Chapter 129 Methodology master Mao Zedong's usual method of making decisions

In fact, before deciding on peace talks, Mao Zedong had already begun to prepare for strategic adjustments. In late May 1951, it was the fifth battle on the Korean battlefield that was very intense.Mao Zedong made a decision that seemed illogical: Deng Hua, deputy commander of the Volunteer Army who was on the Korean battlefield, Wu Xinquan, commander of the 39th Army, Wen Yucheng, commander of the 40th Army, Wu Ruilin, commander of the 42nd Army, Liu Liu, political commissar of the 38th Army Xi Yuan (army commander Liang Xingchu did not participate due to illness) was called back to report the battle situation.

These few people are all the heads of the first batch of troops who went abroad to fight in North Korea, and they all do hard work. Regardless of the fierce battle, Mao Zedong never did this before calling the commanders of the main force fighting on the Korean battlefield to the rear for discussions, whether it was during the Red Army, the War of Resistance Against Japan, or the War of Liberation.Moreover, this does not conform to Mao Zedong's consistent thinking. Just when the second battle started, MacArthur, the commander of the United Nations Army, also did such things.He put aside the war and didn't care about it, and called the generals to a meeting in Tokyo, Japan, to discuss the war. The generals hated him so much that his teeth were itching—yes, the front is about to collapse, but what kind of meeting is going on in the rear, and when the meeting is over, The day lily is cold.Even tabloid reporters joked, saying "this is the weirdest meeting in the world".

The strategist Mao Zedong did this, what happened to him? The form is similar, but the core is different. In fact, it was Mao Zedong who felt that it was time for a strategic adjustment when the war was fought so far and the situation was unexpected (the third and fourth battles). Strategy is more important than tactics. Ideas are more important than actions. This is exactly the reason why Mao Zedong made such a decision. Adjust strategy, how to adjust? Mao Zedong took out his forte - investigation and research. Without investigation, there is no right to speak—as early as the Red Army era, Mao Zedong criticized those dogmatists in this way.

Method, don't people talk about method? Mao Zedong is a master of methodology. His methods are simple and easy to implement, and often have miraculous effects. There was no way to go to the Korean battlefield in person, so he asked the people on the Korean battlefield to return to China and listen to their reports directly. Although he knew that doing so might affect the war a little. One day at the end of May, after dinner, Wu Ruilin received a call from the office of Nie Rongzhen, the acting chief of staff, saying, "Chairman Mao wants to meet you."When Wu Ruilin heard that he was going to meet Mao Zedong, he was both excited and nervous.

Mao Zedong didn't like politeness and rarely greeted and sent off his subordinates.But when Wu Ruilin arrived, Mao Zedong stood at the door to welcome this great hero. Mao Zedong first asked Wu Ruilin with concern about vomiting blood from exhaustion on the battlefield. Wu Ruilin replied: "When I broke through the 38th parallel, I was sitting on a stretcher and commanding the battle." Wu Ruilin first reported to Mao Zedong his understanding of the war against the U.S. and aiding North Korea, and then talked about the military preparations for entering North Korea. Mao Zedong: After crossing the Yalu River, three infantry divisions, one artillery division, and transport vehicles all passed overnight. The far ones have advanced sixty or seventy miles after crossing the river, and the closest ones have traveled 30 miles. How do you go so fast? What about the bridge?

Wu Ruilin: Before crossing the river, the deputy army commander and I looked at the terrain for three days (look, we also used investigation and research), and finally came up with a strategy. Take a quick walk along the railway line.Walking on the train track, there are many obstacles and walking is slow, so they put wooden planks on the sleepers, flush with the rails, and nailed them with nails. The train passed without any problem, and the infantry's four-way column passed without any problem. How to cross the river?The method is to build bridges underwater.Instead of taking the Yalu River Bridge to cross the river, they used stone slabs to pave the underwater bridge in the shallow area of ​​the river.Roads were urgently built on both sides of the bridge head, and the disguise was so invisible that vehicles and horses passed through the underwater bridge, which could even prevent air raids.

Mao Zedong: No matter how fierce the battle is, you always maintain a complete regiment of 2,000 people. Why is that? Wu Ruilin: The first is to defend against the enemy's airborne landing, the second is to defend against the enemy's sneak attack from the sea, and the third is to make up for leaks. Mao Zedong: Reserve team, good. Mao Zedong: Your army alone is carrying out tasks on the Eastern Front. The task is very heavy. You also suggested that an echelon division be left to guard Myohyang Mountain south of Xichuan. Why is that? Wu Ruilin said: That is a node, and key areas must be defended.Mao Zedong was very happy to hear that.

The superiors were most afraid of the disobedience of the subordinates and asked their subordinates to obey, while Mao Zedong talked about another "high theory". Mao Zedong: The Art of War states that "the general is outside, and the emperor's order is not subject to it."When you are on site, you can make immediate decisions on issues that pose a global threat and issues of strategic significance, and report while implementing them. You don’t have to wait for approval before implementing them. This is very correct!I have always advocated that commanders make practical decisions based on actual conditions.

Mao Zedong: I heard that the commanders of the Korean People's Army who came back from the enemy-occupied area all wanted to talk to you Wu Ruilin. What's the matter? Wu Ruilin: That's because I have known many cadres for a long time, and they want to ask me to learn about the situation of the volunteer army.According to President Peng's instructions, I talked with more than 30 division-level cadres and four military-level cadres.Among these people were three groups of people I knew at three different times, and they all knew me or knew me.The first batch was in 1945. We had just moved from Shandong to Andong in the northeast to recruit students to run a military academy. Comrade Xiao Hua asked me to serve as the principal concurrently. More than 1,600 people were recruited, including more than 600 North Korean students.When Comrade Kim Il Sung passed through Andong on his way back home, he asked these people to go back.The second batch was formed after we arrived in the Northeast, with a team of Korean ethnicity, led by Li Hongguang, with more than 6,000 people.This unit is fully armed and capable of fighting. Later, Comrade Kim Il Sung will reorganize this unit into the 5th Army Corps.The third group was the Central Military Commission who gathered Korean comrades from various field armies to reorganize into a reinforced division. The commander of the four fields handed it over to me. This division consisted of four infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and one technical battalion.I've spoken to them a few times, so most of them know me.

Then, Mao Zedong and Wu Ruilin discussed the difficulty of the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea. Wu Ruilin said that sometimes ammunition, clothes, and food were not available, so he mobilized soldiers to make straw sandals and cotton socks by themselves, supplementing themselves with captured goods, so as to maintain their combat effectiveness. Mao Zedong expressed his views on the circumstances under which he dared to take risks. Wu Ruilin said that interspersed with Chengchuan was a dangerous move that he was forced to take, but it was actually dangerous. Mao Zedong: It was a little risky, but this action not only shook the enemy on the Qingchuan River, but also shook the enemy in Pyongyang, causing the enemy to collapse across the board and flee to the 38th parallel, thus completely breaking MacArthur’s Christmas in Yalu River drinking horses dream.Therefore, when conditions permit, risk-taking can also play a decisive role.When I was in northern Shaanxi, the whole party and the army were very worried. I sent a telegram to ask, and I called back and said, "It's as stable as Mount Tai, don't worry!"

Wu Ruilin: The 42nd Army and the 66th Army broke through the 38th parallel and set the main attack direction on Tianxian Daocheng Xian.Daochengxian is a narrow path with steep rocks up and down. The three divisions and the army headquarters have to pass this path, and it is extremely difficult to climb up from the ice.But the enemy here also ignores it, the fortifications are weak, there are no barbed wire mines, no fortifications, only a gun tower was built at the mountain pass, and it is the joint defense of the enemy's two divisions, and the enemy is very paralyzed.The scouts observed the enemy's gun tower for more than two hours twice, but the enemy never found it. Before the war, the assault troops trained on ice roads to climb snow-capped mountains and ice slopes. They prepared chaff, and each person took a bag of chaff and sprinkled it while walking to pave the road and prevent slipping.In case Daochengxian fails to break through, there are still three divisions that can attack in the area 15 miles away from the main attack point. Mao Zedong: Good!Your preparations are meticulous.The enemy thinks that I have no planes, boasted, and was completely smashed by you. Finally, Mao Zedong mentioned that the strategic thinking of active defense must be correctly understood and implemented. In the future, on the battlefield of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the policy of "zero knocking on brown sugar" will be adopted to carry out wars of killing and attrition. Wu Ruilin: From the strategic point of view of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, we were on the defensive, and the guiding ideology of campaigns and tactics was active defense, not passive defense.Major counterattacks, such as counterattacks against Hengcheng, Pingli, and Yuanzhou, and small counterattacks, in our army's nearly 70-mile frontal defense line, occur almost every day.We eat the enemy and leave in one bite, and attack the enemy in several places overnight. This is our tactic for killing and injuring the enemy.Adopting active defense and killing tactics, if our army suffers one casualty, the enemy will pay the price of three to four people. Mao Zedong: Good!What I think is the tactics of killing and consuming the enemy! Wu Ruilin: This was also forced out by the enemy. Mao Zedong: The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was forced by the Americans! This meeting lasted more than three hours in total. Having the opportunity to discuss war with Mao Zedong for more than three hours has become the pride of Wu Ruilin's life.