兰夫)，辖骑兵第1、第2、第10、第11、第16师；合江、吉林、嫩江、龙江等军事部；第163、第164、第165、第166师；整训第1、第2、第3、第4、第5、第6师；警卫师。 华北军区，司令员聂荣臻，政治委员薄一波，副司令员徐向前、滕代远、萧克，参谋长赵尔陆(4月，萧克、赵尔陆调离华北军区到第四野战军工作，由唐延杰接任参谋长)，政治部主任罗瑞卿，副参谋长王世英，政治部副主任蔡树藩。下辖：军政大学，校长兼政治委员叶剑英，副校长萧克，副政治委员朱良才；炮兵第3、第4师；补训兵团，司令员兼政治委员曾涌泉，副司令员兼参谋长叶楚平，辖第1、第2、第3、第4、第5、第6、第7、第8、第9旅；第69军(由第7纵队改称)军长周彪，政治委员漆远渥，辖第205、第206、第207师；第70军(由第14纵队改称)，政治委员甘渭汉，辖第209、第210师；晋中军区，司令员兼政治委员罗贵波，辖独立第4、第5、第6旅，五台、交城、太谷等军分区； 冀中军区，司令员孙毅，政治委员林铁，辖俘训旅，津南、保定、平南等军分区； 冀东军区，司令员潘峰，政治委员吴德，辖第12军分区； 冀南军区，司令员王光华，政治委员马国瑞，辖临清、夏津、邯郸、南宫、衡水等军分区； 太行军区，副司令员赵辉楼，副政治委员冷楚，辖独立第7旅，邢台、左权、长治、焦作、漳卫、武安等军分区； 冀鲁豫军区，司令员赵健民，政治委员潘复生，辖独立第2旅，临河、湖西、豫北、鲁西南、运东、运西、直南、濮范等军分区； 太岳军区，司令员曹普，政治委员顾大川，辖岳南、王屋等军分区； 察哈尔军区，司令员王平，政治委员杨耕田，辖俘训旅，雁北、平西、建平、易水、察南、察北、冀察等军分区。 在整编中，全军统一了编制，调整了武器装备，充实了各级领导干部，补充了大量兵员，全军总兵力达400万人，使人民解放军的正规化建设向前迈进了一大步，为向全国进军做好了组织上的准备，创造了有利条件。 活动于南方各省几支较大的游击武装也遵照中央军委的命令，于1949年1月先后进行了整编，组成中国人民解放军游击纵队，即：琼崖纵队，司令员兼政治委员冯白驹，下辖第1、第3、第5总队和独立总队；粤赣湘边纵队