Chapter 28 1. Fully prepare for a major counterattack

After the "three visits to the south of the Yangtze River" and "four guarantees for Linjiang", the offensive momentum of the Kuomintang army has been contained.In more than two months, no major actions have been taken.Due to the vigorous strengthening of the construction of base areas, the achievements of our army have gradually emerged. The logistics support has been greatly improved, and we have got rid of the predicament when we first arrived in the Northeast.Judging from the overall situation, our army has gradually changed from passive to active.However, there is still a long way to go before launching a full-scale counter-offensive against the enemy.This is because:

(1) The current strength of our army is about 460,000 (statistics in mid-May 1947), of which the main force is 15 divisions in 5 columns, plus 11 independent divisions, totaling 240,000 people, and there are also local armed forces 220,000 people.The Kuomintang army's regular troops in the Northeast have 7 armies, a total of 23 divisions, 460,000 people including special forces and directly affiliated troops, and 120,000 local armed forces, a total of 580,000 people. In terms of military strength, our army is still weaker than Nationalist Army. (2) Our army is divided into two regions, South Manchuria and North Manchuria, each with limited space.

Although they can respond to each other, it is not easy to concentrate forces to organize large-scale campaign operations.However, the enemy is just in the middle of the two large areas of our army, and it is more convenient to mobilize and use than our army. (3) The enemy occupies the main communication lines and more than 70 cities, and they are connected together, which is more advantageous than us in controlling the entire situation. (4) The enemy is still much stronger than us in terms of weapons and equipment. Although our army has established artillery at this time, there are only 10 artillery regiments, which are not enough for fighting tough battles.

Therefore, although we can embark on the road of a comprehensive counter-offensive, there is still a long way to go, and we still have to make great efforts.This requires our army to form a powerful iron fist in a short period of time. If you don't fight, you can do it. Once you hit it, you can smash Du Yuming to pieces. The "Four Guarantees Linjiang" had just ended. On April 8, 1947, Lin Biao said in a telegram to the Nanman Score Bureau: "The situation of dividing troops between the north and the south formed by two fists in the Northeast formed by objective conditions should be changed. In order to form a concentrated battle based on big fists. It is estimated that sometimes several enemy divisions can be wiped out at a time, and the enemies in many secondary cities will retreat without fighting, or they will be defeated one by one by us."

In order to achieve the above goals, Lin Biao held two important meetings.The first time was in mid-to-late April, when he held a meeting of cadres above the division level in Shuangcheng, the frontline command headquarters, to discuss combat techniques, especially how to truly concentrate troops to attack fortified positions and how to use the "one point, two sides" tactic. "One point, two sides" is Lin Biao's vivid interpretation of the basic tactics of the troops when they attack, and it is also his basic requirement for the commanders and fighters of the troops at all levels.In the troops under his command, the "one point, two sides" tactics must be conscientiously implemented.What is "one point and two sides"?The following is Lin Biao's own elaboration in a telegram:

The so-called one point is to choose the weakest point of the enemy, concentrate the main force on this point, and only use a small number of troops to assist other aspects.In short, the force cannot be used equally.The so-called two sides mean that the commando and restraint teams should not be used on the front side.Usually, the commando team should be used on the enemy's side, and the clamping team should be used on the enemy's front.If you only attack from the front, the enemy will have no worries and will resist tenaciously.And after being defeated, he can run away and is not easy to eliminate.For the above two, cadres above the platoon should adopt them regardless of whether they are attacking large targets or small targets.

This tactic seems simple, but many people often make mistakes on the battlefield and cannot do it.Therefore, Lin Biao often talked about this "one point and two sides" repeatedly on various occasions. The second meeting was the Northeast Bureau Work Conference held in early May.The meeting comprehensively discussed the overall situation in Northeast China and future work. On May 5, the "Resolution on the Current Situation and Responsibility in Northeast China" was passed. Important resolutions are generally referred to simply as the "May 5th Resolution".The resolution pointed out that after more than a year of arduous struggle by the military and civilians in the Northeast, the base area has been established, the rear has been basically consolidated, the position in South Manchuria has been stabilized, the thinking within the party and the army has been unified, and the tasks stipulated in the "July 7 Resolution" have been completed. Victory done.On the battlefield, I have wiped out nine and a half of the 21 divisions of the 7 regular armies that Jiang Jun entered the northeast, and I have wiped out a regiment of every division of Jiang Jun's ace new army.In this way, Jiang Jun had to switch from active offense in 1946 to passive defense. "This puts forward a new task in front of the entire Northeast Party, which is to actively organize forces, prepare for a major counter-offensive, wipe out a large number of enemies, recover a large number of lost areas, and consolidate and expand the liberated areas."

The task is very clear, which is to "prepare for a major counter-offensive with all our strength." This decision is synchronized with the development of the national situation and the unified deployment of the Party Central Committee.Although Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were still commanding the battle to defend the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area on the northwest battlefield in northern Shaanxi at this time, if we make a far-sighted deployment from the overall situation, we can already grasp the pulse of the times, and we can already shift from strategic defense to defense against the Kuomintang army. The strategy counterattacked.Just when the "May 5th Resolution" was formed, our Xinhua News Agency published an editorial titled "All-out preparation for a major counter-offensive" on May 1, clearly declaring to the world: "Our mission is: mobilize all forces and fully prepare Great counter-offensive.” Mao Zedong not only gave specific instructions on strategic principles and tactical arrangements for turning into a major counter-offensive in various instructions to various battlefields across the country, but also carefully considered some very specific issues. .For example, on March 26, 1947, he specially sent a telegram to Lin Biao and Gao Gang, instructing that from now on, the Northeast should no longer break the road, but should protect the road, because "the near future will be all for my use, otherwise It will be extremely difficult to fix in the future." On May 20, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Lin Biao and Gao Gang again, asking them to consider resolving Jehol and East Jidong after resolving the South Manchurian issue, because this was "for the future to seize the two roads of Changchun and Beining, and the two routes of Changchun, Shenyang, Beiping, and Tianjin. essential condition".Mao Zedong also said in this telegram: "Looking at the overall situation, most areas have shifted to counter-offensive operations a few days ago. We only need to wait for one or two more victories in Shandong before we can switch to a full-scale counter-offensive."

In order to meet the needs of the development of the revolutionary situation in the Northeast, strengthen the party's centralized and unified leadership of various tasks, and implement a clear division of labor between the party, the government, and the army, the Northeast Bureau made the following adjustments to the leadership of the Northeast in late May with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: (1) Expand the membership of the Northeast Bureau from the original 20 (that is, 20 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Northeast) to 26 members, with Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Gao Gang, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, and Lin Feng as the Standing Committee; With Lin Biao as the secretary, Luo Ronghuan, Gao Gang, and Chen Yun as the deputy secretaries, and Gao Gang as the secretary-general.

(2) In order to strengthen the Party's leadership over military work, the Northeast Branch of the Central Military Commission was established, with Lin Biao as the chairman, Luo Ronghuan as the vice-chairman, and Gao Gang, Tan Zheng, Liu Yalou, Xiao Jinguang, and Cheng Zihua as members. (3) In order to strengthen the Party's leadership over the government organs, the Northeast Administrative Committee Party Committee was established. The Northeast Administrative Committee was chaired by Lin Feng, the vice-chairmen were Zhang Xuesi and Gao Chongmin, and the administrative committee party committee was concurrently secretary.

In order to fully prepare for the big counteroffensive, the military and civilians in the Northeast have done a lot of hard work.