Chapter 239 2. East China Field Army’s Autumn Combat Plan

Before receiving instructions from the Central Military Commission, the main force of the East China Field Army was gathering in the Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu areas to rest and prepare for a new offensive after the rainy season.Su Yu and others considered that the internal and external corps of the East China Field Army had not yet fully joined forces, and it was difficult to complete the combat mission of capturing Jinan and sending reinforcements only with the existing strength of the Shandong corps.If the field army's internal and external corps would merge and rest for a period of time, and then the whole army would join forces to attack Jinan, the situation would be quite different.

On July 16, Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, and Zhang Zhen jointly called the Central Military Commission.The telegram said: With the current strength of the Xu Tan Shandong Corps, it is difficult to balance Jinan's attack and reinforcements.If Xu Tan were to attack Jinan exclusively, although the strength of the troops was sufficient, it would take a long time; if the two corps of Qiu Qingquan and Huang Botao came to the north at the same time, then Xu Tan would be dedicated to attacking Jinan, but he also felt that the troops were not enough. "It is suggested that Xu Tan and us buy time to rest for a month, and then join forces to attack Jinan and send aid at the same time." "As long as Jinan can solve the attack and win the aid, the battle may move south quickly. The plan to capture Xuzhou this winter seems to be very great. possible". (Report to the Military Commission by Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, and Zhang Zhen: "According to the current situation, it is recommended that the whole army take a rest for one month before attacking Jinan together", July 16, 1948)

On July 23, the Central Military Commission replied by telegram agreeing with the suggestion of Su Yu and others that the whole army should rest for a month, and then depending on the situation, fight a few battles in the north and south of the Longhai line, and then Zhang proposed a plan according to the situation and unified command. (Instructions from the Central Military Commission to Xu Tan, Bingsu, Chen, Tang and Zhang: "The whole army rests for a month, and then captures Jinan or fights on the Longhai line first depending on the situation", July 23, 1948) Attack Jinan, or attack Jinan first and send aid, by Su, Chen, Tang, According to the above instructions of the Central Military Commission, Su Yu, Chen Shiju, Tang Liang, and Zhang Zhen carefully studied all aspects of the theater and decided to concentrate the entire East China Field Army after the rainy season (including Xu Tan and Wei Ji Corps, a total of more than 300,000 people) , or capture Jinan first, or transfer to the outside line for large-scale annihilation, and drew up three plans for the East China Field Army's autumn operations ("Su, Chen, Tang, Zhang, Zhongxiang Military Commission, East China Bureau, Central Plains Bureau report, And report to the Shandong Corps and the North Jiangsu Corps", August 10, 1948):

1. Concentrate all efforts to fight in Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and Huaibei Road East, cut off the Xubang Railway, isolate Xuzhou, focus on fighting aid, and strive to first annihilate the 5th Army during the campaign, and then expand the results of the battle. 2. Concentrate the main force to capture Jinan first, and only use the necessary forces to stop the enemy who may be aided by the north. "If Jinan is captured in the short term, it will have a positive impact on the national war situation and political situation, and will create a more favorable strategic situation in the next step, and liberate the Shandong Corps so that they can move to the outer line with all their strength. But the disadvantage is that Jinan defends the enemy's strength. There are already a considerable number of them, and they have been fortified for a long time. I am afraid that it will not be possible to capture them in the short term (it is estimated to take about 20 days), and it will be very difficult for the troops to block the reinforcements. If the reinforcements cannot be stopped, there is a possibility of a stalemate." 3. The capture of Jinan and the reinforcements at the same time Carry out, coordinate and use troops in a focused manner.The telegram said: "We have studied the above three cases in detail and believe that the implementation of the third case is the best."

On August 12, Mao Zedong replied to Su Chen, Tang and Zhang and told Xu Tan: "We are considering the three proposals you proposed, and we will formally reply to you after you Xu Wangtan discusses with you and puts forward more realistic opinions. Now We only put forward some preliminary impressions as reference materials for your discussions." The telegram agreed to attack aid and aid, and predicted three possible outcomes: 1. Fight a huge war of annihilation, not only conquering Jinan, but also annihilating 5 2. Fight a big but not huge war of annihilation, conquer Jinan, and wipe out some of the reinforcements; 3. Jinan has not been conquered, and reinforcements are not easy to fight. A stalemate has been formed, so we have to find another fighter .

Mao Zedong emphasized: "The purpose of your third plan is to strive for the first result. Its weakness is that it only occupies the airport with two columns, and neither really fights against Jinan. If you concentrate 11 columns to fight for aid, then the aid to the enemy must be carefully assembled. Slowly advancing, not real aid. The reason why the Qiu District Corps really aided Kaifeng was because we really opened Feng. The enemy clearly knew that we were blocking aid, not fighting aid, so we arrived in Kaifeng in ten days. If your plan this time is not If we really want to attack Jinan, but focus on aid, then after the district corps are wiped out and the Qiu and Huang corps are severely damaged, the aid will inevitably adopt (will not not adopt) this method of prudent assembly and slow advance. At that time, Our army is bound to change the plan midway and focus on the real fight against Jinan. Although there is nothing very bad about changing the plan midway, it loses part of the time and allows the enemy to advance a certain distance, which may be unfavorable to the battle situation Influence.” (Volume Four of Mao Zedong’s Military Works)

In this telegram, Mao Zedong clarified the strategic decision of "attacking aid and aid" in a far-sighted manner.For Commander Huaye, the most important thing at present is to establish confidence in capturing Jinan.Our army already possesses the combat capability to attack fortified cities, but it is more cost-effective than annihilating the enemy in motion because of heavy casualties and high consumption.Therefore, when the commander makes up his mind, he always worries that he will not be able to attack the fortifications, and he will be flanked by the reinforcements, and he will be passive and have to withdraw from the battle.The lessons of the Nanma and Linqu battles are still fresh in his memory, so it is natural for Su Yu to take a cautious attitude in attacking aid and aid.At this time, Mao Zedong encouraged Huaye to dare to attack the fortifications and really fight Jinan, which greatly promoted the confidence of Huaye commanders.