Chapter 148 Chapter 17 Battle of Menglianggu: Brilliant Achievements

On May 3, 1947, Su Yu commanded 4 columns to besiege Xintai, preparing to attack the 11th division. Because Wang Jingjiu's corps came to help quickly, our army could not win a quick battle, so we took the initiative to withdraw from the siege.Thus ended the Battle of Temun. In order to find a suitable fighter, Chen Yi and Su Yu asked the Central Military Commission for instructions on May 3: The enemy in Central Shandong is concentrated and it is difficult to fight. They are going to divide the troops so that the 1st and 6th columns will enter the enemy's rear in southern Shandong, and the 7th column will enter the enemy's rear in northern Jiangsu. Scatter the enemy's key offensive forces.

At this critical moment, Mao Zedong showed a far-sighted strategic vision. On May 4th and 6th, the Central Military Commission issued instructions one after another, requesting the East China Field Army: "The enemy army is densely packed and it is difficult to fight. It is patient and waiting, and the disposal is very appropriate. As long as you are patient, there is always a chance to wipe out the enemy. Move your rear to Jiaodong and Bohai Sea It is not too late to let the enemy occupy Laiwu, Yishui, and Juxian in the vast areas south of the Jiaoji Line and the Jiaoji Line, and then annihilate them. The first thing is to have great patience; Second, we must master the maximum force; third, do not alert the enemy's rear too early." ("Mao Zedong Military Collection" Volume 4, p. 52) "In the current situation, the enemy should be in a hurry, but our side should not. Tuo Si taught us that it is especially inappropriate to divide the troops. Not only should the 1.6 and 2 verticals not be separated prematurely, but the 7th vertical should also stay in the coastal area for about a month as a restraint, and then go south after a month depending on the situation. In two months, you divide by 7 and you are located outside Binhai. The rest should be concentrated in the Laiwu and Yishui areas for rest and standby, waiting for the enemy to advance or other changes, and then take the opportunity to attack. First, don't be impatient. Second, don't divide your troops. As long as the main force is in the There is always a chance of destroying the enemy. In any action, we should not only estimate one possibility, but two possibilities. For example, mobilizing the enemy may or may not be mobilized, most of them may be mobilized, or only a small amount may be mobilized. The Ministry was mobilized. Whenever the situation is uncertain, our main force should be located in a place that can cope with the two possibilities."

After introducing the experience of the Northwest Liberation Army in annihilating the southern part of Hu Zong in northern Shaanxi, the Central Military Commission emphasized: "The difference is that the Shandong area is narrow, and your troops are very large, and it is not easy to move around. You should adapt to local conditions and everything depends on the situation." ("Mao Zedong" Military Anthology, Volume 4, Pages 58-59) These two telegrams are important manifestations of Mao Zedong's military thought. Based on this, the East China Field Army re-determined: the main force of the field army took a step back, gathered in the areas east of Laiwu, Xintai, and Mengyin, let go of the front, and let the Kuomintang army advance boldly so as to create fighter opportunities and wait for annihilation; the 1st and 7th columns suspended their southward march , so as not to disperse its forces and alarm the enemy prematurely; the 6th column, which has already moved south, is hiding in southern Shandong and is waiting to cooperate with the main force.

Huaye's patient waiting finally changed the enemy's situation. After the Kuomintang troops on the southern and western fronts met in Xintai and Mengyin, the main force of our army could not be seen. Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng believed that our army was "exhausted from the offensive" and had already retreated to Zichuan, Nanma, Tanbu and other places.So Tang Enbo's 1st Corps was ordered to attack the Tanbu area on a large scale. Tang Enbo issued an order on the afternoon of May 10: "The main force of the communist army retreats to occupy Juxian, Yishui, Tanbu, Zibo and other areas", "The national army will follow and suppress, and enter and leave Juxian, Yishui, Yuezhuang, and Zibo line".Use the 1st Corps to occupy the front line of Tanbu and Yishui; use the 2nd Corps to attack Boshan and Zhangzhuang; use the 3rd Corps to gather in Xintai and Mengyin areas, and cooperate with the 1st and 2nd Corps after the offensive succeeds Develop an offensive eastward in an attempt to encircle and annihilate the East China Field Army in the Luzhong mountainous area.The Central News Agency also issued a telegram declaring: "Northern National Army entered the area around Yanxiang Pass, Mengyin Fortress on the morning of the 9th, and will soon launch a decisive war of annihilation against the main force of the Communist Army concentrated in Laiwu." (Central Daily, May 10, 1947 )

At this time, Tang Enbo, the commander of the 1st Corps, who was in charge of the right attack, even forgot what he had done, and changed the tactics of densely approaching, steady and steady, and gradual advancement. The reorganized 25th and 83rd divisions cooperated on the left and right wings, and marched northward from the east and west areas of Duozhuang in the southeast of Mengyin on the 11th, limiting the "Wenri (12th) attack on Tanbu" in an attempt to take the opportunity to occupy the road from Yishui to Mengyin ; Use the main force of the 7th Army and the Reorganized 48th Division that have been placed under the command of the Corps to advance from the Tangtou and Gegou areas to Yishui to cover the right wing of the Reorganized 74th Division; the Reorganized 65th Division is located in Mengyin, waiting to move eastward .

The enemy fighter that Huaye had been waiting for finally appeared.