Chapter 53 9. Inventory

The Central Soviet Union Campaign lasted from July 13 to August 27. During the 45 consecutive days of combat, the Central China Field Army, with 19 regiments (increased to 22 regiments in August), fought 7 consecutive battles against the superior Kuomintang army. , Annihilated 6 brigades of the Kuomintang army and 5 traffic police brigades, a total of more than 50,000 people, accounting for 2/5 of the total force of the Kuomintang army attacking the Liberated Area in Central Jiangsu.The Central China Field Army suffered a total of 12,000 casualties.More than 12,000 long and short guns, 194 heavy machine guns, 1,193 light machine guns, more than 160 guns of various types, more than 160 grenades, more than 1.6 million bullets, more than 4,600 artillery shells, and a large number of military supplies were seized.

The Sino-Soviet campaign was of great significance.The Yan'an Headquarters spokesman said: "The Kuomintang Army Tang Enbo's attack on Soviet Central has been a disastrous failure. This incident will have a major impact on the future development of the war situation." The victory of the Central China Field Army made Chiang Kai-shek arrogantly declare that "within three weeks The attempt to wipe out the North Jiangsu Communist Army came to naught, and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kuomintang government had to admit that it suffered heavy casualties. The Soviet Central Campaign was the first large-scale battle fought by the Chinese People's Liberation Army after the outbreak of the all-out civil war. It played a role in strategic reconnaissance and enabled the PLA to gain valuable experience in annihilating the enemy inside.

The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong pointed out when reporting the experience of the Suzhong campaign to the entire PLA: "In each battle, concentrate the absolute superiority of troops to fight against one part of the enemy (for example, in the Xuantai battle, 15 regiments were concentrated against 2 enemy regiments, and in the Libao battle, 14 regiments were concentrated. One regiment fought against three enemy regiments), so they were invincible and their morale was very high; they captured a lot, so they were well equipped; they relied on fighting in the liberated areas, so they were supplemented with convenience; coupled with correct command, they were both flexible and brave, so they were able to win great victories. .This experience is a good experience, and I hope that all districts will follow suit.”

When the National Defense Ministry of the Kuomintang government reviewed the lessons learned from the Suzhong campaign, it believed that: "First, the use of troops during the campaign was insufficient, and the main force of the bandits could not be defeated. Afterwards, the defense was dispersed and the bandits were defeated one by one, resulting in heavy losses. Second, the Soviet Union The bandits in the north are very deep, so the bandits are flexible in intelligence and move freely, while our army has a sense of blind combat every day, which often gives the bandits the opportunity to concentrate their forces to attack us."

After the Battle of Suzhong, the Yan'an Headquarters spokesperson said that this victory, together with the breakthrough of the Central Plains and the Battle of Dingtao, "these three victories played an important role in reversing the situation on the southern front in the Liberated Area. Jiang's army must be defeated, and our army must win the situation." It's settled." And said: "The history of General Su Yu is a history of hard struggle for the liberation of the nation and the people. Today, General Su Yu has become the banner of victory for the military and civilians of Jiangsu and Anhui."

Later military historians also spoke highly of the Suzhong Campaign: They believed that the Suzhong Campaign not only fully demonstrated Su Yu's flexible and eclectic use of troops, but also marked the superb tactical command level of our army's senior commanders in the early days of the War of Liberation.It is believed that when the enemy and our troops are four to one, the number of wiped out enemies is half of the total number of enemy troops, which is equivalent to twice the total strength of our army. This is rare in the history of Chinese and foreign wars.