Chapter 147 7. Inventory

In the Battle of Taimeng, the East China Field Army annihilated the headquarters of the 72nd Division, the 34th Brigade, the 13th Brigade, a part of the 15th Brigade, the 83rd Division and 1 and a half regiments of the 83rd Division, and the 10th Division. The regiment (2 battalions), captured 14,000 Kuomintang troops, killed and wounded 10,000 Kuomintang troops, a total of 24,000 people.A total of 4 howitzers, 5 anti-war guns, 28 mortars, more than 530 machine guns, 5,600 long and short guns, more than 200 grenades, 3 flamethrowers, more than 500,000 rounds of various ammunition, and more than 20 vehicles were seized. vehicles, shot down 1 aircraft, and recovered 10 counties including Tai'an and Ningyang, as well as vast areas in western Shandong.The East China Field Army suffered 3,000 casualties.

In the Battle of Taimeng, the East China Field Army annihilated the main force of the 72nd Division reorganized by the Kuomintang Army, disrupted the deployment of the Kuomintang Army, and dealt a blow to the key offensive of the Kuomintang Army. Practical experience has proved that in terms of power balance, when the Kuomintang army has an absolute advantage, the East China Field Army can only conscientiously implement the idea of ​​​​mobile warfare. Only by maneuvering with high maneuverability, mobilizing and confusing the Kuomintang army, and creating fighter opportunities can the Kuomintang army be wiped out.After the East China Field Army's attempt to go south was exposed, the head of the field army found that the Tai'an garrison on the flank of the Kuomintang army was isolated. He resolutely marched westward with a part of his troops, and adopted the tactics of attacking fortified positions, and won the victory of eliminating the main force of the 72nd Division of the Kuomintang Army's reorganization. .

The majority of commanders and fighters of the 10th Column of the East China Field Army believed that this was "the correct implementation of Chairman Mao's (strategic) strategy of mobile warfare" ("Materials of the 10th Column's Liberation of the Troops after the Battle of Tai'an - Make Unremitting Efforts to Fight for the Second Step" Victory and Struggle, 1947).During this period, the main lessons learned by the East China Field Army in combat were that they were not patient enough, their campaign intentions were too strong, and their forces were not concentrated enough, which resulted in the failure to realize several combat determinations.

During the Taimeng campaign, which lasted for more than a month, the East China Field Army carried out highly mobile operations in the vast areas of southern and central Shandong, striving to mobilize the enemy, capture fighters, and made many determinations to wipe out the enemy. Except for the main force of the 72nd Division, the rest of the times failed to be realized due to the enemy's new tactics of intensive and steady advancement and the lack of concentration of its own forces.However, this continuous and rapid transfer, sometimes east and sometimes west, sometimes north and south, gathering at different times, attacking and moving at other times, and the Linmeng Highway and the Xintai enemy, first encircled and did not attack, and then actively withdrew the encirclement and retreated, It not only confuses the enemy, making it difficult to judge the intentions and movements of the People's Liberation Army, but also pampers the enemy, making it more arrogant and aggressive, thus creating conditions for the upcoming victory of the Menglianggu Battle.

However, for this battle, the Kuomintang Central News Agency declared on April 30 and May 4: "The Tang Enbo Corps on the south bank of the Niyi River moved forward with overwhelming momentum, and the results were brilliant." , and achieved an unprecedented victory in the north of Qingtuo Temple, and is now attacking the Communist Army with a winning streak." ("Central Daily", May 1st and 5th, 1947) It can be seen that he is extremely arrogant.