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Chapter 10 Chapter 10 The first exchange of fire with the Tibetan army, our army suffered heavy losses

Know the enemy and know yourself, and you will never be imperiled in a hundred battles. After the advance detachment of the 18th Army had a comprehensive understanding of the enemy, they came to the conclusion that in addition to the Tibetan local army, they had to face another kind of enemy, which was the natural environment of Tibet.It is more terrifying than the Tibetan local army. Our planned war zone is the alpine and canyon area in eastern Tibet.The average altitude here is about 4000 meters, and the landform is extremely complex and changeable.There are not only continuous high mountains, but also high-altitude but gentle grasslands. No matter how different the landforms are, they are all the same high cold and hypoxic.On the high mountains of more than 5,000 meters, there is usually no grass growing or snow all the year round, but in some canyon areas, you can see stretches of virgin forests and clusters of blooming rhododendrons.Due to the complex terrain, the climate in eastern Tibet is also changeable. It was sunny and sunny at first, and the sky was clear, but in a blink of an eye, there was a sudden gust of wind, the sky was dark, and the wind and snow were mixed.At night, the water dripped into ice on the top of the mountain, and during the day, it was sweating profusely under the sun in the valley.

From the perspective of pure sightseeing, the scenery of eastern Tibet is very beautiful.This is one of the few "Xanadu" in the world.But when you walk through here at the cost of your life, you will find its cruelty.It forges you with cruelty, so that you have a spine that will never bend. The rivers in eastern Tibet wind around the valleys at the foot of the mountains, like beautiful little snakes, which will bite you suddenly.These seemingly beautiful rivers are all in the Grand Canyon. They are wide at the top and narrow at the bottom, and the water above is calm;The Jinsha River is known as "goose feathers do not float, and weights do not sink", which vividly represents the characteristics of rivers in eastern Tibet.

In high mountains, hypoxia is extremely prone to occur.At that time, the term "hypoxia" did not exist, but many people experienced physical abnormalities when they climbed the mountain.To this day, speaking of these, they still haunt the old revolutionaries like ghosts: headache, difficulty breathing, dry throat, vomiting, proteinuria, edema, hair loss, sunken nails, shock, rapid heartbeat, heart failure, myocardial infarction Infarction, epistaxis, cerebral hemorrhage, altitude coma, pulmonary edema, snow blindness...the list goes on and on. As long as you rush forward bravely, you can defeat the invisible enemy of the Tibetan local army.

However, the harsh natural environment and the resulting altitude sickness are invisible.It trails behind everyone and will kill you at any time.It creates an atmosphere of horror that tenses your nerves all the time.To overcome it, you must first overcome yourself and make your spirit strong.And make your body function gradually adapt to it, and finally you can overcome it. In the battle of Qamdo, there was a team - the transport army.They are an important part of the combat troops.This is a huge and strange team.This team is mainly composed of government cadres, cultural workers, and some Tibetan compatriots, both male and female.They drove mules, horses, yaks, and carried ammunition and supplies. Some were directly incorporated into various troops, and some acted independently. From different directions, they pointed to the same target-Qamdo.Among them, the transportation team composed of 30 lesbians from the 52nd Kangzang Task Force was particularly eye-catching. Their average age was 17 or 18 years old, and the youngest was only 13 years old.The hardships experienced by this army are no less than that of combat troops.Many of them were a little apprehensive when they saw mules, horses and yaks in the past, but now they are suddenly asked to take care of several mules, horses or yaks. It is not easy for them to escape.Hearing that the troops were starving in front, they were anxious and sad, and rushed forward desperately.The yak, known as the "boat of the plateau", was also exhausted later.In some yak teams, 20% of the yaks died of exhaustion.Some lesbians burst into tears looking at the fallen yak.Dead yaks cannot be thrown away either. They cut off the good meat and put it on the back of other yaks.The mule and horse transport team led by Wang Yongkui, the head of the division's supply department, exhausted seven mules and horses on the Damara Mountain. He insisted on organizing everyone to carry the grain carried by the seven mules and horses to Qamdo step by step.Facts have proved that without this team, there would be no victory in this battle.

On the way from Sichuan to Tibet, passing through Zheduo Mountains, you can see herds of black yaks mixed with other colors everywhere.It is also they who have made great contributions to the transportation line of our march into Tibet, liberation of Qamdo, and construction of roads. One day in May 1950, Commander Wu Zhong, who led the detachment to Ganzi, called the three comrades Hao Xueli, Li Chengcai, and Li Xingcai from the supply department of the division, and explained to them face to face: "We marched into Tibet. Supply is more important than fighting.' If the pro-imperialist elements in the Tibetan local government refuse to accept the central government's decision to liberate Tibet peacefully and force us to fight a battle in Qamdo, the urgency of transporting supplies will be great. Under the conditions of inconvenient transportation on the Kham-Tibet Plateau, the most important thing to solve the supply problem is to use the yak as a means of transportation. Now I am sending you three comrades to Shiqu County to purchase five or six thousand yaks. This task is very difficult. But it must be completed! As long as you implement the party’s ethnic policy and the three major disciplines and eight points of attention, and ensure that the business is fair, you will be able to complete it.”

On June 9, Comrade Hao Xueli and three people set off from Ganzi to Shiqu County.When they crossed Haizi Mountain at an altitude of 5,000 meters, it was snowing heavily, and there were four or five inches of snow and ice on the road.For the urgent need of the army to enter Tibet, the three of them are not afraid of difficulties and have to drive more than 50 kilometers every day.Although they had horses, they were reluctant to ride them. They walked for a while and rode for a while, and arrived at the seat of Shiqu County Government 2 days in advance. Arrived at Shiqu, learned some things after preliminary investigation.The county covers an area of ​​more than 14,000 square kilometers, with an average altitude of over 4,000 meters. There are five districts, 25 tribes, more than 24,500 people and 240,000 yaks.We have to purchase 6,000 yaks at once, accounting for 25% of all their yaks, which is also a rather large number.

In order to clarify the purpose of coming to the Tibetan people in Shiqu and dispel everyone's suspicion, on June 29, a meeting of the tribal leaders of the whole county was held.To their surprise, the heads of the five districts and 25 tribes all arrived at the meeting on time.They took advantage of this meeting to say: "We marched into Tibet under the orders of the Central People's Government and Chairman Mao to complete the great cause of reunification of the motherland. The three of us came to ask the Tibetan people in Shiqu to sell yaks to the PLA to support transportation. What we bought All yaks will be paid according to the price. I hope to get the great assistance and support from the leaders of the tribes." During the meeting, the three of them also called on the leaders of each tribe separately and had a cordial and enthusiastic conversation.He also gave rice, biscuits and canned food that he was reluctant to eat to the leaders who attended the meeting, and even ate and lived with the leaders, and influenced the leaders with his exemplary actions of observing policy and discipline.The chieftains saw with their own eyes that they paid Dayang at the price for the cattle, sheep and firewood they sent.When they consulted the leaders from all over the place, everyone thought that the price they gave was the best price.Gongjue Dunzhu of Shangshiqu and Banbao of Xiashiqu respectively represented the leaders of their areas, and expressed their determination to support the army to liberate Tibet enthusiastically. The number was sold to the People's Liberation Army.This meeting made a good start for completing the task of purchasing yaks.

After the meeting, the leaders from all over the place immediately went back to convey the task to the various tribes, and then carefully selected the yaks and sold them to the People's Liberation Army.Hao Xueli and the other three went to the ranch separately to visit the masses and inspect the yaks.They run hundreds of miles every day, one by one tribe, one by one pasture to fulfill the tasks.Knowing that the People's Liberation Army needs to buy cattle and that the sale is fair, the Tibetan people happily brought the best yaks to the People's Liberation Army for selection.The Tibetan people in various pastures sent dozens, hundreds to thousands of yaks to the seat of the clan government from all directions.Although it rained and snowed for two days in the middle, the Gezepingma and Gezegongma tribes in the northern area still brought the yaks from the 11th horse station.Just as Gongjue Dundup, the head of the Northern District, said: "No matter how bad the weather is, it can't delay the army's entry into Tibet!"

Comrade Hao Xueli, after more than two months of patient work and hard life, not only overfulfilled the arduous task of purchasing 6,000 yaks, but also purchased more than 2,000 catties of ghee and 6,000 catties of salt. At the same time, the Datouren from Xiage Daodeng in Yulong sold us 5,000 yaks, and the headman from Zhuqing sold us another 1,500 yaks.In order to facilitate our transportation, we also sold a full set of saddlery for 200 yaks.In addition, Dege chieftain Jiangyangbomu, the heads of Ganzi and Baiyu sects also sold yaks to us one after another.In this way, there are more than 14,400 yaks, which can fully undertake the arduous transportation task of marching into Tibet and liberating Qamdo.

Among the 14,400 yaks, 5,100 were assigned to Deng Ke to follow the North Road troops to Qamdo, and the remaining 9,300 yaks were organized into five transport armies to go straight to Qamdo from the Middle Road to ensure the supply of the troops. The personnel who participated in the yak driving were all temporarily transferred from various units.There are cadres, soldiers, orderly personnel, and dozens of female comrades from the whole division, and even young comrades aged 13 or 14 have joined the ranks.At the beginning, the minds of the staff were very confused. Some soldiers from the company thought that driving yaks was inferior and lowered their status, and they were very annoyed.In response to the ideological reflections of comrades, the leaders used Chairman Mao’s instructions on marching into Tibet that “politics is more important than military affairs, and supplies are more important than combat” to make it clear to everyone: driving yaks is not an easy job, but a matter of hundreds of people. Tens of thousands of catties of food, a large amount of ammunition and supplies are transported to the front. This task is as important and honorable as the combat troops.In addition to clarifying the importance of driving yaks to improve everyone's ideological understanding and enthusiasm, there are also special conditions for meritorious service in driving yaks: no running, no throwing, no dead yaks; no violation of policies and disciplines; no complaints, no impatience, and obedience to orders Listen to command; solidarity and mutual assistance, care for public property, etc.This quickly unifies everyone's thinking.

The transportation started, and everyone subcontracted the task of driving dozens of yaks. Even the lesbians in the logistics and art teams were divided into 20 yaks each; even the three youngest art workers, Liu Qin, Li Zhaolin, and Peng Liangtian Driven 20 yaks.Shi Quhan's yaks were not used to this new environment and their owner, and felt strange, staring at everyone with two big eyes like copper bells.Some lesbians are timid, and their hearts are pounding when they drive so many yaks.Fortunately, the local Tibetan people saw our difficulties, and some took the initiative to send people to help.For example, Xia Gedaodeng of Yulong took the initiative to select 16 strong and strong yak drivers to help the team directly under the division drive yaks. Comrades in the People's Liberation Army can rest assured that as long as we are here, there will be oceans and tea, and we promise to transport them to Qamdo and hand them over to the People's Liberation Army." The transportation team set off from Yulong, Zhuqing and other places respectively.The comrades who drove the yaks were very enthusiastic and interested at first, and always wanted to hurry up the yaks. Who knew that the first day did not go far, and the yaks ran all over the mountains and plains, and more than 200 yaks from the art team also ran away at once. .Moreover, the yaks from various units and even the soldiers and civilians were mixed together, which really stumped these warriors who were accustomed to killing the enemy on the battlefield, and some lesbians were so anxious that they wanted to cry.But when I think about it, it's useless even if I cry to the sky!The only way is to find a leader.Various units have studied the situation together, and almost all have similar phenomena.How to do it?The conclusion is: learn from Tibetan compatriots and invite Tibetan people to be teachers.The Tibetan compatriots in Yulong and Zhuqing also saw the problem of our comrades driving yaks, so they patiently told us: "When driving yaks, don't be impatient, don't fight, and don't be frightened. You must slowly drive yaks from behind and on both sides. When you encounter a place with good water and grass, you must rest so that the cattle can eat good grass and drink enough water; when you rest, you must unload the burden so that the cattle can rest." He also taught everyone how to tie and herd cattle. .The method taught by the Tibetan teacher is very effective, and the yaks will gradually listen to the greetings of all teams.Everyone's confidence in driving the cattle was strengthened again, and they walked quickly. Men, women and children drove tens of thousands of yaks, climbed snow-capped mountains, crossed glaciers, drilled forests, and walked on the long plateau road every day.As time went on, life became more and more difficult, and there were more and more troublesome things.The backs of the yaks were broken, and the horns of some oxen’s hooves were worn off, and some silver dollar boxes were smashed, some rice bags were scratched, and some brick tea bags were worn out.Everyone had to check carefully as they walked. If the rice bag was broken, it would be repaired in time, and if the silver dollar box was rotten, it should be fastened;When crossing the Daniangjiao River, yaks jostled and dropped two boxes of silver dollars into the river. Tibetan Sheng Genhua went down to look for them in the icy cold water. Good pack to catch up with the brigade. The commanders and fighters who drive the yaks are all out of a sense of responsibility, take good care of the yaks and supplies seriously and responsibly, and regard the yaks as their silent comrades-in-arms and loyal partners.After crossing the Jinsha River, they even lost a cow. Du Yuanmin, the cook of the third company, regardless of hunger and fatigue, crossed the glacier six times back and forth in the dark night, and ran for 15 kilometers. Finally, he found the lost cow and returned it. Come back with two boxes of shells (after arriving in Qamdo, the regiment gave him meritorious service).In order to reduce the loss of the yaks, the comrades of the three-company and five-squads used their own money to buy grass for the cattle; the back of the yak was broken. In addition to scrubbing with wet water, they also carried part of the supplies by themselves, and carried them for more than 10 days. .In order to reduce the load of the yak, everyone carried their own things on their backs.Liu Qin and the other three team members were tired after driving yaks for a day with nearly 20 kilograms of luggage on their backs. When they arrived at the campsite, they wanted to lie down and have a good rest. Regardless of fatigue, he yelled at the yak, stepped on the ice and snow, waded across the glacier and released it on the mountain. Not long after the victory in the battle to liberate Qamdo was over, the food carried by the troops was almost exhausted.The food per person per day was reduced from one jin to four liang to one jin, ten liang, and half a jin, and in the end even four liang could not be guaranteed.At this critical moment, all comrades in the division are eagerly looking forward to the arrival of the yak transport team.Comrades who drove the yaks were anxious about what was ahead of them. They drove the yaks faster and finally arrived in Qamdo in mid-November. They sent rice, food substitute powder, canned food, tea, silver dollars and various supplies to the troops. The yak transportation brigade not only brought food and material food to the troops, but also a large number of books, newspapers and periodicals, office utensils, basketball volleyballs, red and green paper, various paints and other materials; There are 150 sets of colored hanging portraits of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief Zhu, as well as announcements from the Southwest Military and Political Committee and the Southwest Military Region Command to the Tibetan people. Among the gifts sent by the yak to the commanders and fighters of the division, there are also letters from home, love letters from lovers, and good news from relatives and friends from distant hometowns. "The beacon fire lasts for three months, and the letters from home are worth ten thousand gold." After the Battle of Qamdo, and stationed on the remote Kham-Tibet Plateau, the letters from home, relatives and friends feel more cordial.These letters have brought great comfort and warmth to every cadre and soldier.The company also seized this opportunity to carry out ideological and political work to the troops, which received very good results. In order to ensure the supply of food and fodder during our division's garrison in Qamdo and the transportation and supplies to support the peaceful liberation of Tibet, our division sent four procurement stations and set up 17 military depots in the Qamdo area.Immediately afterwards, the rear headquarters of our Eighteenth Army set up four offices in Yulong, Dengke, Qamdo, and Dingqing respectively, with several military depots under their jurisdiction to organize the transportation of yaks on the middle and north roads. In April 1951, Qamdo established a support and transportation association mainly composed of upper-class Tibetan patriots, and each sect also established a support and transportation branch to organize tens of thousands of yaks to undertake support and transportation.Chayazong’s Support Transportation Committee accepted the task of transporting 250,000 packs from Tuoba to Qamdo on April 12, 1951; Give the troops 1,100 yaks and 2,000 sheep, and carry more than 1,000 supplies to Chaya.With the great assistance of upper-level Tibetan patriots and people in Kangbei and Qamdo areas, we purchased 6,044 yaks and 8,400 sheep in each sect in Qamdo during the nine months from the beginning of November 1950 to the beginning of August 1951. Many.In addition, we purchased more than 30,000 yaks during the difficult years of marching into Lhasa. The Tibetans used yaks to support our transportation during our march and garrison to exceed the above number by several times.It is understood that in the nearly five years before the opening of the Kham-Tibet and Qinghai-Tibet highways to Lhasa on December 25, 1954, only eight counties in northern Kangbei, including Shiqu, Dengke, Yulong, Dege, Baiyu, and Ganzi, were dispatched successively. There were more than 200,000 yak trips. From 1951 to the end of 1954, 500,000 to 600,000 loads of yaks were used to support the transportation in Changdu area.These yaks not only silently brought a large amount of supplies to the troops, but also pioneered our march in the ice and snow.When our commanders and fighters in Tibet mentioned yaks, they couldn't help but praise: "The yaks on the Kangzang Plateau have contributed everything to us, and they have contributed the most!" However, mastering the situation in the war zone west of the Jinsha River is also an important aspect of "knowing the enemy", and its difficulty is too much to understand the situation of the Tibetan army.In the process of marching to the Ganzi area, we have experienced the characteristics of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.Our planned theater of operations belongs to the alpine and canyon regions of eastern Tibet. What tactics should be adopted to fight against the special opponent of the Tibetan army under the special terrain conditions of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau?This is a big problem that needs serious research to solve.To this end, we trained cadres at the battalion, company, and platoon levels in batches.Many cadres, influenced by their past combat experience with the Kuomintang army, focused on how to break through the opponent's strong fortifications, and raised many specific questions in this regard.For example, some comrades pointed out: There are many lama temples in the war zone, and the walls of some temples are as thick as one meter. A temple is like a large blockhouse group. If the Tibetan army defends the temple and resists, our army must abide by the religious policy, and neither can fire nor use it. Explosives are difficult to be effective with infantry firearms alone, so what should we do?Raising such questions shows that some cadres lack a deep understanding of the Tibetan army and the characteristics of this operation. The military department believes that in this battle, our army has comprehensive advantages in terms of strength, equipment, command, and technology; while the biggest advantage of the Tibetan army is its familiarity with the terrain, its ability to adapt to the natural environment, and its large number of mules and horses. Under normal circumstances, the maneuvering speed is faster than our army, and the individual combat effectiveness is stronger.The key to fighting such an opponent is to be able to catch him and not let him escape.No matter where he persists, we all wish for it, and there are many ways to eliminate him.If we let him run away or break up, we will be forced to fight him in a deeper depth, or disperse the search and suppression. Not only will we have to pay a higher price, but it will also be difficult to complete the task of liberating the whole of Tibet within the time limit set by the central government. Therefore, as far as the purpose of the campaign is concerned, we should gather and annihilate the main force of the Tibetan army in the Qamdo area; for each battle, we should strive to annihilate them all on the spot.Commanders at all levels must take how to capture the Tibetan army as the primary issue in organizing and commanding battles.In short, we are afraid that we will not be able to grasp it, not that we will not be able to annihilate it; as long as we can grasp it, we will definitely be able to annihilate it.These opinions are accepted by all.The tactical thinking was unified, and then serious research was carried out around the core issue of how to seize the Tibetan army.Everyone put forward many good opinions, which greatly improved the confidence of victory. In order to find out the deployment of the Tibetan army along the Jinsha River, the terrain, roads, etc., after the 2nd Battalion of the 154th Regiment was stationed in Dengke, it sent reconnaissance teams across the river many times for reconnaissance.Every time I go back and forth for three to five days, and go deep into dozens of kilometers, I only meet a few people.The masses have already heard about the situation of our army in Jiangdong, and warmly welcome the army to cross the river as soon as possible, and have reported many situations. On June 22, the head of the 154th regiment sent another reconnaissance platoon across the river to reconnaissance along the road leading to Qamdo.At about 10 o'clock, at a distance of about 20 kilometers from the river, they encountered hundreds of Tibetan troops.The other party was unloading, resting and eating. Countless mules, horses and yaks were scattered all over the mountains and plains, and they seemed unsuspecting.As soon as they found our army, they panicked and withdrew hurriedly.In the chaos, more than a dozen pack horses and dozens of yaks ran towards us and were captured by me.But when they saw that the number of our troops was limited, they rectified their ranks, relying on the strength of their numbers, mounted their horses and shouted to charge towards the reconnaissance platoon. The reconnaissance platoon was led that day by a trainee reconnaissance staff officer. He could have calmly commanded the detachment to disengage and retreat back to Jiangdong when the opponent was in chaos. Take alternate cover tactics and retreat in an orderly manner; at the same time, you can send people to ride the captured horses and rush back to Deng Ke to report.If this is the case, then in this battle, since the opponent launched the first attack and I was forced to defend myself, politically I have a reasonable advantage; militaryly, although I have fewer enemies and more enemies, I can still return with the whole army after inflicting certain damage on the opponent.But it is a pity that the staff officer made a series of mistakes due to inexperience and misjudgment: he sent two soldiers to drive the captured yaks and pack horses to Deng Ke; he ordered two squads to occupy the nearby highland on the left as the Keep alert while another squad moves on to find out the situation. As a result, the forward squadron was dispersed by the overwhelmingly superior Tibetan army, and the other two squadrons could not withstand the tide-like impact of the opponent, so they had to fight and retreat to the river.The two soldiers who were responsible for the evacuation and reporting tasks did not play the role of reporting because the yaks moved slowly.When Deng Ke heard the gunshots, Yang Jun, the political commissar of the regiment, hurriedly led two companies across the river to respond, but the Tibetan army had already occupied favorable terrain, and the attack failed, and the two sides formed a confrontation.In this battle, both sides suffered casualties. Our side, including the reinforcements, sacrificed, 25 people were missing, and 26 people were injured. This is the first time we have fought against the Tibetan army, and it is also the only battle our army has fought with the Tibetan army in the five months from entering the Ganzi area to the launch of the Qamdo campaign; at the same time, it is the whole process of our marching to Tibet Among them, the battle with the largest casualties.The end of the fight is sad.The failure of this battle, of course, has its own problems with the reconnaissance platoon, and there are some accidental factors.But the main problem comes from the leadership, and the lessons should be summed up mainly from the leadership.The first is to send armed squads to the west of the Jinsha River controlled by the Tibetan army for reconnaissance. Crossing the river for reconnaissance, but underestimated the possible situation, and lacked a plan to deal with various situations. I agreed to send a small team across the river for reconnaissance. This was a mistake in my decision-making.At that time, I focused on considering issues from a military perspective. After the battle situation was reported to the military headquarters on June 22, the military chief believed that our cross-river reconnaissance practice was not conducive to winning over the Tibetan authorities, criticized us, and ordered the cross-river detachment to withdraw to Jiangdong.It was later learned that the Tibetan army that exchanged fire with me was the third-generation headquarters, with about 400 people.This generation is the only generation of 1,000 Tibetan troops deployed in the Qamdo area, and its combat effectiveness is also the strongest. The chief official of the third generation, Muxia Ciwang Rigzeng, is a representative figure of the "Main War faction".It is said that he once patted his chest to the Tibetan authorities: he will not return to Lhasa unless the "Han army" is driven away.Mou Xia was not in the army during the battle that day, and Ruben was in charge of commanding, and he was killed by me during the battle. These Tibetan local government troops originally planned to come to Dengke to set up defenses. After this battle, they were afraid of being too isolated and wiped out, so they quickly withdrew to the Guodui and Shengda areas 60 to 70 kilometers away from Dengke.In this battle, the Tibetan army took the initiative to attack me, which not only exposed their stubbornness in their determination to confront the central government by force, but forced us to take it seriously in the military; I have a more specific understanding of the quality and tactics of the army.This Tibetan army attacked my infantry reconnaissance platoon with hundreds of people on horseback. Although the reconnaissance platoon was improperly commanded, it still did not win a complete victory, and it also suffered a lot of casualties. It can be seen that Tibet The combat effectiveness of the local government forces is indeed not strong. While the division's advance detachment was intensively preparing to enter Tibet, the main force of the division stationed in the Meishan area of ​​western Sichuan, according to the unified deployment of the Southwest Military Region, used its main force to fight against bandits in Meishan, Pengshan, Pujiang, Hongya, and Danling areas. .After Comrade Liu Zhenguo was transferred to work in the military department, the superiors did not appoint a new political commissar in time, and the deputy political commissar of Yinfa Tang presided over the daily work of the rear troops as the deputy secretary of the division party committee.By July of that year, the whole division had wiped out more than 9,800 bandits, and successfully completed the task of suppressing bandits assigned by the superior.While carrying out the task of suppressing bandits, the division also dispatched some cadres and soldiers to assist the local government in its work, mobilized the masses to clean up bandits and fight hegemony, reduce rent and return mortgages, which not only strengthened the construction of local political power, established a revolutionary order, and created favorable conditions for the land reform movement. conditions, and at the same time completely removed the obstacles for me to march into Tibet, so that our army has a stable rear.After completing the task of suppressing bandits, the main force of the division immediately turned to preparations for entering Tibet. On July 20, the division held a mobilization meeting for cadres above the company level. Comrade Yinfa Tang made a summary of the work in the first half of the year, and put forward requirements for further preparations for entering Tibet; Comrade Chen Zizhi, the deputy division commander, made a "firm will to enter the Kangzang Plateau" " mobilization report.The army was in full swing, and the preparations were done with both momentum and solidity.In particular, the scenes of officers and soldiers braving the scorching heat of summer for military training are extremely touching.In order to enhance their ability to march with heavy loads on the plateau, many soldiers secretly tied sandbags on their calves, punched a few bricks into their backpacks, and sweated a lot every day. Although the advance detachment and the main force of the division were separated by Guanshan, they have always maintained close contact.In addition to reporting the situation of the advance detachment in the front to the military headquarters and the Southwest Military Region, it was transmitted to the rear through radio waves in time.Sometimes I can also use the radio to talk directly to the comrades in the rear.The comrades in the rear rejoice for every victory we have achieved, and worry about the difficulties and setbacks we encounter.When it was heard that we were short of food due to transportation difficulties, many comrades in the rear also felt restless, as if they were starving themselves.Comrades in the rear often educate the troops with the exemplary deeds of the advance detachment.We also continued to publicize the achievements of the rear troops in suppressing bandits, mobilizing the masses, and training troops in the advance detachment, so that the front and rear naturally launched revolutionary competition activities, which effectively promoted the preparation of the whole division to enter Tibet. . On August 28, the main force of the division held a grand swearing-in meeting for marching into Tibet in Meishan.Political commissars Zhang Guohua and Tan Guansan attended the meeting to inspect the troops and gave exciting speeches.In the next few days, led by Chen Zizhi, Yin Fatang and other comrades, with the warm welcome of the local people, the troops marched westward in batches along the newly completed Ya'an-Ganzi highway by car. In mid-September, they arrived in the Ganzi area successively and joined forces with the advance detachment.At this time, the troops were high-spirited, and everyone was gearing up and eager to try. Southwest Military Region and army chiefs seek opinions on organizing the Qamdo Campaign.The campaign thinking of the leaders at the two levels is very clear: this campaign is a military-political battle, or it can also be called a political-military battle, and its purpose is to create conditions for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.Therefore, we must not fight indifferently, and if we don’t fight, we will stop. If we fight, we must hurt him, we must fight a war of annihilation, and we must completely break the illusion of the Tibetan authorities through this battle.On July 8 and July 18, our army successively reported its analysis and judgment on the current situation of the Tibetan army and suggestions on the use of troops.Our Ministry believes that after our army crosses the river in a large scale, the Qamdo Tibetan Army may resist with danger, but it is more likely to withdraw the main force westward to Lhasa.Its westward withdrawal roads mainly include north, middle and south roads: the north road passes through Enda, Dingqing, Suozong, Heihe (Naqu), and turns south to Lhasa; the middle road passes through Enda, Luolong, Bianba, Jiali and Taizhao go to Lhasa; the south road goes south to Bangda, and turns west to Lhasa via Basu. Comparing the three passages, although the terrain of the North Road is high, slow and grassy, ​​it is convenient for large troops, especially the cavalry; A very long section lies between the north-south Hengduan Mountains. The mountains are high and the valleys are deep, and the terrain is dangerous. It is difficult for troops to move when they leave the road.According to road conditions, the Tibetan army in Qamdo area is more likely to flee west along the North and Middle Roads.Based on this, it is suggested that the campaign should implement the policy of combining north-south response, frontal containment (offensive) and great detour. The specific opinion is: use the 157th Regiment of the 53rd Division stationed in Ba'an (now Batang) to cross the river first, threaten Ningjing (now Mangkang), and induce the main force of Qamdo Tibetan Army to go south for reinforcements, and make them trapped in deep mountains and valleys; The main force of the 52nd Division will cross the river from Dengke, go straight to Leiwuqi and Enda, and cut off the passage for the Tibetan army to retreat westward from the northern line; In Qamdo, when the main force of the Tibetan army going south for reinforcements discovers our army's intention, it will be too late, and I can accept the effect of the north-south pincer attack. The Army Front Finger, led by Wang Qimei, the deputy political commissar of the army, and Li Jue, the second chief of staff, entered Ganzi on July 24.The chief of the former finger and I have studied the campaign plan many times together. On September 5, Commander Zhang Guohua arrived in Ganzi. He conveyed Chairman Mao's request that the 18th Army occupy Qamdo in October, so as to urge the Tibetan authorities to send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate at an early date and strive to march to Lhasa to liberate the whole of Tibet next year. He also conveyed The "Basic Order of the Qamdo Campaign" issued by the Southwest Military Region on August 26. The division secretary reported to Commander Zhang the basic situation of the advance detachment since it entered Ganzi and its opinions on the implementation of the military region and military campaign plans.Comrade Zhang Guohua, accompanied by Comrade Li Jue, inspected the preparations of the troops. He also visited some influential upper-level people, consulted their opinions on our army's entry into Tibet, and learned about their ability to support our army.Comrade Zhang Guohua is most worried about the logistics and transportation capabilities of the 52nd Division Headquarters.When Yulong Datou Xia Ke Daodeng and others assured him that 30,000 yaks could be mobilized immediately to take up the main task of transporting to Qamdo, he made the final decision to fight. On September 15, the army pointed out that a combat meeting was held in Ganzi.Aiming at the characteristics of the Tibetan army’s deployment along the Jinsha River with Qamdo as the hub, according to the Southwest Bureau’s proposal submitted to the Central Committee for approval, “In terms of campaign organization, use our main force to use the right wing (north), detour to the west of Qamdo, and force the enemy to attack.” According to the principle of gathering troops in Qamdo and annihilating them", Commander Zhang announced: Our army adopts a combination of frontal attack and large roundabout tactics; the basic battle is arranged into two combat groups, the north and the south, and the main forces are concentrated on the northern front.The Northern Front Group is composed of the 52nd Division, the Army Direct Artillery Battalion, the Engineer Battalion, the 54th Division Artillery Company, and the Qinghai Cavalry Detachment that entered Yushu from Xining in late July, all under the command of the 52nd Division. The northern line group is configured from the left, the middle, and the right: the right is the 154th regiment and the Qinghai cavalry detachment, which are responsible for the detour mission of the campaign.After the start of the battle, the 154th regiment crossed the river from Dengke and followed the cavalry detachment southward, pretending to enter Lhasa via Heihe.After the bag was full, they rushed to Leiwuqi and Enda, cut off the escape route of the Tibetan army to the west, and blocked the east aid of the Qinghai-Tibet army.The middle road is the 52nd Division, the 155th Regiment, the 156th Regiment, and the Army's Artillery Battalion.After the 154th regiment crossed the river in Dengke, went south via Guodui and Shengda, and went straight to Qamdo.On the left side are the Army Direct Reconnaissance Battalion, the Engineer Battalion and the Artillery Company of the 54th Division.After our middle and right troops approached Qamdo and cut off the retreat of the Tibetan army, we cooperated to encircle and wipe out the Qamdo defenders, and used a detour to the south of Qamdo to prevent and annihilate the Tibetan army fleeing south. The Southern Front Group consists of the 157th Regiment of the 53rd Division, the 126th Regiment of the 42nd Division of the Yunnan Fourteenth Army (less than 1 battalion), and the 3rd Battalion of the 125th Regiment.The 157th Regiment of the 53rd Division on the right crossed the river from the south of Ba'an, wiped out the Ningjing Tibetan Army, went straight out of Bangda and Basu, and cut off the southwest retreat of the Qamdo Tibetan Army; the part of the 42nd Division on the left side was dispatched from Deqin and Gongshan on the border of Diankang. Annihilate the Mengong, Bitu, and Yanjing Tibetan troops, and then make a feint attack to the northwest to cooperate with the northern front group. The division party committee conducted a serious study of the combat mission assigned by the head of the army to the 52nd division.The soldiers felt that the mission was glorious and arduous. The key to our mission was to cut off the retreat of the Tibetan army, that is, to occupy Leiwuqi and Enda before the Tibetan army retreated.The journey from Jinsha River to Enda is about 500 kilometers.The biggest problem in carrying out this task is that they have no idea about the terrain and other natural conditions in the area where they are advancing and fighting, and they don't know much about the deployment of the Tibetan army. It is difficult to predict what unexpected situations will happen and disrupt their actions plan.However, they are still full of confidence. This confidence comes from a comprehensive understanding of the quality of the 52nd Division troops, and they believe that any difficulties will not trouble them, a unit with a glorious history.
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